The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  A Spirited Campaign

  None of the candidates openly campaigned for office, but the followers of each were busy, particularly in the middle states. “Never did I witness a more spirited preparation for an election,” said a New Yorker.18 The war was the principal issue in the campaign. Madison’s supporters insisted that the contest was necessary to vindicate the nation’s rights and to uphold its independence. “It is a war of right against lawless aggression,” said a South Carolina campaign document, “of Justice against perfidy and violence.”19 Republicans also argued that the president could not be blamed for setbacks in the field, that it was unfair “to impute to Mr. Madison the failure of every military expedition, or the defection of every military chief.”20 In response to this, the Clintonians accused Madison’s followers of embracing “the British maxim—the king can do no wrong,” and of applying it “to the President in its full force.”21

  The Clintonians sought to win northern support by portraying their candidate as a bold and energetic leader who was friendly to commerce and the navy and in no way tied to France. In pro-war states, Clinton’s followers emphasized that he would shorten the war by prosecuting it more vigorously, while in anti-war states he was portrayed as a man who would achieve this end by negotiating with the British. Friends of the administration were quick to exploit this inconsistency. “In the west,” said one critic, “Mr. Clinton is recommended as a friend of war . . . in the East he is presented as a friend of peace.”22 A character in a contemporary play echoed this sentiment: “He cannot have war and peace at the same time.”23

  The Clintonians claimed that there had been a breakdown in presidential leadership, a charge that some of Madison’s followers privately conceded. According to a New Hampshire War Hawk, “many of the friends of the Administration believe, that the Executive are not disposed to prosecute the war with vigor, provided they can find any hole through which they can creep out, and avoid the contest.”24 Even in Madison’s home state a “horrible spirit of disaffection or distrust” was said to be afoot. “All the misfortunes of our arms,” reported a Virginia Republican, “are here Publicly ascribed to the mismanagement of the Genl Government.”25 Many people wondered whether “Little Jemmy” (who was only 5 feet 4 inches tall) was big enough for the job. “Mr. Madison is wholly unfit for the storms of War,” Henry Clay confided to a friend. “Nature has cast him in too benevolent a mould.”26

  The Republicans sought to counter charges of Madison’s weakness by attacking Clinton’s character. One called him “the modern Cromwell,” a second described him as a “sprig of upstart nobility,” while a third compared him to “Judas Iscariot.”27 The Republicans also tried to discredit Clinton by focusing on his alliance with the Federalists. According to a Philadelphia campaign document, this alliance was “unanswerable evidence, that Mr. Clinton has sacrificed his democratic principles on the altar of his ambition.” “Courting the interest and votes of the Essex Junto,” said another Republican, “ought forever [to] damn him with Democrats.”28

  The means of selecting presidential electors varied from state to state. Half of the states chose their electors by popular vote, while the rest left the decision to the legislature. Before 1848 each state followed its own timetable, and the results drifted in over a two-month period in the fall of 1812. The outcome was by no means certain. According to congressman Samuel Latham Mitchill, November was “a dark and dismal month” in the White House because news of election defeats coupled with military reverses rolled in “Day after day, like the tidings of Job’s disasters.”29

  Federalists Gain Ground

  The voting followed the same sectional pattern as the vote on the declaration of war. Clinton fared best in the North, Madison in the South and West. The outcome hinged on the results in New York and Pennsylvania, the two populous middle Atlantic states. Clinton needed both to win. He had no trouble in New York, winning all of that state’s twenty-nine electoral votes, mainly because of shrewd maneuvering in the legislature by twenty-nine-year-old Martin Van Buren, who henceforth would be known as the “Little Magician.”30 Madison, however, prevailed in Pennsylvania, winning all twenty-five electoral votes and proving again that this state was the “Keystone in the Democratic Arch.”31 The election was “pretty close work,” conceded Richard Rush, “and Pennsylvania, as usual, carries the union on her back.”32 Madison was aided in no small degree by Pennsylvania’s booming prosperity, which was based on military spending and a still robust overseas trade. “Never did the abundant harvests of Pennsylvania find a quicker or a better market,” crowed a Republican campaign document.33 In all, Madison won 128 electoral votes to Clinton’s 89. (By contrast, Madison had defeated Charles Cotesworth Pinckney in 1808 by a margin of 122 to 47.)34

  The Republicans also lost ground in the congressional elections. The proportion of seats they held fell from 75 to 63 percent in the House and from 83 to 78 percent in the Senate. Their losses were particularly heavy in New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.35 The Republicans lost control of several states, too. In 1811 they had won every state except Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware. In 1812 they lost these states as well as Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Maryland. They also lost their majority in the New York assembly and suffered small or moderate losses in almost every other state east of the Appalachian Mountains.36 Although the Republicans remained in charge of the nation’s destinies, their popularity appeared to be waning. The Federalists, on the other hand, had every reason to be pleased. By capitalizing on the mismanagement and unpopularity of the war and by exploiting the gruesome violence at Baltimore, they had achieved their most impressive electoral gains since the 1790s.

  Cabinet Changes

  With the elections safely behind them, Republican leaders urged President Madison to strengthen his cabinet. Secretary of War William Eustis and Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton had long been under fire, and by the end of the year this criticism threatened to engulf the president. “Our executive officers are most incompetent men,” said John C. Calhoun. “We are literally boren down under the effects of errors and mismanagement.” “The clamor against the gentlemen who are at the head of the War and Navy Departments,” said another congressman, “is loud & very general.” If these men are not removed, added a Georgia senator, the president “must be content, with defeat, and disgrace in all his efforts, during the war.”37 Although Madison was reluctant to act, he finally accepted the resignations of both men in December.38

  To replace Hamilton, Madison chose William Jones, a Philadelphia merchant and former congressman who had fought at Trenton and Princeton and served on a privateer during the Revolution.39 Although later discredited for mismanaging the national bank, Jones had considerable ability. With some justice, Madison later claimed that he was “the fittest minister who had ever been charged with the Navy Department.”40 Far more knowledgeable about naval affairs than his predecessor, he was a good administrator who brought energy and efficiency to the department and won the admiration of his contemporaries. “I know of Some,” said Nathaniel Macon in 1814, “who once thought little of his talents, [but] now consider him, the most useful member of the administration.”41

  It was much harder to find a new secretary of war because this office was such an administrative nightmare. “With all its horrors & perils,” said Gallatin, the office “frightens those who know best its difficulties.” Finding a candidate who is “qualified, popular, and willing to accept is extremely difficult.”42 Secretary of State James Monroe agreed to serve temporarily but refused to take the office permanently because he was hoping for a command in the field. Senator William H. Crawford and General Henry Dearborn also declined.43

  The president finally settled on John Armstrong of New York.44 Although knowledgeable about military affairs and a good judge of talent, Armstrong was abrasive and indolent and a known enemy of the Virginia Dynasty. In 1783 he had written the notorious Newburgh Letters inciting the Continental Army to mutiny, and many people c
onsidered this “an indelible stain” upon his character.45 He also had a reputation for intrigue, a reputation that was largely justified.46 Given his liabilities, his confirmation in the Senate was doubtful. “Armstrong will rub hard, if he gets through at all,” said one Republican.47 Although the Senate finally approved him, the vote was 18–15, with both Virginia senators abstaining.48

  The new appointments improved the efficiency of the administration but not without a price. Armstrong lived up to his reputation for intrigue and alienated his colleagues. Monroe saw him as a rival for the presidency and was constantly at odds with him. Monroe finally told Madison that if Armstrong were not removed he would “ruin not you and the admn. only, but the whole republican party and cause.”49 Gallatin also despised him. Armstrong sided with Gallatin’s enemies (particularly in Pennsylvania) and distributed patronage accordingly. The crowning insult came when he awarded an army staff position to William Duane, the editor of the virulently anti-Gallatin Philadelphia Aurora. “The appointment of Duane,” lamented Gallatin, “has appeared to me so gross an outrage on decency and self respect . . . that I felt no wish to remain associated with an administration which would employ such a miscreant.”50 By the summer of 1813, William Jones had lost confidence in Armstrong, too. “Many begin to believe,” he said, “that the ‘Old Soldier’ [Armstrong’s nom de plume] is not a legitimate son of Mars.”51

  The War Congress Meets Again

  On November 2, 1812, about a month before the election results were in and the cabinet shuffling had begun, the Twelfth Congress met for its second and last session. This was the same Congress that had declared war four and a half months earlier. Since House officers are chosen for the life of a Congress, Henry Clay resumed his place as speaker. Once again he filled the key committees with supporters of the war.52 Although a Federalist congressman thought that the advocates of war had “greatly cooled in their zeal,” this was not evident in the proceedings.53

  On November 4 President Madison sent his annual message to Congress.54 He opened on a positive note, reminding Americans of their health and prosperity. “It is my first duty,” he said, “to invite your attention to the providential favors which our country has experienced.” Madison was not exaggerating, for the nation was enjoying a wartime boom fueled by huge government expenditures and a mushrooming trade that included large exports of grain to the Spanish Peninsula and large imports of manufactured goods from the British Empire.55

  The president mentioned the defeats on the northern frontier and the victories at sea. He also contrasted British and American Indian policies. “Whilst the benevolent policy of the United States invariably recommended peace and promoted civilization among that wretched portion of the human race . . . the enemy has not scrupled to call to his aid their ruthless ferocity.” In order to prosecute the war more efficiently, Madison recommended measures to improve the army, upgrade the militia, expand the navy, and restrict trade with the enemy. “The situation of our country,” he concluded, “is not without its difficulties. . . . The spirit and strength of the nation are nevertheless equal to the support of all its rights, and to carry it through all its trials.”56

  Republicans in Congress were receptive to the president’s recommendations, but before they could act, a full-scale debate erupted on the merits of the war. House Federalists had remained silent during the proceedings on the war bill the previous June, refusing to debate the issue in secret session. Now, as one Republican put it, they “embraced [the] opportunity to deliver themselves of their war speeches with which they were pregnant last session.”57 The Republicans responded with lengthy speeches of their own, and for two weeks the debate raged, pushing other business aside. The exchanges focused on the wisdom of the war and the justice of invading Canada and were so long-winded and repetitious that even John Randolph, who was no fan of brevity, conceded that the debate had become “unnecessarily protracted.”58

  The most provocative speech was delivered by Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts. Taking a swipe at Jefferson, Madison, and Swiss-born Albert Gallatin, Quincy said that for twelve years the nation’s affairs had been mismanaged by “two Virginians and a foreigner.” The war policy, he claimed, was designed to further the Virginia Dynasty by insuring that James II (Monroe) succeeded James I (Madison). Those New England Republicans who aided the administration were characterized as “toads, or reptiles, which spread their slime in the drawing room”—language so coarse that Quincy deleted this passage before publishing his speech.59

  Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts (1772–1864) was an outspoken opponent of Republican policies and defender of New England’s interests. In this cartoon, he is lampooned as a secessionist who hoped to become King Josiah the First of New England and Nova Scotia. (Watercolor etching by William Charles. Library of Congress)

  Republicans hotly denied Quincy’s accusations and, according to one War Hawk, “paid him in his own coin, and with use.”60 Not all the speeches were recorded because most were extemporaneous, and a stenographer was not always present to take them down. Stevenson Archer’s speech, which was recorded, was probably typical. The Maryland Republican accused Quincy of “secretly advocating, and insidiously endeavoring to effect, a disunion of the States.” Archer also articulated a view that most Republicans shared, namely, that Federalists could best work for peace by supporting the war. It is the duty of every good citizen, he said, “to aid in the prosecution of the present war, in order that a speedy and honorable peace might be be [sic] obtained.”61

  Congress Adopts an Impressment Bill

  Both sides talked at length about impressment because, with the Orders-in-Council repealed, this was the only major issue that separated the two nations. “There is but one point of difference,” said a Connecticut Federalist. “But that is a point which we well know, or ought to know, that [Great Britain] will not yield until reduced to the last extremity.”62 Republican leaders recognized the importance of impressment, and the administration had already offered to bar all British tars from American ships if Great Britain would give up the practice.63 Although Britain had rejected this proposal, the administration was anxious to publicize it in order to shore up its position at home and abroad. As one Republican put it, we must “define the grounds of contest . . . that we may stand justified in our own eyes, and in the eyes of the world.”64

  Accordingly, Gallatin drew up a bill that embodied the administration’s views. As finally enacted into law, the foreign seaman bill barred from American ships the seamen of any nation that excluded American tars from its ships. The bill also required foreigners seeking American citizenship to reside continuously in the United States for five years. This was designed to force those interested in citizenship to give up seafaring because the British claimed the right to impress anyone born in the British Isles, even those who had become naturalized foreign citizens.65

  The “Impressment Bill” (as contemporaries called it) was attacked by both sides in Congress.66 Some Republicans thought it was humiliating to give legislative sanction to an offer already rejected by the British. John Clopton of Virginia argued that the bill would “greatly lower the dignity of this nation” and would probably be treated by the British with “scorn and contumely.” Joseph Desha thought the measure was tantamount to “begging for peace” and that Americans would be humbling themselves “at the footstool of British corruption.”67 Federalists also distrusted the bill, believing that its main purpose was to undermine opposition to the war. According to Charles Goldsborough of Maryland, the proposal was “a sort of political adventurer, sent out to catch what it may; peace, if it may so happen; if not, what is perhaps more desired—popularity to the war and its authors.”68 Despite these misgivings, a bipartisan coalition pushed the bill through Congress, and Madison signed it into law.69

  Raising Troops and Reforming the Army

  Congress devoted much of its time in this session to debating the larger issues of the war. As valuable as this was for bringing the issues int
o focus, it did little to strengthen American arms in the field, and this, most Republicans agreed, was essential. “We ought not to calculate on peace,” said David R. Williams; “it has become more than ever necessary to prove that we will not only declare war, but can prosecute it with energy and courageous enterprise.” “The next campaign,” echoed George M. Troup, “must be opened with vigor, and prosecuted to success.”70

  The main problem the nation faced was raising troops. Recruitment lagged behind need for a variety of reasons. Army pay was low and army life hard, and Republicans no less than Federalists were reluctant to enlist. “Money usually can command men,” said one Federalist, “but it will take millions to make soldiers of the happy people of this country—nothing short of a little fortune will induce our Farmers or their sons to enter on a life which they cordially despise: that of a common soldier.”71

  The administration made a number of proposals for upgrading the army, and most of these were enacted into law.72 The most important provided for raising an additional 22,000 regulars for one year of service, thus increasing the authorized level of the army to 57,000 men. This bill offered short-term recruits a bounty of $16 and was designed to replace the volunteer act of 1812, which had failed because it offered no bounty at all. Proponents of the new bill argued that the short enlistment period would attract recruits, while opponents claimed that the term was too short to allow for sufficient training. The bill probably would have been defeated had not Federalists chosen this occasion to deliver most of their speeches against the war.73 This transformed the vote on the troop bill into a vote of confidence on the war. According to William Lowndes, “there were not half a dozen men who approved [the bill]. . . . The vote was by many considered a vote of approbation to the war.”74