The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  Congress also tried to spur enlistments by raising army pay. Privates earned only $5 a month, which was less than half what most unskilled laborers made.75 To lessen the gap, Congress boosted army pay to $8. This also had the effect of increasing the bounty for long-term recruits, which was set at $16 plus three months’ pay and 160 acres of land. Under the revised pay schedule, new recruits would receive a cash bounty of $40 instead of $31. On top of this, Congress ordered the army to give all long-term recruits three months’ advance pay, which would put an additional $24 into their pockets. Congress also increased the number of officers in each regiment (so that more could concentrate on recruiting) and authorized long-term recruits to sign up for the duration of the war instead of the usual five years.76

  Congress also prohibited the arrest of any soldier for debt.77 Although Federalists claimed that this measure was unconstitutional, Ezekiel Bacon of Massachusetts argued that it was necessary to prevent fraud. Some soldiers, he said, created fictitious debts, were arrested, and then released when a friend or relative promised to serve as their bail. These soldiers could not be reclaimed by the army because the courts considered a man the property of his bail until the suit was settled—which could take years.78

  The practice that Bacon complained of continued even after Congress had legislated against it. In Massachusetts, Judge Joseph Story complained that “the service has suffered exceedingly from fraudulent arrests,” and there was nothing he could do about it. “The Courts of the United States are expressly prohibited from issuing a writ of habeas corpus, except in certain specified cases, and this is not within the exception.”79 An army officer reported that soldiers continued to be arrested for debt in Connecticut, too. “No regard is paid, here,” he said, “to the laws or authority of the United States.”80

  Congress added several measures to improve the efficiency of the army. The number of staff officers was increased, and some of these were assigned to armies in the field. In addition, to keep better track of supplies, Congress created a superintendent general of military stores and ordered all supply officers to make quarterly reports.81 Finally, the secretary of war was ordered to draw up a new code of regulations defining the respective duties of the different departments in the army. Armstrong responded to this charge with unaccustomed alacrity. The result was “Rules and Regulations of the Army of the United States,” published on May 1, 1813. This manual was so well conceived and so clearly drawn that it governed army organization and procedure for years to come.82

  Although the administration got most of the army legislation it wanted, Congress denied two requests. The War Department sought authority to enlist minors eighteen years or older without the consent of parent, master, or guardian, but Federalists denounced the proposal, claiming that it would violate parental right and contract law and undermine the apprentice system.83 If the war were as popular as Republicans claimed, said Laban Wheaton of Massachusetts, it would not be necessary “to call to their aid . . . boys without discretion.”84 The Senate was sympathetic to these arguments and killed the proposal.85 The administration also lobbied for a bill to arm and classify the militia—a measure long advocated by southerners. In the past, schemes of this sort had been defeated by a bipartisan coalition of northerners in the House. This time the House approved the plan, but it died in the Senate.86

  Naval Expansion and Privateering

  Congress also endorsed naval expansion. “Our brilliant naval victories,” said an army officer, “have contributed to place that description of force in a proper point of View.”87 In the flush of excitement generated by the American victories, even President Madison had come out for naval expansion.88 The remaining opposition in Congress was deflated by two grand naval balls, one of which was held on board the U.S. Frigate Constellation and attended by the president and his cabinet.89 Congress subsequently authorized the construction of four ships-of-the-line (rated at 74 guns), six heavy frigates (rated at 44 guns), six sloops, and an unspecified number of vessels for service on the northern lakes.90 This legislation—a fundamental reversal in Republican policy—committed the nation to a large-scale, long-term construction program.

  As usual, Federalists were virtually unanimous in support of naval expansion. In fact, so enthusiastic were they that James Milnor of Pennsylvania suggested that Congress authorize a special naval loan so that opponents of the war could contribute to maritime defense. Republicans, however, voted down this proposal, claiming that the war must be prosecuted as a whole.91 The various interests in the country, said Langdon Cheves, “should be all freighted in the same bark . . . and they should all float or go down together.”92

  Besides endorsing naval expansion, Congress sought to foster privateering. Merchants from New York and Baltimore had appealed to the government to reduce the duties on prize goods, which (counting all the fees) usually amounted to 30 or 40 percent of their value.93 Gallatin was opposed to any reduction, claiming that it would cost the government money without stimulating privateering.94 Congress accepted Gallatin’s logic and sought instead to promote privateering by expediting the sale of prize goods and limiting some of the fees. A pension fund was also established for privateersmen wounded in action. Moreover, to promote the destruction of armed enemy ships by any means—privateers, submarines, mines, or the like—Congress authorized the payment of a bounty equal to half the value of each vessel destroyed.95

  The Debate over British Imports

  Republicans were able to forge a consensus on army and navy legislation, but tax and trade issues continued to divide them. The most pressing trade problem concerned the flood of imports that had arrived illegally from the British Empire after the declaration of war. This problem grew out of the repeal of the Orders-in-Council in June 1812. To American merchants in England, the British action appeared to pave the way for the restoration of normal trade relations because the administration had earlier promised to lift non-importation if the Orders were rescinded. Seeking guidance, a group of merchants had approached Jonathan Russell, the American chargé d’affaires in London. Russell, who was himself a merchant, “thought it his duty to countenance the idea that shipments made after the revocation of the orders, would be admitted into the United States.”96

  Accordingly, those merchants who already held British-made goods began to ship them to America, while those who held other forms of capital began to convert their funds into goods. When news of the declaration of war reached England at the end of July, the merchants again asked for Russell’s advice, and again he advised them to send their property home.97 The British government, hoping the repeal of the Orders would put an end to the war, allowed these shipments under special license.98 American merchants in Britain’s colonies responded to the news of war by shipping their property home, too.99

  All of these shipments were made in violation of the non-importation law, and thus every ship and cargo was subject to seizure. As word of the shipments spread, merchants in some American ports began to fit out privateers in the hope of reaping an easy harvest.100 The government, however, ordered American warships and privateers not to interfere with the shipments.101 Instead, the merchandise was seized by customs officials when it arrived in port. By the end of the year, the government had impounded merchandise whose prime value was $18 million but whose actual value in the American market was close to $30 million.102

  The administration sought to keep the goods under government seal, but federal judges working closely with sympathetic customs officials in Baltimore, New York, and New England released some of the merchandise on bond. Gallatin was dismayed by this but decided that (in fairness to merchants elsewhere) the rest of the goods should be released as well. As a result, the government was left holding $18 million in penal bonds.103

  Normally, the administration might have prosecuted for the full value of the bonds, but under the circumstances the merchants seemed entitled to more sympathetic treatment. After considering various alternatives, the administration decided t
o cancel half the value of the bonds and to prosecute for the balance. The secretary of the treasury had authority to pursue this course under a 1797 law, but because of the scope of the problem, the administration decided to seek congressional approval first.104

  The merchants, however, launched a massive campaign to persuade Congress to cancel the penalties altogether. Claiming that their profits had been modest—only 5 or 10 percent above normal—the merchants argued that they could not afford to pay even half the value of the bonds.105 Many congressmen, Federalists and Republicans alike, were sympathetic to their pleas. There was considerable sentiment among commercial Republicans for appeasing the merchants in the hope of winning their support for the war. As William M. Richardson of Massachusetts put it: “The merchants are a powerful class of the community, and ought at this crisis to be conciliated.”106 There was also much resistance to bilking the merchants to finance the war. Privately, William Branch Giles called Gallatin’s plan a “miserable impracticable attempt to plunder merchants,” and Langdon Cheves said that he “would rather see the objects of the war fail . . . than see the long arm of the Treasury indirectly thrust into the pocket of the citizen through the medium of a penal law.”107

  Most Republicans, however, were skeptical of the merchants’ claims. Rumors circulated of enormous profits, and some people thought the merchants could afford to pay the bonds and still make a profit. “In many cases,” Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania claimed, “the profits were immense, three hundred per cent advance, from the hungry demand of an exhausted Market.”108 To most Republicans, the merchants’ bonds offered an irresistible alternative to internal taxes. Richard M. Johnson best summarized this view: “I am unwilling to fix upon [the American people] internal taxation until it become[s] indispensable, nor to permit [the merchants] to monopolize advantages without an equivalent.”109 After much soul-searching, Congress finally sided with the merchants, though the decision in the House was close. The result was the passage of a trio of bills that remitted all fines and forfeitures on the goods in question.110

  The Restrictive System Challenged

  The defeat of Gallatin’s plan for dealing with the illegal imports deprived the government of $9 million in revenue and brought the whole non-importation system into question. There were some Republicans—including Gallatin himself—who wanted to modify the system in order to raise revenue. Accordingly, Cheves reintroduced his bill from the last session to permit the importation of most British goods. To make the bill more palatable to restrictionists, Cheves included provisions that prohibited judges from releasing impounded goods on bond and provided for closer inspection of ships importing certain products traditionally purchased from Britain’s colonies.111

  Cheves pleaded for the passage of this bill, claiming that the disadvantages of non-importation far outweighed the advantages. “It puts out one eye of your enemy,” he said, “but it puts out both your own. It exhausts the purse, it exhausts the spirit, and paralyzes the sword of the nation.”112 Most Republicans, however, were as yet unwilling to give up on economic coercion. Many agreed with a memorial from Baltimore that non-importation was “amongst the most effectual means, which can be used to procure for our Country the blessings of a speedy and honorable peace.”113 Although Federalists did not accept this logic, they too opposed Cheves’s bill because they saw it merely as a device “to put further off the dooms-day of direct taxation.”114 Federalists joined with Republican restrictionists to strike out the heart of the bill. Although the House passed the remnant, it died in the Senate. Thus, the non-importation system remained intact.115

  Republicans were divided over controlling not only imports but also exports. The enemy trade act adopted shortly after the declaration of war should have prevented most trade with the enemy, but American citizens continued to supply British subjects in Canada and the West Indies, British fleets in American waters, and British armies in the Spanish Peninsula. Most of this trade was conducted under British licenses, some 500 of which were issued by British military and civilian authorities in the first two and a half months of the war. Known as “Sidmouths” or “Prince Regents” (after the authority that issued them), these licenses were usually valid for three to six months. They were extremely valuable, not only for protecting the overseas trade but also as a cover for the coasting trade. The licenses were frequently counterfeited and were openly hawked in American cities, sometimes commanding as much as $5,000.116

  The British government was particularly anxious to facilitate trade to the Spanish Peninsula because British armies there were dependent on American provisions. The export of American flour to this region had mushroomed from 105,000 barrels in 1809 to 939,000 barrels in 1812.117 Since this trade was vital to American agriculture, the government was careful not to obstruct it. The enemy trade act did not prohibit the use of British licenses to trade with non-British ports, and the attorney general’s office and the Treasury Department both ruled that American trade with British-occupied Spain and Portugal did not violate the law.118

  President Madison was never very fond of the license trade, but he tolerated it until early 1813, when he learned of a British order directing officials in the West Indies to favor Federalist New England with the licenses.119 Incensed by this policy, Madison sent a special message to Congress accusing the British of adopting “a system equally distinguished by the deformity of its features, and the depravity of its Character.” The British policy, the president said, was an “insulting attempt on the virtue, the honor, the patriotism, and the fidelity of our brethren of the Eastern States.” To spare New England from temptation, Madison asked Congress to outlaw the use of all foreign licenses. He also asked for a ban on all exports in foreign bottoms because he was convinced that most neutral vessels were British ships in disguise.120

  Both presidential recommendations ran into stiff opposition in the Senate. A bill to prohibit the use of foreign licenses passed the House but was postponed indefinitely by the Senate.121 The opposition to non-exportation was even greater. Cheves called non-exportation “a system of self-torture” that would throw the nation “upon the rack of excruciating torment.”122 The House had already rejected two proposals to restrict exports when the president made his recommendation.123 Although a bill was duly introduced to restrict the export of provisions in foreign bottoms, the prohibition was to remain in effect for only four months. Federalists succeeded in making the bill less palatable—and also more fair—by broadening the prohibition to include all exports. The House passed the bill in this form, but the Senate killed it just as it had killed the ban on foreign licenses.124

  Public Finance

  Congress thwarted the administration not only on trade measures but on tax policy as well. Even though the $11 million loan of 1812 had never been filled, Gallatin was able to balance his books at the end of the year by borrowing short-term money and taking advantage of the $5 million tax windfall generated by the British imports.125 Balancing the budget in 1813, however, was likely to be more difficult. In January Gallatin estimated that expenses for the coming year would be $36 million but that revenue would be only $17 million. This would necessitate raising $19 million with loans and treasury notes, a sum that Gallatin considered prohibitive.126 “I think a loan to that amount to be altogether unattainable,” he told the president.127 Hence the imposition of new taxes was more essential than ever.

  Republicans had no objection to authorizing a $16 million loan and $5 million in treasury notes, but they were still reluctant to move on the tax issue.128 A proposal to triple the foreign tonnage duties—from $2 to $6 a ton—failed because it was attached to the bill suspending non-importation.129 The House refused even to consider internal taxes until mid-February, three and a half months into the session. By then most Republicans professed to believe that it was too late to take any action and that the tax windfall from the British imports rendered immediate action unnecessary anyway.130 Even a proposal to hold a special session in May to deal wi
th the tax issue was initially defeated and was salvaged only by intense lobbying outside of Congress.131 Thus when the Twelfth Congress adjourned on March 3, 1813, the imposition of internal taxes still lay in the future. The failure to provide “a system of finance . . . adapted to a state of war,” admonished a Republican paper, was “wholly inexcusable.”132

  Several days after the adjournment of Congress, the Russian minister in Washington transmitted a formal proposal from his government to mediate an end to the war.133 The president accepted this proposal, which necessitated another cabinet change because Gallatin, who had grown weary of Armstrong’s intrigues and the burdens of the Treasury Department, asked to be appointed to the peace commission. Madison complied with Gallatin’s wishes, but rather than permanently lose such a valued member of his official family, he retained Gallatin as nominal head of the Treasury Department, assigning his duties temporarily to Secretary of the Navy William Jones. This arrangement caused the president considerable embarrassment in the Senate, and Gallatin never in fact rejoined the cabinet.134

  The New Congress Meets

  The Thirteenth Congress met for its special session on May 24, 1813. Most congressmen were unaccustomed to Washington’s hot and sticky summers, and there were some complaints. In June Federalist John Lovett of New York claimed that it was “hotter, in this house, than purgatory.” The following month, after meeting in open session for five hours, Lovett reported that “the doors were closed and we were boiled and roasted three hours longer; almost to suffocation.”135 Lovett also complained that it was difficult to sleep because of “the yells and popping [shooting] of our undisciplined Patrols.”136 Doubtless these distractions contributed to the unruliness of the session.