The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  Henry Clay was again elected speaker, and again he packed the key committees with strong war men.137 But the Republican party was in a weaker position than it had been in the last Congress. As a result of the elections of 1812, the Federalists had increased their strength in both houses. “We have . . . a majority of decided friends of the Administration,” said one Republican, “but the opposition have gained considerably in talents.”138 With the Republican majority reduced, this Congress threatened to be more factious than the Twelfth Congress had been.

  Nor was the president able to provide effective leadership. At the beginning of the session, a Republican reported that Madison was in “good health & spirits & temper.”139 Yet three weeks later the president was struck down by a “bilious fever”—an intestinal ailment, perhaps dysentery—which kept him bedridden for five weeks and carried him to the doors of death.140 “His complaint,” said a Republican congressman, “justly excites apprehensions as to the issue.”141 With the president ill and the cabinet divided, it was difficult for the administration to give direction to Congress. “The influence of the president is much less than I supposed,” conceded a first-term Federalist senator. “There seems to be little plan or concert in the management of public affairs.” “Party sperit,” added John C. Calhoun, “is more violent than I ever knew.”142

  Madison’s Appointments Rejected

  President Madison sent his opening address to Congress on May 25. He expressed hope for the Russian mediation proposal, mentioned military and naval developments, and again blasted the British for employing Indian auxiliaries. He also urged Congress to put the nation on a sound financial footing. “This can be best done,” he said, “by a well digested system of internal revenue.”143

  Before Congress could tackle the tax issue, it became embroiled with the president over two of his diplomatic appointments. Shortly after the session began, Madison nominated Jonathan Russell, former chargé d’affaires in Paris and London, to serve as United States minister to Sweden. Some senators suspected Russell of mismanaging his earlier diplomatic assignments, and many questioned whether a full-fledged minister was needed in Sweden. When the president refused to confer with a Senate committee to discuss the matter, the Senate rejected the appointment by a vote of 22–14.144 Russell’s rejection, said a Federalist, “is considered here, as being the most important point which has been carried against the administration for ten years.”145

  Shortly thereafter, the president received another jolt when he asked the Senate to confirm John Quincy Adams, James A. Bayard, and Albert Gallatin for the Russian peace commission. Many senators resented the president’s precipitous decision to dispatch the envoys to Russia without waiting for Senate confirmation. Many also doubted whether the secretary of the navy could handle his own duties as well as those of the Treasury Department.146 Although Adams and Bayard were confirmed by large majorities, there was considerable opposition to Gallatin.147

  Gallatin had long feuded with Republican dissidents in the Senate, and resentment against him had been mounting ever since he had urged internal taxation on the eve of war. His enemies now claimed that “The Rat—in the Treasury” (as the Philadelphia Aurora called him) was deserting the ship of state at a critical time.148 “It is freely imputed to him,” said a Republican senator, “that he fled to avoid the Odium of the System of taxation . . . which he himself asserted necessary.”149 Gallatin’s enemies hoped to take advantage of this resentment to force him from the cabinet. “The scuffle,” said one observer, “is to get Gallatin out of the treasury.”150

  The Senate adopted a resolution declaring that the powers of the secretary of the treasury and those of a diplomatic envoy “are so incompatible, that they ought not to be . . . united, in the same person.”151 When the president refused to budge, the Senate rejected Gallatin’s appointment by a vote of 18 to 17.152 Gallatin had been a presidential confidant and cabinet minister for more than twelve years, and according to one Federalist, his defeat (coming on the heels of Russell’s defeat) was “the rudest shock the president has ever experienced. It was wholly unexpected.”153

  The St. Cloud Decree Challenged

  It was not only the Senate that feuded with the president. There was trouble in the House, too. On June 10, Daniel Webster, a first-term Federalist congressman who was at the beginning of a long and distinguished career, introduced a series of resolutions to secure information on the repeal of the Continental Decrees.154 At issue was the authenticity of the St. Cloud Decree, a mysterious French document dated April 28, 1811, that purportedly repealed the Continental Decrees. The document was not made public until 1812, and everyone knew that it had been backdated by French officials to make it look like the Continental Decrees had been repealed the year before. Federalists were particularly incensed by France’s deception, believing that this kind of trickery had led to the War of 1812. “I declare confidently and boldly,” said Congressman Harmanus Bleecker, “that Napoleon has inveigled us into the war. . . . But for his arts, intrigues, and duplicity, the United States would not now [be] at war with Great Britain.”155 Webster’s resolutions were designed to force the administration to acknowledge French perfidy and to bring into question the repeal of the French decrees and by implication the war itself.

  The resolutions posed a dilemma for Republicans. Adopting them would force the administration to address an issue that it preferred to ignore, while rejecting them might raise charges of a cover-up. Felix Grundy tried to turn the debate against the Federalists by characterizing their opposition to the war as “moral” treason.156 Although Federalists hotly denied this charge, it dogged them for the rest of the war.157 Ultimately all the resolutions were approved by large majorities.158 This forced the administration to admit that it knew nothing of the St. Cloud Decree until it was made public in 1812. Monroe tried to put the best face on matters by delivering a long report justifying the war, but the damage had been done.159

  New Taxes Adopted

  The House and Senate debates over policies and appointments pushed financial matters into the background, but only temporarily. By early March the government was so destitute of funds that Gallatin told the president: “We have hardly money enough to last till the end of the month.”160 Shortly thereafter, the $16 million loan had been opened for subscriptions. Initially there was little response, but the Russian mediation proposal raised hopes for peace, and the entire loan was subsequently filled. Three wealthy merchants—David Parish, Stephen Girard, and John Jacob Astor—took two-thirds of the sum offered, though the Treasury had to accept a 12 percent discount, which meant that it received only $88 in cash for every $100 in bonds.161 Since the loan was 6 percent for thirteen years, this worked out to an effective interest rate of just under 7.5 percent.

  The discount on the loan emphasized the need for more tax money, but Congress still seemed reluctant to act. Although most Republicans conceded the need for additional revenue, no one in Congress wanted to take the lead. “The authors of the war,” said a Virginia Federalist, “approach the subject with fear & trembling.” “Even the most supple courtiers and minions of power,” declared another observer, “fear the loss of their Seats.”162 All were anxious to spare their constituents from as much of the burden as possible, and this threatened the entire program. As John W. Eppes of Virginia put it, “every one is for taxing every body, except himself and his Constituents.”163 Federalists were particularly skeptical of Republican resolve. The internal taxes had been repeatedly postponed, and most Federalists expected them to be put off again.164

  Much to the surprise of their enemies, the Republicans closed ranks and enacted virtually the entire tax program. The new duties were designed to yield $5.5 million.165 They included a direct tax on land, a duty on imported salt, and excise taxes on stills, retailers, auction sales, sugar, carriages, and bank notes and other negotiable paper. All the taxes were to go into effect on the last day of 1813 or the first day of 1814, which showed that Republicans were still de
termined to put off “the dooms-day” of internal taxation as long as possible. The direct tax was levied for a year only, but the other duties were to remain in effect until a year after the end of the war.166

  The most important of the new levies was the direct tax, designed to yield $3 million. Federalists had imposed a $2 million direct tax in 1798 during the Quasi-War, but the method of assessment was so complicated and collection was so difficult that as late as 1812 close to $100,000 was still uncollected, mainly in the South.167 Republicans hoped to avoid this problem by giving discounts of 10 or 15 percent to any state willing to pay its quota directly into the federal Treasury.168 Seven states took advantage of this provision, but the rest declined because they would have to raise their own taxes.169 Federalist states had an additional reason for refusing to assume the direct tax. According to the Rhode Island Assembly, paying the tax “would release the General Government from the odium of collecting a tax which their own mad policy has brought upon the country.”170

  Congressional action on tax legislation came none too soon, for the administration came back to Congress in mid-July with a request to borrow an additional $7.5 million. According to the acting secretary of the treasury, William Jones, this money was needed to cover an unanticipated deficit and to defray costs in early 1814 before a loan for that year could be filled.171 Congress passed the necessary legislation, and the loan was filled at a discount of 11.75 percent, which was slightly less than the discount on the previous loan.172 No doubt this was a reflection of the continued optimism generated by the Russian peace initiative as well as the progress Congress had made on tax legislation.

  More Trade Restrictions and a Boost to Privateering

  Even though the administration finally got the tax program it wanted, it still had trouble with Congress over trade restrictions. The only restriction adopted in this session was a ban on the use of British licenses. Although the previous Congress had balked at such a ban, the courts had come to the administration’s aid. At the end of 1812 the U.S. Frigate Chesapeake had seized the Julia, an American ship trading with Lisbon under a British license, and the courts had upheld the seizure. Basing his decision on the common law, Judge Joseph Story ruled that using a British license to supply British armies (even through a neutral port) constituted illegal intercourse with the enemy.173 Congress sustained this decision in the summer of 1813 by adopting legislation that outlawed the use of all enemy licenses. Thenceforth, American ships carrying British licenses would be treated like enemy vessels.174

  The administration was pleased with the court decision and the license law, but these measures did not halt the flow of provisions to British men-of-war in American waters. Coasting vessels continued to ply this trade, and so too did neutral vessels, many of which were actually British ships in disguise. Madison was incensed by this trade. He also resented a British decision to blockade the middle and southern states while leaving New England’s ports open. Determined to put an end to the flow of goods to the enemy and to the “insidious discrimination between different ports of the United States,” the president sent a confidential message to Congress on July 20 recommending an embargo on all exports.175

  Officials throughout the British Empire issued licenses to permit trade that was otherwise prohibited by the Navigation Acts or other Parliamentary acts or Royal decrees. This license, issued by the lieutenant governor of Nova Scotia, authorized a Halifax merchant to import food from the United States in 1813. (Record Group 8, Halifax Prize Cases, Library and Archives of Canada)

  The president’s proposal was treated roughly in both houses. The House referred the message to its foreign relations committee, which recommended against an embargo. The House overrode this recommendation and passed the necessary legislation, but it was defeated in the Senate.176 Madison was dismayed by the Senate’s action, claiming that an embargo would have “driven the enemy out of Canada, expelled him from our waters, and forced him to retire from Spain and Portugal.”177 Nor was the president pleased when the House rejected proposals to expand the scope of the enemy trade act and prohibit the export of provisions and naval stores in foreign bottoms.178 Neither chamber, it seemed, was enthusiastic about restricting trade with the enemy.

  Blocked in Congress, the administration fell back on its executive powers. On July 29, the day after the embargo was defeated, the secretary of the navy issued a general order to all naval commanders, directing them to seize any vessel, whatever its flag, that was headed toward enemy ships in American waters or enemy stations in American territory. A week later, the War Department issued a similar directive to the nation’s army officers.179

  Before adjourning, Congress sought to give another boost to privateering. In a letter to a House committee, William Jones took issue with Gallatin’s argument (voiced during the previous session) against reducing the duties on prize goods. Jones claimed that excessive duties had sharply curtailed privateering and that the revenue from prize goods was now “very inconsiderable.”180 Jones recommended a reduction in the duties, and Congress responded by approving a 33 percent decrease.181 The purpose of this measure, said Federalist John Lovett, was “to bore a hole through the Non importation Law, large enough to throw a little money . . . in the hands of the Admin.”182 Congress also sought to encourage privateers to hold on to their prisoners of war (instead of releasing them at sea or in a neutral port) by offering a bounty of $25 for each prisoner brought to the United States. The balance of prisoners held by the two warring nations was running against the United States, and the government was anxious to redress the balance.183

  Congress Adjourns

  Congress adjourned on August 2, 1813, thus bringing to a close a difficult nine months for the president. At the beginning of this period, Madison was nearly defeated in a close election, and at the end he suffered through a lengthy illness that almost took his life. In between, he had to contend with a recalcitrant Congress that blocked two of his appointments, questioned his position on the repeal of the French decrees, rejected his proposals for trade restrictions, militia reform, and the enlistment of minors, and dangerously delayed the adoption of new taxes.

  The Senate was particularly obstreperous. The “Invisibles,” led by William Branch Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib, had frequently sided with the Federalists, not because they opposed the war but because they opposed the administration and its management of the war. “[I] never saw or heard of so much personal rancor and private intrigue,” said Republican Alexander Dallas, who was visiting from Philadelphia. “The malcontent junto, of self-called Republicans, was worse” than the Federalists.184 Nor were the malcontents amenable to criticism. When the semi-official National Intelligencer suggested that opposition to Gallatin’s diplomatic appointment was based on jealousy of “his virtues and transcendent talents,” dissident senators responded angrily, calling the paper’s British-born editor “a d—d little mischief making ‘English-man.’”185

  By the end of the session the Senate had become so unmanageable that the vice president, Elbridge Gerry, refused to follow custom and vacate his seat as presiding officer. This prevented the election of a president pro tem and thus ensured that if death took both the ailing Madison and the elderly Gerry (who was sixty-nine), the presidency would pass on to the reliable speaker of the house, Henry Clay, instead of to Giles or to one of the other “malcontents” in the Senate.186

  Yet Congress did not entirely repudiate presidential leadership or ignore its responsibilities for prosecuting the war. A good deal of much-needed war legislation was adopted in these two sessions. The army was expanded and the general staff and supply system improved. The pay of the troops was increased and so too was the enlistment bounty. In addition, the navy was expanded, privateering encouraged, new loans and taxes authorized, and a ban on the use of British licenses adopted. But time was running out on the United States, and whether this legislation would translate into battlefield victories was by no means certain.

  Chapter 6<
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  The Campaign of 1813

  When the spring thaw opened the campaigning season in 1813, the United States was in a stronger position than it had been in 1812. The addition of John Armstrong and William Jones to the cabinet had improved the leadership in Washington, and there were better commanders in the field as well. Although no competent officers had been found to take charge of the Niagara and St. Lawrence fronts, William Henry Harrison had succeeded William Hull in the Northwest, and Andrew Jackson was emerging as a leader in the Southwest. Moreover, Armstrong was promoting talented young officers to positions of authority. Thus men like Winfield Scott and Zebulon Pike were able to play a larger role in 1813 than they had in 1812.1

  The troops in the field were also better. Although enlistments still lagged behind need, the combination of higher bounties and better pay attracted large numbers to the service. By the spring of 1813, there were about 30,000 men in uniform. This was more than twice as many as when the war began, and 50 percent more than the 20,000 regulars and quasi-regulars that the British could muster in Canada.2 Although most of the American troops were still inexperienced, the campaign of 1812 had turned some into seasoned veterans. In addition, the staff and supply legislation passed the previous winter, coupled with Armstrong’s new code of regulations, promised to make army operations more efficient. To ensure tighter control, Armstrong also had divided the nation into nine districts, putting a regular officer in charge of each sector with orders to report directly to the War Department.3