The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  In spite of these reforms, the road to victory was beset with obstacles. The campaign of 1812 had demonstrated that conquering Canada was no easy task and that the British would not simply cave in to American demands. Under these circumstances, the nation had little choice but to prepare for a vigorous campaign in the hope of bringing the British to terms. “I have no belief in an honorable peace,” said one Republican, “’till We give them a drubbing on Land.”4 Speed was important because the tide in Europe was running in Britain’s favor. If the United States were to prevail in the New World before Britain was freed from her commitments in the Old, the nation had to act quickly and decisively.

  American Strategy: Winning Control of the Lakes

  American strategy in 1813 once again focused on targets in Upper Canada. Quebec was ignored because it was so heavily fortified, and even Montreal was considered too well defended to be a primary target. Armstrong had trouble setting priorities, but his broader plan called for regaining control of the Old Northwest, driving the British from the Niagara peninsula, and destroying Britain’s two naval bases on Lake Ontario (Kingston and York). Success against these targets was expected to pave the way for operations against Montreal and other British strongholds further east while at the same time producing a favorable effect on the spring elections in New York.5

  The key to the campaign was control of the Great Lakes—particularly Ontario and Erie. Because of the dense wilderness and lack of good roads, the lakes offered the only efficient means of moving men and material on the northern frontier. Whoever controlled the lakes controlled the border. Command of Lake Ontario was particularly important because it was close to the centers of power and population in the East and served as a vital link between the St. Lawrence River and British outposts in the West.

  At the beginning of the war, the British held undisputed sway over both lakes. On Lake Ontario they had five vessels that mounted 8 to 22 guns, while the United States had only the Oneida (16 guns). On Lake Erie, the British had another four ships mounting 3 to 18 guns, while the United States had only the Adams (14 guns), an army supply vessel that fell into British hands with Hull’s surrender.6 Control of Lake Erie had played a central role in British success in 1812. While Hull struggled to supply his army by using undeveloped and exposed roads, Brock was able to use the lake. The disruption of American supply routes contributed to Hull’s decision to surrender Detroit, while British control of Lake Erie enabled Brock to capture Detroit while still maintaining a presence on the Niagara frontier.

  American officials were aware of the importance of controlling the lakes but had hoped that a few well-aimed strokes would destroy British power in Canada and render the whole question academic. It was only after Hull’s defeat that the administration resolved to secure command of the lakes. “Without the ascendency over those waters,” Madison said, “we can never have it over the savages, nor be able to secure such posts as Mackinaw.” “The success of the ensuing Campaign,” added the secretary of the navy, “will depend absolutely upon our superiority on all the Lakes—& every effort, & resource, must be directed to that object.”7

  Accordingly, in September 1812, the administration ordered Captain Isaac Chauncey, a forty-year-old veteran naval officer, “to assume command of the naval force on lakes Erie and Ontario, and to use every exertion to obtain control of them this fall.”8 The nation already had a naval base at Sackets Harbor, New York, on Lake Ontario, and Chauncey dispatched Lieutenant Jesse Elliott to develop a shipyard at Black Rock (near Buffalo) for Lake Erie. At the same time the Navy Department sent Sailing Master Daniel Dobbins to develop a second yard for Lake Erie at Presque Isle, Pennsylvania. Dobbins was soon joined by master shipbuilder Noah Brown. By purchasing merchant vessels and converting them into small warships, and by launching an energetic program to build larger ones, American officials hoped to wrest control of the both lakes from the British.9

  British officials fully appreciated the significance of the American challenge. “The enemy,” reported Brock, “is making every exertion to gain a naval Superiority on both Lakes which if they accomplish I do not see how we can retain the Country.”10 The British were determined to match America’s building program, but this was no easy task. Unlike the United States, which had relatively short and secure supply lines to both lakes, the British had to ship men and material across the Atlantic and then over a Canadian water route that was both long and exposed. Moreover, for the first nine months of the war, British vessels on the lakes were under the direction of the Provincial Marine, an army transport service. The men who ran this service were old and ill-equipped for energetic action. Not until March 1813 did London officials put Sir James Yeo (pronounced Yo), a Royal Navy captain, in charge, and not until 1814 did the Royal Navy assume responsibility for the ships. In spite of these liabilities, the British were able to maintain parity on Lake Ontario. On Lake Erie, however, they lacked the manpower and resources to compete effectively. As a result, they lost control of this lake, although this did not occur until the late summer of 1813.11

  The Campaign Opens in the West

  When the campaigning season opened in the spring of 1813, the British were still dominant in the Old Northwest, and officials in Washington were not eager to challenge them until the United States had won control of Lake Erie. With the Treasury nearly empty, Gallatin recommended “reducing the Western expenditure to what is necessary for defensive operations, relying exclusively on the possession of the Lakes for any thing of an offensive nature.”12 Armstrong, who was himself an advocate of economy, agreed. He had no confidence in Harrison and preferred to concentrate American resources further east anyway. Hence he restricted Harrison’s authority to call out the militia, draw supplies, and engage in offensive operations.13

  Harrison was unhappy with these restrictions but understood the need to bide his time until he could take the offensive. Already he had ordered the construction of a major post at the Maumee Rapids in Ohio that would serve as both a supply depot and staging area for his operations. Named in honor of Return J. Meigs, the governor of Ohio, the fort was built under the supervision of two of the first West Point graduates, captains Eleazer Wood and Charles Gratiot. Fort Meigs was exceptionally strong. Ringed by picket logs and reinforced by mounds of dirt, it was protected by blockhouses and batteries that commanded all approaches and later included interior earthworks, known as traverses, that afforded additional protection.14

  The Siege of Fort Meigs

  Britain’s Indian allies were eager to invade American territory, and Brigadier General Henry Procter realized that he had to act before the American military position in Ohio became too strong. Departing from Fort Amherstburg with 1,000 regulars and militia in late April, Procter sailed to the mouth of the Maumee River, where he met 1,200 Indians headed by Tecumseh. Their target was Fort Meigs, which was defended by 1,100 men under Harrison. Procter hoped to bring the defenders to their knees by using his artillery and mounting a siege. The artillery bombardment began on May 1, but most of the round shot fell harmlessly on the interior earthworks. “The Enemy,” Procter reported, “had during our Approach so completely entrenched, and covered himself as to render unavailing every Effort of our Artillery.”15

  On May 5 a 1,200-man relief force of militia under the command of Brigadier General Green Clay arrived from Kentucky and attacked the British positions on the west bank of the Maumee while Harrison’s men launched a sortie from the fort against the British on east bank. In this engagement, known as the Battle of Fort Meigs, Clay’s Kentuckians were initially successful, overrunning several British batteries. But ignoring orders to head for the fort, the militia launched a disorganized pursuit of the retreating enemy and ran into the jaws of a powerful Anglo-Indian counterattack. Almost half of the Kentuckians were killed, wounded, or captured. Harrison complained that the “excessive ardour” shown by the militia was “scarcely less fatal than cowardice.”16 Later that day the Indians, ignoring pleas from their British a
llies, started killing their prisoners. Some forty Americans were killed before the British Indian agent, Matthew Elliott, and Tecumseh arrived on the scene and ended the carnage.

  By this time, most of the Indians, perceiving that the siege was a failure, started drifting off with whatever plunder they could find. At the same time, the Canadian militia, eager to get home to plant their crops, were leaving the British camp in droves. With his force melting away, Procter lifted the siege on May 9 and returned to Canada. The United States had suffered 320 killed and wounded and 550 captured. British losses (excluding Indians) were only about 100. Still, the British had been unable to capture the fort, largely because it was so well built.17

  Assault on Fort Stephenson

  In late July Procter invaded Ohio again, this time with 500 troops plus a large body of Indians. Following a plan developed by Tecumseh, the British hoped to lure the defenders out of Fort Meigs by staging a sham battle nearby. But Brigadier General Green Clay, who was now in command of the fort, knew that no other Americans were anywhere near and refused the bait. Urged by Tecumseh to find an alternative target, Procter marched to Fort Stephenson on the Sandusky River (in present-day Fremont, Ohio). This small post was defended by 160 men under twenty-one-year-old Major George Croghan (pronounced Crawn), the nephew of George Rogers Clark (of Lewis and Clark fame). Convinced that the fort was indefensible, Harrison ordered Croghan to abandon it. But Croghan demurred. “We have determined to maintain this place,” he wrote Harrison, “and by heavens we can.”18 In the face of such determination, Harrison relented.

  Procter attacked Fort Stephenson on August 1. Although Indians accompanied the British, they had no taste for storming a fortified position, and the British had to act alone. When the British reached a ditch at the edge of the fort, they were cut down by small arms fire and grapeshot from a concealed 6-pounder cannon known as “Good Bess.” Calling this “the severest Fire I ever saw,” Procter gave up the attack and ordered his troops back to Canada. He blamed the defeat on the Indians, who had clamored for action and then disappeared when the fighting began. “A more than adequate Sacrifice having been made to Indian Opinion,” he said, “I drew off the brave Assailants.” The British had lost about one hundred men in the assault, while Croghan had sustained only eight casualties.19

  Capture of the Detroit and Caledonia

  Procter’s assault on Fort Stevenson was the last British operation in Ohio, for the balance of power on Lake Erie was beginning to shift against them. While fitting out schooners at Black Rock the previous fall, Lieutenant Jesse Elliott had learned of the arrival of two British vessels at Fort Erie to the south. These were the Detroit (6 guns) and the Caledonia (3 guns). Elliott decided to try to take the ships by surprise. “A strong inducement,” he wrote, was “that with these two Vessels added to those which I have purchaced and am fitting out I should be able to meet the remainder of the Brittish force on the upper Lakes.”20

  In the early morning hours of October 9, 1812, Elliott set sail upriver with his two schooners and a mixed force of one hundred seamen, regulars, and militia. Taking the British by surprise, the Americans made off with the ships. The Caledonia was navigated safely to the American shore, but the Detroit was carried off by the river current and ran aground. She was pounded by fire from both shores and finally burned by the Americans.21 The loss of these vessels and the supplies they carried—the hold of the Detroit was loaded with ordnance captured at Detroit—was a serious blow to the British. “This event is particularly unfortunate,” said Brock, “and may reduce us to incalculable distress.”22

  By the end of 1812 Chauncey was searching for a more seasoned officer to assume command of Lake Erie when he learned that Master Commandant Oliver H. Perry, a twenty-seven-year-old officer who was in charge of the gunboats at Newport, was eager to escape from flotilla service. “You are the very person,” said Chauncey, “that I want for a particular service, in which you may gain reputation for Yourself and honour for your country.”23 Thenceforth, Chauncey devoted himself exclusively to Lake Ontario, giving Perry a free hand on Lake Erie.24

  The Struggle for Control of Lake Erie

  When Perry arrived at the Niagara front in the spring of 1813, he found four converted merchantmen and the Caledonia at Black Rock and two brigs and two gunboats under construction 100 miles away at Presque Isle. Although plagued by recurring bouts of “bilious fever”—probably dysentery—Perry worked at a frantic pace to prepare his squadron for action. His first task was to move the vessels at Black Rock to Presque Isle. Moving these ships upriver into Lake Erie against a steady wind was exceedingly difficult and was accomplished only with the assistance of 200 soldiers supplied by Major General Dearborn and only after the British had evacuated Fort Erie at the end of May. Getting the ships to Presque Isle posed additional dangers because the British squadron on Lake Erie was cruising nearby, but Perry’s luck held, and a fog covered his movements. Even after all the ships were at Presque Isle, Perry needed to get them ready for service, and once they were ready, the brigs had to be stripped of their guns and lifted by floats over a sand bar to reach deep water. This was accomplished in early August when the British squadron had withdrawn, probably to resupply.25

  Perry faced another problem: finding men to fill out his crews.26 At one point he became so exasperated with this task that he asked to be transferred, even offering to return to his old station at Newport, but the secretary of navy refused his request.27 Perry blamed his manpower problems on Chauncey, claiming that the senior officer had kept the best sailors and sent only “a Motley set, blacks, Soldiers and boys.”28 Major General William Henry Harrison was more cooperative, furnishing Perry with 100 of his best Kentucky sharpshooters and all the seamen he could find in his army.29 With this ragtag crew, Perry took command of the Lawrence (20 guns) and assigned the Niagara (20 guns) to Lieutenant Elliott. The squadron of nine vessels then set sail for Put-in-Bay, located in the Bass Islands at the western end of the lake. This afforded a good vantage point for watching the British squadron, now anchored near Fort Amherstburg, and for disrupting the British supply line on the lake to Detroit.30

  The commander of the British squadron was Captain Robert H. Barclay, an experienced naval officer who had been with Lord Nelson at Trafalgar and had lost an arm in the service (which prompted Indians to call him “our father with one arm”).31 Barclay’s squadron of six ships was inferior to Perry’s force, especially at close range. The weight of his broadside was just over half of Perry’s, 494 to 912 pounds.32 Like Perry, Barclay faced a manpower shortage that could be remedied only by using soldiers. He was also short of naval guns and had to use guns taken from Fort Amherstburg to equip his best ship, the Detroit. Because of a shortage of slow match, these guns could be fired only by shooting a pistol over the touch hole.33

  Barclay also had to contend with a food shortage because British officials at Fort Amherstburg had to feed some 14,000 Indians.34 “The quantity of Beef, and flour consumed here is tremenduous,” Barclay complained; “there are such hordes of Indians with their Wives, and children.” By early September Barclay reported that “so perfectly destitute of Provisions was the Post, that there was not a days flour in Store, and the Crews of the Squadron under my Command were on Half Allowance of many things.” Desperately short of provisions and goaded on by the army, Barclay decided “to risk everything” to open his lines of communication.35 Accordingly, he sailed forth to meet Perry’s squadron.

  The Battle of Lake Erie

  On September 10, 1813, the opposing squadrons came within sight of each other. Following common practice, Perry had spread sand on his decks to prevent his men from slipping on the water that would be splashed up or the blood that would be spilled. He flew a battle flag emblazoned with the words “DON’T GIVE UP THE SHIP.”36 At first the British had the weather gauge (the wind at their backs), which meant that they could choose the distance for the engagement. But once again Perry’s luck held, and the wind shifted to give him
the weather gauge. Barclay claimed this was “a prodigious advantage,” although given the disparity in their firepower, it is unlikely that Barclay could have prevailed even if he had retained the wind at his back.37

  The British opened at long range, which was their best strategy, but Perry soon closed to take full advantage of his firepower. “I made sail,” he said, “and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy.”38 Elliott, however, held the Niagara back, preferring for reasons that have never been satisfactorily explained to rely on his long guns. This meant that Perry fought the British ships at close range with only minimal assistance from his sister ship.

  The Lawrence repeatedly traded broadsides with the two largest British ships, the Detroit (19 guns), which was Barclay’s flagship, and the Queen Charlotte (17 guns). Perry’s smaller vessels also pounded the big British ships. After two hours, all three of the big ships were badly damaged, and the casualties on both sides were staggering. Perry’s crew had suffered more than 80 percent casualties, forcing the commander to call up surgeon’s assistants and the wounded from below to man his guns. Although his ship had become a floating hulk, Perry refused to surrender. Instead, he hauled down his battle flag, hopped into a small boat manned by four unwounded sailors, and headed for the Niagara, miraculously escaping injury from the rain of fire around him.