The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  The British were also anxious to protect their Indian allies. Having abandoned them in the Peace of 1783 and again in the Jay Treaty of 1794, British officials had repeatedly promised not to desert them again. In February 1814 Sir George Prevost told an assemblage of western Indians: “Our Great Father considers you as his children and will not forget you or your interests at a peace.”62 Several months later, Lieutenant Colonel Robert McDouall told the Indians at Mackinac that the King would help them recover their “old boundaries.” Great Britain, he added, would make peace only “on the express condition that your interests shall be first considered, your just claims admitted, and no infringement of your rights permitted in future.”63 Several British newspapers echoed this pledge. “These sable heroes,” said the Sun, must “be for ever secured against Yankee encroachment and barbarity.”64

  As a boundary for the Indian reservation, the British suggested the line established by the Treaty of Greenville in 1795, although subject to “such modifications as might be agreed upon.”65 This treaty had been superseded by others, but if resurrected, it would have secured to the Indians about a third of Ohio, half of Minnesota, and almost all of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. This territory was not, as the American envoys claimed, a third of the land mass of the United States, but 250,000 square miles, or about 15 percent.66 The region was inhabited by some 43,000 Indians and about 100,000 whites.67 When asked what would become of those Americans who found themselves on the wrong side of the new boundary, the British replied that “they must shift for themselves”—meaning that they would have to abandon their homes.68

  In presenting their demand for an Indian barrier, the British envoys exceeded their instructions in two ways. First, they presented the Indian reservation as a sine qua non, although officials in London saw the barrier as simply one possible means of protecting the Indians.69 Secondly, even though the British government was only interested in preventing Americans from purchasing land in the barrier, the British envoys demanded that the United States refrain from acquiring territory “by purchase or otherwise.”70 This would prevent Americans from acquiring lands inside the barrier by conquest in “defensive” wars.

  The British terms need not have surprised anyone since they were anticipated by newspaper articles on both sides of the Atlantic.71 Nevertheless, the American envoys were stunned. Although aware of the strident anti-American feeling in Britain, they had assumed that the British government would be more conciliatory.72 They failed to realize that with the war in Europe over, British leaders were anxious to end the American war on terms that would ensure that Canada and its Indian allies were amply protected in the future.

  America’s Response

  The American envoys flatly rejected the British proposals. “A Treaty concluded upon such terms,” they said, “would be but an armistice. It cannot be supposed that America would long submit to conditions so injurious and degrading.”73 The Indian barrier was particularly offensive. It undermined American sovereignty, ran counter to a tradition of national control over the Indians, and threatened the westward movement. Adams told Goulburn that to condemn such a vast expanse of territory “to perpetual barrenness and solitude [so] that a few hundred savages might find wild beasts to hunt upon it, was a species of game law that a nation descended from Britons would never endure.”74 This unyielding attitude surprised Goulburn. “Till I came here,” he said, “I had no idea of the fixed determination which there is in the heart of every American to exterpate the Indians & appropriate Their territory.”75

  Convinced that the prospects for peace were remote, the American envoys sent a truce ship home to notify the administration. In mid-October, President Madison sent the envoys’ dispatches to Congress. Several days later he gave Congress the instructions that authorized the envoys to drop impressment. These documents were published to show the world—and particularly the Federalists—how reasonable the administration was and how unreasonable the British had become. Publication of these documents had the dual effect of generating support for the war at home and embarrassing British officials abroad.76

  British leaders were annoyed by the publication of the documents. “Mr. Madison has acted most scandalously,” declared the prime minister, Lord Liverpool. To publish terms with a negotiation still in progress was unprecedented “on the part of any civilized government.”77 British officials were also exasperated by the intransigence of the Americans—their unwillingness to make any concessions. “The doctrine of the American government is a very convenient one,” Liverpool said; “they will always be ready to keep what they acquire, but never to give up what they lose.”78

  Members of the opposition, on the other hand, attacked the government for making excessive demands. Alexander Baring charged the ministry with setting up “extraordinary pretensions,” and the Marquis of Lansdowne made it clear that he was “no supporter of these new principles upon which the contest was conducted.”79 The Morning Chronicle declared that the British terms “were any thing but wise and moderate” and accused the cabinet of fighting “a war of aggression and conquest.”80

  The British Retreat

  With the talks apparently stalled, the mood of the American envoys became gloomy. Only Clay retained even a shred of hope for peace.81 An inveterate gambler who sometimes stayed up all night playing cards, Clay thought the British might be bluffing.82 The Kentucky War Hawk found it difficult to believe that the British would allow the talks to break up over the issues in question. “Such a rupture,” he said, “would entirely change the whole character of the War, would unite all parties at home, and would organize a powerful opposition in Great Britain.” Perhaps, Clay suggested, the British were “attempting an experiment upon us”—dragging out the negotiations in the hope that “they will strike some signal blow, during the present campaign.” If this were the case, then there was still hope that the British “would ultimately abandon [their] pretensions.”83

  Clay’s suspicions were well founded. The British demands were what one scholar has called “a probing operation.”84 Their purpose was to provide a basis for negotiation and to determine what concessions the Americans were willing to make. Even the Indian barrier was not supposed to be a sine qua non, even though it was presented as such by the British envoys. “Our Commissioners,” Liverpool lamented, “had certainly taken a very erroneous view of our policy.” They failed to appreciate “the inconvenience of the continuance of the war.”85

  Clay’s suspicion that British officials were trying to buy time was also correct. With the balance of power in the New World shifting in their favor, the British were confident that victories in the field would soon strengthen their hand at Ghent. In early September, Liverpool said: “If our commander [Sir George Prevost] does his duty, I am persuaded we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier which we ought to insist on keeping.” Later that month he suggested that the discussions be drawn out until news arrived on “the progress of our arms.” And the following month he said that the best policy to pursue was “to gain a little more time before the negotiation is brought to a close.”86

  Unwilling to end the negotiations, the British gradually retreated from their demands. Instead of an Indian barrier, they agreed to settle for a pledge to restore the Indians to their status as of 1811.87 “Their sine qua non,” said Clay, “has dwindled down to a demand that the Indians shall be included in the peace and put in the condition they stood in prior to the battle of Tippacanoe.”88 This stipulation was too vague to be meaningful. For all practical purposes, the British once again had abandoned their Indian allies.

  Having retreated from their initial terms, the British offered a new basis for peace in October—uti possidetis, which meant that each side would retain whatever territory it held at the war’s end.89 If this offer were accepted, the British would gain eastern Maine, Mackinac, and Fort Niagara, while the United States would get Fort Amherstburg and Fort Erie. The British suggested that the agreement
be “subject to such modifications as mutual convenience may be found to require.”90 Their hope was to retain northern Maine (for the overland route between Quebec and Halifax) as well as Mackinac and Fort Niagara, but to trade the rest of eastern Maine for forts Amherstburg and Erie.91 The British gave little thought to the possibility of retaining New Orleans because by this time their projected campaign against the Crescent City had assumed only minor importance in their overall strategy for ending the war.92

  Britain’s new offer was far more moderate than her original terms, but the American envoys were too close to the situation to appreciate its significance. A week later Bayard said: “It is impossible to tell what is the real intentn. of the British Govt. on the question of Peace or War. They probably mean to be govd by events.”93 Even Clay thought that obstacles “of a serious and difficult character” still remained and that “the safest opinion to adopt is . . . that our Mission will terminate unsuccessfully.”94

  Rejecting the new British offer, the American envoys again sent a truce ship to Washington to bring the administration up to date. Madison transmitted the envoys’ dispatches to Congress on December 1. The publication of these documents convinced many people that peace was near, and the result was a steady flow of peace rumors that continued until the conflict was over.95

  When it became evident that the Americans would not agree to uti possidetis, the British dropped this demand just as they had their others. By this time the shrill attacks against the United States in the British press had given way to protests over war taxes. “Economy & relief from taxation are not merely the War Cry of Opposition,” said one official, “but they are the real objects to which public attention is turned.”96 The British were also disillusioned by the lack of military progress in America. Reports of the fall of Washington and the occupation of eastern Maine had raised their hopes, but news soon followed of the failures at Plattsburgh and Baltimore.97 “If we had either burnt Baltimore or held Plattsburgh,” Goulburn said, “I believe we should have had peace on [our] terms.”98

  The failures in America suggested that another campaign—whose projected cost was £10 million ($49 million)—would be necessary if the British were to exact any concessions.99 “The contest with America,” grumbled an opposition leader, “was likely to plunge the country in[to] frightful expense.”100 According to the Morning Chronicle, the prospect of renewing the property tax was greeted everywhere with “a sense of horror and indignation.”101

  Another year of fighting was also likely to undermine Britain’s position in Europe. “We are certainly anxious to make Peace before the next Campaign,” said a British official. “We do not think the Continental Powers will continue in good humour with our Blockade of The whole Coast of America beyond that Period.”102 The allies at Vienna were already feuding among themselves, and British officials were wondering how quickly they could recall troops from America.103 “The negotiations at Vienna are not proceeding in the way we could wish,” said Liverpool, “and this consideration itself was deserving of some weight in deciding the question of peace with America.”104

  To buttress their position at home and in the field, British officials asked the Duke of Wellington to take charge of the American war.105 The Iron Duke agreed, but he refused to leave Europe until the spring or to guarantee success. “I feel no objection to going to America,” he told Liverpool, “though I don’t promise to myself much success there.” What the British needed was “not a General, or General officers and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes.” Without this, there was little hope of success. Given the existing circumstances, Wellington concluded, “you have no right . . . to demand any concession of territory from America.”106

  On the eve of war in June 1812, Lord Liverpool (1777–1828) became the prime minister of Great Britain, a position he held until 1827. Liverpool played a central role in forging moderate peace agreements at Ghent and Vienna, thus ushering in the Pax Britannica and a lasting peace on both sides of the Atlantic. (Portrait by Sir Thomas Lawrence. Wikimedia Commons)

  Wellington’s opinion was all the cover that British officials needed to jettison their last territorial demands. On November 18 Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh: “I think we have determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any acquisition of territory.”107

  The only important issues that remained unsettled were the status of the American fishing rights in Canadian waters and British navigation rights on the Mississippi River. Since both rights were guaranteed by the Treaty of 1783, both were likely to stand or fall together. Discussion of these rights raised a larger issue: Did the War of 1812 abrogate all previous treaties and any rights or privileges they established? In line with long-standing European practices, the British argued that this was the case, and most European peace treaties acknowledged this by reaffirming all previous treaties. The Americans, however, insisted that rights and privileges spelled out in the Treaty of 1783 (including independence) were so fundamental that no war could annul them.

  The debate over these rights also caused a deep division in the American camp. Clay, representing western interests, wanted to close the Mississippi to the British, while Adams, representing Massachusetts fishermen, insisted on retaining the fisheries. Ultimately, both issues were left out of the treaty.108 This was a victory for Adams because after the war Americans continued to fish in Canadian waters, and the British ultimately confirmed this right in a series of treaties.109

  The Treaty of Ghent (1814)

  The American and British envoys spent close to a month hammering the treaty into final form. Their handiwork—completed on December 24, 1814—is known as the Treaty of Ghent or the Peace of Christmas Eve.110 The treaty mentioned none of the maritime issues that had caused the war. It simply restored the status quo ante bellum—the state that existed before the war. Each side agreed to evacuate all enemy territory, although the British were allowed to retain several islands in Passamaquoddy Bay (between Maine and New Brunswick) until their ownership was determined. Each side agreed not to carry off any enemy property and to return all prisoners of war “as soon as practicable.”111 Any prizes taken beyond a certain time—ranging from twelve days off the American coast to 120 days in distant parts of the world—had to be restored to their owners.

  Each nation promised to make peace with the Indians and “to restore to such tribes . . . all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to, in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities.”112 In addition, the treaty established commissions—three in all—to fix the Canadian-American boundary and to establish the rightful owner of the Passamaquoddy Islands.113 Both nations also promised to “use their best endeavors” to stamp out the slave trade.114

  On three earlier occasions—in connection with the Jay Treaty in 1794, a boundary convention in 1803, and the Monroe–Pinkney Treaty in 1806—the United States had insisted on modifications after an agreement had been signed by its envoys in London. This time the British would settle for nothing less than unconditional ratification. They also wanted hostilities to end not when the treaty was signed (which was customary) but only after ratifications had been exchanged. Since this would entail a delay if the British instrument of ratification were lost at sea, the envoys agreed that hostilities would cease when both sides had ratified the agreement. The treaty, however, would not be binding until ratifications had been exchanged.115

  The Treaty of Ghent was signed on Christmas Eve in 1814. Pictured here the two delegation heads, Admiral James Gambier on the left and John Quincy Adams on the right, are shaking hands surrounded by members of their respective delegations. On the far left is Anthony St. John Baker, secretary to the British delegation, who brought the British instrument of ratification to the United States and exchanged ratifications with Secretary of State James Monroe. (Lithograph of painting by A. Forestier. Library and Archives of Canad
a)

  British Ratification

  The British government wasted no time, ratifying the Treaty of Ghent on December 27. British leaders welcomed an end to the war because it undercut criticism at home and gave them a freer hand in Europe. Castlereagh called the restoration of peace “a most auspicious and seasonable event” and congratulated Liverpool on “being released from the millstone of an American war.”116 In Vienna a British official reported that peace had “produced an astonishing effect,” helping to foil a Russian bid for aggrandizement.117

  The British people also welcomed peace, although somewhat grudgingly. The Courier, Naval Chronicle, and Annual Register all praised the results of the negotiations, and an army officer said that most soldiers agreed because they “saw that neither fame nor any military distinction could be acquired in this species of milito-nautico-guerilla-plundering-warfare.”118 The Morning Chronicle rejoiced at the restoration of peace but said that British leaders had “humbled themselves in the dust” and “thereby brought discredit on the country.”119 The Times and Globe, on the other hand, criticized the government for failing to win any concessions. Calling the treaty “deadly” and “disgraceful,” the Times lamented that the United States had escaped “a sound flogging.”120

  In Parliament, members of the opposition tried to make political capital out of the negotiations. Richard Wellesley (brother of the Duke of Wellington) complained that “the American commissioners had shown the most astonishing superiority over the British” and that “peace had been concluded under circumstances in which neither honour nor security had been provided for.”121 Opposition motions that challenged the government’s handling of the negotiations, however, were decisively defeated.122 In the heady days of the postwar Pax Britannica, few people were interested in this kind of criticism. Indeed, according to the Morning Chronicle, such was the buoyant mood of the British people that, even before peace was restored, “purchases to an immense amount” were made in the stock market, generating “the greatest Bull Account which has been known for years.”123