The War of 1812

by Donald R Hickey

  U.S. Ratification

  The American envoys feared that they too might be criticized by their constituents. Clay called the agreement “a damned bad treaty” and predicted that “we should all be subject to much reproach.”124 Except for Bayard, the other envoys shared his apprehension. The only thing the envoys would say in defense of the treaty was that it was the best that circumstances allowed and that it ended the war without sacrificing any honor, territory, or right.125

  On January 2, 1815, Henry Carroll, Clay’s personal secretary, boarded the truce ship Favourite in London to take a copy of the treaty to the United States. He was joined by Anthony Baker, who carried a copy of the British instrument of ratification. The ship encountered bad weather in the Chesapeake Bay and hence headed for New York harbor, docking around 8:00 p.m. on February 11. Carroll made no secret of his mission. Word quickly spread that peace was at hand, and soon the entire city was celebrating.126

  From New York reports of the treaty spread in all directions. An express rider carried the news in a record thirty-two hours to Boston, where handbills announcing the treaty were distributed. Schools in Boston were closed, people left their jobs, and the legislature adjourned. In the boisterous celebration that followed, bells were rung, the city was illuminated, troops turned out to fire a salute, and cartmen formed a procession of sleighs, parading around the city with the word “peace” on their hats.127 Celebrations of this sort took place all over the country.128 “Grand illuminations are making throughout the United States,” said one American.129 Everywhere, too, the news of peace drove up the price of war bonds and treasury notes. Goods that were normally shipped to foreign markets also rose in value, while the price of war material and imported goods slumped.130

  The British were prepared to offer a separate peace to New England if the treaty were not ratified, but there was no danger of this happening.131 News of the treaty reached the nation’s capital late on February 13, and an official copy arrived the following day. Madison submitted the treaty to the Senate on February 15, and the next day the Senate voted unanimously (35–0) to approve it. Madison gave his own approval later that day, thus completing the ratification process. Since the British had already ratified, this marked the end of hostilities, and both sides notified all army and navy commanders. The treaty became binding at 11:00 p.m. the following day—February 17—when Monroe exchanged ratifications with Baker, who had arrived in Washington earlier that evening.132

  America Wins the Peace

  Although Americans of both political parties rejoiced at the restoration of peace, Federalists had special cause to celebrate. The war, after all, had achieved none of the nation’s goals, neither a renunciation of British maritime practices nor the conquest of Canada. Instead, the Treaty of Ghent seemed to confirm what Federalists had been saying all along about the futility of the conflict. Many Federalists expected to reap significant political dividends once the celebrations died down and the American people took at close look at the peace terms. As Christopher Gore put it; “The treaty must be deemed disgraceful to the government who made the war and the peace, and will be so adjudged by all, after the first effusions of joy at relief have subsided.”133

  There was one Federalist, however, who was not so optimistic. James Robertson of Philadelphia said that the strategy of Republicans was already apparent. They would ignore the causes of the conflict and portray it as “a war on our part of pure self defence against the designs of the British to reduce us again to subjection.” By portraying the war in this light, they could claim that it was a great triumph. “The President,” Robertson concluded, “will only have to call it a glorious peace, and the party here will echo it.”134

  Robertson’s prophecy proved correct. In a message to Congress announcing the end of the war, President Madison congratulated Americans “upon an event which is highly honorable to the nation, and terminates, with peculiar felicity, a campaign signalized by the most brilliant successes.” The war, Madison claimed, “has been waged with a success which is the natural result of the wisdom of the Legislative councils, of the patriotism of the people, of the public spirit of the militia, and of the valor of the military and naval forces of the country.”135

  All across the country Republican orators and editors echoed the president’s cry. “Never did a country occupy more lofty ground,” said Joseph Story; “we have stood the contest, single-handed, against the conqueror of Europe.” “This second war of independence,” crowed the New York National Advocate, “has been illustrated by more splendid achievements than the war of the revolution.”136 The nation had attained all of its objectives, added a writer for the National Intelligencer: “the administration has succeeded in asserting the principles of God and nature against the encroachments of human ambition and tyranny.” “Yes,” echoed the Worcester National Aegis, “we have triumphed—let snarling malcontents say what they will, we have gloriously triumphed!”137 Republicans exaggerated, for the United States could not in justice claim to have won the war. But because of the clearheaded determination shown by the American envoys at Ghent, the nation could at least claim that it had won the peace.

  Conclusion

  The War of 1812 is often called America’s “second war of independence.” The issues and ideology of this conflict echoed those of the Revolution. In addition, this was the nation’s second and last struggle against Great Britain, the second and last time that it was the underdog in a war, and the second and last time that it tried to conquer Canada. Nevertheless, the supposed threat to American independence in 1812 was more imagined than real. It existed mainly in the minds of thin-skinned Republicans who were unable to shake the ideological legacy of the Revolution and interpreted all British actions accordingly.

  British encroachments on American rights were certainly both real and serious. But throughout this period the focus of British policy was always on Europe. The overriding objective of the British government was to secure the defeat of France, and this took precedence over all else. Britain’s policy, in other words, was preeminently European. Her aim was not to subvert American independence but to win the war in Europe. Once this objective was achieved, her infringements on American rights would cease.

  Not only did Republicans misread British intentions, but throughout this turbulent era they consistently overrated America’s ability to win concessions. Daniel Sheffey, a Virginia Federalist, made this point in a speech delivered on the eve of war in 1812. “We have considered ourselves of too much importance in the scale of nations,” he said. “It has led us into great errors. Instead of yielding to circumstances, which human power cannot control, we have imagined that our own destiny, and that of other nations, was in our hands, to be regulated as we thought proper.”1 Sheffey’s analysis was borne out, not only by the restrictive system but also by the war.

  The War of 1812 lasted only two years and eight months—from June 18, 1812, to February 16, 1815. Although the war was not long, the United States was beset by problems from the beginning. Many of the nation’s military leaders were incompetent, and enlistments in the army and navy lagged behind need. Relying on untrained militia was costly and inefficient, and citizen soldiers repeatedly refused to cross into Canada or to hold their positions under enemy fire. It was difficult to fill the war loans, and the nation’s finances became increasingly chaotic with the government teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. There was also extensive trade with the enemy—trade that Federalists and Republicans alike freely took part in. A combination of Federalist opposition, Republican factionalism, and general public apathy undermined the entire war effort.

  Wartime Leadership

  Congress was partly responsible for this state of affairs. Endless debate and deep divisions delayed or prevented the adoption of much-needed legislation. Congress was particularly negligent on financial matters. Hoping for a quick war and fearing the political consequences of unpopular measures, Republicans postponed internal taxes and delayed a national bank. A
s a result, public credit collapsed in 1814, and a general suspension of specie payments ensued. By the end of the war, the administration had to rely on depreciated bank paper and treasury notes. If the contest had lasted much longer, the Revolutionary War phrase “not worth a continental” might have been replaced by “not worth a treasury note.”

  A strong president might have overcome some of these difficulties, but Madison was one of the weakest war leaders in the nation’s history. Although his opponents called the contest “Mr. Madison’s War,” it never bore his stamp. Cautious, shy, and circumspect, Madison was unable to supply the bold and vigorous leadership that was needed. In some respects, to be sure, his caution served the nation well. Unlike other war presidents, he showed remarkable respect for the civil rights of his domestic foes. Despite pleas from other Republicans, he refused to resort to a sedition law. Even though Federalists had to face mob violence (particularly at the beginning of the war), they never had to contend with government repression. Madison’s treatment of enemy aliens and prisoners of war was also commendably humane, and his circumspect policy toward New England disaffection was undoubtedly well judged, too.

  In other ways, however, Madison’s cautious brand of leadership undermined the nation’s war effort. He allowed incompetents like William Eustis and Paul Hamilton to head key departments, he tolerated John Armstrong’s intrigues and James Monroe’s backbiting in the cabinet, and he retained Gideon Granger as postmaster general long after his hostility to the administration had become notorious. Madison was also slow to get rid of incompetent generals or to promote officers who had proven themselves in battle. Because he lacked a commanding influence in Congress, he was unable to secure vital legislation, and because he lacked a strong following in the country, he was unable to inspire people to open their hearts and purses.

  Contemporaries were aware of Madison’s shortcomings, and even Republicans criticized his leadership. “Our President,” said John C. Calhoun in 1812, “has not . . . those commanding talents, which are necessary to controul those about him.” “His spirit and capacity for a crisis of war,” declared a Pennsylvania congressman in 1814, “are very generally called in question.” “Mr. Madison,” added a western congressman in 1815, “is perhaps ‘too good’ a man for the responsible office he holds. He does not like to offend his fellow men for any cause.”2 Even Virginia Republicans considered Madison “too tender of the feelings of other people.” “The amiable temper and delicate sensibility of Mr Madison,” declared one Virginian, “are the real sources of our embarrassments.”3

  The British, on the other hand, were pretty well served by their leaders. In London, Liverpool and Castlereagh, with an assist from Wellington, generally made good decisions. Although they had to focus on Europe, they did not neglect the American war. Instead, they gave that war just enough attention to preserve Canada. Their principal mistake was a failure to deploy more warships after the fall of Napoleon to blockade duty off the American coast or to defending against American privateers in British waters.

  In North America, Sir George Prevost, the governor-general of Canada, did a good job of managing his limited resources to beat back the American invasions, but his failures in the field, most notably at Plattsburgh, gave his critics an opening, and his reputation never recovered. More than anyone else, however, Prevost deserves to be remembered as “the savior of Canada.”

  Costs of the War

  No doubt poor leadership in Washington and in the field drove up the cost of this war. At the beginning of the contest, a Federalist newspaper predicted that the war would cost 30,000 lives and $180 million and lead to a French-style conscription.4 This prediction was not far off. Official sources, although not entirely reliable, indicate that the total number of American troops engaged in the contest was 528,000: 60,000 Regulars, 10,000 U.S. Volunteers, and 458,000 drafted and volunteer militia.5 Another 20,000 served in the navy and marines.6 The battle casualties were comparatively light. The official figures are 2,260 killed and 4,505 wounded.7

  There is no record of how many soldiers died from disease, but before the advent of modern medicine, deaths from disease invariably exceeded those from enemy fire. Epidemics were common, and field commanders sometimes reported 30, 40, or even 50 percent of their troops on the sick list.8 There were numerous reports of multiple deaths from dysentery, typhoid fever, pneumonia, malaria, measles, typhus, and smallpox. In 1812, a soldier at Buffalo said: “Every day three or four are carried off to their Graves.” In 1813, Governor Isaac Shelby said: “They are dying more or less every day on our March.” And in 1814, General George Izard called the mortality rate from disease and exposure among his troops “prodigious.”9

  After sampling records from the regular army, one scholar has concluded that two and a half times as many soldiers died from disease or accident as were killed or wounded in battle.10 If this sample is representative, then military deaths from causes unrelated to combat must have been around 17,000.11 The army executed an additional 205 men, mainly for repeated desertion, and the navy executed a few men, too.12 Some privateersmen also died in the war, primarily from disease in British prisons. There were a few civilian casualties as well—mostly victims of Indian raids in the West. Adding all the pertinent figures together suggests that the total number of American deaths attributable to the war was roughly 20,000.13 British losses were probably around 10,000, and Indian losses perhaps 7,500.14 American losses were much higher because so many unseasoned regulars and militia contracted camp diseases, but as a proportion of their population, the Indians suffered the largest losses.

  The cost of the war to the United States (excluding property damage and lost economic opportunities) was $158 million. This includes $93 million in army and navy expenditures, $16 million for interest on the war loans, and $49 million in veterans’ benefits.15 (The last veteran died in 1905, the last pensioner—the daughter of a veteran—in 1946.)16 The government also awarded land bounties to some 224,000 people who had served in the war.17 The national debt, which Republicans had reduced from $83 million in 1801 to $45 million in 1812, rose to $127 million by the end of 1815. The government borrowed $80 million during the war, but because of discounts offered and paper money received, it probably got only about $50 million specie value. This works out to an interest rate of close to 14 percent.18

  Winners and Losers

  Who won the war? Scholars are still debating this, but according to one interpretation everyone was happy with the outcome. Americans were happy because they thought they had won; Canadians were happier because they knew they had won; and the British were happiest of all because they quickly forgot about the war. This assessment ignores the Indians (who were the biggest losers in the conflict), but otherwise it is not far off the mark.19

  Although the war ended in a draw on the battlefield, in a larger sense it represented a failure for American policymakers. The nation was unable to conquer Canada or to achieve any of the maritime goals for which it was contending. Indeed, these issues were not even mentioned in the peace treaty, which merely provided for restoring all conquered territory and returning to the status quo ante bellum.

  The British, on the other hand, had every reason to be satisfied with the outcome. They had held on to Canada and retained all of their maritime rights, and they had done this without short-changing their war effort in Europe. For the British, in other words, the return to the status quo ante bellum was a triumph, for it had demonstrated that they could defeat Napoleonic France in Europe while still fending off U.S. aggression in North America.

  The Legacy in Britain and Canada

  Although the war had ended in a military draw, in a host of ways it was fraught with consequences. The conflict had the least impact on Britain. Most British subjects saw the contest as little more than a sideshow, a footnote to the much grander and more consequential Napoleonic Wars. As a result, the war was quickly forgotten, and today in Great Britain the very phrase “War of 1812” is likely to conjure up
images of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.20 Yet even if most people forgot the war, the British government and the armed services did not. The joint operations that ended in defeat at Plattsburgh and New Orleans exacerbated postwar rivalry between the British army and navy. Moreover, the naval losses on the high seas and the northern lakes left such a sting that several generations of British writers, beginning with the Admiralty court lawyer William James (arguably the first modern naval historian), wrote treatises to explain away these defeats. The British also kept their replica of the President in commission until 1903 to remind people that even the most advanced American frigates could not withstand the power of the mighty Mistress of the Seas.

  The war forced the British government to treat the United States with greater consideration. “The Americans,” said Augustus J. Foster, “have had the satisfaction of proving their courage—they have brought us to speak of them with respect.” According to another British subject, the war had “humbled the tone of our ministry and of the nation, and made the United States much more respected in Europe.”21 The British were careful not to impress any Americans when the Royal Navy went back on a war footing during Napoleon’s Hundred Days in 1815.22 In fact, Americans were never again subjected to those dubious maritime practices that had caused the war. With Europe generally at peace in the century after Waterloo, the Great Powers had no interest in regulating American trade or in tampering with the nation’s merchant marine.