Washington's Engineer

by Norman Desmarais

  OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

  Congress adopted a resolution on February 3, 1778, requiring that every officer in the military take an oath of allegiance before the commander in chief or any major general or brigadier general:

  Resolved, That every officer who holds or shall hereafter hold a commission or office from Congress, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation:

  I, do acknowledge the United States of America to be free, independent and sovereign states, and declare that the people thereof owe no allegiance or obedience, to George the third, king of Great Britain; and I renounce, refuse and abjure any allegiance or obedience to him: and I do swear (or affirm) that I will, to the utmost of my power, support, maintain and defend the said United States, against the said king George the third and his heirs and successors, and his and their abettors, assistants and adherents, and will serve the said United States in the office of which I now hold, with fidelity, according to the best of my skill and understanding. So help me God.22

  As France had not yet declared war against Great Britain, French officers were not required to sign the oath until after the Treaty of Alliance with France was promulgated. Duportail signed it on May 12. His signature on this document would later play an important role, as it conferred American citizenship on him ipso facto.

  DEFENSES OF VALLEY FORGE

  The defenses of Valley Forge were practically completed by the end of March. Henry Laurens, president of Congress, wrote to a friend on April 7, “The present newly adopted encampment Genl. Duportail assures me, is tenable against the enemy’s utmost efforts by their present powers.”23

  The defenses of Valley Forge consisted of five redoubts (highlighted) connected by miles of trenches and earthworks designed to strengthen the natural advantages of the terrain. The redoubts were arranged in a triangle and were all visible to each other because the ground had been cleared of trees for miles around to build the huts and earthworks and for firewood. Enemies approaching the encampment could be spotted miles away. Valley Forge National Historical Park Visitors’ Brochure.

  The work was accelerated because General Washington expected the enemy would attack the Continental Army in their entrenchments as soon as the good weather returned. Washington also thought that an enclosed work on a particular height (“Joy Hill” or “Mount Joy”) might add to the army’s security. General Duportail wrote a note on April 13, expressing his concern that such a work would be a hindrance rather than a help, as it only allowed viewing an enemy advance on one or two sides. They could mount an attack on the other sides under cover, which were incapable of defense.24

  The situation at Valley Forge was very tense during April 1778. The so-called Conway Cabal attempted to replace Washington with General Gates as commander in chief. The debate roiled in Congress during February and March and was still on everyone’s mind when news of a new menace reached camp. After news of the surrender at Saratoga reached London, Parliament considered Lord North’s Conciliatory Bills, and General Howe was sending out notices from Philadelphia about them. There were also reports of commissioners from Parliament coming to restore peace. They were due to arrive shortly, with full powers to grant any demand short of independence and to pardon all who would immediately lay down their arms.

  Washington wrote a private letter to John Banister, a personal friend and a delegate from Virginia, a few days later, emphasizing his distress:

  The enemy are beginning to play a game more dangerous, than their efforts by arms . . . which threatens a fatal blow to the independence of America, and of course to her liberties. They are endeavoring to snare the people by specious allurements of peace. . . . Nothing short of independence, it appears to me, can possibly do. A peace on other terms would . . . be a peace of war. The injuries we have received from the British . . . are so great and so many, that they can never be forgotten.

  He then thinks of France, and his outlook brightens immediately:

  I think France must have ratified our independence and will declare war immediately, on finding that serious proposals of accommodation are made. . . . It cannot be fairly supposed that she will hesitate to declare war if she is given to understand, in a proper manner, that a reunion of the two countries may be the consequence of procrastination. An European war or European Alliance would effectually answer our purpose.25

  General Washington proposed on April 20, 1778, three plans and related questions for his general officers to consider for the upcoming campaign:

  [A]ttempt to recover Philadelphia and destroy the enemy army there. What mode of execution to pursue and what force will be required against an estimated 10,000 men, exclusive of marines and seamen, whose aid may be called in? Attempt an attack by storm, by regular approaches or by blockade, and in what manner?

  [T]ransfer the war to the north by attacking New York. Should this be done by a coup de main, with a small force, or make an attack with a large force? How large a force would be necessary in either case, estimating the number of the enemy in and around New York at 4000 men, and how to dispose of the troops to achieve the desired result, and to protect the country and secure the stores at the same time?

  [R]emain quiet in a secure, fortified camp, drilling and disciplining the army. What post shall be taken so as to keep the army secure, to cover the country and magazines and to be in a position to counteract any future movements of the enemy?26

  Duportail’s memorial on this occasion was a very significant document, as it had a profound influence in shaping Washington’s policy. It also indicated that Duportail was imbued with the American cause during the five months he had been in the Continental Army because he saw the cause of France in it. He understood English very well by this time and had listened to all the arguments of the officers in camp regarding the situation of America. He thought the victory at Saratoga blinded the people in the north to the true character of the American troops. His memorial emphasized, “Let us take care that the successes in the North do not occasion defeats here, where the circumstances are by no means the same.”27

  He wrote the “Supplement” in English and in his own hand. This version of the memorial is Colonel John Laurens’s translation, which includes Duportail’s interlined corrections. It also shows how carefully he watched Laurens’s work to ensure that his ideas were conveyed accurately in the English version that the commander in chief would read. The memorial intended to state that England could never reduce America by arms if proper care were taken of the men and if France continued to keep England on guard by warlike preparations so that she retained a large part of her troops in Europe.

  DUPORTAIL’S MEMORIAL

  The memorial is as follows:

  In all great Enterprises, the first thing to be done, is to form a general Plan of Conduct, to which all the particular operations are to have reference. This general plan is as it were the touch Stone by which all the subordinate projects are proved—according as they agree or disagree with it they are good or ill, deserve to be approved or rejected: now in this great Enterprise of supporting American Liberty by arms, I do not see that we have established the principles which ought to guide us in war, or, to speak more frankly, it appears to me that we have adopted defective principles. Almost every one considers the American Army in the same light as the British, thinks it capable of the same things, and would have it act in the same way; thus we see from time to time bold projects formed, rash resolutions proposed, which are the better received as they flatter those to whom they are proposed, by shewing them that the Nation is judged capable of vigorous actions—but this flattery may have fatal consequences, it may ruin America. Let it be our endeavor in this important business, to consider things in their true light.

  It is an Axiom among Military men, that Troops which are not what are called Regular Troops cannot make head against regular troops in level ground or in any Situation that does not offer them very considerable advantages. The American Army therefore cannot stand against the British who ar
e composed with British or German troops all Regular. perhaps some person too much prejudiced in favor of their Country, or not sufficiently instructed, will ask me, why I refuse to call the American Troops regular; I have no answer for the Persons who make this question; it proves that they do not know what Troops are—I address myself only to those who have an idea of what is understood by Discipline, Theory and Practice of Manoeuvres, System, Pride of Corps etc. . . . Such Persons will grant that the American Army new in every respect, and not having had a foundation of formed officers and Soldiers, cannot as yet claim the Title of regular Troops, and that it is therefore incapable, as I remarked above, of resisting the Enemy on equal ground. besides has not experience manifestly proved it? we were beaten at Brandywine—we were beaten at German Town altho’ we had the immense advantage of a complete Surprise. if any action is to enlighten us in respect to our troops, it is this—The dispositions on our side were excellent. General Washington was truly victorious over General Howe, since the latter was absolutely in fault and completely surprised, but his troops conquered ours and thereby they have saved the glory of their general and [they] gave a great proof of their superiority in plain [in even contest]. Let us therefore avoid committing ourselves in this way again—for it is farther a principle of war cautiously to avoid doing what your Enemy would have you do—Now let General Howe be asked whether he would like to meet the American Army on nearly equal ground for the issue of the present dispute, he will answer that it is the wish of his heart—that he desires only two or three such opportunities to decide the cause of America—because he is sure of beating us, and that the loss of general actions will soon have ruined our party without recourse. I know very well that many persons are not of this opinion, and that they say, that having more men than the English and greater facility of procuring them we cannot fight the Enemy too often because even if we should be beaten, the loss of the Enemy, though less in itself would be greater relatively to their whole number, and consequently they must soon be ruined—but this opinion is built upon a foundation altogether false. our numbers are not superior to those of the English. doubtless measures were taken last year to get as great a number as possible, yet at Brandywine we scarcely had 12,000 men, the English had as many—besides let us remark one thing; we received in the month of October 1500 men from General Putnam’s army; in November 3000 from the Northern army; these added to the 12,000 men we had in the month of September would amount to 16,000 men. however when we quitted Whitemarsh we were scarcely between 8000 and 9000 men—that is to say, that in three months, the diminution from Battle and principally sickness and Desertion, has been half the Army; thus if the Campaign instead of opening in the month of September had commenced in the months of April or May we should not have had a man left at the end of the campaign. This proves that if we get men easily, we lose them in the same manner. besides with respect even to the facility of getting them, I do not see that many recruits arrive. On the contrary I hear that they experience great difficulties in procuring them. nevertheless the last Campaign, all things considered, was not unlucky, and the northern successes keep up the spirits of the people. if then notwithstanding these things, there is so little eagerness in enlisting, or so much facility in quitting the army; what would be the case if we were to be unfortunate in general actions the loss of which will not always be made up by great success in another part. What we ought to propose to ourselves, is to defend the country inch by inch, to endeavor to hinder the enemy from rendering himself master of it, consequently never to receive him but when we are protected by a natural or artificial fortification, in other words to carry on what is styled a defensive War. this is our true part and it is so obvious that in Europe, all Military men and even those who are not so, suppose this to be our Conduct—if the Americans could consult the modern daily publications, they should there find that the model offered to General Washington is principally Fabius, that wise Roman who ruined Hannibal by refusing to fight him in plain. Fabius however commanded Romans, but these Romans had been thrice defeated, they were disheartened, dreaded the Enemy, and were nearly reduced to the condition of new and unformed Troops. The Consul conducted himself accordingly, avoided general Battles, kept himself on the defensive, always occupying strong positions and where the Enemy could not attack him but with considerable disadvantage—it is true that this kind of war was not approved of at Rome; Men of leisure who loved to be amused by great events, men of impetuous dispositions, men whose discernment was not sufficient to judge of what circumstances required, in a word the particular enemies of the Consul, turned him into ridicule, affixed to him insulting surnames, but the sage General was unmoved by them. he knew that after all, the event would determine his reputation in the world—he therefore invariably pursued his plan, and by his firmness which was crowned with success, he merited the appellation of Savior of Rome.

  Application of the foregoing Principles to our present Situation and what we ought to propose to ourselves.

  Ought we to open the Campaign by an attack on the Enemy’s lines as I hear sometimes proposed?

  If the English army were out of its lines at the distance of one or two miles in front, from the reasons just mentioned we ought not to attack them for we should expose ourselves to almost certain Defeat (I suppose our army so large as in its last Campaign): and because this army is covered by lines, because it has added to its natural Strength that of Fortification we would attack it? This is manifestly unreasonable. Fortification is the means used by the weak to enable them to resist the strong. We Engineers count that a good fortified place enable those who defend it to resist ten times their own number.—Field Engineering does not afford such considerable advantages, but according as the ground is more or less judiciously chosen, as the Engineer has traced his work with more or less skill, and afterwards as the Profiles are more or less respectable, executed with more or less care, this kind of fortification renders one equal to two, three, four, and sometimes more—I am not acquainted with the English lines in their whole extent, but I may judge by what I have seen, because it is a principle in fortification to establish as perfect an equality as possible in the different parts, so that no one be more attackable than another; now by what I have seen of the English Lines, I judge that the defenders may at least hold them against double their numbers. Their army may at present be 10,000 strong, consequently they may defend themselves against 20,000 composed of troops equal in every respect (I mean Regular Troops). Let us make the comparison and judge.

  I cannot forbear making an observation here which is, that to judge by the rash or rather the [paper torn] Projects of certain Persons they would think, that they had originally imagined that the establishing of American Liberty was to be the business of one or two years. that being deceived in this respect they begin to grow tired of the war, and wish to bring the matter to a speedy decision one way or the other. in effect, if their projects were followed, the matter would soon be decided. instead of free Citizens the Americans would in a little time be a conquered people, and consequently obliged to submit to the conditions imposed on them by their Subduers.

  I know very well that those who propose to attack the English in their lines, deduce their arguments from the American Troops having attacked and carried lines in the North, but let us take care that successes in the North do not occasion defeats here, where the circumstances are by no means the same. the Northern Troops may perhaps have attacked and carried some portion of Intrenchments, either illy made or injudiciously disposed, or not sufficiently lined with troops;—or perhaps they attacked with vastly superior numbers—but that they ever attacked with a number nearly equal to that of the enemy (which would be our case), Intrenchments such as those of the English at Philadelphia, supported on each flank by a River, secure from being turned and attackable only in front, is what I will never believe. I will add to this by way of explaining my idea, that if I were General Howe, and the Americans should advance to attack me in my lines, I would not g
ive myself the trouble of defending them. I would retire some four or five hundred yards in the rear to some covered place, I would only leave a few poppers to deceive them and make them think they had forced the lines, and when they had once got within and were preparing to push their imaginary advantage, I would fall upon them like a thunderbolt. The aim of this conduct which at first appears whimsical, is as follows: General Howe by defending his lines seriously would soon disgust the Americans and oblige them to desist from the attack, which would produce nothing decisive for the English—whereas if they were once within the Lines and were repulsed to effect a retreat every one must regain the breaches made in the Entrenchments and abbatis, which is not very easy and exposes the greatest part of the army to be slaughtered or made prisoners.

  Second Question—

  Ought we at the opening of the campaign to approach Philadelphia? No. We ought not. we are even too near already, and for this reason—would we approach the enemy in order to be more certain of fighting him? this is altogether useless—he will certainly come to seek us. The English Minister does not send Genl. Howe with his army into America, to remain inactive in Philadelphia. he must fight us—must endeavor to destroy us. he must conquer the Country; not to do it, is to be conquered himself. it is to give gain of cause to the Americans. therefore General Howe will make it his business to find us. but at present I say, to wait for him ten or twelve miles nearer to or farther from Philadelphia makes for us the difference of having about two thousand men more or less to engage. this is clear. . . . supposing us more than thirty miles from Philadelphia, it will no longer be practicable for him to come upon us in one march, he must leave the City at a great distance; then if we had a sufficient body of militia conveniently posted for the purpose, at about fifteen miles from the Town, this body as soon as Genl. Howe should be at proper distance, might march to the Lines, destroy them, enter Philadelphia and burn the Magazines. To prevent this Genl. Howe would be obliged to leave a sufficiency of troops to guard the Lines and the Town, that is to say, about 2500 or 3000 men—this would be 2000 men less . . . which is certainly worth attention—on the other hand, as long as Genl. Howe has only to move twenty miles from Philadelphia to attack us—his rear, his Communications with the town are secure; we venture to interpose any Troops, as in case of a sudden retrograde motion of the Enemy such parties would be entrapped between his army and the Town or the Rivers. whereas if he were at the distance proposed, we might convert our numerous Militia which cannot be opposed in front of the enemy, to harrassing his Flanks, attacking his baggage, Convoys etc.