Washington's Engineer

by Norman Desmarais

  These are real advantages; what are those expected from approaching Philadelphia which can counterbalance them? To cover ten or twelve miles of Country? what a pitiful consideration is that in competition with the powerful interests above mentioned—To close in upon the Enemy, and render their subsistence difficult? we ought not to be seduced by this reason—this made us take and occupy the position of White marsh until the month of december, and it was very much better founded at that time, nevertheless what end did it answer—the Enemy still procured nearly all that they wanted—and for our part, by remaining in that camp, in a season already cold, in which the Soldiery suffered greatly, when the proximity of the Enemy and the dread of being attacked, obliged us to keep Tents, baggage, and provision waggons at a distance—by having amused ourselves that Camp, with the absurd plan of attacking the Enemy his Lines with an inferior Army—by having too long delayed to come and build our barracks and form Magazines of every kind—the Camp of White Marsh may be charged with the loss of three or four thousand men perhaps, of which we have been robbed by sickness, misery and Desertion—it may be charged with half the horses of the Army, which emacerated by the hunger they have suffered this winter, will perish on our first movements in the Spring, and leave, may be, our waggons and Artillery in the roads.

  We ought therefore in my opinion to keep ourselves between 30 and 40 miles distance from Philadelphia, and since we have the advantage at present of obliging the enemy to march to our own ground to fight us, it is our part always to post ourselves in such a manner as that he cannot attack us but under considerable disadvantages; and for this purpose to always choose Situations strong in themselves, and besides avail ourselves of the Succors of Art. We should farther prefer positions in which we might avoid a general Battle if we thought proper—we should esteem it an essential quality in our positions to have the Rear free and an easy Retreat in order that an unlucky action might not be attended with too extensive consequences. if we should discover in our position any capital Defect which did not at first appear, or which only became such in consequence of the movements of the Enemy, we would immediately decamp and go elsewhere.—we should be cautious not to give into the Snare, which our Enemies will not fail to lay for us, endeavoring by their Raillery on our Retreats, to make us establish it as a point of honor, rather to keep a bad position than to make a retrograde movement. we should not forget that in war, to advance or retire are neither honorable or dishonorable; that it is at the end of a Campaign that the Prize is given, and that Glory is his reward who has gained his end—besides if the Enemy in the movements which he should make to try us, to turn us, should give us an opening, should expose any of his Troops, Posts, Baggage, to be attacked with advantage; we should never fail to do it—for one must not imagine that defensive war consists in never forming any Enterprise against the Enemy, but in such war the whole army (I Confess) should not form enterprises against the whole ennemy’s army—enterprises are formed with Detachments, whenever you can assure yourself of attacking with greater numbers—these expeditions even ought to be sought for, and frequently repeated, for it is thus that new Troops are by degrees enured to War.—Care must be taken, only, not to expose them to too severe marches, excessive bad weather or the want of Provisions. it appears to me that this kind of War would greatly embarrass the Enemy: for at length, as it is absolutely necessary that he attack us, he would do it; but as we are supposed to be always well fortified, and choose positions in which the whole Army cannot be attacked at once as we support the points only as long as it can be done with advantage, and retire whenever the Enemy begins to get too great an ascendancy over us, he is always liable to suffer considerable Loss without procuring decisive Success—in fact if we retire, even if the greatest part of the Army should have been successfully employed in supporting the point attacked, it is after all no battle—it is a post forced—a particular Corps repulsed—and this has no consequence—the Retreat is peaceably conducted—another post is taken hard by, and the business is to begin again—but General Howe has not a sufficiency of Troops, to purchase ground so dearly—it is easy to see that by these means 20 miles of Country would cost him half his Army—it is when weakened to this degree, and advanced into the interior of the Country he would tremble to see himself surrounded by those clouds of Militia useless at other times, but serviceable then, that he would be forced to yield the Country to us, and retire to shut himself up in his lines—and this is all that we have to desire, because it would prove to the English their inability to reduce this State, and consequently America—for what would happen in this State would in like manner happen in any other by pursuing the same Conduct. Nothing therefore would be better calculated [to] disgust them from continuing useless Efforts; whereas if we pique ourselves upon making war as equal European Armies do, if we will engage in general Actions, attack the Enemy or receive him in any kind of ground and unprepared, we shall experience some considerable Check—the Enemy will not always commit the fault of which he was guilty at Brandywine (where he might have cut off our Retreat, made himself master of our baggages and have reduced us to a ne plus ultra between the Delaware and the Chesapeak Bays), he will pursue us vigorously, hinder our reassembling, dissipate us, drive us from the Pennsylvania State, then availing himself of the disaffection of the majority of the inhabitants, make it declare for the King, and perhaps take arms in his favor—an event of the greatest consequence relatively to the other States of America, which would not be unshaken by such an example—relatively to the English who would be encouraged by it to make the greatest Efforts. and lastly considered with reference to foreign powers who not being near enough to estimate such Events according to their real value—and distinguishing in them only a proof of the great Superiority of the English, or inconstancy of the Americans, would not perhaps involve themselves further by giving them unavailing Succors—

  This translation is interlined here and there by Duportail, who adds with his own hand and in his faulty English the following:

  Supplement

  the more i reflect upon the matter above treated, the more it seems to me impossible that the English can reduce America by arms, at least so long as the Americans behave himself properly. provided also that the Court of france will not Change her political system and by the awe of War which she gives to England, will hinder its sending to America more troops than it has sent hytherto. if there is any cause of reducing it, we should look for that Cause in the American army itself. i have observed just now that in three or four months our army diminished one half without doubt principally by desertion. that is very frightful for everybody sees that if it continues so all America will soon be exhausted of men. there can be certainly many Causes of that prodigious desertion, but the most Considerable and which can be Remedied is the bad situation of the Soldiers, the want of cloathing that (besides he must bear all the intemperatures of the weather) abases his profession in his own eyes and makes him disdain it—the want of provisions During many Days the more hard to be borne as when he has any he has too much—the want of Cleanliness in his tents which causes us shameful sicknesses that are the appendices of the extreme misery. the proofs of what I mention are before our eyes. we see that there are a great deal less depression in some battalions of artillery who are generally better provided with every thing and whose officers take more care of their Soldiers.

  i will say no more on this subject because it is within reach of every body i thinck that great many persons have taken notice of it and proposed the means necessary to remedy the inconveniency above mentioned. as for me I have mentioned them only because I had an opportunity to share them in a prospect very striking since every body can perceive that upon this depends most the fate of America.

  LE Chvr. DUPORTAIL28

  In a separate paper, Duportail addresses the several questions proposed and disposes of them by referring to this quoted memorial. He adds the following general observations:

  it appears to me that there is
a previous important point to be decided because all our operations ought to be subordinate to it—this point is to know, in case of our army suffering a check and not being able to maintain its ground here, in what direction our Retreat is to be made in preference—towards the blue mountains?—on the other side of the Susquehannah?—on the side of the Delaware? by determining this, we shall determine where the grand magazines of the army are to be formed—and then we shall be governed by these two considerations in the choice of our positions as well as in all our movements.

  As for the determination of this capital point, viz. whether in case of a check we are to go to the North, to the South, or to the West mature deliberation is required—we are to consider, supposing the communication between the Northern and Southern States cut off, which of the two will be able to furnish the most numerous army, and provide it best with subsistence and stores—

  as this is not proposed for our examination I shall say nothing more on it.

  CHvr. du PORTAIL29

  FRANCE RECOGNIZES THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

  This memorial was ready on April 23, several days before Washington received all the responses. While Washington was still considering the responses, Simeon Deane, brother of Commissioner Silas Deane, brought news from Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, on May 1 that France had recognized the independence of the United States and had signed a Treaty of Alliance with her. Deane had been entrusted with the precious treaties and secretly sent from France with them. He crossed on the frigate Sensible, landing safely on the shores of Casco Bay at the mouth of the St. Lawrence. He then proceeded on horseback as quickly as possible toward York, Pennsylvania, where Congress was sitting, spreading the good news as he went. Washington waited for authorization from Congress before announcing the event to the army.

  That authorization arrived on May 5, and he proclaimed the following day as a day of rejoicing by the whole army. The day began with religious exercises to thank God for having “raised up among the Princes of the Earth a great and mighty friend.” There would be a feu de joie, cheers, and feasting, and every soldier was to receive a gill of rum.

  Duportail gave his written report three days later, as did most of the other officers:

  As to the first question—whether we ought to attack General How in his lines—I adhere to what is contained in my last memorial—Unless we have 25 thousand resolute men armed with good muskets and bayonets (for the latter will be necessary here) we ought not to think of it.

  It is not in my power to discuss the second relative to the Attack on New York, as I am not acquainted with the topography, nor have ever seen any particular plan of the Town, or the fortifications in its vicinity and at Kingsbridge—I shall remark only that the expedition against N. York ought not to be attempted at the expence of the Army opposed to General How, for if this army should cease to be in condition to make head against the british—the latter would attack it, dissipate it, and march uncontrouled through Pennsilvania and Jersey—it is I presume needless to point out the consequences.

  but if without prejudicing this army, we may have besides, a number of Troops which intelligent and experienced Officers acquainted with N. York and its vicinity, judge sufficient to attack it—in that case doubtless the attempt may be made—but measures must be prudently taken.

  Lastly, as to the third object of discussion—what are the positions to be taken by this Army acting on the defensive—it appears to me that there is a previous important point to be decided—because all our operations ought to be subordinate to it—this point is, to know, in case of our armys suffering a check and not being able to maintain its ground here, in what direction our Retreat is to be made in preference—towards the blue mountains? on the other side of the Susquehannah? On the other side of the Delaware? by determining this, we shall determine where the grand magazines of the army are to be formed—& then we shall be governed by these two considerations in the choice of our positions as well as in all our movements.

  As for the determination of this capital point, vizt Whether, in case of a check we are to go to the North, to the South, or to the West—mature deliberation is required—we are to consider, supposing the communication between the Northern and Southern States cut off, which of the two will be able to furnish the most numerous army, and provide it best with subsistence and Stores—as this is not proposed for our examination, I shall say nothing more on it.30

  The officers (John Armstrong, Johann Baron de Kalb, the Chevalier Duportail, Horatio Gates, Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, the Marquis de Lafayette, Thomas Mifflin, Friedrich von Steuben, and William Alexander Lord Stirling), in a rare display of unanimity, signed a joint communication on May 9, recommending “to remain on the defensive and wait events; without attempting any offensive operation of consequence.”31

  Neither Congress nor the army had any positive knowledge of what was going on in Europe. They had not received any dispatches from their commissioners at Paris in almost a year, since May 26, 1777. While a packet boat arrived at the beginning of 1778, it had no letters of political significance. The Committee of Foreign Affairs had written, announcing their stupefaction on January 12, 1778,

  GENTLEMEN: Not having received any letters from you since the 26th of May, we were severely chagrined yesterday, upon the arrival of Captain John Folger, who, under the name of dispatches from the commissioners at Paris, delivered only an enclosure of clean white paper, with some familiar letters none of which contained any political intelligence. . . . We cannot yet prove whether he [Folger] was willfully connected with the robbers of the packet.

  We shall endeavor to find whether the roguery was committed after Folger left France; but we must depend upon you to trace the circumstances from the time of your sealing till that of his embarking.32

  This incident remained a mystery for many years, until the British spy correspondence relating to this phase of England’s struggle to maintain control of her American colonies became accessible. Franklin and Deane trusted Joseph Hynson, a young American privateer sea captain, but he was a secret agent for the British. He had orders to use any means to get control of any message sent by the commissioners to Congress.

  When Hynson received a package of dispatches to be given to Captain Folger onboard his ship, he had a paid expert substitute blank papers for the dispatches without arousing suspicion. Folger took the package, unaware of what had happened. Hynson returned to London, where the British secret service gave him a handsome reward. In the meantime, he wrote a lying letter to the commissioners, relating an imaginary accident that prevented his immediate return to Paris.

  Duplicate dispatches were sent soon afterward aboard another vessel, but they were cast into the sea when the vessel was chased by a British cruiser. A third set reached America after news of the Treaty of Alliance had been received. Had the stolen dispatches been delivered as sent, they might have wrecked the cause of independence. They contained news regarding the attitude of France toward America that was so discouraging that Congress, if it had received the dispatches, might have accepted Lord North’s Conciliatory Bills when they arrived in April. America had the added advantage that England was thrown off her guard because the American commissioners had almost given up hope of France forming an alliance with America.

  Neither Washington nor Duportail knew any of these facts in April 1778. Congress had spurned the Conciliatory Bills, and the army was eager to attack General Howe in Philadelphia. Washington knew that public opinion and his generals supported him if he attempted any such action.

  It began to seem certain that the enemy would soon evacuate Philadelphia without striking a single blow. The question then became, Will they march across New Jersey or go to New York by sea? The scouting parties watched every move intently and faithfully reported every detail to headquarters.

  BRITISH COMMISSIONERS

  The British commissioners sent to restore friendly relations between England and the Americans reached Philadelphia in early June. T
hey immediately sought to enter into relations with the leaders of Congress. General Washington convened a Council of War on June 17 to discuss the situation.33 As usual, the officers were asked to send their opinions in writing. Duportail wrote,

  I think we ought not to quit our position of Valley Forge—before the enemy has evacuated Philadelphia—he must have lost his reason to remain in that city without the means to defend it. Thus, either the intelligence which says there are no more than 2 or 3000 men there, is false—or the English have it in their power by the measures which they have taken, signals agreed upon, number of boats to recross in sufficient force—in case of our advancing to attack them—