Washington's Engineer
Page 8
The matter is besides reducible to this—Either the English are not going away—or they are—if the former be the case all that has hitherto been done is a feint on their part and conceals some snare into which they would draw us—
if they are really determined to go away—what can we desire more—here is a certain immense advantage—let us not risk the loss of it, by procuring another, which even should we obtain it, would not change our affairs—
However, as we have here 12,000 men and that our position may be defended by a smaller number, I think it would be well to send 1500 men into the Jerseys, to reinforce what is there already—the whole should be commanded by a person well acquainted with the Country—they ought not in general to oppose the enemy in front, on his march—but to follow him on his left flank—
When the English shall have passed the Delaware, we ought in my opinion to move to the banks of that River and prepare to pass it likewise—but certain precautions are necessary—if we learn that the English are advancing hastily towards N. York—we may likewise pass with celerity but if they should halt, or appear to march slowly—in that case I think our troops ought not to pursue the enemy as fast as they could cross the River but post themselves advantageously near the River, and wait till the whole Army has passed in order to advance in force—
In Jerseys as well as every where else, I think we ought always to avoid General actions—to seek advantageous posts—to have the Roads of Retreat well reconnoitered, and to have secure communications with our magazines. After all, I find it difficult to believe that the Enemy mean to cross the Jersies and go to New York—unless there is deficiency of transports—but we have the same conduct to observe in case the Enemy should march down the left shore of the Delaware to embark below—
DUPORTAIL34
That same day, the entire camp at Valley Forge was put into condition to leave on the shortest possible notice. A returning scout brought intelligence at 11:30 the following morning that the enemy had evacuated Philadelphia earlier that morning. General Washington immediately put six brigades in motion while the “rest of the army prepared to follow with all possible dispatch.”35 All the troops converged at Coryell’s Ferry, about forty miles from Valley Forge and thirty miles north of Philadelphia. The whole army had crossed the Delaware by the twenty-first. After they “had cleaned their arms and gotten matters in Train,” the main body moved on toward Princeton, while General Poor, aided by Lafayette, led a detachment forward to come up with the enemy’s rear and left flank, giving them “as much annoyance as possible.”36
Colonel John Laurens, Washington’s aide-de-camp, and General Duportail went to reconnoiter the slopes of the Sourland Hills, while Washington passed through Princeton with the main body and took up headquarters at Hopewell. They each sent their reports to Washington, both dated June 23, 1778. Colonel John Laurens summarized Brigadier General Duportail’s observations on the other side of Duportail’s letter:
By General Duportail’s leave I inclose a rude sketch of the Road and the principal points, which have relation to the ground your Excellency desired to have reconnoitred. The chain of Sourland hills as nearly as I can judge runs north by east—its nearest distance from Prince Town is five miles—General Duportail has reconnoitred as well as time will permit a position in that part of the chain—the front is generally good—the flanks can only be made so by art—Roads of Retreat could not be examined—water is not very abundant, but might be sufficient for a short stay—there is an inferior range of hills in front of those above mentioned, upon which stands a Militia Alarm Post. A good position might perhaps be found there but the Rocky Hill from all accounts promises the strongest ground—Genl. Duportail proposes to await further orders ’till 8 o’clock tomorrow morning.37
The army did not use the position on the Sourland Hills.
At about the same time, the officers held discussions to determine the feasibility of launching an attack against Philadelphia. Some, including Duportail, Nathanael Greene, Henry Knox, and John Sullivan, opposed the offensive. General Washington, after listening to their reasons, concurred and abandoned the plan. The two sides clashed in a major battle at Monmouth, New Jersey, on June 28. Two days after the battle, Duportail was sent to ascertain what defenses would be necessary for its security and to plan fortifications for the Delaware, as Washington feared the British might send a fleet to attack Philadelphia after the return of Congress. The army later took up its position at White Plains near the Hudson River north of New York.
While Duportail was engaged fortifying the Delaware, Congress received news that a French fleet, under the Admiral Comte d’Estaing, was approaching American shores. A short while later, on July 12, Conrad-Alexandre Gérard landed at Chester, Pennsylvania, the first foreign representative to be received by the United States. A delegation from Congress received and escorted him in a carriage to the nearly ruined city that the British had demolished before leaving.
A completely new phase of the American struggle with Great Britain was set to begin. After only a year in America, Duportail, having been chosen as a captain, had become the commander in chief’s most valued advisor, a confidence that would never be betrayed.
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WEST POINT AND THE HUDSON
General Washington funneled available resources to the field army after the defeats of 1777. He refortified the Hudson Highlands to make the area the strategic pivot for the main army. A large portion of the engineer corps worked on the fortress at West Point from the winter of 1777–1778 until the end of the war. Instead of a single large fort, which could be lost in one stroke, Duportail’s engineers erected a complex of smaller, mutually supporting works for in-depth defense.
These defenses were the most important during the whole extent of the war because the line of fortifications extending along Lake Champlain had originally served the British in their struggle with France for supremacy on the continent. The Hudson River also provided an inland waterway from New York to Canada. British control of the river could also control communications between the northern and southern colonies, thereby dividing the country.
Philadelphia received news on May 18, 1775, of the capture of Fort Ticonderoga a few days after the Second Continental Congress convened. Congress resolved on May 25, “that a post be immediately taken at or near King’s Bridge.”1 General Clinton began constructing defensive works in the summer of 1777 but abandoned and destroyed them when he realized he could no longer hold them after Burgoyne’s surrender at Saratoga on October 16, 1777.
Congress requested on October 6, 1777, that Washington send an officer of engineers to take charge of the works of the north following the retreat of the Continental Army from Germantown. The commander in chief immediately sent Lieutenant Colonel Louis-Guillaume-Servais des Hayes de La Radière to serve at Fort Montgomery and take charge of the defensive works on the Hudson. He was promoted to the rank of colonel the following November.
General Washington then wrote to General Israel Putnam on October 8 to inform the commander of the Highlands.2 He was nearly sixty years of age when he was appointed to command the important Hudson defenses. He had led the defense of Bunker Hill, and his men adored him, but this was his last great exploit. He was not well fitted for conducting long-drawn-out campaigns that required definite knowledge and accuracy of details. He was impatient and peevish at times. Washington himself even had difficulties with him.
Lieutenant Colonel Radière was very different. His training and gifts were diametrically opposed to Putnam’s, and the two could not understand one another. Radière was very punctilious and guided by knowledge of principles. He worked by exact rules and was used to weighing the pros and cons before beginning operations. He was incapable of comprehending Putnam’s attitude and refused to allow himself to be disturbed. He persistently continued acting in his own meticulous way.
DEFENSES OF THE HUDSON
Radière’s date of arrival in the Highlands is unknown because one or two early
memorials have not been preserved. His first letter in the Papers of the Continental Congress is dated “New Windsor, December 13, 1777.” He drew up an elaborate plan for the defenses of the Hudson River dated January 2, 1778, which begins,
To the Honorable Major General Putnam and to the Council of War called for fixing a plan of Defence for Hudsons River.
The Memorial of Luis de la Radiere, Col. of Engineers, showing the reasons for fortifying the HILL upon which FORT CLINTON was, in preference to any other place.
GENTLEMEN
I have requested General Putnam to call a Council of War in order to lay before you my thoughts concerning the Settlement of a Fort for the defence of Hudsons River. It is the more necessary that I make you acquainted with the reasons on which my opinion is founded, as many of you may not concur with me in it. But am in hopes that the perusal of this memorial will accord our sentiment.3
Since Radière’s plan was not followed, it has been omitted here.
• • • • • • • • •
Conclusion:
You have certainly observed, Gentlemen, in this Memorial that there are many arguments for fortifying the Hill upon Fort Clinton, & very few for fortifying West Point; as also the arguments for fortifying Fort Clinton are stronger than those for fortifying West Point. Therefore I think that you will conclude with me that a fort must be built on Fort Clinton.
I will read to you Gentlemen a Memorial about all the preparations necessary for the building of this Fort & for the Obstructions of Hudsons River. I have two others ready concerning different parts of the same subject. After the reading of which I will request General Putnam to settle a general plan of what is to be undertaken & of the necessary preparations. Yet if any among you Gentlemen does not think that the place which I propose to you to be fortified is the best, I request you will again examine the reasons above mentioned and shew me Cause why they think my opinion is not well grounded, then I will adopt another. This business is of too great consequence not to be unanimous in our opinions.
I beg General you will direct to me your orders about the place to be fortified. I will execute them. It was my duty to make this representation, at present it is my duty to draw and take under my direction the works that shall be deemed advantageous by the Commander in Chief.4
WEST POINT FORTIFICATIONS
General Putnam and the other officers, together with the governor of New York, decided to fortify West Point, and the French engineer could not change their decision. When Radière asked them, as he practically did near the end of his memoir, “Show me your reasons for preferring West Point to Fort Clinton; if your arguments are stronger than mine, I will adopt your decision,” they had nothing to say because their minds worked in a totally different manner than his. They had made up their minds, and that was the end of it so far as they were concerned. Matters practically came to a standstill. General Putnam wrote to General Washington at Valley Forge,
Dear Sir
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I wrote Your Excellency that the place agreed upon to obstruct the navigation of the Hudson’s River was at West Point—Previous to that I had been with Governor Clinton, his Brother, the French Engineer and several others, to view that place. It was the opinion of all except the Frenchman, that it was the best and only effectual on the River. He could not prefer any other place but thought it was necessary to take more time to examine the ground etc. and it was near a month before we could have his opinion—which he at last gave in favor of Fort Clinton. This being contrary to the sentiment and expectation of every general officer, I was advised to wait on the Council and Assembly of this State for a final Determination. They at my Request, appointed a Committee for that purpose who have been these three days Reconnoitering the River and have now unanimously determined on West Point.
I have directed the Engineer to lay out the fort immediately—but he seems disgusted that every thing does not go as he thinks proper, even if contrary to the judgment of every other person. In short he is an excellent paper Engineer and I think it would be as well for us if he was employed wholly that way—I am confident if Congress would have found Business for him with them, our works would have been as well constructed & much more forward than they now are.5
Work on the fortifications progressed all through February 1778 but under great difficulties. During a temporary absence of General Putnam, the command devolved on another Connecticut man, General Samuel Holden Parsons. He wrote to General Washington on March 7,
Col. Laradiere finding it impossible to compleat the Fort and other Defences intended at this Post in such manner as to effectually withstand the attempts of the Enemy to pass up the River, early in the Spring and not choosing to hazard his reputation on Works erected on a different scale, calculated for a short Duration only, has desired leave to wait on Your Excellency and Congress which I have granted him. In justice to Col. Laradiere I ought to say he appears to be a gentleman of Science and Knowledge in his Profession and disposed to render us every Service he is able to do.6
General Washington responded to General Parsons’s letter on March 18, announcing the appointment of General Alexander McDougall to take the command at the Highlands “to reconcile all matters and to obviate the jealousies and prejudices that whether well or ill founded, have taken place.”7
THE SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN DEPARTMENT
The situation in the Northern Department had been rendered difficult not only because of the differences between the commanding officer and the engineer in charge of the works but also because of the confusing and, at times, conflicting orders issued by the Continental Congress. General Gates was president of the Board of War, and some of his friends in Congress wanted him to replace Washington. Gates admired and preferred another foreign engineer, Thaddeus Kosciusko, who had come to America a year before Duportail and his companions. Congress gave him the rank of colonel on October 18, 1776.
Kosciusko had gone north with General Gates in 1777 and had been responsible for the fortifications at Saratoga. He was greatly liked by the men who served under him as well as by his superiors, and there was a distinct effort put forward by his friends in Congress to have him made brigadier general in reward for his services at Saratoga. When news of the difference between Colonel Radière and the officers on the Hudson became known in Congress, without consulting Washington, it was decided that the Polish colonel should be sent north to replace the Frenchman. The visit of the latter to camp, indicated in the permit given him by General Parsons, offered the opportunity. Congress ordered Kosciusko north as Radière arrived at Valley Forge.
General Washington hoped that General McDougall’s command of the Highlands would smooth away all difficulties. He easily persuaded Colonel Radière to return to his post and the fortification of West Point, giving him at the same time the following letter of introduction to the new commanding officer:
Head Quarters, 21st March, 1778
Sir
This will be delivered to you by Colonel de la Radiere of the Corps of Engineers who was employed to superintend the fortifications on the North River—but from some misunderstanding between him and the late commanding officer, in which he thought his own honor and the public interest were committed, he determined to renounce the work, and return to Camp. I can safely recommend him to you as a man who understands his profession, and make no doubt of his giving you satisfaction, both in projecting and executing the works required for the defence of the River.8
Kosciuszko, acting under orders from Congress, immediately set to work on the fortifications already begun, expecting to be made brigadier general. Then, Colonel Radière returned with express orders from General Washington, who later learned, in some unexplained way, of the double command and ordered General McDougall, “The presence of Colonel de la Radiere rendering the Services of M. Kosciousko as Engineer at Fishkill unnecessary,—you are to give him orders to join this army without loss of time.” He added the following postscript: “P.S. Howe
ver desirous I am that Mr Kosciousko shd. repair to this army if he is specially employed by order of Congress or the Board of War, I wd. not wish to contravene their commands.”9
Congress placed General Gates in charge of the Highlands soon afterward, so that the two friends were together again. Kosciusko followed Gates to the south in 1780, and after the latter’s defeat at Camden, North Carolina, he served under General Nathanael Greene. He never came close to Washington.
General McDougall replied to Washington’s communication,
Fishkill 13th April 1778
Sir
I have lately been three days at West Point, the Fort is by this time so enclosed as to resist a sudden assault of the Enemy. But the Heights near it are such that the Fort is not tenable, if the Enemy possess them. For this reason we are obliged to make some work on them. It will require 5,000 men effectually to secure the ground near the Fort which command it. And these Objections are to almost all the Points on the River, proper to erect works to annoy the Shipping. Mr. Kosciousko is esteemed by those who have attended the work at West Point, to have had more practice than Col. Delaradiere, and his manner of treating the people more acceptable, than that of the latter; which induced Genl. Parsons and Governor Clinton to desire the former may be continued at West Point. The first has a Commission as Engineer with the rank of Colonel in October 1776—Colonel Delaradiere’s Commission I think is dated in November last,10 and disputes rank with the former, which obliges me to keep them apart; and avail the services of their assistance in the best manner I can devise. This seems to be the Idea recommended by the Board of War in consequence to a reference of Congress to them, on the Subject of Disputes relative to the construction of the works. If Your Excellency should think proper in this State of those Gentlemen, to order Mr. Kosciousko to join your army, whenever I am honored with your Commands on this Head, I shall despatch him.11