Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series)

by Sunzi

  Chia Lin says: “Victory is the only thing that matters, and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons.” It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating every accepted canon of warfare.

  and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.

  Tu Mu says: “Conform to the enemy’s tactics until a favourable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove decisive.”

  68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you.

  As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.

  XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE

  I love the smell of napalm in the morning.

  Lt. Col. Bill Kilgore in Apocalypse Now, screenplay by John Milius (1976)

  Rather more than half the chapter (paragraphs 1-13) is devoted to the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.

  1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;

  Li Ch’üan says: “Set fire to the camp, and kill the soldiers” (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch’ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see chapter XI, paragraph 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he exclaimed: “Never venture, never win! [Otherwise translated: Unless you enter the tiger’s lair, you cannot get hold of the tiger’s cubs.] The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely; this will cool the King’s courage and cover us with glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.”

  “The officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch’ao then fell into a passion: ‘It is to-day,’ he cried, ‘that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate for valiant warriors!’ All then agreed to do as he wished.

  “Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan Ch’ao ordered ten of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy’s barracks, it being arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch’ao slew three of them with his own hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames.

  “On the following day, Pan Ch’ao went back and informed Kuo Hsün [the Intendant] of what he had done. The latter was greatly alarmed and turned pale. But Pan Ch’ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: ‘Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking sole credit for our exploit.’ This satisfied Kuo Hsün, and Pan Ch’ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch’ao took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king’s son as hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku.”

  the second is to burn stores;

  Tu Mu says: “Provisions, fuel and fodder.” In order to subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Kêng recommended Wên Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.

  the third is to burn baggage-trains;

  An example given is the destruction of Yüan Shao’s waggons and impediments by Ts’ao Ts’ao in 200 A.D.

  the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

  No fewer than four totally diverse explanations of this sentence are given by the commentators, not one of which is quite satisfactory… . The interpretation which I have adopted is that given by Tu Yu … : “To drop fire into the enemy’s camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy’s lines.”

  2. In order to carry out an attack with fire, we must have means available.

  Ts’ao Kung thinks that [“means” indicates] “traitors in the enemy’s camp.” … But Ch’ên Hao is more likely to be right in saying: “We must have favourable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help us.” Chia Lin says: “We must avail ourselves of wind and dry weather.”

  The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.

  [The Chinese character] is explained by Ts’ao Kung as “appliances for making fire.” Tu Mu suggests “dry vegetable matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc.” … Chang Yü says: “vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for lighting fires.”

  3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration.

  A fire must not be begun “recklessly” or “at haphazard.”

  4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellation of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind.

  These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.

  5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments:

  6. (1) When fire breaks out inside the enemy’s camp, respond at once with an attack from without.

  7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy’s soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

  The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.

  8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are.

  Ts’ao Kung says: “If you see a possible way, advance; but if you find the difficulties too great, retire.”

  9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your attack at a favourable moment.

  Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of incen-diaries) inside the enemy’s camp. “But,” he continues, “if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not wait on in hopes of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus render our own attempts fruitless.”

  The famous Li Ling once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking advantage of a favourable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese general’s camp, but found that every scrap of combustible vegetation in the neighbourhood had alread
y been burnt down.

  On the other hand, Po-ts’ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. At the head of a large army he was besieging Ch’ang-shê, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: “In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers do not account for everything. [The commentator here quotes from Sun Tzu, chapter V, paragraphs 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T’ien Tan [who used converted spies to devastating effect].”

  That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city-walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them into headlong flight.

  10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.

  Chang Yü, following Tu Yu, says: “When you make a fire, the enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success.” A rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: “If the wind is in the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy.”

  11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.

  [Compare this] to Lao Tzu’s saying: “A violent wind does not last the space of a morning” (Tao Té Ching, chapter 23). Mei Yao-ch’ên and Wang Hsi say: “A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general rule.” The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.

  12. In every army, the five developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.

  Tu Mu’s commentary … : “We must make calculations as to the paths of the stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our attack with fire.” Chang Yü [says]: “We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar attacks from them.”

  13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.

  14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.

  Ts’ao Kung’s note is: “We can merely obstruct the enemy’s road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores.” Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of fire. This is the reason, Chang Yü concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu speaks thus of the two elements: “If an army is encamped on lowlying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be exterminated by fire.”

  15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation.

  This is one of the most perplexing passages in [The Art of War]… . Ts’ao Kung says: “Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single day.” And Tu Mu: “If you do not take opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will ensue.” …

  For several reasons, however, and in spite of the formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch’ên, whose words I will quote: “Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the favourable moments when they come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to say, they must resort to such means of attack as fire, water and the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to sit still and simply hold on to the advantages they have got.”

  16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.

  The meaning seems to be that the ruler lays plans which the general must show resourcefulness in carrying out… . Tu Mu [offers this quotation from another commentator]: “The warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, knits them together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be respected.”

  17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.

  Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the Tao Té Ching, chapter 69: “I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot.”

  18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique.

  19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.

  This is repeated from chapter XI, paragraph 17. Here I feel convinced that it is an interpolation.

  20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.

  21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being;

  The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this saying.

  nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.

  22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact.

  XIII. THE USE OF SPIES

  When you conceal your will from others, that is Thick. When you impose your will on others, that is Black.

  Lee Zhong Wu, Thick Face, Black Heart (1911)

  The evolution of the meaning “spy” is worth considering for a moment, provided it be understood that this is very doubtful ground… . [It is defined elsewhere] as “a crack” or “chink,” and on the whole we may accept Hsü Ch’ieh’s analysis as not unduly fanciful: “At night, a door is shut; if, when it is shut, the light of the moon is visible, it must come through a chink.” From this it is an easy step to the meaning “space between,” or simply “between,” as for example in the phrase “to act as a secret spy between enemies.” … Another possible theory is that the word may first have come to mean “to peep,” which would naturally be suggested by “crack” or “crevice,” and afterwards the man who peeps, or spy.

  1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.

  Chang Yü has the note: “We may be reminded of the saying: ‘On serious ground, gather in plunder’ [chapter XI, paragraph 13]. Why then should carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways?—The answer is, that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to the army. Besides, the injunction to ‘forage on the enemy’ only means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be provided agai
nst. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, again, there are places like salt deserts, where provisions being unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with.”

  As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labour.

  Mei Yao-ch’ên says: “Men will be lacking at the plough-tail.” The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts, … each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, as Tu Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common… . In time of war, one of the families had to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able-bodied soldier to each family), the husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.

  2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy’s condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honours and emoluments

  “For spies” is of course the meaning, though it would spoil the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually mentioned at this point.

  is the height of inhumanity.

  Sun Tzu’s argument is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy’s condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing less than a crime against humanity.