War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  On the fourth, Codman, Stiller, and I decided to find the 6th Armored Division. Stiller rode in the armored car to lead the way and Codman and I followed in the peep, moving via Avranches, Pontorson, Combourg, and Merdrignac. We met a very excited liaison officer who told us that the road was under fire. Afterward we found out that the poor boy was slightly touched in the head. However, proceeding down a road for over fifteen kilometers in country known to be occupied by the enemy, and not seeing one of our soldiers, was rather exciting. Finally we caught up with the Command Post of the division.

  1 See Third Army Organization Appendix H.

  Next day, at the briefing, I learned with considerable perturbation that I had driven right through a German division. I did not wish to chagrin our G-2 by telling him I had not been able to find it.

  As we advanced into the Breton Peninsula, the attitude of the people became much more friendly. I think this is because there had been less fighting there and less bombing. The Normans in the Cherbourg Peninsula were certainly not particularly sympathetic. However, since both we and the Germans had had to bomb their towns, perhaps they should not be criticized.

  On account of the great distances I had to cover, most of my travel was done in an L-5 Liaison plane and I saw hundreds of crashed planes. Around each one of these wrecks there was a path beaten by curious ghouls. The sight reminded me of dead birds partly eaten by beetles. The gliders with their big heads and wings far forward were reminiscent of dragonflies.

  One day, on visiting Twelfth Army Group, General Bradley’s Headquarters, I passed through St. Lo, where Beatrice and I spent a night in 1913 and bought some furniture. Up to that time it was the most completely ruined city I had ever seen. Since then my education has been improved.

  The seventh of August was the heaviest air bombardment we received. I think they were light bombs, probably about two hundred pounds, and some personnel bombs. During this operation they got one of our ammunition dumps to the tune of about one thousand tons. It was still going off three days later.

  As of the seventh—that is, the beginning of the second week—the 83d Division of the VIII Corps was in the outskirts of St. Malo. The 6th Armored Division was close to, but not in, Brest. Dinan had been captured by an infantry combat team of the 8th Division, which then moved on up the Peninsula west of St. Malo to attack Dinard. The 4th Armored Division was in Vannes and was approaching Lorient. The 79th Division was across the river at Laval and the 90th across at Mayenne, while the 5th Armored was near Chateau Gontier and reconnaissance elements of another part of the 8th Division were in Chateaubriant.

  At 0830 an American Air Corps officer, who had been shot down near Angers and rescued by a member of the French Forces of the Interior, came in and told us that he had driven from Angers to Chateaubriant on the back roads and found no large formed bodies of Germans —only a few Signal Corps men taking up wire and moving east. He stated that the bridge at Angers was intact. I sent General Gaffey, the Frenchman, and Colonel Carter1 of the Staff to Vitry to pick up a combat team of the 5th Infantry Division with some tanks and a reconnaissance troop, and attack Angers. It was a slightly risky operation, but so is war. In this case it was successful, except that the bridge was blown up in their faces just as they reached it.

  Late on this day we got a rumor that the Germans had several Panzer Divisions and would attack west from the line Mortain-Barenton on Avranches. Personally I thought this a German bluff to cover a withdrawal. However, I stopped the 80th and 35th Infantry Divisions and the 2d French Armored Division in the vicinity of St. Hilaire in case something should happen.

  On the eighth, Hughes2 and I drove to Dol, which is supposed to contain the largest phallic symbol in the world, although I could not find it; then to see the VIII Corps. Next on to near St. Malo, which the 83d Division was attacking. I found Macon, who commanded the division, well up in front. When he saw General Hughes in the car with me, he turned white, and I realized he thought I was about to relieve him, so I called out, “Fine work.” As a matter of fact, the division was doing well, but not too well. They had already lost eight hundred men and had taken thirteen hundred prisoners.3

  1Lieutenant Colonel B. S. Carter, Assistant G-2, Third U.S. Army.

  2Major General E. S. Hughes of General Eisenhower’s Staff.

  3At the time General Patton visited General Macon and the 83rd Division in St. Malo, the fighting had degenerated to a sniping contest. Though there wasn’t much noise, it was dangerous to stick one’s neck out. Because of the quietude, General Patton suggested that General Macon take General Hughes and himself closer to the front. General Macon is reported to have replied, “General, if you just move up there forty yards, you’ll be in the enemy front line.” Nothing else was said

  This was the day we ordered the XV Corps to attack on the line Alengon-Sees. On the eighth, St. Malo fell to the 83d and the last resistance to the 5th Division in Angers ceased.

  General Spaatz,1 Tedder, and Bradley came to Headquarters. This was the first time we had all been together since GAFSA,2 the day the Germans bombed the main street in broad daylight just after Spaatz had told me that the British had complete mastery of the air. Tedder laughingly said, “I’ll bet Patton laid that on as a wheeze.” I told him I had not, but if I could find the German who did the bombing, I would certainly decorate him. As a result of this bombing, we also had the unique experience of seeing Arabs and camels run.

  I became worried because there was a big hole in the American flank from St. Hilaire to Mayenne; also a second gap southwest of Alengon. The only thing I could do to safeguard these gaps was to assemble the 8th Armored at Fougeres.

  On the eleventh, Codman and I visited Headquarters of the XV Corps northeast of Le Mans, then the 79th and 90th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Armored Division. I could not find General LeClerc of the 2d French Armored, as he was running around up in front, although I followed him farther than caution dictated. The 2d French Armored and the 5th Armored had had quite a fight the day before in which they lost between them some forty tanks.

  An amusing incident occurred on this trip. I have always insisted that anti-tank guns be placed where they can see without being seen. I came to a crucifix in the middle of a three-way road junction, and sitting exactly under the crucifix was an anti-tank gun completely unconcealed. I gave the non-commissioned officer in charge the devil for not having carried out my instructions. When I got through he said, “Yes, sir, but yesterday we got two tanks from this position.” So I had to apologize. Perhaps the sanctity of the location saved the gun?.

  1Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, American Air Forces, under General Eisenhower.

  2GAFSA—General Patton’s Headquarters in Tunisia.

  We made plans for the 7th Armored Division to cross the Mayenne River at Mayenne and move on Alencon, while the 80th Division moved north to join them on the Laval-Le Mans road. Whenever the 35th Division was relieved by the First Army, it was to close up on these divisions to form the XX Corps, which then would go in on the left of the XV Corps. The 5th Infantry Division, less a combat team which was still at Angers, assembled at Le Mans and was to be joined by the 4th Armored as soon as it was relieved. These two divisions were to form the XIII Corps, prepared to move northeast—that is, on the south of the XV Corps and on the right flank of the army.

  The islands off St. Malo were still giving trouble, firing at our troops on shore with their long-range guns, but so far I had had no success in persuading the British Navy to do anything about it. We also decided to ask for the air on Dinard, because we were having too many casualties trying to avoid bombing towns.

  In driving to our new Command Post, six miles northwest of Le Mans, Codman and I stopped at the Chateau Fougeres. This is the best chateau from a military point of view, I have ever seen, because the dwelling part of it was destroyed by Richelieu and no people have lived in it and improved it since this day. It has been taken only twice, once about a.d. 1100 and once when
we took it.

  On the thirteenth, it became evident that the XX Corps was hitting nothing, so we moved it northeast of Le Mans, using the 7th Armored Division and the 5th Infantry Division and sending a combat team of the 80th to Angers. This permitted us to make the XII Corps out of the 4th Armored and 35th Infantry, which was now assembled. The XV Corps, consisting as before of the 5th Armored, 2d French Armored, 90th and 79th Divisions, had taken the Alen$on—Sees—Argentan line. It could easily have entered Falaise and completely closed the gap, but we were ordered not to do this, allegedly because the British had sown the area with a large number of time bombs. This halt was a great mistake, as I was certain that we could have entered Falaise and I was not certain that the British would. As a matter of fact, we had reconnaissance parties near the town when we were ordered to pull back.

  Owing to the resulting necessity of halting the XV Corps, the XX Corps now moved on Dreux and the XII Corps on Chartres. From this formation the army, consisting of four corps (VII, XII, XV, and XX Corps), could attack in any direction without crossing columns and, in fact, did on the twelfth and thirteenth and also later.

  Thanks to the foresight of Colonel Cummings,10 the Adjutant General, the system of administration in the Third Army passed direct from divisions to army, leaving the corps in its proper sphere as a tactical unit. Because of this arrangement we had perfect facility in shifting divisions without losing a moment’s time. We never had to regroup, which seemed to be the chief form of amusement in the British armies.

  —————

  1

  The 3d Division and Combat Command “A,” 2d Armored Division, landed at Licata.

  2

  Combat Command “B,” 2d Armored Division, landed at Gela on D + 1.

  3

  8Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Division Commander.

  4

  Major General Terry de la M. Allen, commanding the 1st Division.

  5

  The Command and General Staff College.

  6

  Colonel Charles R. Codman, Aide de Camp to General Patton and with him throughout the war.

  7

  The heart of Germany and the destruction of the Reich.

  2«we”—General Patton was accompanied by Major General H. J. Gaffey, then Chief of Staff of Third Army, his Aides, Lieutenant Colonel C. R. Codman and Major Alexander Stiller, Sergeant Meeks, his orderly, and “Willie,” the General’s dog.

  8

  See Appendix H.

  9

  Colonel Paul D. Harkins, Deputy Chief of Staff for General Patton throughout the war. See Appendix F.

  10

  Colonel Robert E. Cummings, Adjutant General of the Third Army throughout the war.

  As of August 14 the Third Army had advanced farther and faster than any army in history. The night of the fourteenth was the first night we had not been bombed since starting, but in the morning we were attacked by an American plane which had got lost.

  Codman and I flew to Le Mans, and I never recall getting into a plane with more reluctance, because I had been assured by all the Staff that, if the Germans failed to shoot me from above, the Americans would get me from below, as they were trigger happy, due to considerable bombing. It was one of the few days, in fact, that I have had a premonition of impending death. It failed to materialize.

  We landed beside a road and immediately secured a medical peep which happened to be passing. Before getting into it, I had them take down the Red Cross flag, as I did not wish to travel under false colors. After seeing McLain of the 90th, we went to the XV Corps to orient Haislip on what was going on. He agreed with me that, with two divisions, he could move on Dreux and hold the Falaise Gap with the other two. Later, I saw Bradley,

  who approved the plan, so we started the XV Corps on Dreux, the XX on Chartres, and the XII on Orleans. He also let me keep the 80th Division for the eastern march, replacing it in the VIII Corps with a division from the First Army which had been pinched out. To sum up, at the close of this day the arrangements were that three corps would attack east at 2030 and the VIII Corps would continue mopping up in Brittany.

  Just east of Le Mans was one of the best examples of armor and air co-operation I have ever seen. For about two miles the road was full of enemy motor transport and armor, many of which bore the unmistakable calling card of a P-47 fighter-bomber—namely, a group of fifty-caliber holes in the concrete. Whenever armor and air can work together in this way, the results are sure to be excellent. Armor can move fast enough to prevent the enemy having time to deploy off the roads, and so long as he stays on the roads the fighter-bomber is one of his most deadly opponents. To accomplish this happy teamwork two things are necessary: first, intimate confidence and friendship between air and ground; second, incessant and apparently ruthless driving on the part of the ground commander. A pint of sweat saves a gallon of blood.

  The spirit of the men in the Evacuation Hospitals was improving and the incidence of “battle fatigue” and of self-inflicted wounds had dropped materially. Soldiers like to play on a winning team.

  General LeClerc came to see me, quite upset because he and the 90th Division were standing fast, while the 5th Armored and the 79th Infantry Divisions were moving on Dreux. I explained to him that that was the quickest way to shuffle the troops, and that I was not interested in the political repercussions of who got to the Seine first. In spite of a little rough talk, we parted friends.

  There was another scare about five Panzer Divisions at Argentan, so I was ordered to halt on the line Dreux-Chateaudun. However, I talked my way out of this and started again in the morning.

  On the fifteenth, Prince Felix of Luxembourg joined us.

  On the sixteenth, Stiller, Codman, and I drove to Chartres, which had just been taken by Walker whom we met at the bridge, still under some fire. The bridge had been partly destroyed by a German hiding in a fox hole who pulled the detonator and blew the bridge, killing j some Americans, after the leading elements had passed. : He then put up his hands and surrendered. The Americans took him prisoner, which I considered the height of folly.

  From there, we visited the Headquarters of the XV Corps at Chateauneuf-en-Thymerais. General Haislip had a very bad eye, due to an accident with a French truck, but he and the troops were in good spirits.

  At 1830 on the sixteenth of August, Bradley called and told me to attack and capture Trun, in the Falaise Gap, with the 2d French Armored and the 90th and 80th Divisions. He also said that General Gerow, whose V Corps in the First Army had been pinched out, and whose divisions had been sent to my VIII Corps in the attack on Brest, would take over these troops (2d French Armored and 90th and 80th Divisions) as a corps, Bradley also intimated that Gerow would take over the new attack on Trun.

  In the meantime, I sent Gaffey to Alen$on to carry out Bradley’s order and start the war; and as Bradley had sent for me, I arranged with Gay that if Gaffey was to be replaced by Gerow, I would telephone Gay the words “change horses” and add the time of attack.

  Next morning I learned that Gerow and Staff had arrived at* Third Army Headquarters. I called Gay, and gave what I believe was the shortest attack order ever issued to an army corps: “Change Horses 0600.”1

  In place of the three divisions we lost, we got two pinched out from the First Army and also two Ranger Battalions.

  In the meantime I told Haislip to attack and take Mantes-Gassicourt with the 5th Armored and 79th Infantry Divisions. In this way we would control the German barge traffic on the Seine.

  On the seventeenth of August a very sad thing happened. Major General Gilbert Cook, who commanded the XII Corps and had been Deputy Army Commander during the movement of the army from England to the Continent, became so ill from circulatory disorders that he could no longer retain command. This was a great blow to

  both of us, and I acceded to medical opinion only after a very soul-searching time. Cook was, and is, a fine soldier and an audacious leader. He had hung onto command l
onger than a proper regard for his health justified. On the nineteenth, I secured Major General Manton C. Eddy to replace him. Eddy had commanded the 9th Division in Tunisia and Sicily and in the cross-Channel landing.

  Colonel Odom1 was wounded by a sniper while passing through the same woods I drove through on the sixteenth. He was standing up in his peep, having just remounted, when he felt a blow over his heart and heard a shot. He put his hand up and it came away covered with blood. When the driver saw it he said, “We will get the hell out of here,” and turned so fast that Odom was almost thrown out. The bullet followed a rib and did not go into the lung cavity. Had it done so, it would have killed him. Disregarding his own medical education, he returned to duty three days after being hit.

  The Sicilian Campaign had ended a year before, on the seventeenth.

  On the nineteenth, in company with General Wyche of the 79th Division, we went to Mantes and saw the Seine River. I was strongly tempted to order the 79th across, but did not do so until I had seen General Bradley. When I did see him that evening, after a long flight in which we twice had to turn back on account of bad weather, he not only approved the crossing of the 79th, but ordered the 5th Armored Division of the same corps to attack north along the western bank of the Seine, while the XIX Corps (Major General C. H. Corlett) of the First Army came up on its left rear. Furthermore, he sanctioned my plan to cross the XX Corps at Melun and Fontainebleau and the XII Corps at Sens. It was evident that when these crossings were effected, the Seine and Yonne became useless to the Germans as military barriers. The Melun crossing is the same as that used by Labienus with his Tenth Legion about 55 b.c.

  Colonel Codman went to Vannes and brought back my old friend, General Koechlin-Schwartz of the French Army. In World War I he was one of the leading instructors at the Army General Staff School at Langres. We had a very pleasant evening talking over old times and he said, among other things, that had he thought, much less taught, at Langres what I had been doing, he would have been put in the madhouse. He also stated that when he heard an armored division was heading for Brest, he knew I was in command. I asked him why the French Army had done so badly in 1940. He replied at once that for ten years prior to that time the French Army had thought, taught, and practiced defense—never attack.