War as I Knew It

by George S. Patton

  On the twentieth, one combat team of the 79th Division, XV Corps, forced a crossing at Mantes. At the same time the 5th Armored Division, same corps, started north on Louviers. Just as it was clearing Evreux, it was struck in the left rear by some German armor. The 7th Armored, which was at Evreux at the time, joined in the fight and the Germans lost ten tanks and withdrew. However, this fight delayed the move of the 5th Armored.

  In consonance with the plans I had already made on the twentieth, I fixed the time of attack for the XX and XII Corps on Melun, Montereau, and Sens respectively as of daylight Monday, the twenty-first of August, so that no one would be up in time to halt me. However, to play safe, I gave them the code word “Proset” which, if it came over the radio, would mean “Halt in place.”

  I always had a very funny feeling at such times. The plans, when they came into my mind, seemed simple, but after I had issued the orders and everything was moving and I knew that I had no reserve, I had a feeling of worry and, as usual, had to say to myself, “Do not take counsel of your fears.” The sensation is very much like that I used to have steeplechasing. I was always very anxious to ride the race, but when the saddling bell rang I felt scared. When the flag dropped and the race was on, my fear left me.

  When this move started, Eddy of the XII Corps asked me how much he should worry about his right flank. I said that that depended on how nervous he was by nature. Of course, there was nothing to cover his right flank, but by advancing in depth—that is, one division following the other—this lack of defense was immaterial. If I had worried about flanks, I could never have fought the war. Also, I was convinced that our Air Service could locate

  any groups of enemy large enough to be a serious threat, and then I could always pull something out of the hat to drive them back while the Air Force in the meantime delayed their further advance.

  Having completed these instructions, we moved the Army Command Post to Brou, fifteen miles northwest of Chateaudun. It was in these woods that Willie was attacked by a large number of ferocious hornets. It took the Commanding General, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, several soldiers, and about five gallons of gasoline to bum out the hornets. Willie was very sorry for himself, and we put soda and water on his wounds.

  About this time Colonel Nixon secured three complete fuses for the V-l bombs from materiel we captured at the airdrome northwest of Orleans.

  As of August 21, the end of the first three weeks, casualties for the Third Army were:

  Our replacements during the same period had amounted only to 10,622. This was the beginning of our constant dwindling in strength, caused by lack of replacements, which did not terminate until about halfway through the Bastogne fight.

  During this same three weeks’ period we estimated that the enemy had lost:

  From our experience in Tunisia and Sicily our estimates were very accurate. Materiel losses were as follows:

  Tiger Tank

  While we were at this camp, Judge Robert P. Patterson, Under-Secretary of War, and General Brehon E. Somervell, Chief of the Army Service Forces, visited us.

  The crossings over the Seine and Yonne Rivers were successful at Montereau and Sens. The XX Corps had not yet got across at Melun, owing to the fact that there had been a very severe fight between our 2d Infantry (Colonel A. W. Roffe) of the 5th Division and several thousand Germans at Bauillet. I felt at this time that the great chance of winning the war would be to let the Third Army move with three corps, two up and one back, to the line Metz—Nancy—Epinal. It was my belief then, and still is, that by doing this we could have crossed the German border in ten days. The roads and railways were adequate to sustain us.

  Elements of the 5th Infantry Division ran into some Gestapo in Orleans, who, unfortunately, attempted to escape. They also captured a very fine Cadillac car, which they presented to Third Army Headquarters.

  I flew to Bradley’s Headquarters to sell the above plan to him, but found that he had already gone to see Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery on a similar plan, the only difference being that he proposed to use two armies, the First and Third, whereas I proposed to use simply the Third.

  The citadel at St. Malo fell to the 83d Division on the twenty-first, allegedly because an American-born German, who had been captured, was put on cook police in the citadel and had persuaded the two German cooks on duty there, who were also from Brooklyn, that the best way to end the war was to punch a hole in the water tank. This was done, and the garrison was forced to surrender because of lack of water. Whether true or not, this is a good story.

  On the morning of the twenty-third, we had great excitement when it was reported that a group of Frenchmen were in camp with a proposition. I immediately thought they were asking for surrender and so had the conversation taken down. However, it turned out they simply wanted to get a suspension of hostilities in order to save Paris, and probably save the Germans. I sent them to General Bradley, who arrested them.

  Just after they departed, my friend, General Juin,3 came to see me. He was extremely complimentary and said that my daring was Napoleonic. He also said, and this was more to the point, that the easiest way through the Siegfried Line was the Nancy Gap. I had come to this same conclusion from a study of the map, because, if you find a large number of big roads leading through a place, this is the place to go regardless of enemy resistance. It is useless to capture an easy place that you can’t move from. In order to make my plan for the movement on the Nancy Gap more workable, it was desirable to secure two extra divisions. Neither the 90th nor the 80th would get up in time, so I tried to persuade

  General Bradley to let me have two divisions from the VII Corps (Major General J. L. Collins) of the First Army, which I thought had closed on Chartres. When I talked to Bradley, I found out that this was not the case, so I had to proceed east without them.

  Colonel Muller1 and I then flew to Laval to see Bradley on the question of supply. He was at the airport waiting for me, as he had to go to see Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery. Bradley was very much worried, as he felt that Montgomery was over-influencing General Eisenhower and would cause all or part of the American armies to turn north. Air Marshal Sir Leigh-Mallory2 had been talking to Bradley all day trying to sell the idea. After Bradley left and in the short period of time, about ten minutes, which was necessary to ride from the airport to the Headquarters, I had what I believe was my greatest tactical idea—namely, for the Third Army to turn north, the XX Corps from Melun and Montereau, the XII Corps from Sens. This could be done faster than anything else. We would head initially on Beauvais, and could have picked up the 4th Infantry Division, First Army, which was closing in on Paris, the 79th Division, also First Army, from Mantes, and possibly the 5th Armored Division. After reaching Beauvais, we could have paralleled the Seine River and opened it to the British and Canadians, and thereafter have taken our supplies across at Mantes, saving at least fifty per cent of the haul necessary to take them via Montereau. General Leven C. Allen, Bradley’s Chief of Staff, was enthusiastic, so we decided that when Bradley returned, if he telegraphed me “Plan A,” I would turn north and if “Plan B,” I would continue east.

  If the doings of the Third Army and its General are subject to inquiry by future historians, the two points just mentioned should be a warning. In the space of two days I had evolved two plans, wholly distinct, both of which were equally feasible. The point I am trying to bring out is that one does not plan and then try to make circumstances fit those plan. One tries to make plans fit the circumstances. I think the difference between success and failure in high command depends upon the ability, or lack of it, to do just that.

  1Colonel, later Brigadier General, Walter J. Muller, G-4, Chief of Supply for General Patton throughout the war.

  2Air Marshal Sir Leigh-Mallory, Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces.

  The French 2d Armored and the 4th Infantry Division entered Paris on the twenty-third. On the twenty-fourth, the British Broadcasting Compan
y announced that Patton’s Third Army had taken Paris. This seemed to me poetic justice, as I could have taken it had I not been told not to. Later, I found that when the French 2d Armored entered Paris, they told everyone they belonged to the Third Army and not to the First.

  On the twenty-fifth of August, we moved the Third Army Command Post to a point between Orleans and Pithiviers. Just before starting for this point, Bradley wired me to come to Chartres. The Cathedral, from which all the glass had been removed, was not hurt in any way, and, to my mind, was more beautiful than ever, because there was enough light inside to appreciate its architecture.

  Monty had won again, and the weight of the operation was to be turned north rather than east. The First Army with nine divisions was to cross the Seine at Melun and Mantes, both of which places had been captured and bridged by the Third Army. Upon crossing, the First Army would move on Lille. The Third Army, with seven divisions—namely, XII Corps, 4th Armored, 35th and 80th; XX Corps, 7th Armored and 5th Infantry; and XV Corps, 2d French Armored and 90th Infantry—was to advance alone in the direction of the line Metz-Strasbourg. So far things were not too bad, as we still had seven good divisions going in the direction in which Bradley and I always wanted to go.

  Returning from this conference, I reached the new Command Post rather late and decided to fly to the XX Corps, which I had not seen for a few days. My regular pilot (Major W. W. Bennett, Commanding Officer, 14th Air Liaison Squadron, Third Army) was not there, so a sergeant pilot flew me. Presently it became very clear that we were lost, but we kept wandering around until we flew right over a German field hospital in a woods. This convinced me that we were at least fifteen miles in the rear of the German lines, so we climbed and got out as fast as we could.

  On the twenty-sixth, the Signal Corps sent people around to take “A Day with General Patton.” We first drove to the XX Corps, which was at Fontainebleau, then via Nemours to beyond Montereau and found the 5th Infantry Division. I complimented General Irwin on the splendid work which his division had done and had the good luck to be able to decorate several of his men with Distinguished Service Crosses.

  When, early in the campaign, I had issued orders that at least one regimental combat team of infantry should ride on the tanks of an armored division, the 5th Infantry Division complained most bitterly, stating, among other things, that there was nothing for the men to hold on to. I told them that was the men’s hard luck, but I was sure soldiers would rather ride on anything for twenty-five miles than walk fifteen miles. I remember that on this day Irwin was loud in his praise of tank-borne infantry. The professional soldier is certainly conservative.

  We retraced our steps and crossed the Seine at Melun in company with elements of the 3d Armored Division, First Army. When they recognized me, all these men stood up in their tanks and cheered.

  After leaving them, I found the Headquarters of the 7th Armored Division and told the Commanding General in very incisive language that I was not satisfied with him nor his division as to appearance or progress. This is important, because it was later necessary to relieve this officer.

  I then returned to Fontainebleau and flew to the XII Corps, which was situated on the Sens—Troyes road. While there, General Wood came in to state that the 4th Armored had just captured Troyes. This capture was a very magnificent feat of arms. Colonel, later General, Bruce Clark brought his combat command up north of the town, where a gully or depression gave him cover, at about three thousand yards from the town. The edge of the town was full of German guns and Germans. Clark lined up one medium tank company, backed it with two armored infantry companies, all mounted, and charged with all guns blazing. He took the town without losing a man or a vehicle. Later, it was necessary to re-attack to get him out, because the Germans closed in behind his small force.

  In reading over the account in the preceding pages of the places I went in one day, I am impressed with my own agility. Perhaps some day I shall figure out the number of miles I drove and flew trying to direct the campaigns of the Third Army. I’ll bet it was about a million.

  On the twenty-seventh, the XX Corps took Nogent and continued to move on Reims, while the XII Corps moved out on Chalons via Vitry. Higher authority compelled me to leave the 35th Division east of Orleans covering my right flank, although personally I did not believe you could have persuaded a German to cross the Loire in a northerly direction. I flew to Orleans, which was being shelled from across the river in a very moderate manner. The airport northwest of the town was doing a roaring business. The day before it had dispatched six hundred airplanes and was doing about the same this day. These airplanes carried gasoline and ammunition for our troops.

  On the twenty-eighth, we took Chateau-Thierry and closed in on Vitry-le-Francois, Chalons, and Reims. General Bradley came about 1030. I had considerable difficulty in persuading him to let me continue the attack to the Meuse. He finally assented.

  The twenty-ninth of August was, in my opinion, one of the critical days in this war, and hereafter many pages will be written on it—or, rather, on the events which produced it. It was evident at this time that there was no real threat against us as long as we did not allow ourselves to be stopped by imaginary enemies. I therefore told Eddy of the XII Corps to move on Commercy and directed Walker of the XX to do the same on Verdun. Everything seemed rosy, when suddenly it was reported to me that the 140,000 gallons of gas we were to get that day had not arrived. At first, I thought it was a backhanded way of slowing up the Third Army. I later found that this was not the case, but that the delay was due to a change of plan by the High Command, implemented, in my opinion, by General Montgomery.

  I saw Bradley, General H. R. Bull (General Eisenhower’s G-3), and Allen, Bradley’s Chief of Staff, at Chartres on the thirtieth. I presented my case for a rapid

  advance to the east for the purpose of cutting the Siegfried Line before it could be manned. Bradley was very sympathetic, but Bull and, I gather, the rest of SHAEF’s1 Staff, did not concur.

  It was my opinion then that this was the momentous error of the war. So far as the Third Army was concerned, we not only failed to get the back gas due us, but got practically no more, because, in consonance with the decision to move north, in which two corps of the First Army also participated, all supplies—both gasoline and ammunition—had to be thrown in that direction.

  In addition to this, the air lift, on which we had previously counted for a good proportion of our supplies, was being diverted to feed the Parisians; while other transport planes were being assembled, unknown to me at the time, for an air drop in front of the Twenty-First Army Group. Finally, as a last straw, Com Z2 used several truck companies to move their Headquarters from Cherbourg to Paris at this very date.

  After receiving the above heartbreaking news, I went to our new Command Post at La Chaume, near Sens. There I found that Eddy had obtained permission from Gaffey to halt at St. Dizier, because he said that to continue beyond that point would find his tanks without any gasoline. I immediately called him and told him to continue until the tanks stopped, and then get out and walk, because it was mandatory to get crossings over the Meuse. In the last war, I drained three-quarters of my tanks in order to advance the other quarter, and I felt Eddy could do the same. I was sure it was a terrible mistake to halt even at the Meuse, because we could continue to the Rhine in the vicinity of Worms. It was a good time to quote Kipling’s poem. “If.” “If you can fill the unforgiving minute with sixty seconds’ worth of distance run.. .”

  To add to our troubles, General DeGaulle attempted to detach the 2d French Armored, which was badly needed to relieve the 35th Division, then guarding our right flank.

  Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Communications Zone, commanded by Lieutenant General J. C. H. Lee.

  On the thirty-first of August, I flew with General Bradley to Morlaix on the northwestern end of the Brittany Peninsula. From there we drove to the Headquarters of the VHI Corps and then on to Plougastel—Daoulas Pen
insula, which is just southeast of Brest, and met Middleton. He was not sanguine about the capture of Brest, and was full of complaints about the lack of daring on the part of the infantry. Also the Com Z had failed to bring up the amount of ammunition they had promised. I told him the explanation concerning the infantry was that they were tired out from having fought so long. On the way back, I told Bradley I could not fight on four fronts indefinitely and would like the VIII Corps turned over to someone else, Bradley, as usual, had been thinking the same thing. It was quite remarkable during this war how often the same ideas struck both of us. Spent the night with Bradley and Simpson.1 Simpson was to take over command of the troops in the Peninsula, with the idea of using the 94th Division, when it arrived, to relieve the 6th Armored Division.

  On the second of September, at Chartres, General Eisenhower gave Bradley, Hodges, and myself his plan, which was to support Montgomery in clearing the Pas de Calais area. We told him that the Third Army already had patrols on the Moselle in the vicinity of Nancy, and that patrols of the 3d Cavalry had entered Metz.

  We finally persuaded General Eisenhower to let the V Corps of the First Army and the Third Army go on and attack the Siegfried Line as soon as the Calais area was stabilized. Until that time we would be able to get very little gas or ammunition. He was impressed with the thought of a great battle of Germany. Personally I did not believe, and so stated, that there would be a great battle if we pushed right on. It finally ended up with permission to secure crossings over the Moselle and prepare to attack the Siegfried Line whenever I could get the fuel to move.