The Guns of Muschu

by Don Dennis

  After the close of hostilities, there were loose ends to tidy up, mountains of paperwork to be completed and investigations to be conducted. The SRD had a few loose ends of its own, including the fate of the seven missing men from Operation Copper. The circumstances behind their deaths were to be confirmed, and their bodies located and buried with due ceremony.

  Major Cardew was given the task of carrying out the investigation. In September 1945, he travelled to Muschu Island to interview the Japanese officer who commanded the island during the period of the operation. Muschu by then had been turned into an internment camp housing almost 13,000 Japanese soldiers awaiting processing before being repatriated to Japan.

  After a month’s work, during which he interviewed the commander of the island and other officers and soldiers present during Operation Copper, Cardew concluded that the four Australian commandos who’d set out to swim to the mainland had been lost as previously assumed. The fate of the three others was clouded by a report from local islanders, who’d fled to the mainland claiming that they’d witnessed the execution of the Australians, then seen their bodies mutilated by the Japanese.

  Cardew continued his investigation and finally decided that these claims were groundless. The grave where the three men were buried was located, their bodies exhumed, then moved to Wewak for medical examination, to be later interred in the Lae War Cemetery.

  The final report was compiled by Major Cardew in October, then confirmed by Headquarters 1st Australian Army in November 1945. The file was then closed.

  Over 40 years later, when shown a copy of this investigation, Mick Dennis disagreed with the findings concerning the deaths of Chandler, Hagger and Weber. Out of respect for their relatives he’d remained silent on the subject, believing it would serve no real purpose to reopen the case. He firmly believed the Japanese executed the three men, then mutilated their bodies. Someone—probably one of the Japanese commanders or his officers —then contrived a cover story.

  According to Major Cardew, the Japanese commander of the island stated that two of the Australians were tracked after escaping the ambush, and were then shot dead while trying to operate their radios. From the description of the two men it was assumed they were probably Signallers Chandler and Hagger. The location wasn’t specified, but reported to be ‘somewhere in the area of the water hole’.

  A third Australian was found dead later the same day, near the poisoned water-filled bomb crater that had been their rendezvous.

  The Japanese stated that all the bodies were left where they had fallen for over a month. They also claimed that they had not searched the bodies or removed any documents or identity tags. This in itself is peculiar behaviour: it is normal procedure to search enemy dead for identification and intelligence purposes.

  The two men shot while using the radio would possibly have been carrying the mission codebooks and signals instructions—potentially valuable information for Japanese intelligence. Even if they’d ditched them earlier, any Japanese soldier worth his pay would realise that Australian soldiers with radios were valuable captives. Armed with only .38 Smith & Wesson pistols they probably would have been easily taken prisoner, especially if they were outnumbered or surprised. At the very least their bodies would have been searched. Similarly, any competent commander would have reported back to his immediate HQ, giving details of the action and information about any enemy killed. Captain Tomei’s rather lame explanation that he had no idea why the bodies were left where they fell for over a month simply doesn’t ring true.

  And assuming the Japanese commander’s explanation that the third man (Sergeant Weber) was wounded and then crawled to the rendezvous where he died was true, why didn’t Dennis find the body when he returned later that day to search for his mates? Dennis had also checked around the rendezvous, including the concealed area they’d already used as a lay-up—a place they’d agreed was suitable to set up the radios. He didn’t find any bodies then, nor the following morning when he returned to check the area before setting out to escape the island.

  There are also other inconsistencies with Captain Tomei and Captain Temura’s statements, but unfortunately after more than 60 years, nothing can be proved, and most of those involved are now gone.

  However, there are still islanders who remember the commando raid. Villager Michael Sumari recalls:

  Australians landed at Som Point, right over there. They had a Bren Gun and .303 rifles and went around the island shooting Japanese on the island. The Japanese were eating lunch and they caught them by surprise. Word spread that they were there and they tracked them down. When the Australians saw us islanders, they would say ‘We have come here to save you,’ but we did not know what to do. The Japanese found them and killed three and one [E.T. Dennis] swam back to Cape Wom and he was safe.

  This statement suggests a possible clue to the fate of Chandler, Hagger and Weber. Even though there are inaccuracies concerning the weapons carried by the Australians and the patrol’s landing area, which can probably be attributed to confusion over the years, what is significant is Sumari’s description of the patrol’s reaction when they sighted the islanders: ‘We have come here to save you’.

  The natives on Muschu were sympathetic towards the Japanese and it’s likely they were being used as trackers. If Michael Sumari’s statement is based on fact, then it’s possible that Signallers Chandler and Hagger were discovered by a native. Perhaps they tried to persuade the tracker to keep their location secret, but he had second thoughts or told his friends and the information was passed on to the Japanese. What hasn’t been explained is why the Japanese reported that casualties were still being inflicted on them up until the afternoon of 17 April, one of these being Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe. Radio intercept indicates Watanabe was being escorted by a Japanese squad when they were ambushed at the eastern end of the island—probably by one Australian commando during the afternoon of 16 April. At this time Mick Dennis was at the western end of Muschu, resting up before his night crossing of the strait to the mainland.

  Was the squad ambushed by Sergeant Max Weber? At first this seems unlikely, as Weber would only have been armed with a .38 Smith & Wesson, hardly a weapon one would use to take on ten or more Japanese soldiers. However, it’s also possible he had the remaining Welrod. Could he have seen an opportunity to inflict more Japanese casualties? Hidden near the track he may have realised Watanabe was of importance and used the silenced weapon with great effect. The result would be the confusion reported by the Australian radio intercept unit.

  One final mystery concerning the fate of the three men relates to Signaller Michael Hagger. Although Major Cardew concluded that he was shot along with Signaller Chandler while they were attempting to get the radios working, and that his remains were returned to the Lae War Cemetery for burial, Michael Hagger remained listed as Missing in Action for some time after the war. For more than a year afterwards, the Military Police continued to arrive unannounced at his parents’ home in Victoria to search for him.

  Why would the Military Police conduct a search for a soldier who was known to be buried in a war cemetery? Was this an example of the military bureaucracy gone cruelly wrong, or did they have additional information? One can hardly believe Chandler somehow escaped the island and made his way back to Australia, yet the family was subjected to this indignity many times without explanation or apology.

  The truth about the fate of these men may never be known.

  History reveals, that the guns of Muschu, which had been at the centre of the ill-fated operation, were untouched by the subsequent Australian bombing. For many years after the war they stood with their barrels elevated and ammunition in ready-lockers around them. Eventually they were picked over by locals and souvenir hunters, anything removable whisked away to private collections or scrap merchants.

  The guns themselves remain intact to this day, partly concealed by jungle and looking as if they are still waiting to be fired.

  APPENDIX

&nb
sp; The following report is the result of the investigation conducted by Major R.A. Cardew, Services Reconnaissance Department, into the loss of seven men during Z Special, Operation Copper, 11–20 April 1945. The report has been copied verbatim, with corrections to spelling only. The original document source is in the Australian War Memorial Archives.

  In this report, Major Cardew refers to Cape Sabar (see p. 241). It is believed that this is either an accidental misinterpretation of the name Cape Barabar as marked on the operational map or a localised abbreviation. The actual landing site was on the beach about a kilometre south-west of Cape Barabar. The maps used for the mission were compiled by the US Army Corps of Engineers from aerial photographs, but there were also German maps created before World War I, and subsequent Australian adaptations. The proliferation of maps was the source of some confusion at the time and resulted in different names being used for many prominent features on Muschu Island and the New Guinea coast.

  REPORT ON INVESTIGATIONS OF

  MISSING PERSONNEL—MUSCHU ISLAND

  10 OCT 1945

  To: C.S.

  From: Major R.A.C. Cardew

  Subject: REPORT ON INVESTIGATIONS OF MISSING PERSONNEL—MUSCHU PARTY

  The following personnel were members of an S.R.D. party from Group ‘C’ who were inserted into MUSCHU Island, T.N.G. [Territory of New Guinea], on the night 11/12 Apr 1945:

  Lt BARNES J.J.

  Lt GUBBAY A.R.

  Sgt WEBER M.F.M.

  L/Cpl WALKLATE S.H.

  Pte EAGLETON R.E.

  Spr DENNIS E.T.

  Sig. HAGGER M.

  Sig. CHANDLER J.R.

  I was instructed by C.O. ‘Z’ Special Unit to proceed to H.Q. 6 Aust. Div. to make investigations in an effort to trace the seven missing personnel of this party (Spr DENNIS was the only member of the party to return safely to our lines). I arrived at WEWAK, the location of 6 Aust. Div. on 13 Sept 45. There I contacted the G.O.C. G1 of 6 Aust Div., O.C. ANGAU Det., WEWAK, and O.C. A.I.B. Det., WEWAK. All the above officers advised me that investigations and interrogations of the enemy had been carried out in an attempt to locate the whereabouts of the missing personnel, but that no trace could be found.

  About five days prior to my arrival all the natives of MUSCHU Island had been withdrawn to the mainland in the vicinity of the HAWAIN River. This was done as it was intended that the whole of MUSCHU Island would be used as a P.W. Camp for the enemy.

  On 14 Sep 45, I obtained permission from all concerned to proceed to HAWAIN River to personally interrogate the abovementioned natives. These natives had been very pro-Japanese and, as a result, were not inclined to make any information available on any matter in the fear that they would be implicated as War Criminals with the Japanese in any atrocities committed in the area. However, by using subterfuge methods I was able to obtain the following information:

  (i) That a party of unknown numbers had landed on the eastern tip of MUSCHU Island (Cape SABAR) about the middle of April, 1945.

  (ii) Three of the party were ambushed and killed by Japanese naval members of the Island garrison, approximately three days later.

  (iii) The name of the native who accompanied the enemy patrol which ambushed these personnel.

  (iv) The name of the native who was fired at by Spr DENNIS (according to his report).

  (v) The approximate location of the site of the ambush.

  (vi) The approximate position of the foldboat hideout.

  (vii) The whereabouts of 1 ATR4A wireless set and 1 Welrod.

  (viii) That the bodies of the three personnel were mutilated by having their legs, arms and heads cut off by enemy troops after the personnel had been shot (this latter information proved incorrect).

  (ix) The natives had no knowledge of the whereabouts of the remaining four missing personnel nor had they seen them or heard of them at any stage of the action.

  (x) The area in which the operation took place was under enemy Naval control.

  On 15 Sep 45, accompanied by the native who was with the enemy patrol during the action, a MANUS native who had heard of the operation, and an interpreter in Japanese, I proceeded to Cape SABAR on MUSCHU Island and there located:

  (i) The foldboat hideout.

  (ii) The position at which two of the party were ambushed and killed while endeavouring to work their W/T set.

  (iii) The water-hole mentioned in Spr DENNIS’ report where the remains of the third body were found.

  In reference to (i) above, odd pieces of dowelling were found in the area of the foldboat hideout.

  In reference to (ii) above, pieces of human skeletons and clothing were found in the area of the ambush.

  In reference to (iii) above, again pieces of human skeleton were found.

  All remains were collected to take back to the 7 Aust. War Graves Unit at WEWAK.

  Later that day in making a reconnaissance of the Island, I ran into a Japanese Naval patrol and questioned them on their knowledge of the shooting of the three personnel. They told me that a Capt. TOMEI, the Japanese Naval officer who was in command of that area, had full knowledge of the matter and would answer any questions necessary. I proceeded to the Western tip of the Island to MARCHESA Bay where Capt. TOMEI was located and interrogated him. He said that he was not in a position to answer my questions, but that the naval Commander of the Island, a Capt. TEMURA, would be in a position to give the full information required. I then proceeded to Capt. TEMURA’s H.Q., which were three miles distant, and interrogated him. He advised that he had only taken over command of the Island on the day of the landing of our party and therefore was not fully in the picture in the matter but that Capt. TOMEI would answer all questions. I immediately put Capt. TEMURA under arrest and returned to MARCHESA Bay to put Capt. TOMEI under arrest but found that he had, in the meantime, returned to the Eastern tip of the Island. Owing to sea transport difficulties I was not able to contact Capt. TOMEI until the following day, whereupon I interrogated both Capt. TOMEI and Capt. TEMURA together, the outcome being that Capt. TEMURA instructed Capt. TOMEI to give all the information required and to facilitate in the recovering of the bodies. From this interrogation the following information was received:

  (i) The party had landed on the night 11/12 Apr 45 at Cape SABAR.

  (ii) The enemy had suffered as casualties from action by our party, six killed and two wounded and one, possibly two, MGs destroyed (owing to the length of time between the landing of the party and the time of interrogations, Capt. TOMEI could not remember the exact details of the MGs).

  (iii) A Japanese patrol found one dead Japanese soldier on the beach at Cape WARBU. This patrol then proceeded immediately eastwards along the beach and located the foldboats, by which time they realized an enemy party had landed and the alarm was given. An ambush was arranged over the foldboats; patrols were dispatched to various parts of the Island, and a general search was made.

  (iv) Approximately two days later two of our personnel were surprised by an enemy party while trying to make communication with their W/T Set. The two personnel were shot dead at a range of approximately 30 yards. One of them had in his possession a Welrod.

  (v) The following day another of our personnel was found dead at the water-hole mentioned by Spr DENNIS’ report, having apparently died of wounds which had occurred in a clash with the party the day before. The bodies were not searched and were left lying where they fell for one month. The remains were then collected and buried in a common grave North of Cape SABAR. Capt. TOMEI could give no reason as to why the bodies were not buried immediately.

  (vi) While the bodies were left on the ground part of one of them was blown to pieces during a bombing raid.

  (vii) The wireless set and Welrod were brought to Capt. TOMEI’s H.Q. and then they passed them on to Capt. TEMURA’s H.Q.

  (viii) Capt. TOMEI stated that the personnel were not searched or mutilated in any way after death.

  On completion of the interrogation Capt. TOMEI led me to the common grave
of the three personnel. There I observed the nearly complete skeletons of three personnel, one of the skulls having a bullet wound above the left ear. Also from this grave was dug up one serviceable oil bath prismatic compass and odd pieces of equipment and clothing. The grave was clean, well laid out and marked with three headstones. The bones, on my examination, did not appear to have been fractured in any way as had been stated by the natives.

  Neither Capt. TEMURA nor Capt. TOMEI had any knowledge at all of Lt BARNES, Lt GUBBAY, L/Cpl WALKLATE, Pte EAGLETON or Spr DENNIS. However, they estimated that, owing to the extent of operations of the party, approximately 16–20 personnel had been landed. They did not know that Spr DENNIS had escaped and were quite surprised to know that there were still four personnel missing.

  The bodies were taken to the WEWAK War Cemeteries (7 Aust. War Graves) where I arranged for a burial service and photographer to take photos of the graves. Unfortunately, I was unable to identify individually the three bodies but from the following information and deductions I presume them to be Sgt WEBER, Sig. CHANDLER and Sig. HAGGER:

  (i) Spr DENNIS stated that four personnel had set out on individual logs to contact HDML 1321, i.e. Lt BARNES, Lt GUBBAY, L/Cpl WALKLATE, Pte EAGLETON.

  (ii) The three personnel remaining with him were Sgt WEBER, Sig. CHANDLER and Sig. HAGGER.

  (iii) Spr DENNIS stated in his opinion that these three personnel had been killed by the enemy in the action and position described in his report which was, as far as possible, confirmed by Capt. TEMURA and Capt. TOMEI.

  (iv) It is most probable that the two personnel working the W/T set were the two signallers.

  (v) The four personnel who set out on logs would not have landed at their point of embarkation owing to the strong currents prevailing in that area.

  Aust. War Graves are making a full investigation into the matter of identification of the bodies and they hope to obtain satisfactory results.