The Guns of Muschu

by Don Dennis

  Owing to the lack of sea transport for the next two days I was held up at WEWAK. On the following day I proceeded to WALLIS Island, West of MUSCHU Island, where I interrogated the native chiefs and other members of the Island, but they had no knowledge whatever of the operation nor of any of the personnel concerned. This is quite understandable as these natives were not friendly disposed towards the MUSCHU natives nor the enemy and would make as little contact with MUSCHU as possible.

  The following three days I spent in making a search and contact of natives on KAIRIRU Island just North of MUSCHU. These natives had knowledge of the three personnel all being killed on MUSCHU but were completely unaware of the existence of any further personnel. Throughout all the interrogations of the natives I am convinced, from my own personal knowledge of their nature, that they spoke the truth in all but a few minor details, in fact, eventually, they had a tendency to exaggerate in certain matters in their endeavour to help. I am also convinced that no atrocities were committed against our party by the enemy and that the information that they eventually gave me was true, to the best of their knowledge. In fact, once they realized that they would not be marked as war criminals, they were eager to give all the information in their power.

  As regards the four missing personnel, the only conclusion I can come to is that they lost their lives by drowning at sea. It is to be remembered that they set out separately on logs approximately 2000 hours at night in waters with very strong currents—up to 2 to 3 knots—and that by daylight they were probably washed well off the coast and either succumbed through exhaustion or were drowned or taken by sharks.

  Prior to my closing up of Group ‘C’ in Jun 45, I had personally searched VOKEO and VALIF Islands, lying to the DON DENNIS North-East of MUSCHU, and there were no signs of them having landed there. Therefore I did not consider it necessary to make a further search of these Islands.

  (Signed) Major R.A.C. CARDEW

  AUTHOR’S NOTE

  The story of Operation Copper and the ordeal of Sapper Mick Dennis has taken me over 40 years to write. Mick Dennis is my uncle and when I was a youth I’d often heard my family talking about his and other relatives’ experiences during the war. Mick’s story, though, was always discussed with a certain amount of awe, with voices hushed whenever I came into hearing range.

  I’d asked my uncle a number of times to tell me about his experiences and being a modest person, his explanations always tended to be very brief. The early impression I gained from these discussions was of a visit to a tropical island for a quick look around to see what the enemy was up to, then a rather long swim home.

  It wasn’t until 1990, when Mick loaned me his diaries, that I learned the truth about Operation Copper. I think he figured by then I’d matured sufficiently to be able to approach the subject objectively. I’d spent 10 years in the Army, served in Vietnam, been married, had children, done all those things that in theory contribute to grey hairs and wisdom. I found his story fascinating and I suppose having had my own experiences of jungle warfare and having lost several of my own mates in Vietnam I could better understand what he’d endured.

  By then, there’d been a number of unit histories written that mentioned Operation Copper, along with many of the other Z Special Operations conducted during the war—the most notable of course being Operation Jaywick. Unfortunately these tended to briefly summarise the events, or merely list the ordeal in chronological order, much in the way of the official histories. While competently written, I felt that none of them really did Operation Copper justice.

  I’d just published a book about the Vietnam War and after showing my editor sample chapters the editor agreed it would make an exciting story. In 1992, I visited the Australian War Museum’s (AWM’s) research centre and they offered me every assistance. Over the following years I continued my research, visiting the AWM many times and collecting more data. One difficulty I’d had with the story was trying to obtain background information into the reasons behind the mission, the personnel involved and a range of small yet vital facts that filled in many of the blanks in the narrative. Even with the AWM’s excellent facility, driving to Canberra for research involved time that business commitments wouldn’t allow.

  The project stalled until 2000. Although I regretted the delay, in many ways it was a godsend. Suddenly I had a new research tool at my disposal— the internet. The AWM went online and their database grew; eventually, all the headquarters war diaries covering the period of Operation Copper became available. The internet also allowed me to obtain accounts from veterans and their unit associations in Australia and Japan—even information on the radios and weapons used by Z Special were now online.

  This information allowed me to approach the story in a totally different manner. All military ventures have reasons behind them. What were the reasons behind Operation Copper? Who were the personalities involved? What were the Japanese doing when the Australians infiltrated the island? Who were they?

  The internet, while providing many of the answers, also opened up more questions. Although it gave me background and additional information on Operation Copper, there were still many gaps that were impossible to fill. Fortunately most of these were minor details, so where possible I’ve made my own assessment as to what occurred and filled them in accordingly. I don’t claim to be 100 per cent accurate as the information has either been lost or has been buried by time; however, the recounting of Mick Dennis’s journey comes mostly from his own diaries and from discussions over the past 30 or more years with him and members of our family.

  Many people believe war diaries kept by military units are 100 per cent accurate and treat them as if they are the ultimate reference source. My experience in Vietnam and speaking with Second World War veterans who’d maintained such diaries disputes this. Many commanders were simply too busy fighting the war to worry about filling in the paperwork each evening. Certainly they made an effort to do so, but the diaries at all levels took second place to the business of war.

  This also applies to HQ diaries. In my research I found inaccuracies with many entries, usually only a minor detail, but often enough to open a different thread of investigation. One instance were the entries listing the activities of the naval patrol vessels during Operation Copper. Sometimes they were referred to as an HDML, at other times a Fairmile, and when crosschecked with crew logs it became apparent that someone was confusing their vessel types and numbers. Army personnel are generally ignorant about ship types—vessels come in various sizes and are usually painted grey, with a blunt and a sharp end and hopefully structures in between that include weapons and a beer fridge.

  Often the diaries were compiled by clerks using hastily written notes handed to them by various commanders, and some of the details of these entries became guesswork. While many former staff officers will deny this, the Australian 1st Army HQ war diaries themselves contain several entries during 1944–45 appealing for sub-units to pay more attention to accuracy when compiling the diaries!

  Although such errors made little difference to the outcome of the war, for the individuals concerned it can be annoying to be credited with deeds they haven’t done or see credit mistakenly given to someone else.

  I’ve attempted to straighten out confusing details, but sometimes the picture is just too clouded by the passage of time and unreliable memories. Expecting veterans of a war that is now more than 60 years over to be completely accurate is being unrealistic. So I apologise in advance for any errors or incorrect assumptions I may have made.

  Another point I need to make is that when researching Operation Copper, I not only found many differences in the way the Army operates then and now, but also many similarities. Z Special had its supporters and its critics. Some of its operations were failures, many more were successful.

  Although Mick Dennis probably believes otherwise, Operation Copper was a success. Many of the techniques used by Australian Special Forces today evolved from lessons learned the hard way by soldiers
like Mick Dennis and the men of Operation Copper.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  To acknowledge everyone who assisted me with this book over such a long gestation period would be impossible. First in line though would have to be Mick Dennis, family legend and gentleman. Although I’ve never told him, the knowledge that he’d ‘done it’ was always in my mind during my tour of Vietnam. He’d set the benchmark and although I wanted to go home only 24 hours after arriving at Nui Dat, I knew if I turned to jelly I’d be letting him and my family down.

  Next would be my late uncle, George (Gus) Golding. George was an irrepressible character with whom Mick had a friendship that lasted more than 60 years. I was only privy to some of the escapades George and Mick got up to over that time—mostly from George after a bottle or two. George taught me to box and shoot and, once during the mid-1970s he told me about Mick’s experience—and also the rather eerie story of a night in 1945 when his two sisters suddenly awoke believing Mick was in great danger. It was George who originally sparked my desire to eventually tell Mick’s story. So thanks George—wherever you are.

  Of great assistance has been the Australian War Memorial’s online archives. Before that the staff of their research centre were always helpful and courteous. I encourage the Government to continue funding their projects as it’s vital we preserve and learn from the lessons of the past. The availability of the internet gives everyone a chance to delve into the archives and Australia is probably unique in being able to eventually have all our military records online.

  Major Ronald Smith (retired) deserves special acknowledgment. His was the first face I saw when I marched into my first army unit, 16th Army Light Aircraft Squadron, back in April 1966. That was scary. We’ve been friends ever since and got up to our own brand of mischief, including landing Army aeroplanes in places where aeroplanes were never meant to go. I didn’t know it then but Ron had flown Beauforts and Beaufighters in the New Guinea campaign and managed to safely ditch his crippled aircraft after getting it shot full of holes around Wewak during a raid on the town. He’d also flown over Muschu Island many times and his descriptions of the island and the surrounding coastal areas provided valuable background to the narrative.

  Captain Owen Eather, long-time friend who I met in Vietnam and once accidentally saluted because he looked so pukka I mistook him for the Task Force Commander, has provided valuable support. His knowledge of the New Guinea campaign is I believe second to none.

  Hitoshi Nakatsu, whose relatives also fought in the New Guinea campaign, has been especially helpful in providing me with information about the Japanese forces and their intelligence services at the time. He’s also given insight into the possible characters and motivation of some of the commanders in the area. He’s handled my questions with dignity and patience and put me in contact with other Japanese families who had relatives in New Guinea. Sometimes we forget that our opponents had families too.

  John Arthur, formerly of the Royal Navy, was also instrumental in convincing me the book should be written. His stories of sending young seamen to ‘fetch buckets of steam from the fog locker’ were a reminder of how naive young soldiers (and sailors) can be. I fell for the same stunt myself when as a brand-new second lieutenant, on day one in my new unit, Major Ron Smith ordered me to go and get issued with a new blue beret from the squadron’s ‘Far Q’. I spent two hours wandering around the base making an idiot of myself asking directions to this mysterious, nonexistent Quartermaster’s store.

  Geoff Black, a former Fairmile crewman whose craft participated in the search for the missing patrol, was very informative in describing the activities of the Fairmiles and the HDMLs during that period. His-self published work Against all Odds is worthy of reading and in addition goes into much of the background of the 2/5th Commando Company and its campaign around Mubo and Wau in 1943. The 2/5th was Mick Dennis’s original unit before he joined Z Special, and their stand against the Japanese has tended to be overshadowed by the Kokoda campaign.

  Justin Taylan, webmaster of www.pacificwrecks.com, has been particularly helpful in providing photos of Muschu and information about the natives who were on the island during Operation Copper. Contact with Justin has added some interesting twists to the narrative.

  Peter Dunn, of www.diggerhistory.info, has provided valuable information. The Digger History site has over 4000 online pages and gave me important details on the somewhat tangled structure of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, the Special Operations Executive and the Services Reconnaissance Department.

  There are many more—you know who you are and I thank you for your persistence. For some it’s been a very long wait.

  THE GUNS OF MUSCHU WEBSITE

  Learn more about Operation Copper by visiting

  www.gunsofmuschu.com

  This website contains photos and descriptions of equipment, weapons and tactics used by Australia’s Z Special forces, with links to the Australian War Memorial’s archives where the official war diaries and the original maps used for the operation can be viewed.