Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945

by Aleksei Isaev

  A German 150mm sFH 18 howitzer abandoned on the approaches to Budapest. (TsAMO)

  A Panzerjäger IV abandoned by its crew. A shell is embedded in the barrel of the gun.

  Searchlights and sound detection equipment aboard platform cars seized by Soviet troops. Hungary, end of 1944.

  An abandoned Hummel self-propelled artillery vehicle. The gun’s barrel is fixed in its travelling position.

  An anti-aircraft Flakpanzer IV Mobelwagen with the 37mm Flak 43 cannon, February 1945, Budapest area.

  A captured Hungarianmanufactured Turan I tank on a railroad platform.

  Soviet soldiers and officers inspecting a Panther, knocked-out on a Budapest street.

  An abandoned Munitionsträger (ammunition carrier) Hummel in Budapest. (TsAMO)

  Amphibious Volkswagen Schwimmwagen abandoned in Budapest. (TsAMO)

  Part II

  The Final German Offensive of the Second World War

  8

  Plans of the German Command

  At the very beginning of 1945, Hitler had made a proposal to remove the Sixth SS Panzer Army from the Western Front, replenish it with equipment and troops, and transfer it to the Eastern Front. Already on 8 January 1945, the Chief of the General Staff General-Field Marshal Rundstedt received an order to begin redeploying units of the Sixth SS Panzer Army to central Germany. However, despite the opinion of a number of German generals, in particular Guderian, Hitler was proposing to use the SS panzer divisions not on the central sector of the Eastern Front in the area of the Oder River, but in Hungary. The main argument in support of such a position was the need to defend the oilfields in western Hungary, which at the time were producing up to 80% of the Third Reich’s oil. Colonel General Jodl stated the following about Hitler’s decision: “The Führer again pointed to the enormous significance of the oil producing sites located southwest of Lake Balaton. Control over them was decisive in the matter of the further continuation of the war.”

  However, the redeployment of the Sixth SS Panzer Army could not be implemented according to a tight schedule – many of its divisions were still locked in combat in the Ardennes. Moreover, because of the pressure of the Anglo-American troops, several of the SS divisions that had been pulled out of the front lines had to be thrown back into the fighting. For example, because of the sharpening of the situation on the front’s right flank, on 14 January 1945 the German command had to re-commit the 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions, which had been pulled into the reserve. Only by 22 January were the divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army completely disengaged from the battle, having been replaced by the Fifth and Seventh Armies.

  Logistics became another obstacle in the transfer of the SS divisions – by this time the Allied air forces were systematically targeting the railroad hubs in Germany. In addition, the German rail system was experiencing a deficit of coal for its steam engines. At Hitler’s personal order, elements of the III Flak Corps were allocated to cover the trains that were transporting the Sixth SS Panzer Army.

  The movement of the SS divisions was conducted under the strictest secrecy, accompanied by an active disinformation campaign, the aim of which was to convince the Allied intelligence, and first and foremost Soviet intelligence, that the Sixth SS Panzer Army was reassembling in the area of Berlin. Even when the SS divisions began shifting from central Germany to Hungary, the German command continued to attempt to mislead the Soviets, striving to convince them that the Sixth SS Panzer Army was now positioned east of Berlin. The trains carrying the divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army southward were moving primarily at night, and at the order of the German command, the divisional insignia on the equipment had been painted over, and the registration numbers on the vehicles and prime movers covered up.

  The assembly of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary was completed by 8 February 1945. In order to maintain concealment, its formations and units were given code names. For example, the Sixth SS Panzer Army’s headquarters went by the code name “Headquarters of the Higher Pioneer Command of Hungary”, while the headquarters of the subordinate corps and divisions were called “SS Replacement and Training Units”. For example, the headquarters of the II SS Panzer Corps was known as “Ersatz Stab [Training Headquarters], Army Group South”, the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler was called “Ersatz Stab Totenkopf ”, the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich – “Ersatz Stab Nord”, etc. All of the divisions were instructed to observe strict radio silence, while the SS troops were forbidden to approach the front.

  In this fashion, beginning from the moment of its arrival in Hungary until the start of the March 1945 offensive, the divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army had nearly an entire month for rest, refitting and reorganizing. In the process, they were brought back up to table strength in personnel. However, as Georg Maier, the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Sixth SS Panzer Army pointed out in his book Drama between Budapest and Vienna, this applied only to numbers, not quality: “The fighting during the fateful year of 1943, which brought the turning point of the war, had brought such high casualties that they could not be made up rapidly enough with trained replacements suitable for frontline duty. As a result, combat power decreased rapidly.” The majority of the new arrivals were conscripts, and this was true for the Waffen-SS divisions as well. Thus in the course of the month, in the SS panzer divisions that had combat experience, the tankers worked feverishly to prepare the new men. However, according to the opinion of Maier, “when speaking of the SS divisions of 1945, it is necessary to keep in mind that these were not at all those divisions of three or even two years before, with a different combat spirit and a different combat capability.” Nonetheless, despite such assertions by the former German officer, the SS panzer divisions even in 1945 remained a serious adversary and were more powerful than their counterparts in the Wehrmacht formations.

  It should be said that the secrecy surrounding the movement of the Sixth SS Panzer Army didn’t help much – despite the fact that Soviet intelligence failed to detect the headquarters of this army itself right up to the start of the March offensive, the intelligence organs of the Red Army uncovered a major German panzer grouping in front of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. This allowed preparations to repel the enemy offensive in March 1945.

  The planning for the offensive in the Lake Velence – Lake Balaton – Drava River – Danube River area, which received the code name “Frühlingserwachen” [Spring Awakening], was initiated by the German command in the latter half of February 1945. In addition to the Sixth SS Panzer Army, units of Army Groups South and E were to take part in the operation.

  The first option for the offensive plan, which later received the designation “Course of Action C1”, was worked out by General der Panzertruppen Balck and presented to the OKH on 20 February 1945. According to Balck’s draft plan, the Sixth SS Panzer Army was to attack west of the Sárviz Canal with two panzer corps, after which its right flank would pivot and attack to the south. One day later, Armeegruppe Balck would attack east of the Sárviz Canal, and then advance in the direction of Adony, in order to seal the gap between Lake Velence and the Danube. In the operation’s third phase, two panzer divisions of the III Panzer Corps would make a deep penetration between the Danube and Lake Velence to the area of Szekszárd.

  Having been reworked by Lieutenant General von Grolman, this draft plan received the designation “Course of Action C2”. According to it, the offensive Schwerpunkt would push to the east of the Sárviz Canal with the intention to drive to the Danube River crossings at Dunaföldvár and Paks, while the Red Army units located northeast of Lake Velence were to be encircled by the enveloping attacks of five divisions. Simultaneously, the Second Panzer Army would launch attacks, as well as Army Group E in the direction of Pécs.

  The headquarters of the Sixth SS Panzer Army presented its own plan for the offensive, which was later called “Course of Action A”. It proposed to wait until the Red Army went on the offensive toward Vienna (which was anticipa
ted to set in motion at the beginning of March), and then to launch an attack with the SS panzer divisions to the northeast along Lake Velence, in order to link up with an infantry group that would attack to the southeast out of the area north of Zámoly. It would then regroup and launch an attack to the south and east to link up with the Second Panzer Army.

  On 25 February 1945, the various draft plans for Operation Frühlingserwachen were reviewed by Hitler at the Führer Brief in the Reich Chancellery. In the course of the discussion, “Course of Action C2” was adopted. The plan included units of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, Armeegruppe Balck, the Second Panzer Army (71st Infantry, 1st Volks-Gebirg Infantry and 118th Jäger Divisions, and the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Reichsführer-SS), as well as the LXXXXI Army Corps from Army Group E in order to implement it.

  An abandoned Wespe self-propelled howitzer. The tracks have been removed, most likely as a matter of convenience for towing.

  German armored vehicles seized by Soviet troops: A Hummel self-propelled howitzer and a Pz. IV tank. Note the arcs welded onto the Hummel’s fighting compartment to provide for a tarpaulin covering.

  A StuG 40 self-propelled gun, which has become the booty of Soviet troops. A shield for a machine gun is visible on the roof.

  A deeply mired Panther, abandoned by its crew. Spare track sections have been mounted on the tank’s turret as supplementary protection.

  Commander of Sixth SS Panzer Army, Oberstgruppenführer und Generaloberst der Waffen-SS Josef “Sepp” Dietrich (left). (Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-J28625, photo: Roeder)

  9

  German Panzer Forces

  The main shock grouping for Operation Frühlingserwachen was the Sixth SS Panzer Army. The panzer armies were Germany’s operational groups of panzer troops in the Second World War. However, in distinction from the Soviet tank armies, which had a fixed combat roster, in the German panzer armies only the headquarters were a constant; the subordinate formations and units could change. If you will, however, the Sixth SS Panzer Army was something of an exception. It began forming up on 6 September 1944 on the basis of the LXXXX Army Corps headquarters. At the end of the month, the army became subordinated to Army Group B on the Western Front, and in December 1944 it took part in Operation Wacht am Rhein – the German offensive in the Ardennes.

  The core of the Sixth SS Panzer Army consisted of the I SS Panzer Corps (the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjügend) and the II SS Panzer Corps (2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich and 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen). These two panzer corps remained as part of the Sixth SS Panzer Army right up to the end of the war. However, at various times, they were joined by other divisions and various kampfgruppen.

  At the start of Operation Frühlingserwachen, the Sixth SS Panzer Army consisted of the I and II SS Panzer Corps, the I Cavalry Corps (the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, which were reformed in February 1945 on the basis of the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades), as well as the 23rd Panzer and the 44th Volksgrenadier Division. In addition, Armeegruppe Balck, which was operating on the left flank of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, included the 1st and 3rd Panzer Divisions and the 356th Infantry Division.

  The SS panzer divisions that took part in Operation Frühlingserwachen were organized according to the TO&E adopted in 1944. According to it, the division consisted of a headquarters, one panzer regiment, two panzer grenadier regiments, an artillery regiment, plus a Panzerjäger battalion, a Flak battalion, a signals battalion, as well as reconnaissance, engineer, motor transport, commissary, sanitary and reserve battalions and a repair depot.

  The panzer regiment consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company (3 Panthers, 5 Pz IV and a platoon of 37mm Flakpz. IV Mobelwagen anti-aircraft vehicles), two panzer battalions (one equipped with Pz. IV, the other with Panthers), and a repair company (4 Bergepanther recoveryrepair tanks). Each panzer battalion included a headquarters with a headquarters company (8 tanks and 5 Sd.Kfz.251 armored halftracks, and a Flak platoon), and four line companies (each with 22 tanks). Thus, a fully-equipped and staffed panzer regiment numbered 208 tanks, 10 armored halftracks and 4 Bergepanthers).

  The panzer grenadier regiments of the panzer division were of different structures. The first regiment consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company, two motorized panzer grenadier battalions, a combat engineer company, and a battery of heavy self-propelled sIG 33 infantry support guns – 6 Sd.Kfz.138/1 Grille built on the chassis of the Pz. 38(t) tank. The second panzer grenadier regiment was significantly stronger and consisted of a headquarters, a headquarters company (9 Sd.Kfz.251 armored halftracks) and two panzer grenadier battalions, the first of which was mounted in armored halftracks (88 Sd.Kfz.251, of which 12 were Sd.Kfz.251/9 Stummel halftracks equipped with 75mm guns, and 21 were Sd.Kfz.251/17 halftracks equipped with 20mm guns), the other in trucks. However, the latter included an engineer company in armored halftracks (14 Sd.Kfz.251, one of which was equipped with 20mm Flak guns, and 6 Sd.Kfz.251/16 flamethrower halftracks), and a battery of sIG 33 heavy self-propelled infantry support guns – 6 armored vehicles. Altogether the two panzer grenadier regiments numbered 111 armored halftracks of various modifications, 44 mortars, 18 20mm Flak guns, 30 flamethrowers and 12 150mm self-propelled guns.

  The panzer artillery regiment consisted of three battalions: one self-propelled (6 Hummel 150mm self-propelled howitzer vehicles, 12 Wespe 105mm self-propelled howitzer vehicles, 6 Sd.Kfz.251 armored halftracks, 6 Beobpz. III forward artillery observation vehicles constructed on the basis of the Pz. III tank, and 2 ammunition carriers converted from the Wespe self-propelled howitzer), and two towed battalions (12 105mm leFH 18 howitzers, 8 150mm sFH 18 howitzers and 4 105mm K.18 guns). In addition, the panzer artillery battalions had 20mm Flak platoons.

  Each panzer division had a powerful reconnaissance battalion, which was capable of conducting many combat assignments independently. It included a headquarters with a headquarters company, four armored halftrack companies, and a logistics company – altogether 111 armored halftracks of various modifications (55 Sd.Kfz.250, 56 Sd.Kfz.251). It also had 16 Sd.Kfz.234 armored cars.

  A Panzerjäger battalion had a composite structure: it included both towed anti-tank guns (12 75mm PaK 40 anti-tank guns) and assault guns (21 StuG III assault guns), 1 Sd.Kfz.251 armored halftrack, and 2 Bergepanther.III recovery tanks.

  The Flak battalion included various weapons – 12 88mm Flak guns, 9 37mm Flak guns, and 12 20mm Flak guns. The engineer battalion was also equipped with armored halftracks – altogether 33 Sd.Kfz.251 (including several Sd.Kfz.251/7 assault engineer vehicles with fittings to carry assault bridge ramps on the sides), as was the signals battalion (16 Sd.Kfz.251, among which were the Sd.Kfz.251/3 communications Funkpanzerwagen, fitted with extra radio equipment for command use, and the Sd.Kfz.251/11 telephone line layer).

  Altogether, a fully-equipped and staffed panzer division was to have more than 19,000 men and 571 armored vehicles (208 tanks, 49 assault and self-propelled guns, 6 artillery observation vehicles, 6 recovery/repair tanks, 2 armored ammunition carriers, 290 armored halftracks and 16 armored cars), as well as 156 guns and mortars and 848 machine guns. The Wehrmacht panzer divisions that took part in Operation Frühlingserwachen were formed according to an analogous TO&E.

  According to its composition, one fully-equipped German panzer division was superior to both the Red Army’s tank corps and mechanized corps. The presence of a large number of various armored vehicles (tanks, self-propelled guns, and armored halftracks and Flak self-propelled guns) in it enabled it to carry out the most varied combat missions. The Germans also made wide use of kampfgruppen, which normally consisted of a composite mixture of armor, panzer grenadiers, assault engineers and artillery, which enabled them to conduct more agile maneuvers on the battlefield in a changing situation.

  For the sake of justice it should be said that in 1945, not a single panzer division (either Wehrmacht or SS) was fully equipped according to the TO&E. This wa
s due to the heavy losses at the fronts and the diminishing output of armored vehicles from Reich factories. In order somehow to get around the situation that had arisen, back in the autumn of 1944 the decision was taken to substitute a company of Pz. IV/70 self-propelled guns in place of the authorized Pz. IV or Panther tanks, of which there was not enough. In addition, the possibility was foreseen of forming panzer battalions with a fewer number of tanks in the panzer company – each with 17, 14 or even just 10 tanks instead of the table number of 22. However, even these measures were not enough to offset the situation.

  In addition to the panzer divisions, other tank units took part in Operation Frühlingserwachen. The most powerful of them (according both to their composition and number of tanks) were the heavy panzer battalions equipped with King Tigers. Both the SS 501st Heavy Panzer Battalion and the Wehrmacht’s 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion took part in the fighting at Lake Balaton.