Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945

by Aleksei Isaev

  According to the TO&E that was adopted in November 1944, the Tiger battalion included a headquarters and a battalion headquarters company (3 tanks altogether), three line companies of 14 tanks each (three platoons of 4 tanks each, plus 2 tanks of the company headquarters), a Flak platoon (8 Flak Pz. IV Wirbelwind), a transportation column (16 trucks and 2-3 18-ton Sd.Kfz.9 halftrack prime movers), a maintenance company, and a supply company with 35 trucks. Altogether, the heavy panzer battalion numbered 45 Tiger tanks, 8 Flak Pz. IV, and 97 trucks and prime movers.

  As of 6 March 1945, the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion had 35 serviceable King Tigers, while the SS 501st Heavy Panzer Battalion had 31; another 23 tanks from both battalions were undergoing repair. In addition, in reserve was Feldherrnhalle’s heavy panzer battalion with 33 serviceable King Tigers, as well as a company of 8 Tiger I heavy tanks in the SS Panzer Division Totenkopf. Altogether, not less than 65-70 Tigers and King Tigers took part in Operation Frühlingserwachen.

  The battles near Lake Balaton became one of the few on the Eastern Front where the heavy Jagdpanther tank destroyers were used, which were based on the chassis of the Pz. V Panther tank. They equipped the 560th Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion, which was formed in the summer of 1944. True, by March 1945, this battalion had just 6 serviceable Jagdpanther and 12 Tiger tanks, of which 6 were undergoing repair.

  In addition to the tank units, the German formations at Lake Balaton had a large quantity of tank destroyers lighter than the Jagdpanther, and assault guns. In the first place, in addition to those present in the panzer and panzer grenadier divisions, there were the assault gun brigades: Armeegruppe Balck’s 303rd Assault Gun Brigade and the Second Panzer Army’s 261st Assault Gun Brigade. According to TO&E, the assault gun brigade consisted of a headquarters, three batteries and a transportation company, amounting altogether to either 45 (33 StuG 40 and 12 StuH 42) or 31 (22 StuG 40 and 9 StuH 42) assault guns. At the start of Operation Frühlingserwachen, the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade numbered approximately 30 assault guns, while the 261st Assault Gun Brigade had approximately 25.

  Panzerjäger elements, in addition to the battalions that were part of the panzer divisions, were also present as panzerjäger companies in the infantry, grenadier and Volksgrenadier divisions. According to the adopted TO&E, the panzerjäger company consisted of a headquarters, which had two tank destroyers, and three platoons of 4 tank destroyers each, totaling altogether 14 Hetzer light tank destroyers. By the start of March 1945, 81 such panzerjäger companies had been organized.

  In addition to the aforementioned formations and units, Armeegruppe Balck had the 219th Assault Gun Battalion, which as of 6 March 1945 had no less than 20 Brummbär assault guns; these were 150mm guns set in a casemate-style armored superstructure mounted on the chassis of the Pz. IV tank, which were designed to provide direct infantry fire support. Armeegruppe Balck also had the 351st Flammpanzer Company, which numbered 7 flame throwing Pz. III Flammpanzers.

  By the beginning of 1945, the primary tank that armed the German panzer units was the Pz. V Panther – during Operation Frühlingserwachen, more than half the tanks in the panzer regiments consisted of Panthers. In addition, there was also a rather large quantity of Jagdpanzer IV/70 and Hetzer tank destroyers, as well as assault guns. During the March fighting near Lake Balaton, these self-propelled guns comprised almost one-third of the German armored vehicles.

  A separate subject that merits discussion is the use of infrared night vision optics in the Lake Balaton fighting. In Germany, work to develop such devices was being done by the AEG firm from the beginning of the 1930s. In 1939, the prototype of such a device for use by the German Army was created. It underwent testing on the 37mm PaK 35/36 anti-tank gun, but the results were disappointing to the military. They desired night optical sights with capabilities equivalent to firing at daytime.

  A knocked-out Panzerjäger IV tank destroyer. Note the Zimmerit coating covering the armor.

  A disabled Pz.IV Ausf.H. The camouflage is clearly visible, as are the spare track sections installed on the tank’s frontal armor.

  A Panther tank, prepared for the repair of its drive train and abandoned during a retreat.

  A King Tiger from the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion that has been destroyed by an internal explosion.

  A knocked-out King Tiger of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion. The number “52” was applied by the Soviet inspection team.

  An abandoned Bergepanther repair-recovery tank; Hungary, January 1945.

  An abandoned Panther of the 23rd Panzer Division. The divisional insignia is visible on the front armor, as is the number applied by the Soviet inspection team – “62”.

  In the autumn of 1942, tests of a night optical sight for the 75mm PaK 40 gun were started, which concluded in the middle of the following year. Despite the fact that the results were not bad – firing was possible out to a range of 400 meters – the Wehrmacht’s arms bureau delayed in giving its approval for the device. At the beginning of 1944, the AEG firm at its own initiative, without waiting for final approval, produced 1,000 night optical sights for the PaK 40 anti-tank gun.

  The combat operations in Normandy in 1944 served as a stimulus for work on infrared optics. The Allied air forces ruled the skies over Normandy, and often the German troops could shift locations only under the cover of darkness. Thus, night optical equipment began to arrive in the Wehrmacht by the autumn of 1944.

  The sight consisted of an infrared searchlight and an image converter. The infrared searchlight might be of various diameters (for example, 30 centimeters on the PaK 40 or Marder self-propelled guns), but they all received the designation Uhu (Owl). In accordance with their intended use, there were different versions of night vision devices – three types for nighttime gunnery, the Zielgerät (“aiming device”) 1128, 1221 and 1222; an equal number for night driving, the Fahrgerät (FG) 1250, 1252 and 1253; and one for observation, the Beobachtungsgerät (“observation device”) 1251. The main difference among these devices was the dimensions of the searchlight and image converter, and whether they could be mounted on tanks, self-propelled guns or vehicles.

  In the autumn of 1944, a night vision device mounted on a Panther tank underwent testing. For this, the observation device Beobachtungsgerät 1251 was used, which was mounted on the commander’s cupola. In addition, the tank was equipped with an auxiliary generator and batteries sufficient to ensure the device’s operation for up to four hours. The given assembly received the designation Sperber (Sparrowhawk). Despite the fact that it provided the tank commander with night vision out to 300 meters, assisting both night driving and especially gunnery, the device required considerable expertise and a well-knit crew. The point was that only the tank commander could see both the road and the target at night, and he would have to direct the actions of both the driver and gunner.

  In order to increase the night-time field of vision, the Uhu 600mm night vision device was created. It was mounted on the Sd.Kfz.251/20 halftrack, which received its own name, Falke (Falcon). The Uhu allowed night-time vision out to a range of 600 meters. The Sd.Kfz.251/21 Falke was to operate together with the Panthers, in order to detect targets and report on them over the radio to the Panther crews.

  There is no precise data about how many tanks equipped with infra-red night vision optics took part in Operation Frühlingserwachen. There are mentions that several such vehicles were sent to the front, including one Sd.Kfz.251/21 Falke. There are also mentions in the Soviet literature on the battle about the German use of tanks equipped with night vision optics. In any case, the question about the combat use of vehicles with infra-red night vision devices in the fighting at Lake Balaton in March 1945 requires additional research.

  A few words on the numerical strength of the German assault groupings. Naturally, the most powerful was the Sixth SS Panzer Army, which as of 5 March 1945 numbered more than 125,000 officers and soldiers. Armeegruppe Balck had 45,000 officers and soldiers. Thus, the German assault grouping that attacked between L
ake Balaton and Lake Velence numbered more than 170,000 officers and soldiers. Units of the Second Panzer Army, which launched an attack south of Lake Balaton, had up to 50,000 men, while the units of Army Group E, which was to force a crossing of the Drava River, numbered approximately 40,000 men.

  Regarding the number of armored vehicles that were involved in the German offensive, according to a report from the headquarters of Army Group South dated 5 March 1945 (see Table 5), the Sixth SS Panzer Army had 333 serviceable tanks and self-propelled guns (excluding the Wespe and Hummel self-propelled howitzers). Armeegruppe Balck added another 184 tanks and self-propelled guns (including the two Tiger battalions, but excluding the 303rd Assault Gun Brigade and the 219th Assault Gun Battalion). Thus, the Germans had assembled more than 500 tanks and selfpropelled guns between Lake Balaton and Lake Velence by 6 March, and this doesn’t include the reserve 6th Panzer Division or those armored vehicles that were under repair.

  According to information for 13 March 1945 (see Table 6), the Sixth SS Panzer Army alone had 583 operational tanks and self-propelled guns (150 more than were reported as serviceable on 5 March), while nearly another 400 were undergoing repair. Despite a week of combat, the number of German combat-ready tanks and self-propelled guns increased by almost 50%. Such a discrepancy can be explained by only one thing – the superb performance by the repair services of the Sixth SS Panzer Army, which worked actively to return damaged or disabled tanks and self-propelled guns back to service. Thus, one can confidently state that no less than 750 German tanks and self-propelled guns took part in the German offensive between Lake Balaton and Lake Velence.

  Table 5 The Number of Tanks and Self-propelled Guns in the Divisions of Army Group South as of the Evening of 5 March 1945

  Note: The number to the left of the slash in the figures below the column heading “Under repair” indicates the number of tanks under repair, while the number to the right gives the number of self-propelled guns under repair.

  Table 6 Status of the Armor Complement of the Sixth SS Panzer Army’s Divisions as of 13 March 1945

  Abbreviations: SPGs – self-propelled guns; HTs – half tracks

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  Plans of the Soviet Command

  Immediately after the fighting ended in Budapest on 17 February 1945, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command issued an order to the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts regarding the preparation of an offensive on the Vienna and the Bratislava – Brno axes. However, the situation soon changed – intelligence came in that a major German offensive in the sector of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was pending. In connection with this, it should be stated that unlike the January German offensives (the Konrad operations), when the German managed to achieve surprise, the preparations for Operation Frühlingserwachen were detected by Soviet intelligence.

  For example, two panzer divisions of the Sixth SS Panzer Army (the 1st SS Panzer Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division) were detected on 17-18 February 1945 in the sector opposite the 2nd Ukrainian Front, during the fighting at the bridgehead on the Gran River, north of Esztergom. Subsequently, radio intelligence detected the movement of these two divisions to the south. According to agent reports, the movement of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich and the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen through Munich to Székesfehérvár in February 1945 was revealed. In the period between 18 and 25 February, the work of four headquarters of enemy panzer divisions was revealed in the areas of Koprivnica, Đurđevac and Virovitica (all in presentday Croatia). From the testimonies of a number of prisoners, the preparations for a new German offensive and the movement of fresh panzer units into the area of Székesfehérvár became known. On the basis of this and other evidence, the Soviet command concluded that the Germans were preparing another offensive, the launching of which the 3rd Ukrainian Front expected in the period no later than 10 to 12 March 1945.

  Based on the current situation and the objectives which the enemy had set for the January offensives, the 3rd Ukrainian Front believed the following courses of actions by the Germans were most likely:

  1. If the enemy still shows itself compelled to weaken its forces in the south by shifting part of its formations to the north – an attack out of the area of Székesfehérvár between Lakes Balaton and Velence with the aim of wearing down our forces and making them incapable of resolving active assignments for a lengthy period of time. Thus, make yourself safe in the south, and create the possibility of transferring part of your force from the southern sector of the front.

  2. If the enemy, regardless of his defeats in Pomerania, Brandenburg and Silesia, will nevertheless direct his primary active efforts against our troops in the staging area on the right bank of the Danube – by a concentric attack with major, primarily tank forces out of the areas of Székesfehérvár, Nagykaniža, and from the southern bank of the Drava River out of the Osijek – Donji Mijohlac area with the aim of defeating the forces of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, throwing them back beyond the Danube, and thereby guaranteeing the safety of the directions to Vienna and Graz for a long time. The attack might be launched either simultaneously from three directions or sequentially.

  The Soviet command was thus anticipating three German alternatives. The first option was an attack first out of the Nagykaniža area to the east and out of the Osijek – Donji Mijohlac sector across the Drava River to the north along the Danube River, with the aim of diverting Soviet forces from the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s right wing, and thereby ensuring the success of the subsequent main attack out of the Székesfehérvár area. The main attack would be launched to the east and southeast, only once a sufficient amount of strength had been diverted from the Front’s right flank. In the main attack, the German troops were to advance to the banks of the Danube River, thereby splitting the 3rd Ukrainian Front in two. The main attack was anticipated to be delivered south of Lake Velence (although the possibility of an attack north of the lake as well wasn’t excluded). Subsequently, a German attack south of the Danube was expected, with the objective to smash the right flank of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and the left flank of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.

  The second German alternative, as seen by the Soviet command, was the launching of the enemy attack south of Lake Velence with the same objectives as in the first alternative, but with only pinning attacks against the Front’s forces south of Lake Balaton and on the Drava River.

  The third alternative from the Soviet view was a simultaneous attack by the enemy from all three directions. The main attack would come out of the Székesfehérvár area.

  As of 4 March 1943, the 3rd Ukrainian Front command estimated that the opposing enemy grouping consisted of 10 panzer divisions (the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 9th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, and the Hungarian 2nd Armored Division), 19 infantry divisions (the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Reichsführer-SS; the 11th, 13th, 22nd, 31st, 41st, 96th, 104th, 117th, 118th, 181st, 264th, 297th 356th and 711th Infantry Divisions; the 7th Gebirgs Division; and the Hungarian 20th, 23rd and 25th Infantry Divisions; two cavalry divisions (1st Cossack and Hungarian); and two German cavalry brigades (the 3rd and 4th Cavalry). Altogether in the estimation of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s headquarters, the enemy had more than 310,000 officers and soldiers, 5,630 guns and mortars, 1,430 tanks and assault guns (of which 877 were operational), 900 armored personnel carriers, and approximately 850 aircraft. The main portion of this grouping was concentrated on the axis of the main attack – between Lakes Velence and Balaton:

  From the roster of the [German] Sixth Army, the 356th Infantry Division, the III and IV Panzer Corps (six panzer divisions, an assault gun battalion, two battalions of heavy Tiger tanks, and two assault gun brigades) have been concentrated opposite the Front’s right flank; altogether 258 operational tanks, 114 assault guns, and more than 400 armored personnel carriers.

  The Sixth SS Panzer Army consists of the I and II SS Panzer Corps (the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 12th SS Panzer Divisions), as well as of three infantry division
s (the German 44th, and the Hungarian 20th and 25th Infantry), one panzer (the 23rd) and two cavalry brigades (the 3rd and 4th), two heavy tank battalions, an assault gun battalion and a battalion of anti-tank guns. These formations and units have 303 serviceable tanks (of which 114 are heavy tanks), 132 assault guns and approximately 500 armored personnel carriers. The Sixth SS Panzer Army has been replenished once again with more combat-capable Nazi cadres and refitted with the most up-to-date combat equipment of the time. Its personnel have undergone special training for night operations.

  Here it should be clear that the Soviet intelligence data naturally differed from the actual strength of the German shock grouping in personnel and equipment. However, for sake of justice it should be noted that the discrepancies were not so great, and were actually quite close to being accurate with respect to the German armor. True, most likely armored vehicles that were under repair were included in the number of combat-ready vehicles. As concerns the indicated strength of the troops (310,000 men, 5,630 guns and mortars, etc.), these data relate to the entire Army Group South, and not just to the assault groupings that took part in Operation Frühlingserwachen. After the war, a number of Soviet scholars assigned these numbers to the German units that took part in the March 1945 offensive, thereby greatly increasing the size of the German offensive. Given this sleight of hand, naturally the correlation of forces looked completely differently and much less favorably to the Soviet side than was actually the case.

  A scout commander reviewing an order. In the background is an M3 Scout Car, obtained through Lend-Lease. These armored cars equipped the reconnaissance units of the Soviet tank and mechanized corps.