The Crusader States

by Malcolm Barber

  126. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 63.

  127. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 85–92. See Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 280–1.

  128. Wilbrand of Oldenburg. Wilbrandi de Oldenborg Peregrinatio, in Peregrinatores Medii Aevi Quatuor, ed. J.C.M. Laurent, 2nd edn, Leipzig, 1873, p. 164. Wilbrand was the son of Henry II, count of Oldenburg. He visited the Holy Land in 1211–12.

  129. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 335. See M. Mack, ‘The Italian quarters of Frankish Tyre: mapping a medieval city’, Journal of Medieval History, 33 (2007), 147–9.

  130. Cont. WT, c. 63, p. 77, says ten galleys were sent by the count of Tripoli, presumably meaning Bohemond, since Raymond was dead by this date.

  131. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 2, p. 347. Tr. Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, no. 46, p. 84.

  132. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 63–80; Cont. WT, cc. 63–4, pp. 76–8.

  133. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 338; Ibn Shaddad, p. 79.

  134. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 337–8.

  135. See Chapter 6, pp. 141–2.

  136. See Ellenblum, Crusader Castles and Modern Histories, pp. 213–57, and Chapter 11, p. 276.

  137. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 2, p. 346.

  138. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 79–80; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 344; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 80–2.

  139. See Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 286–91.

  140. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 116–20, describes the meeting with ‘Imad al-Din Zengi in detail, significant because of the previously fraught relations: see Chapter 11, p. 280.

  141. ‘Imad al-Din was Saladin's secretary and was the oldest of the three, having served both Nur al-Din and Saladin. He presents what Donald Richards calls a ‘genuine insider viewpoint’. See D.S. Richards, ‘Imd al-Dn al-Isfahni: Administrator, Litterateur and Historian’, in Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria, ed. M. Shatzmiller, Leiden, 1993, pp. 133–46. Ibn Shaddad entered Saladin's service in May 1188. He says, p. 81, that all information previous to this was ‘from eye-witnesses I trust’. Thereafter he was present at all the main events of Saladin's life until the sultan's death in March 1193, except for the period from October 1189 to April 1190, when he was away on a mission to gather support in the Islamic world to meet the threat of Frederick Barbarossa: p. 124.

  142. See Chapter 5, p. 115: The only previous Sicilian action was an attack on Alexandria in July 1174: see Chapter 11, p. 263.

  143. Cont. WT, c. 72, p. 82.

  144. ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 356–7; Cont. WT, c. 73, pp. 82–3, c. 75, pp. 85–6.

  145. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 122–3.

  146. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 82–3; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 345; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 353–4.

  147. Cont. WT, c. 75, p. 86, c. 87, pp. 92–3.

  148. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 345; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, p. 357.

  149. See J. Burgtorf, ‘Die Herrschaft der Johanniter in Margat im Heiligen Land’, in Die Ritterorden als Träger der Herrschaft: Territorien, Grundbesitz und Kirche, ed. R. Czaja and J. Sarnowsky, Ordines Militares, Colloquia Torunensia Historica 14, Toru, 2007, pp. 27–39, and map 1. Rainald I Mazoir had originally been granted Marqab in 1118, but it was lost after the battle of the ‘Field of Blood’ the next year.

  150. ‘Imad al-Din calls Margaritus a bandit, ‘one of the most ignoble rebels and the most deadly demons’: Conquête de la Syrie, p. 125.

  151. Cont. WT, c. 75, p. 87.

  152. The bishop had in any case been in an invidious position since the sale of the fief of Marqab, since it meant that almost the entire diocese was dominated by the Hospitallers and Templars, who competed for control between themselves. Moreover, the fall of the coastal towns to the north cut off land communication with the patriarch of Antioch. See Hamilton, Latin Church, pp. 107, 212, and Burgtorf, ‘Die Herrschaft der Johanniter in Margat’, pp. 36–7.

  153. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 345–6; Ibn Shaddad, p. 83; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, p. 358.

  154. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 346; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol, 4, p. 362. See also Chapter 2, p. 34.

  155. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 347–8. See G. Saadé, ‘Histoire du château de Saladin’, Studi Medievali, 9 (1968), 980–1003. Saone had been held by the Byzantines from 975 to c.1108 and was really too large for the garrison of a secular Frankish lord. Robert of Zardana's sons, William (died 1132) and Garenton (died by 1175), seem to have mainly been responsible for the refortification of the north-west front.

  156. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 84–5.

  157. ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, p. 367.

  158. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 348, 351–2; Ibn Shaddad, p. 86; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 372–4. See Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 79–84.

  159. ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, p. 376.

  160. While the castle itself was in a formidable position, it had no intervisibility with other Frankish forts: see Edwards, ‘Baras and Armenian Cilicia: A Reassessment’, 431–2.

  161. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 352–3; Ibn Shaddad, p. 87; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 375–9; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 142–4.

  162. In fact, the destruction must have been limited, for there was a small garrison there which attacked a section of the German army travelling from Cilicia to Antioch in the summer of 1190; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 232. See Chapter 13, p. 329.

  163. This led to a long and damaging war between the Armenians and the Templars after Saladin's death in 1193. The Templars did not regain control of the fortress until 1216. See Barber, New Knighthood, pp. 120–2.

  164. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 2, p. 341. Tr. Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, no. 47, p. 85.

  165. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, ed. A. Chroust, MGHSS, n.s., vol. 5, Berlin, 1928, pp. 4–5. Tr. Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, no. 48, p. 86. For Armengarde of Aspe, see Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 107. He suggests that he may not have been master as such, but simply a temporary head until a new master was elected.

  166. It is difficult to know what these contacts meant. Sibylla's sister might be seen as a spy, but she could equally have acted as a channel of communication between Bohemond and Saladin. Raymond of Tripoli, Bohemond's close friend, had had such links, and this might have been seen as prudent in the circumstances.

  167. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 353. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 144–5, says that Saladin had no great wish for a truce, but that the ‘foreign troops’ did not want to fight any longer. As the Antiochenes would not have had time to bring in their harvest by May, he thought no great harm would arise from it.

  168. Ibn Shaddad, p. 87.

  169. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 88–90; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 354–7; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 381–8. See Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 291–4, and Favreau-Lilie, ‘Landesausbau und Burg’, 81–2.

  170. Abu Shama, vol. 4, p. 388.

  171. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 356.

  13 The Third Crusade

  1. ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, p. 363; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 347. This exchange suggests that at this time Saladin perceived the jihad as meaning the total eclipse of the Frankish presence, a position he was forced to modify when combating the crusade that followed.

  2. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, pp. 6–10. Tr. L. and J. Riley–Smith, Crusades, pp. 63–7. For the wider context, see Schein, Gateway to the Heavenly City, pp. 159–87.

  3. Cont. WT, c. 72, p. 82, c. 74, pp. 83–4.

  4. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, pp. 14–15. This is a composite text which includes important contemporary material written very close to the time of the events. See The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick and Related Texts,
tr. G.A. Loud, Crusade Texts in Translation, 19, Farnham, 2010, pp. 1–7.

  5. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 2, pp. 334–5.

  6. William of Newburgh, 3.23, p. 271. See J. Gillingham, Richard I, New Haven and London, 1999, pp. 87–8.

  7. See Tyerman, England and the Crusades, pp. 39–54, for Henry II's past attitudes towards crusading, and Chapter 11, pp. 268–70, for the previous crusade of Philip of Flanders.

  8. Roger of Howden, Gesta, vol. 2, p. 38, and Henry's encouraging reply, pp. 38–9. See Chapter 12, p. 322, for Aimery's letter.

  9. Roger of Howden, Chronica, pp. 342–3. It is not clear if the two bishops had set out before or after the loss of their seats in July 1188, but in any case they must have known that the towns would be taken.

  10. On the circumstances, see Warren, Henry II, pp. 607–26.

  11. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, pp. 18–22, lists all the leading crusaders. See E.N. Johnson, ‘The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI’, in HC, vol. 2, pp. 86–116, and R. Hiestand, ‘"precipua tocius christianismi columpna”: Barbarossa und der Kreuzzug’, in Friedrich Barbarossa Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweisen des Staufischen Kaisers, ed. A. Haverkamp, Vorträge und Forschungen, 40, Sigmaringen, 1992, pp. 51–108. The expedition can be followed in F. Opll, Das Itinerar Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossas (1152–1190), Vienna, Cologne and Graz, 1978, pp. 97–109. Richard I needed as many as 219 ships for an army much smaller than that of the emperor: see Chapter 13, p. 340.

  12. See A.V. Murray, ‘Finance and Logistics of the Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa’, in In Laudem Hierosolymitani: Studies in Crusades and Medieval Culture in Honour of Benjamin Z. Kedar, ed. I. Shagrir, R. Ellenblum and J. Riley–Smith, Aldershot, 2007, pp. 358–60.

  13. See Harris, Byzantium and the Crusades, pp. 132–5, and Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusader States, pp. 230–7.

  14. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 121–2. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 374–5, says that Isaac had promised he would not allow Frederick Barbarossa to cross his territory, but that in the event he was not strong enough to prevent him.

  15. Niketas Choniates, pp. 221–2, 225. The themes were administrative units, organised on a military basis.

  16. Cont. WT, c. 88, p. 93. Tr. Edbury, Conquest, p. 84.

  17. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, pp. 40–3. See Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa, tr. Loud, pp. 16–17, for the context of these negotiations.

  18. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, p. 53.

  19. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, pp. 64–6, for the agreement, pp. 71–2, for the crossing.

  20. See Murray, ‘Finance and Logistics’, pp. 366–7.

  21. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, pp. 72–88; Cont. WT, cc. 89–91, pp. 93–6.

  22. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, pp. 91–2.

  23. Niketas Choniates, pp. 221, 229.

  24. ‘Ansbert’, Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris, p. 92; Cont. WT, c. 97, p. 99.

  25. Cont. WT, c. 96, p. 98.

  26. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 376. See also ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 234, and Ibn Shaddad, p. 116.

  27. Ibn Shaddad, p. 106.

  28. Kilij Arslan had sent a letter of apology for his failure, excusing himself on the grounds that his sons now held the real power: Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 376.

  29. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 114–16.

  30. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 232–3.

  31. Ibn Shaddad, p. 117.

  32. See Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp. 41–5.

  33. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 90–1, 95–6; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 360–1; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 397–400.

  34. Cont. WT, c. 78–81, pp. 88–9. Tr. Edbury, Conquest, p. 80.

  35. Itinerarium, 1.25, pp. 59–60. The release from the oath was justified on the usual ground that it was made under duress.

  36. Itinerarium, 1.26, pp. 61–2. The Pisans had quarrelled with Conrad of Montferrat. See Jacoby, ‘Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat’, p. 200.

  37. On this debate, see Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, p. 299, and H.A.R. Gibb, The Life of Saladin from the Works of ‘Imad al-Din and Baha’ al-Din, Oxford, 1973, pp. 59–61. Ibn al-Athir is not slow to criticise some of Saladin's decisions, so here he probably reflects the views expressed. ‘Imad al-Din agrees; he thinks Saladin was proven to have had the better judgement: Conquête de la Syrie, p. 170.

  38. Ibn Shaddad, p. 97. See Prawer, Histoire du royaume latin, vol. 2, pp. 43–4, and Pringle, Churches, vol. 4, pp. 16–17.

  39. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 45, tr. vol. 2, p. 71.

  40. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 360.

  41. Itinerarium, 1.26, p. 61.

  42. Ibn Shaddad, p. 97.

  43. Itinerarium, 1.27–9, pp. 64–8. See also H. van Werveke, ‘La contribution de la Flandre et du Hainaut à la Troisième Croisade’, Le Moyen Age, 78 (1972), 58, 67–8, 85.

  44. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 98–9; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 364–5.

  45. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 367.

  46. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 101–4; Ibn al-Athir, pp. 366–8; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 178–93; Itinerarium, 1.29–30, pp. 68–72. See Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 302–5.

  47. Itinerarium, 1.29, pp. 70, 71. Ibn al-Athir, p. 368, says that the master of the Temple was captured and executed.

  48. Ibn Shaddad, p. 104. Itinerarium, 1.30, p. 72, admits to 1,500 overall, but makes no attempt to conceal the scale of the defeat, while Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 49, says 5,000 lesser men.

  49. ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, p. 428; Conquête de la Syrie, p. 190; Ibn al-Athir, p. 369; Itinerarium, 1.31, p. 73.

  50. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 201, says the rains were so heavy that the roads were a quagmire and it became impossible to attack the enemy.

  51. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 105–6, 108.

  52. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 368, 369; Itinerarium, 1.31, p. 74.

  53. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 52–4.

  54. ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 440–1, 443, and Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 211–13; Ibn Shaddad, p. 107; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 372.

  55. Ibn Shaddad, p. 108; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 210.

  56. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 377.

  57. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 239–40. See H. Nicholson, ‘Women on the Third Crusade’, Journal of Medieval History, 23 (1997), 335–49, who points out that female warriors in the crusader armies are only mentioned in Muslim sources, evidently with the intention of emphasising the degenerate nature of Christian society. However, it does seem that a small number of women took part in the fighting, especially in the more desperate situations.

  58. Itinerarium, 1.40, pp. 89–91.

  59. See Ibn Shaddad's considered discussion of this, based on his own inspection and information from others, pp. 119–20.

  60. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 377. All the chroniclers thought that the count was important: ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 243–4; Ibn Shaddad, p. 120; Itinerarium, 1.42, p. 92, who provides a detailed list of other arrivals over the following months.

  61. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 372–4; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 215–20; Itinerarium,1.36, pp. 84–5.

  62. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 122–3; Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 377–8; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 245–6.

  63. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, 224–6, 246–7; Ibn Shaddad, pp. 112–13.

  64. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 123–4. The editor, Donald Richards, translates ghiraras as sacks, probably of about 440 lb (200 kg) each.

  65. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 126–7; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 248–9.

  66. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 127–8; Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 61.

  67. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 250–1. See Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa, tr. Loud, pp. 27–8. Loud suggests t
hat the disease that had afflicted the army even before the death of the emperor and that took such a high toll in Antioch was the major reason why the German army was so depleted.

  68. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 130–1; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 255–7; Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 61–3.

  69. Ibn Shaddad, p. 131.

  70. Epistolae Cantuarienses, in Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I, vol. 2, ed. W. Stubbs, RS 38, London, 1865, no. 345, p. 328; Itinerarium, 1.42, p. 93.

  71. Epistolae Cantuarienses, no. 346, pp. 328–9. Tr. Edbury, Conquest, p. 171.

  72. Itinerarium, 1.65, p. 123. Tr. Nicholson, Chronicle of the Third Crusade, p. 126.

  73. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 202–3. This is a typically overwritten passage, but it is still reasonable to assume a basis of truth beneath the linguistic exuberance.

  74. Itinerarium, 1.70, p. 127. Tr. Nicholson, Chronicle of the Third Crusade, p. 129.

  75. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 64–5; Itinerarium, 1.61–2, pp. 115–19, 1.65, pp. 123–4.

  76. Ibn Shaddad, p. 143 (20 January); ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 278 (10 January).

  77. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 135–8; ‘Imad al-Din, in Abu Shama, vol. 4, pp. 510–13; Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 64–5. See Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 320–2, who judge that this was the fiercest fighting in the field since Hattin.

  78. Ibn Shaddad, p. 143. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 271, 278, 283, says that 1190–1 was an exceptionally hard winter and that spring was delayed. The Franks died in great numbers from diverse illnesses. See also Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 379.

  79. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 66–71; Itinerarium, 1.66–81, pp. 124–37. Both authors have graphic accounts of the famine, told to them by survivors anxious to show what they had suffered.

  80. Itinerarium, ll.43–4, pp. 94–5.

  81. Itinerarium, 1.34, p. 79.

  82. Cont. WT, cc. 104–6, pp. 105–7; Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 66–7; Itinerarium, 1.63, pp. 119–23. See Hiestand, ‘Zwei unbekannte Diplome’, 31.