The Crusader States

by Malcolm Barber

  83. See Jacoby, ‘Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat’, pp. 192–3.

  84. The adherence of the legate was obviously crucial and it may be that Conrad had promised the Pisans trade and property concessions, since they changed sides at this point, having previously supported Guy's initial attack on Acre. See Jacoby, ‘Conrad, Marquis of Montferrat’, p. 201.

  85. Eracles, vol. 2, 25.11–12, pp. 151–4; Ernoul-Bernard, pp. 267–8. See S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, vol. 3, Cambridge, 1954, pp. 30–2.

  86. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 67; Itinerarium, 1.63, pp. 121–3; Ibn Shaddad, pp. 139–40.

  87. Tr. Nicholson, Chronicle of the Third Crusade, p. 123.

  88. Ralph of Diceto, vol. 2, pp. 88–9. Tr. Edbury, pp. 171–2.

  89. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 380, echoing ‘Imad al-Din's criticism.

  90. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 8.

  91. Richard of Devizes, Chronicle, ed. and tr. J.T. Appleby, London, 1963, pp. 5–7.

  92. See K. Norgate, Richard the Lion Heart, London, 1924, p. 102.

  93. See J.T. Appleby, England without Richard, 1189-1199, Ithaca, NY, 1965, pp. 15–16.

  94. See S.K. Mitchell, Taxation in Medieval England, ed. S. Painter, New Haven, 1951, pp. 199–222. Cazel, ‘Tax of 1185’, 388, points out that the Saladin tithe was levied at a rate three or four times as heavy as the taxes of 1166 and 1185. Not surprisingly, there was widespread opposition.

  95. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 17.

  96. See N. Barratt, ‘The English Revenue of Richard I’, English Historical Review, 116 (2001), 636–41. The relatively low figure of £15,000 for 1189 reflects the drain on the country caused by the Saladin tithe, the receipts of which are not known; p. 640. Steep inflation from 1180 onwards further increased costs: see P. Harvey, ‘The English Inflation of 1180–1220’, Past and Present, 61 (1973), 3–30.

  97. Roger of Howden, Gesta, vol. 2, p. 106. See Norgate, Richard the Lion Heart, p. 113.

  98. Richard of Devizes, p. 28. See Appleby, England without Richard, p. 24. Henry II had considered the land route, but seems to have rejected it as impractical: see Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 60.

  99. For the foundation of the monastery of Bois-Renou, near Sablé, see A. de Bertrand de Broussillon, La Maison de Craon, 1050–1480: Étude historique accompagné du Cartulaire de Craon, vol. 1, Paris, 1893, no. 173, p. 113. See Bulst-Thiele, Sacrae Domus Militiae Templi Hierosolymitani Magistri, pp. 123–34, for his career.

  100. J. Boussard, Le Comté d'Anjou sous Henri Plantagenêt et ses fils, 1151–1204, Paris, 1938, Pièces justificatives, no. 7, pp. 179–81.

  101. Gerald of Wales, Itinerarium Kambriae, ed. J.F. Dimock, in Giraldi Cambrensis Opera, ed. J.S. Brewer, J.F. Dimock and G.F. Warner, vol. 6, RS 21, London, 1868, 1.4, p. 54, 2.2, p. 113, 2.7, p. 126, 2.13, p. 147; Gerald of Wales, The Journey through Wales and The Description of Wales, tr. L. Thorpe, Harmondsworth, 1978, p. 113.

  102. See Baldwin, Government of Philip Augustus, pp. 101–75, who sees the years between 1190 and 1203 as a period of ‘extraordinary innovation in Capetian government’, and J. Bradbury, Philip Augustus: King of France 1180–1223, Harlow, 1998, pp. 47–50, who attributes more progress to the years before the crusade than Baldwin. Neither would argue, however, that in 1190 Philip was able to draw on the resources available to Richard I.

  103. Recueil des actes de Philippe Auguste, roi de France, vol. 1, ed. E. Berger and C. Brunel, Paris, 1916, no. 292, p. 354; Rigord, c. 76, pp. 274–5. See J. Richard, ‘Philippe Auguste, la croisade et le royaume’, in La France de Philippe Auguste: Le temps des mutations, ed. R.-H. Bautier, Paris, 1982, pp. 414–16, and Mack, ‘Genoese Perspective,’ 48–52.

  104. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 73; tr. vol. 2, p. 94.

  105. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 37.

  106. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 51. See Norgate, Richard the Lion Heart, p. 120. In 1248, Louis IX of France sailed from Aigues–Mortes to Cyprus in twenty-four days, but this had been preceded by months of planning during which large quantities of supplies had been gathered in Cyprus. In 1190, there was no such base. See Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, p. 36.

  107. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 77. The stones were presumably used as ballast.

  108. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 54–5. Roger was present on the crusade between August 1190 and August 1191. See Gillingham, ‘Roger of Howden on Crusade’, pp. 141–53.

  109. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 58, 61–5. See Norgate, Richard the Lion Heart, pp. 132, 137.

  110. The prevailing winds are westerly, but in winter easterlies are frequent, so they may well have found themselves sailing into the wind, a task for which twelfth-century ships were ill-equipped: see Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, pp. 3–4.

  111. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 2, pp. 99–100. The marriage to Berengaria was part of Richard's system for protecting his southern lands against his long-term enemy, Raymond V, count of Toulouse. Richard paid Philip 10,000 marks for this release: see Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 126–7, 140–2.

  112. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 17; tr., vol. 2, p. 46. Presumably at least some of the money extracted from Tancred was then spent on these subsidies.

  113. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 74–86.

  114. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 20; tr., vol. 2, p. 48.

  115. See Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, pp. 70–7.

  116. On the consequences of his death, see H.E. Mayer, ‘Die Kanzlei Richards I. von England auf dem Dritten Kreuzzug’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 85 (1977), 22–35. The matrix of the great seal was recovered when his body was washed ashore. He was replaced by one of the chamber clerks, Philip of Poitiers (later bishop of Durham), whose sometimes idiosyncratic formatting of charters did not entirely accord with usual chancery practice.

  117. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 23; tr. vol. 2, pp. 50–1. This was, of course, a convenient way of justifying an attack upon another Christian ruler.

  118. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 22–8; Itinerarium, 2.28–33, pp. 180–94; Roger of Howden, vol. 3, pp. 105–10. The treatment of the queens is unclear. The Itinerarium says that they were safe in harbour and that Isaac tried unsuccessfully to persuade them to land, whereas Howden says that they were forced to remain outside at the mercy of the storms.

  119. See J.A. Brundage, ‘Richard the Lion-Heart and Byzantium’, in Studies in Medieval Culture, 6–7, Kalamazoo, 1976, pp. 63–70.

  120. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 28, 30–1.

  121. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 37; tr. vol. 2, p. 65.

  122. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 37; tr. vol. 2, p. 64.

  123. Ibn Shaddad, p. 151. ‘Imad ad-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 299, equally emphasises the importance of what he calls a disaster. The chronology is not clear. Ambroise says that the incident occurred while Richard was en route to Acre, whereas Ibn Shaddad and Imad al-Din date it to 11 June, three days after Richard's arrival.

  124. See Pryor, Geography, Technology and War, p. 74.

  125. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 289–90.

  126. Rigord, c. 80, pp. 290–1.

  127. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 74; tr. vol. 2, p. 95.

  128. Rigord, c. 80, pp. 290–1; Eracles, vol. 2, 25.15, p. 157. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 34, presents Richard as hurrying to the mainland when he heard that the city might be taken without him. For contrasting views on Philip's contribution to the crusade, see Bradbury, Philip Augustus, pp. 85–101, and Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 165–6.

  129. Itinerarium, 2.18, p. 166. Tr. Nicholson, Chronicle of the Third Crusade, p. 165.

  130. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 148–50.

  131. Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 380.

  132. Ibn Shaddad, p. 150.

  133. However, Möhring, Saladin, p. 70, argues that the destruction of Acre's defences was never a feasible option, unless Saladin had been prepared to take apart all the other coastal defences as well. Moreover, without the use of Acre's harbour,
an attack on Tyre would not have been possible.

  134. William of Newburgh, 4.4, p. 306, refers to this in 1189. Richard had already been ill while at Nicosia: Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 32. See T.G. Wagner and P.D. Mitchell, ‘The Illnesses of King Richard and King Philippe on the Third Crusade: An understanding of arnaldia and leonardie’, Crusades, 10 (2011), 23–44.

  135. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 74.

  136. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 153, 155.

  137. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 75, 77–9; Ibn Shaddad, pp. 156–8.

  138. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 312–14. He was later captured and, after a year, ransomed by Saladin for 800 dinars.

  139. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 160–2; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 318–19.

  140. Ibn Shaddad, p. 161; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 318; Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 120–1 (with some variations on the figures).

  141. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 123.

  142. Richard of Devizes, pp. 46–7; Rigord, c. 90, pp. 308–9. Richard was a monk of St Swithin's, Winchester. He acquired his information from those who had been present. On the sources for this incident, see Norgate, Richard the Lion Heart, pp. 330–1.

  143. See Richard, ‘Philippe Auguste, la croisade et le royaume’, pp. 420–3, on Philip's contribution to the crusade.

  144. Rigord, c. 88, pp. 304–5, says that Philip II was seriously ill. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 90, claims that the deaths included the patriarch, six archbishops, twelve bishops, forty counts and 500 great landowners, some of whose names are recorded by Roger of Howden: Gesta, vol. 2, pp. 147–50. See Mitchell, Medicine in the Crusades, pp. 143–5, who estimates that between 25 and 40 per cent of the upper classes would have died in a campaign of the duration and intensity of the Third Crusade.

  145. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, p. 111, claims that from the time of the death of Philip of Flanders, Philip II was looking for an opportunity to return to France and gain control of the county of Flanders. He may, too, have been short of funds by this time, although, if this were the case, none of the French chroniclers was prepared to admit it.

  146. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 330–1; Ibn Shaddad, pp. 164–5.

  147. See Gillingham, Richard I, pp. 167–71. He sees most Christian contemporaries as viewing the event in favourable or at least neutral terms. However, there are signs of unease in both Ambroise and the Itinerarium: see M. Barber, ‘The Albigensian Crusades: Wars Like Any Other?’, in Dei gesta per Francos: Etudes sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard, ed. M. Balard, B.Z. Kedar and J. Riley-Smith, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 51–2. See also Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, p. 333, for consideration of the issues.

  148. See Prawer, Histoire du royaume latin, vol. 2, p. 77, who argues that this was an opportunity lost, especially given the low state of morale in the Muslim forces.

  149. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 168–70, 174. ‘Imad al-Din says that ‘all prisoners brought before Saladin were put to death’: Abu Shama, vol. 5, p. 34.

  150. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 91, 98; tr. vol. 2, pp. 110, 115. Richard's levy on horses in England during the preparations for the expedition is particularly pertinent in this context: see Chapter 13, p. 340. Horse armour was sufficiently unusual for Ibn Shaddad to make special mention of an important commander of the Franks whom, in November 1190, he saw ‘mounted on a large horse, clothed in mail down to its hooves’: p. 138.

  151. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 99.

  152. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 173–4.

  153. The Itinerarium, 4.17, p. 260, has six main sections, but the overall pattern is the same.

  154. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 174–6.

  155. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 101–4. The Hospitallers had twice asked the king to be allowed to charge and had twice been refused, but were finally provoked by the impetuosity of two men, including the marshal, who could not hold back. Ambroise believed that victory would have been total had this not happened.

  156. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 176–7.

  157. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 107; Itinerarium, 4.20, pp. 275–6.

  158. See Stevenson, Crusaders in the East, p. 276, n. 3, who calls the effects of the battle ‘insignificant’, despite the fact that it was ‘hotly contested’, and Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 164–5, who says that ‘Any attempt to present it as a signal victory, or as “a crushing blow” is to misunderstand its place in the warfare of the period.’ However, Prawer, Histoire du royaume latin, vol. 2, p. 83, is less dismissive, seeing it as a second opportunity lost. See also the discussion in Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 338–9, on the implications of the battle. They believe that if Richard had decided to turn inland without adequate preparation, then ‘the tables could immediately be turned’.

  159. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 175–6; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 391.

  160. See Mitchell, Medicine in the Crusades, p. 177.

  161. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 101; tr. vol. 2, p. 117. Richard de Templo has his own version of this, exclaiming, ‘how different is the life of contemplation and meditation among the columns of the cloister from that dreadful exercise of war!’ Itinerarium, 4.19, p. 270. Tr. Nicholson, Chronicle of the Third Crusade, p. 254.

  162. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 177–80; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, p. 346.

  163. According to Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 112–14, once the news reached him, Richard wished to stop the destruction of Ascalon as well, but was prevented from doing so by the French.

  164. Roger of Howden, Chronica, vol. 3, pp. 130, 132. Tr. Edbury, Conquest, p. 181.

  165. RRH, no. 706, pp. 189. This includes rights and liberties received from the Hospitallers and Templars, which, as Hans Mayer points out, seems highly unlikely: see ‘Die Kanzlei Richards I.’, 32. He speculates that perhaps the Pisans had submitted forged charters; however, both the masters are among the witnesses. Richard's actions show the readiness of western monarchs to issue their own charters in the East, whatever the rights of local institutions. As early as 1148, Conrad III had issued a diploma on behalf of the monastery of St Samuel at Mount Tabor, even though it in no way appertained to him: see Hiestand, “'Kaiser” Konrad’, 98–113.

  166. Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova, vol. 3, pp. 19–21. Tr. Edbury, Conquest, pp. 181–2.

  167. ULKJ, vol. 2, no. 485, pp. 825–8.

  168. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 187–8.

  169. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 349–51. Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, p. 392, blames the failure of the plan on ‘the priests, bishops and monks’, not on Joanna. Neither Ambroise nor Richard de Templo mentions this proposal, but it is inconceivable that Ibn Shaddad and ‘Imad al-Din, both intimates of Saladin, would have invented the story. See Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, pp. 342–3. It may be that Richard did not think it politic to make such a proposal widely known in the Christian army.

  170. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 194–5.

  171. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 125–31; tr. vol. 2, p. 137. Ambroise's view is shared by some modern historians: see M. Markowski, ‘Richard Lionheart: bad king, bad crusader?’, Journal of Medieval History, 23 (1997), 355–7, and Bradbury, Philip Augustus, pp. 98–9.

  172. Itinerarium, 4.35, pp. 305–6, 5.1, p. 309.

  173. ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 356–7, 371–3; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 393–4.

  174. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 127.

  175. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 194–6; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 353–4.

  176. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 132.

  177. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 138–9.

  178. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 147.

  179. Cont. WT, cc. 133–5, pp. 135–9. See P.W. Edbury, ‘The Templars in Cyprus’, in The Military Orders: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick, ed. M. Barber, Aldershot, 1994, pp. 189–91. There had been a revolt in Nicosia against the Templars earlier in April.

  180. This was evidently a sensational event and was extensively reported by chroniclers on both sides. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 139–44; Itinerarium, 5.26–7, pp. 338–42; Cont. WT, p. 141; Ibn Sh
addad, pp. 200–1; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 376–8; Ibn al-Athir, vol. 2, pp. 396–7. Inevitably there were rumours that this was Richard's work, but Ibn al-Athir attributes it to Saladin, who had wanted Richard killed but, failing this, was prepared to pay the Assassins 10,000 dinars to kill Conrad. Neither idea seems likely.

  181. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 148–51; Ibn Shaddad, pp. 203–9; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 378–81.

  182. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 157–73.

  183. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 209–12.

  184. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 172; tr. vol. 2, p. 174.

  185. Itinerarium, 6.7, p. 394. Tr. Nicholson, p. 345.

  186. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 174–82; Ibn Shaddad, pp. 217–23; Cont. WT, cc. 139–40, pp. 143–6.

  187. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 228–32; ‘Imad al-Din, Conquête de la Syrie, pp. 388–91, who records that he wrote out the text of the agreement; Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 189–90; tr. vol. 2, p. 186.

  188. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 192–3, was among those who visited the city. He pitied the Franks and Syrians held there as slaves, many of whom must have been rebuilding the walls. Michael the Syrian, 20.6, p. 404, says that in October 1187, after the fall of Jerusalem, Saladin had assigned 5,000 of his prisoners to this task.

  189. Cart., vol. 1, no. 945, pp. 597–8. Tr. Barber and Bate, Letters from the East, no. 53, p. 93.

  190. Cont. WT, cap. 152, p. 165.

  191. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, p. 402.

  192. Ibn al-Athir, part 2, pp. 401–2.

  193. Ibn Shaddad, pp. 230, 232.

  194. Ambroise, vol. 1, p. 198; tr. vol. 2, p. 193.

  Conclusion

  1. Kedar, ‘Tractatus’, pp. 123–4. Tr. History Department, University of Leeds.

  2. See the discussions in Jaspert, ‘Ein Polymythos’, 214–30, and Ellenblum, Crusader Castles and Modern Histories, pp. 43–61. For a concise summary, see A. Jotischky, Crusading and the Crusader States, Harlow, 2004, pp. 16–22.

  3. WT, 7.19, pp. 367–8.

  4. Ambroise, vol. 1, pp. 192–6.

  Further Reading

  Asbridge, T., The Crusades. The War for the Holy Land, London and New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010.