Eleven Days in August

by Matthew Cobb

  50 Villate (1958), p. 61.

  51 Bourderon (2004), p. 378. The aircraft may have been part of the group that was engaged in the dogfight over Rambouillet, only twenty-five kilometres away. There is a monument at the side of the D837 just north of Bonvilliers to mark the site.

  52 de Gaulle (1983), p. 295.

  53 de Boissieu (1994).

  54 Because of the postal strike, municipal workers had to be paid in cash rather than by bank transfer. This was announced in a duplicated letter from Jacques Romazzotti, the chief accountant of the council (AN 72AJ/62/V/5, p. 11). It seems surprising that people were habitually paid by bank transfer at this time; this may have applied only to certain sectors of the workforce.

  55 Durand (1968), pp. 549–50.

  56 Chevandier (2002), p. 214.

  57 de Saint-Pierre (1945), p. 42.

  58 BAM VV, 18.8.

  59 Mesnil-Amar (2009), p. 106. This entry is dated 19 August, but a number of the events she refers to (the liberation of Drancy the day before, the announcement of a curfew) make it clear that the entry was written on 18 August. Similarly, the entry for 18 August describes scenes of German departure en masse and has her pedalling, carefree, around Paris in the late evening, when there would have been a curfew, but there would not have been on 17 August. I have therefore used the appropriate historical date for each entry, rather than that given in this version of her diary.

  60 Mesnil-Amar (2009), p. 106–107.

  61 Rajsfus (1996), p. 358. Rajsfus suggests that the failure to allow everyone just to leave was ‘extremely revealing of the stupid and sordid behaviour of the French gendarmes, even after the departure of the Germans’ (Rajsfus, 1996, p. 358, n. 7).

  62 ANACR (n.d.), pp. 28–34.

  63 Riffaud (1994), p. 134.

  64 AN 72AJ/61/I/14, p. 2.

  65 Barat (1945), pp. 31–3.

  66 Dansette (1946), p. 164, n. 2.

  67 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 5; Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), p. 470. Dansette (1946) says the discussion at the CPL involved ‘a violent debate’ (p. 164). However, Hamon’s unpublished diary, which was written at the time (Hamon, 1991, p. 180), says that Rol ‘replied very loyally to my question’ (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 5), which suggests the discussion was relatively calm. The figure of 1000 weapons is taken from the entry for 18 August in Léo Hamon’s unpublished diary, which was apparently written that evening. It is often said that Rol claimed they had 600 weapons (e.g. Dansette, 1946, p. 166; Bourderon, 2004, p. 376); I have been unable to find an original source for this. Dansette (1946) presents the exchange as though from the minutes, although these have never been published nor have I been able to find them in any archives. Denis (1963), the only book on the activity of the CPL, provides no further information (see p. 99) and seems to base its account on Dansette. Hamon later also recalled the figure of 600 (Noguères & Degliame-Fouché, 1981, p. 470); he even did so in his memoirs, which were partly based on his diary (Hamon, 1991, p. 185). In an interview, André Tollet also recalled Rol talking of 600 weapons, although he added: ‘That was more or less the figure. He wasn’t too sure himself.’ (Crémieux, 1971, p. 50.) (Note that Tollet also recalled the meeting as taking place on 17 August.) In the absence of any more precise source than Dansette (1946) for the figure of 600, I have followed the only contemporary figure I can find, that of 1000, contained in Hamon’s diary. It seems unlikely that Hamon would not recall the precise figure when he wrote his diary. It can be assumed that 1000 would be an upper estimate for a figure that was essentially unknowable with any degree of precision. The description by Collins & Lapierre (1965) pp. 96–7 of this meeting does not correspond to any of the contemporaneous accounts, and appears fanciful.

  68 Cogniot et al. (1974), p. 196. This ‘round table’ discussion by Communist Party militants recalling their activity during the liberation of Paris should be read critically, but there is no reason to doubt Rol-Tanguy’s memory on this point.

  69 I have been unable to find a copy of the CGT-CFTC poster. The description of it is taken from Dansette (1946), p. 164. The FFI and Communist Party posters are reproduced in Dansette (1946), pp. 480–2. Dansette states that these posters were actually put up on 18 August, and considers that it is ‘remarkable’ that the CPL did not discuss them at its meeting on the afternoon of that day (Dansette, 1946, p. 164). In fact, there is no evidence that they were actually published on 18 August; the earliest reference to the communist poster is in an entry by Paul Tuffrau from lunchtime on 19 August (Tuffrau, 2002, p. 81). Rol-Tanguy makes clear that although he wrote his declaration on 18 August, it was not pasted up until the night of 18–19 August (Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon, 1994, p. 195). This is also reported by Duclos (1970), p. 201. According to Dansette, Carrel alluded to the fact that the communist poster was ‘ready’ but ‘no doubt he did not know that at that very moment it was being posted on the walls of Paris’ (Dansette, 1946, p. 164, n. 2); it seems most likely that Carrel was telling the truth.

  70 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 6.

  71 AN 72AJ/235/II/333.

  72 Dansette (1946), p. 483. There is a partial and occasionally inaccurate translation of this message in Collins & Lapierre (1965), p. 95.

  73 AN 72AJ/235/II/306–11. The fourth part of the message was partially garbled, rendering the name of a person or a group unreadable (AN 72AJ/235/II/309).

  74 AN 72AJ/235/II/306–8.

  75 It is not clear who this refers to. ‘Léandre’ was the pseudonym of Roger Herlaut, a policeman who was a member of the Communist Party (Rudolph, 2010 p. 66) but it seems more likely that Parodi is referring to a Resistance leader, perhaps Georges Bidault.

  76 AN 72AJ/235/II/305.

  77 Auroy (2008), p. 316.

  78 Galtier-Boissière (1944), p. 257.

  79 Renoult & West (2008), p. 157.

  80 Bood (1974), p. 316.

  81 AN 72AJ/62/IV/2/p. 196.

  82 Groult & Groult (1965), p. 300.

  CHAPTER 8

  1 Roy (1944), p. 18.

  2 AN 72AJ/61/I/4b and AN 72AJ/71/IX/19, p. 2. The occupation of the Préfecture was decided the night before in Montreuil (AN 72AJ/71/IX/5, p. 6); the man behind it was Yves Bayet (‘Boucher’), who was in charge of Resistance work in the police, and was a leading member of Honneur de la Police, which was linked to the Socialist Party (AN 72AJ/58/VIII/1, p. 2). One of those involved, Charles Le Nevez, who was a leader of the Police et Patrie group linked to the right-wing OCM, later claimed that unsuccessful attempts were made to prevent Police et Patrie from being involved in the morning’s events (AN 72AJ/71/IX/5, p. 7). It has been claimed that the operation had in fact begun nearly two hours earlier, when a few dozen policemen took over the key command points of the Préfecture – see the list of the number of men needed to take over the Préfecture reproduced in Anonymous (1965), p. 119. This version of events is also presented in d’Astier (1965), p. 185, and it may be true, but there is no contemporary evidence.

  3 Campaux (1945), pp. 27–8.

  4 Bourderon (2004), p. 385. Rol claimed that some sections of the police had been ordered to end their strike (Crémieux, 1971, p. 37; Bourderon, 2004, p. 385). Although the only evidence for this comes from Rol, he reported this at the time, as shown by an initial draft of his end-of-day report (Bourderon, 2004, p. 393). It is not known who gave this order or why, but it was clearly stopped by Rol’s intervention, and the police remained in civilian clothes.

  5 Crémieux (1971), pp. 37–8.

  6 In fact it was the bureaux – the small executive committees – of the two committees that met. The meeting took place at 41 rue de Bellechasse, off the boulevard Saint-Germain; there is a plaque marking the site. It is generally claimed that the CNR and the CPL met in separate rooms (e.g. Noguères & Degliame-Fouché, 1981, p. 471). This is partially true; Léo Hamon’s diary makes it clear that the two committees briefly met to recognise their fundamental agreement on support for the insurrection before going to separate rooms to draw up their respective declarations
(AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 6).

  7 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 6. For the CPL declaration see Denis (1963), pp. 99–100.

  8 Campaux (1945), p. 68.

  9 The exact status of the tricolour flag under the occupation is complex; although it disappeared from the occupied zone, it was officially used in a number of regions and was also often part of the iconography of the Vichy regime (Dalisson, 2002; Vinen, 2006, p. 96). One exception to the disappearance of the tricolour from Paris was the Ministry of the Interior on place Beauvau; from early 1943 the tricolour had flown from this building, following the request of the Vichy ambassador to the occupying forces, de Brinon (Dubois, 1944, p. 60). Furthermore, when Pétain visited Paris in April 1944, the tricolour flew from the Hôtel de Ville for the first time. This can be seen on the contemporary newsreel (see The Eye of Vichy, 1993). On 1 July 1944 at a Milice swearing-in ceremony in the Ecole Militaire, attended by SS chief Oberg, there was a massive tricolour flag (see photographs LAP-27248 and HRL-524039 at www.parisenimages.fr [accessed July 2012]). Despite these exceptions, the power of the unofficial appearance of the flag in Paris on 19 August 1944 is undeniable.

  10 Cazaux (1975), pp. 152–3.

  11 Footitt & Simmonds (1988), pp. 127–8. For Parodi’s complaint, which was expressed the following day, see Courtin (1994), p. 30.

  12 Valland (1997), pp. 202–203. In fact, many of those treasures had already been stolen by the Germans, or were in safe storage, ready to be shifted to Germany.

  13 Tuffrau (2002), p. 81.

  14 Groult & Groult (1965), p. 300.

  15 Tuffrau (2002), pp. 80–1.

  16 Vilain (1945), p. 19.

  17 Grunberg (2001), p. 340.

  18 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 7.

  19 Liebling (1944), p. 44.

  20 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 9. They also needed cigarettes and wine, Hamon was told.

  21 Brécard’s letter is reproduced in Massiet (1945), p. 126. For a discussion of the significance of this manoeuvre for Vichy, see Bourget (1984), pp. 324–5.

  22 Bourget (1984), p. 325.

  23 Taittinger’s original draft and the printed version are both reproduced in Taittinger (1948), pp. 190–1. Taittinger claimed that ‘the Resistance’ insisted that the section relating to Paris being an ‘open city’ be removed because they wanted to provoke a conflict and did not want the Germans to leave peacefully (Taittinger, 1948, p. 188).

  24 Massiet (1945), pp. 127–8. See Taittinger (1948), pp. 184–5 for an alternative, less detailed, account.

  25 Bourget (1984), pp. 317–318. For a slightly different French translation, which changes nothing in terms of the content, see Kriegel-Valrimont (1964), p. 192: ‘The commanders of the tactical groups must act without pity in their zone and liquidate all important points of resistance.’

  26 von Arnim (1995), pp. 243–4.

  27 Campaux (1945), p. 68.

  28 Tuffrau (2002), p. 82.

  29 Campaux (1945), p. 69.

  30 Campaux (1945), p. 44; Thomas (1995), p. 209.

  31 Roy (1944), pp. 21–2. For David’s fate, see chapter 18.

  32 Roy (1944), p. 21.

  33 Roy (1944), p. 24.

  34 At the time, corned beef was nicknamed ‘singe’ (‘monkey’); Monsieur Barrat also recalled: ‘Ever since I have loved “singe”, especially with tomato sauce. But it never tastes as good as on 19 August 1944!’ See adminet.tv/barrat/liberation.html [accessed July 2012].

  35 Roy (1944), p. 22.

  36 This was testified by Lambolley, one of the leaders of Police et Patrie, in a 1948 court case brought by Hennequin, Director of the Paris Municipal Police, who claimed that the wine cellar had been pillaged. Berlière & Liaigre (2007), p. 453, n. 405.

  37 Maudru (1944), p. 84. The entrance to the Préfecture still bears the scars of the fighting.

  38 Campaux (1945), p. 28.

  39 www.plaques-commemoratives.org/plaques/ile-de-france/plaque.2006-09-29.0385352623/view [accessed July 2012].

  40 Hazard (1998), p. 390.

  41 Roy (1944), p. 21; Fournier & Eymard (2009), pp. 17–18. There are a number of photographs of these incidents, some of which can be timed precisely because of the presence of clocks in the images.

  42 For a dramatic photograph of this, taken by someone who lived nearby, see the cover of Aury (1945). In his end-of-day report, Rol claimed that a German tank was destroyed at the place Saint-Michel (Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon, 1994, p. 204). There is no corroborating evidence for this, although Odette Lainville’s husband Robert telephoned from the Préfecture and told her that the Resistance had just destroyed two tanks (de Saint-Pierre, 1945, p. 52). It seems most likely that the destroyed lorry became a tank in the re-telling; this can be taken as an indication of the confusion and lack of reliable information that predominated. Surprisingly, Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994) uncritically repeat this claim (p. 219).

  43 Tuffrau (2002), p. 81.

  44 Sartre’s report is reproduced in Campaux (1945), p. 122. The same story was also told by Simone de Beauvoir, who was with Sartre (de Beauvoir, 1965, p. 593).

  45 There are no accurate sources for the number of dead and wounded. Amouroux (1988), p. 650, n. 2, claims that on the first day of the insurrection 125 French people were killed and 479 were wounded; 40 Germans were killed and 70 wounded. However, there is no source given, so it is impossible to verify these figures.

  46 Levisse-Touzé (1994a), p. 275.

  47 A drawing of the building can be see in Maudru (1944), opposite p. 174. It looks pretty similar today.

  48 All details from Barat (1945), pp. 42–4. There is a plaque to the memory of Fred Palacio, aged twenty-one, at the junction of the boulevard Saint-Germain and the rue de Buci. FFI commander Dufresne was ‘deeply moved’ by Palacio’s death (Massiet, 1945, p. 134).

  49 Castetbon (2004), p. 174. Alexandre Massiani was killed near the statue of Corneille that is on the northern side of the Panthéon (the Germans had removed the statue; it has since been replaced). There is a plaque on the base of the urn in front of the Panthéon to commemorate his death.

  50 www.liberation-de-paris.gilles-primout.fr/tquantin.htm [accessed July 2012].

  51 BAM VV, 19.8.

  52 AN 72AJ/62/I/4, pp. 1–8 and AN 72AJ/62/I/4, pp. 9–12.

  53 Bood (1974), p. 317. ‘Exciting’ is in English in the text.

  54 Vilain (1945), p. 9.

  55 Auroy (2008), pp. 318–319.

  56 AN 72AJ/61/I/14, p. 3.

  57 Touche (1946), p. 90. The precise timing of Jean-Claude’s detailed, but brief, account of the fighting does not coincide with those of the other eye-witnesses cited here, but the overall description is similar.

  58 AN 72AJ/62/III/3, p. 1.

  59 Auroy (2008), pp. 318–319.

  60 Mesnil-Amar (2009), p. 109.

  61 Bourget & Lacretelle (1959), p. 189.

  62 Jay (n.d.), pp. 67–70; Dansette (1946), pp. 184–5. In his memoir, written in 1970, Jay stated that Dansette ‘describes the course of events [in Neuilly] correctly’ (Jay, n.d., p. 68).

  63 Cazaux (1975), p. 157. In Chapter 7 of his History of the Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky underlined a similarly symbolic moment, in which a protester ducked under the horse of a Cossack, confident that it was safe: ‘The revolution does not choose its paths: it made its first steps toward victory under the belly of a Cossack’s horse.’

  64 Massiet (1945), p. 133. Each of the twenty arrondissements was divided up into four quartiers (literally, quarters) or neighbourhoods.

  65 Touche (1946), p. 88.

  66 Bourget (1984), pp. 321–2.

  67 Benoît-Guyod (1962), p. 19.

  68 Dubois (1944), pp. 54–5.

  69 AN 72AJ/62/III/4, p. 20.

  70 de Saint-Pierre (1945), p. 46.

  71 A-968, p. 14.

  72 Beevor (2009), p. 468.

  73 Carell (1962), p. 262.

  74 A-968, pp. 14–15.

  75 NA GRGG 183, p. 6.

  76 Renoult & West (2008), p. 182.


  77 B-741, p. 10.

  78 Renoult & West (2008), p. 199.

  79 Hinsley (1988), p. 368.

  80 On 31 August Hitler recorded a rambling conversation about von Kluge’s suicide, in which he complained bitterly that he had given von Kluge extra medals and money, and stated that he was convinced that the field marshal was about to go over to the Allies: ‘It’s like a western thriller . . . If it became known that Field Marshal Kluge was planning to lead the entire army in the West to surrender and himself wanted to go over to the enemy, that might perhaps not lead to a breakdown of morale of the German people but it would at least make them despise their Army, So now I’d rather keep my mouth shut about it. We have merely told the generals that he committed suicide. He did commit suicide . . . Actually he was waiting for the English patrol which . . . they missed each other.’ Warlimont (1964), pp. 454–5.

  81 Speidel (1971), p. 138.

  82 See Kershaw (2011) for a chilling study of why the Germans did not surrender.

  83 Naville (1950c).

  84 Nordling (2002), pp. 111–112.

  85 See Rol’s end-of-day report reproduced in Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), pp. 203–204. Several decades later, Rol recalled that when he found out who Nordling was, he brusquely dismissed him by saying ‘he had no reason to be there’ (e.g. Crémieux, 1971, p. 38; Bourderon, 2004, p. 386). In his memoirs, Nordling did not mention meeting Rol at all (Nordling, 2002, p. 112). Rol’s contemporaneous account simply states that Nordling was present.

  86 Nordling (2002), pp. 114–115. In contrast, Swiss consul René Naville reported that whenever he saw von Choltitz during this period, the German commander was always calm and good humoured (Naville, 1950c). Nordling later recalled that von Choltitz’s tone had softened as Nordling suggested how bad it would look if the German commander went down in history as the man who destroyed Paris with all its beautiful buildings (Nordling, 2002, p. 116). However, there is nothing in von Choltitz’s memoirs or in Nordling’s 1946 account of these events to support this version.