Eleven Days in August
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87 The two men adopted an order that mobilised all able-bodied men aged eighteen to fifty years old, through which Parodi effectively ceded command to Rol (Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon, 1994, p. 198). By the end of the afternoon an order to this effect was pasted up all over the city. For details of the publication of the order, see Bourderon (2004), p. 388. Rol then returned briefly to the Préfecture where he met the three members of COMAC – Villon, Valrimont and de Vogüé – before returning to his headquarters in the south of the city; by the evening, however, he and his staff had decided to move once again, this time into a safe underground bunker below place Denfert-Rocherau, which had been built before the war to house the military defence of Paris in the event of an air attack (Bourderon, 2004, pp. 392–3).
88 Dansette (1946), pp. 191–2. Thirty years after the events, Parodi gave a briefer description of Ollivier’s intervention which, while less alarming in its detail, conveyed the same tone (Crémieux, 1971, p. 47); see also Studer (2003), p. 497.
89 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 10; Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981), p. 476. Earlier that day, Chaban had sent a message to London urging the Free French to demand ‘a rapid occupation of Paris. If this is impossible it is necessary first to tell us what you want us to do, and second to warn the population clearly on the BBC in order to avoid a new Warsaw.’ (ML Arc.)
90 Chevrillon (1995), pp. 158–9. It is not clear who the ‘messenger’ sent on 19 August was. Because there is no copy in the ‘messages received’ file, nor any trace in the register in the Archives Nationales (AN 72AJ/236/I), it is not known when this message arrived in Algiers, if ever. The conspiratorially minded might be excited by the fact that the final pages of the register have been cut out (AN 72AJ/236/I, p. 44).
91 It is striking that just as Rol had not previously met Parodi, this was the first time that Hamon had met Chaban.
92 Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 197. Interestingly, Rol-Tanguy previously summarised this part of the order as stating that buildings should be occupied ‘without holding on whatever the cost’ (Anonymous, 1964, p. 61), which is not the same thing. This latter interpretation was accepted by Noguères & Degliame-Fouché (1981) in their discussion of the events of 19 August (pp. 475 and 478). The following day, 20 August, Villon told the CNR that the aim of the insurrection was not to seize buildings, but to harm the enemy (Dansette, 1946, p. 492).
93 This was claimed by résistant and policeman Henri Buisson (Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon, 1994, p. 219).
94 All details from Massiet (1945), pp. 147–9.
95 Massiet (1945), p. 147 and Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 220, respectively.
96 Campaux (1945), p. 29. According to Campaux, it was ‘the CNR’ that telephoned and ordered the evacuation.
97 The clearest account of this mysterious and, at this distance, undoubtedly unresolvable enigma is to be found in Bourget (1994). Bourget had previously alleged that the person who made the call was the Vichy Prefect of Police, Bussière, who was under arrest (Bourget, 1984, pp. 319–320). In his later analysis Bourget rejects this hypothesis but does not provide another name.
98 Nordling (2002), p. 117.
99 Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), pp. 220–1.
100 Bourget (1994), p. 246. Roland Pré, who was involved in the negotiations (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 13) sent the following message to Algiers: ‘The Préfecture de Police has been attacked by the Germans since this afternoon. This evening, the German military command threatened to bomb the neighbourhood, then, via the intermediary of the Swedish consul, proposed to stop the attack on the Préfecture, to treat prisoners as soldiers, and to allow the fire brigade to move freely. This proposition is currently being applied, with no end in sight.’ (Bourget, 1994, p. 246).
101 Nordling (2002), p. 118.
102 von Choltitz (1969), p. 232 and von Choltitz’s account published in Le Figaro 10 October 1950. In his memoirs, von Choltitz wrote of the cease-fire: ‘I would like to underline the fact that I had no contact with the enemy, that no formal cease-fire was agreed and that I made no agreement of any kind. Furthermore, I had no knowledge, at least officially, of the change that had taken place at the head of the Hôtel de Ville and the other administrations, changes that the French considered as the first steps towards liberation. To sum up, I did nothing more than create a modus vivendi which followed the orders that I had received’ (von Choltitz, 1969, p. 232). Von Choltitz also claimed that he had no personal recollection of Bender, and that his aide insisted that he only ever met Bender in the company of Nordling (von Choltitz, 1969, p. 232). In his first description of the ceasefire after the war, Nordling did not refer to anything more than a verbal agreement between himself and von Choltitz (Desfeuilles, 1945, p. 14). For an account of negotiations from within the Préfecture, see Hamon’s diary, AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 12.
103 Crémieux (1971), p. 80.
104 Dansette (1946), p. 208.
105 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 13.
106 Roy (1944), p. 22.
107 de Saint-Pierre (1945), p. 53.
108 BAM VV, 19.8. Professor Veau’s friend, Pasteur Vallery-Radot (PVR), shamelessly stole these words when he published his own diary (Pasteur Vallery-Radot, 1966, p. 280). PVR explained that he used Veau’s diary to establish the exact times of events (Pasteur Vallery-Radot, 1966, p. 278, n. 1), but did not declare that he copied whole sections.
109 Bood (1974), p. 317.
CHAPTER 9
1 Galtier-Boissière (1944), p. 261.
2 Campaux (1945), p. 109. The detail in the rest of this paragraph is from Hamon’s diary: AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 14.
3 AN 72AJ/42/IV/1, p. 209.
4 This description is based on the contemporary accounts by two of the participants – Hamon (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, pp. 14–16) and Cazaux (1975), pp. 158–60.
5 Taittinger (1948), p. 209. Stéphane, arm in sling, can be seen briefly in footage of the occupation of the Préfecture in La Libération de Paris, at 07:00. He looks quite debonair.
6 Burton (2001), pp. 90–117.
7 First Lieutenant Graf of the 902nd Regiment recalled: ‘The panzers advanced, followed on a wide front by SPWs [half-tracked armoured vehicles], then numerous vehicles, artillery, trucks. The infantry marched on the side for security. Enemy tanks and anti-tank guns then opened fire against our panzers. An armoured duel ensued. Nervously the column sought protection in the hedges . . . Then we learned that we were being fired upon from all sides. Where is the enemy? Who is the enemy?’ (Ritgen, 1995, p. 130). For an account of the breakout from the German point of view, emphasising the bravery of the German Army, see Carell (1962), pp. 262–8.
8 Ritgen (1995), p. 129.
9 Ritgen (1995), p. 129. After the war, Major General Rudolf von Gersdorff wrote: ‘The loss of all the German war diaries makes it very difficult to give an accurate figure of the German forces which were thus saved from annihilation. Estimates vary between 20,000 and 30,000 men.’ (ETHINT 59, p. 5.) Carell (1962) claims that 50,000 Germans broke out, 10,000 were killed and 40,000 were captured (p. 268).
10 A-968, p. 16.
11 Eisenhower (1948), p. 306.
12 Beevor (2009), p. 471. For the 1500 Polish troops on Mont Ormel, things were not quite so straightforward: with little fuel and less ammunition, they were attacked from the east by German forces seeking to relieve the pressure on their comrades, and had to fight valiantly to survive.
13 Beevor (2009), p. 478. Beevor argues that the Germans were able to get so many men to safety because Field Marshal Montgomery had been unable to close the Falaise gap rapidly with British troops alone but had refused American help. The Germans appear to have been aware of this. After the war, Major General Rudolf von Gersdorff described the surprising ease with which his group was able to break out:
As commander of a task force which had been formed ad hoc, I succeeded in breaking through weak enemy opposition during the early morning of 20 Aug 44 at St Lambert. Subsequently, individual combat teams repeatedly succeeded in breaking through
at exactly the same spot . . . At the time we were unable to understand why this ‘hole’ was [not] closed, although we knew that the British-American boundary ran through this area. This had been one of the reasons why the breakthrough was undertaken at this point. (ETHINT 59, p. 5.)
14 German military historian K. J. Müller has stated: ‘According to the War Diaries and the archives of Army Group B, the escapees from the Falaise pocket no longer formed coherent units. They were a mass of disorganised soldiers.’ (Levisse-Touzé, 1994a, p. 181.)
15 Umbreit (1994), p. 334.
16 Zaloga (2009), p. 42.
17 Roussel (2002).
18 de Gaulle (1956), p. 296.
19 Brissaud (1965), pp. 282–95. Film of Pétain’s desultory departure can be seen in La Mémoire Courte (1963).
20 Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 215. For Rol’s account, see Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 223. There is no description of this in Lizé’s memoirs (AN 72AJ/61/III/1).
21 Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), pp. 215–216.
22 The description of the discussions is based on the only contemporary eye-witness account, Léo Hamon’s diary (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, pp. 16–18). Dansette (1946) provides a detailed account, though with no sources. De Saint-Phalle, who had acted as an intermediary between Parodi and Nordling, was apparently also present (Dansette, 1946, p. 215). A cruel view would be that Besse was there as a stooge, and that he played his part.
23 For Parodi’s half-hearted justification, see Crémieux (1971), p. 81; Rol’s response can be found in Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), p. 221.
24 During the negotiations with Nordling, which took place in the Swedish consulate on rue d’Anjou in the 8th arrondissement, Hamon initially argued that the only possible agreement would be one that involved the Germans surrendering to the Resistance, and refused to have any direct contact with them. Nordling – an experienced diplomat – pointed out that Hamon’s preconditions were unreasonable, and that it would be clear to everyone that the Resistance was victorious because they held the public buildings and the Germans had made a deal with them. During these discussions, Nordling was repeatedly interrupted by telephone calls from the Resistance, telling him about attacks by German troops, or the appearance of threatening concentrations of German men and machines. Each time, Nordling telephoned von Choltitz and asked him to intervene in order to stop the fighting (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 18). Pierre Taittinger claimed that he was also involved in the negotiations: even though he was under arrest, he said he was allowed to telephone Nordling and participate in the discussions (Taittinger, 1948, p. 212). There is no mention of this in either Nordling’s or Hamon’s accounts.
25 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 17.
26 AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, pp. 17–18.
27 Nordling (2002), p. 124. Von Choltitz also insisted that an appeal for the population to remain calm should be added to the end. According to Nordling, these changes were communicated to the Préfecture de Police at around lunchtime, and it was agreed they should be included (p. 124). It is not clear who agreed to this, or whether it was ever brought to the attention of any of the résistants who had negotiated the cease-fire. For the final version see Dansette (1946), p. 495.
28 Blumenson (1961), p. 597. Although the cease-fire has been the subject of many partisan discussions (for a recent polemical account, see Rajsfus, 2004, pp. 224–43), it has never been the focus of any academic study, although Studer (2003) provides a brief account.
29 Hamon rightly pointed out in his diary that it was amazing that in the middle of an insurrection, the organisation that was supposed to be in charge was not meeting. The preliminary views of the members of the CPL he was able to contact were predictable – the right-wing OCM supported the cease-fire, while the communists would not say one way or another (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 18). The minutes of the morning meeting of the CNR are reproduced in Dansette (1946), pp. 488–91. The only eye-witness account of the meeting is in Hamon’s diary (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, pp. 18–19). Collins & Lapierre (1965) give a confused description of a series of meetings in the Préfecture at which the Free French warned that there would be bloody reprisals. According to Collins & Lapierre, Lorrain Cruse overheard Chaban warning Rol that the price of the insurrection would be 200,000 dead; Rol allegedly replied: ‘Paris is worth 200,000 dead’ (p. 145). This claim, which has no other basis, and strikingly was never made by Chaban, was vigorously denied by Rol (Crémieux, 1971, pp. 134–6).
30 They were Bidault, Villon, Avinin (from the Franc-Tireur Resistance group) and Bloch-Masquart (OCM). Le Monde 25 August 1945, p. 3.
31 Dansette (1946), pp. 489 and 491.
32 Dansette (1946), p. 490. The point about the importance for the Germans of keeping an open passage through Paris was made forcefully by General de Marguerittes (‘Lizé’) in his unpublished memoirs (AN 72AJ/61/III/1, p. 273).
33 de Gaulle (1983), p. 289. This is pointed out by Andrieu (2004), p. 89.
34 Dansette (1946), p. 491.
35 AN 72AJ/61/I/17, p. 11.
36 Rol-Tanguy & Bourderon (1994), pp. 224–5. They also ordered their men to stop the loudspeaker cars ‘by force if necessary’.
37 Barat (1945), p. 48.
38 Denis (1963), p. 108; AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 20. One of the reasons for this delay was that Marie-Hélène Lefaucheux, who had just arrived back from eastern France after following the 15 August Pantin train that was carrying her husband to Germany, wanted further information.
39 Extracts from the minutes of this second meeting are given in Dansette (1946), pp. 491–5. An eye-witness account is in Debû-Bridel (1978), pp. 158–9.
40 Hamon thought the CNR decision was ‘bizarre’ (AN 72AJ/42/IV/3, p. 21). In fact, it showed that Hamon, Parodi and Chaban did not represent the whole of the Resistance.
41 Courtin (1994), p. 31. Courtin heard that the SS tanks from Vincennes would be set on the city; there was no Waffen SS Panzer group at Vincennes – the tanks there were part of the 5th Security Regiment (Renoult & West, 2009, p. 9).
42 BAM, VV 20.8. Veau describes the source, who was a friend of Père Chaillet, as ‘a French colonel, in contact with the Intelligence Service, who is working with Nordling’. I have assumed that this refers to Ollivier/Arnould. On the Left Bank, Georges Benoît-Guyod also heard the story about the two divisions from the south (Benoît-Guyod, 1962, pp. 292–3). This may have been based on the fact that troops from the south had been scheduled to arrive in Paris, although they had in fact been diverted; see chapter 7 and B-728, p. 5.
43 Chevrillon (1995), pp. 160–1. Chevrillon’s contact was the actress Jeanne Boitel. Security was so tight that Chevrillon had never met Parodi (p. 163).
44 Nordling (2002), p. 125–7. Nordling himself had to explain to the French policemen what they were to do. At this stage Nordling thought the Resistance was entirely behind the agreement. It took some time for the police loudspeaker cars to arrive from the 13th arrondissement. For a photograph of one of these vehicles at the place de l’Etoile, surrounded by onlookers, see Rocheteau (2004), p. 13.
45 Auroy (2008), p. 302; Tuffrau (2002), p. 89.
46 Bood (1974), p. 320.
47 Guéhenno (2002), p. 434.
48 Bobkowski (1991), p. 609.
49 Campaux (1945), p. 124.
50 Grunberg (2001), p. 341. Madame Oudard’s confusion may have been partly due to the vagueness of the terms of the cease-fire, which merely referred to ‘the German command’. A similar effect was noted on the boulevard Saint-Michel, when people heard the term and deduced that ‘Hitler has demanded an armistice!’ (Galtier-Boissière, 1944, p. 264).
51 Galtier-Boissière (1944), p. 264.
52 Campaux (1945), p. 36. For an account of the scene a few hours earlier, see Georges le Fèvre’s report in Campaux (1945), pp. 61–2.
53 See the message to the Préfecture in Campaux (1945), p. 230. Photographer Robert Doisneau captured the aftermath (see de Thézy & Gunther, 1994, p. 17), while the event itself, showing several hundred people, can be
seen in Anonymous (1944), p. 39.
54 The document is reproduced in Kriegel-Valrimont (1964), pp. 197–200.
55 Allied pilots flying over the city had seen pillars of smoke and explosions, but were unsure whether these were due to Resistance actions or the Germans blowing up their depots (Crémieux-Brilhac, 1976, p. 191).
56 de Gaulle (1956), p. 301.
57 Rajsfus (2004), pp. 224–43. However, Parodi and Chaban had overlooked a key part of de Gaulle’s 12 August instruction to the Parisian population: ‘in all cases, prevent the retreating enemy from withdrawing his men and materiel.’
58 See chapter 7. The fate of the Brécy mission was unclear for months and even years after the liberation of Paris; in his memoir, written in 1947, Dr Robert Monod hoped that Brécy might still be alive (Monod, 1947, p. 52, n. 1).
59 AN 72AJ/61/I/17, p. 13. Gallois’ extensive account of his mission was written in August/September 1944. Sections of it are reproduced in Monod (1947). Collins & Lapierre (1965), following Monod, state that Rol did not ask for the Allies to turn to Paris and that this was later decided by Gallois; Gallois’ near-contemporaneous account indicates that this is incorrect.
60 For Monod’s contact with Parodi a week earlier, see Monod (1947), pp. 21–3.
61 Monod (1947), pp. 36–7. It turned out that Monod and Cocteau already knew each other through their Resistance work, as ‘Prospero’ and ‘Gallois’, respectively.
62 For details of the establishment of this line see B-741, p. 10.
63 AN 72AJ/61/I/17, pp. 17–18; Monod (1947), pp. 55–6. According to Monod, they slept on sofas, not mattresses.