Commando General
Page 18
Apart from constantly living on their nerves, the main problem was boredom. Whilst waiting for the return of the raiding party, Bob had borrowed a copy of The Wind in the Willows from Pryor and he carried it away with him, reading extracts to Terry as their sole entertainment.
Far away to the east, Eighth Army had been engaged in Operation CRUSADER since 18 November, and it looked for some time, to Cunningham at least, as if it would fail. Auchinleck, however, encouraged by reports from ULTRA that the Axis forces were very short of supplies, replaced Cunningham with Ritchie but kept control of the battle himself. In due course Rommel was forced to retreat and, on Christmas Day, after 41 days on the run, Bob and Terry spotted what appeared to be their first British troops. The two men were wearing British battledress with Italian overcoats, which they discarded as soon as their hopes were confirmed.
They were immediately taken off to Eighth Army HQ , where their first act was to demolish a jar each of marmalade to satisfy their craving for sugar, which had been almost absent from their diet. A signal was sent to GHQ announcing that Bob had arrived at 21.20 for Christmas dinner. The reply came asking why he was one hour and twenty minutes late. Terry, in the sergeants’ mess, was only grateful that he did not have to endure yet another story about Mr Toad!
Bob was flown back to Cairo, where he was invited to stay during his recuperation by Oliver Lyttelton, the Resident Minister of State for the Middle East, to whom his brother Peter was acting as Military Assistant. He had been posted missing on 24 November, which had caused consternation at home. Telegrams and signals were sent immediately announcing his reappearance, but it was 30 December before he was able to write to Angie, apologizing for causing her so much anxiety. The one compensation, he wrote, was that he had slimmed down considerably.11
The ‘Rommel Raid’, as it has become known to history, was in almost every respect a disaster. Apart from killing a small number of Germans and causing some minor damage to their communications, it had achieved nothing. There were only two fatalities, Keyes and Corporal Peter Barrand, the man who had been swept off Talisman and drowned during the attempt to launch the boats, but Campbell and Pryor had been wounded, the former suffering the subsequent amputation of his leg. These two and all the others who had landed from the submarine were captured, save only for Bob, Terry and Bombardier Brittlebank, Pryor’s partner in the folbot, who made it to safety entirely alone.
Rommel was in fact not only absent from Beda Littoria, he was out of the country in Rome, a fact known to British Intelligence through ULTRA intercepts. This information was possibly withheld in order to protect the integrity of the source, but it is more likely that communication between the intelligence and operations branches on this occasion was poor. There is evidence that he had occupied the house at one time, but he had long before moved his HQ much closer to his front line; indeed, when he heard about the raid he was appalled that anyone should believe that he would command from so far away. The occupants of the house at the time of the raid were members of his administrative staff. Bob certainly knew this by the time that he was visited by Hermione Ranfurly, a family friend12 who was working in Cairo, on 3 January 1942. He asked Lady Ranfurly to take his account down in shorthand and she recorded it in her diary. He told her that the object of the raid:
… was to cause maximum damage and interruption to German installations and communications and, incidentally, to raid a house at Sidi Rafa13 where Rommel was known to stay frequently with the German ‘Q’ General.14
This is at odds with the operational order and Bob’s subsequent report, both of which make it clear that this, the first of the four objectives, was far from incidental, having been allocated from the outset to Keyes himself and then prioritized when the number of men available was seriously reduced. Neither source, however, mentions the killing of Rommel himself as an objective, and it was probably regarded as no more than a low-odds bonus, albeit that its achievement would have represented a major coup. The rest of the story recorded by Lady Ranfurly is broadly in line with Bob’s report and thus differs from what really happened, at least as far as the attack on the house was concerned.
News of the raid was not hushed up. On the contrary, much was made of it in an effort to boost morale. Keyes was in due course posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross on Bob’s recommendation, the usual requirement that there should be three witnesses to the action having been dispensed with. Campbell, who was later repatriated from POW camp due to his injuries, was awarded the DSO and Terry the DCM.
Bob’s recuperation was retarded by the development of an abscess in a tooth, which left him ‘demented with pain’.15 However, he had no duty to perform other than to write his report, signed off as ‘Lt. Col. R. L. Laycock RHG, O.C. M.E. Commandos’. In fact, by that time he no longer held the appointment, having relinquished it, unbeknown to him, on 25 November, one month after he was posted missing. On Christmas Day he had also lost his temporary rank as a lieutenant colonel. There was no job for him in Middle East Command, but in any event he had been ordered back to the UK.
Mountbatten had come to his rescue!
Chapter 14
Brigade
Bob flew via Khartoum to Lagos, where he boarded a ship back to the UK. He arrived in Liverpool on 28 February 1942, to be met by Angie bearing a letter from Mountbatten. In it Mountbatten wrote that he had sent a telegram on 15 November, just as Bob was landing at Khashm al-Kalb in Operation FLIPPER, to ask for him to be sent home to take over command of the Special Service Brigade from Charles Haydon, whom he had appointed as his Military Adviser at Combined Operations HQ. It is likely that this was the result of representations from Angie, following Bob’s letters to her expressing his disappointment at developments in the Middle East. One may well speculate on what would have happened if the signal had arrived a week earlier. It seems entirely possible that Bob would not have become personally involved with a failed operation or endured so many weeks on the run.
Mountbatten and Bob had first met on the polo field in the early 1930s and had come across each other socially on a number of subsequent occasions.1 It is clear that there was a high degree of mutual admiration and that Mountbatten was, for the time being at least, to become Bob’s key supporter, and a powerful one at that. Following his appointment in October 1941 in succession to Keyes as Adviser and then Commodore, Combined Operations, he consolidated his position energetically, expanding the establishment of COHQ from a very modest twenty-three to over four hundred in six months. Churchill was impressed and, a week after Bob’s return to the UK, told Mountbatten that he was now to become Chief of Combined Operations and to sit on the Chief of Staffs’ Committee, with the acting ranks not only of vice admiral, but also of lieutenant general and air marshal.
On 1 March Bob was appointed Commander of the Special Service Brigade and promoted to acting brigadier. It was only on 12 March, however, after two weeks’ leave, that he arrived at his new headquarters at Castle Douglas in southwest Scotland and began to take stock of his new command.
The Special Service Brigade had experienced mixed fortunes since the departure of Layforce in early 1941. It had certainly had its share of disappointments, but these had at least been interspersed with some successes. The first of the latter was Operation CLAYMORE, which was mounted in March 1941 by 3 Commando under John Durnford-Slater and 4 Commando under Dudley Lister, with Haydon in overall command. The target was the Lofoten Islands off northern Norway. The landings were unopposed and achieved their objective of destroying the local fish factories; moreover, 228 German prisoners were taken, mostly merchant seamen; but the most significant result was the seizure of rotors for an ENIGMA machine, together with its code books.
Over the following months a number of small raids were carried out on the French coast, none of which achieved much, and the same sense of frustration developed as had been experienced by Layforce. It was only in December 1941, following Mountbatten’s appointment, that two raids were mounted which would sh
ine a much more favourable light on the Commandos. These were Operations ANKLET and ARCHERY. The first was set up as a diversion for the second, and once again the target was the Lofoten Islands, but this time the operation was mounted by 12 Commando. It landed on 26 December, taking the Germans entirely by surprise. Two radio transmitters were destroyed, some boats were sunk and a number of Germans and Norwegian quislings were taken prisoner, before the force withdrew in good order.
ARCHERY was more ambitious and, for once, it was well planned, with Durnford-Slater, whose 3 Commando was providing most of the troops, working in close conjunction with Haydon, who commanded the military force from his HQ at sea. The target was the island of Vaagso, on the central Norwegian coast. Supported by a strong naval force, the troops went ashore at dawn on 27 December on both the main island at South Vaagso and the neighbouring island of Maaloy. Opposition was much stiffer than anticipated, but the objectives were largely achieved, with the destruction of four fish factories and several military installations, the sinking of a number of ships and the capture of 98 prisoners. Although 17 of Durnford-Slater’s men were killed and 53 wounded, the operation was accounted a success overall and, perhaps more importantly in the long term, it played a part in Hitler’s decision to reinforce Norway, which he would continue to regard as vulnerable to invasion right up to the end of the War.
The active presence of Haydon in both CLAYMORE and ARCHERY highlighted an anomaly in the Special Service Brigade, which was that its commander was expected to take to the field from time to time, as well as to carry out his primary role, which was to administer all the Commandos in the UK. Haydon, in his new capacity as Military Adviser at COHQ , but temporarily still in charge of the Special Service Brigade, wrote to Mountbatten on 16 February 1942 enumerating the problems this caused. He pointed out that his HQ was in constant contact not only with the eight Commandos (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 12), but also with COHQ , the Commando Depot, the War Office and HQ Force 110, which in late 1941 was formed to mount an operation, subsequently aborted, to capture the Canary Islands. When Brigade HQ participated in an operation, the strain on it became excessive. The responsibility for training, in particular, suffered as a result. His proposal was that the Special Service Brigade should be split in two, with projects allocated fairly to each. If one brigade was planning or carrying out an operation, the more general control of its non-operational units, including training, would be temporarily assumed by the other. The reorganization would inevitably result in a doubling of the staff.
Bob was asked for his own recommendation, which he put forward in a letter to Haydon on 27 March. In contrast to Haydon, he urged that the Special Service Brigade should remain a single formation. He did not cite the advantages, which he claimed were considerable, but he did make the point that the recent creation of Haydon’s own department at COHQ would lift much of the administrative burden from the Brigade HQ. Nevertheless, Bob asked that the establishment of officers should be increased, although it would still be less than the number required by splitting the formation in two. He proposed that there should be a Brigade Second-in-Command, with the rank of colonel, who would not only support the Commander but would also be available to lead operations which involved more than one Commando. He requested the retention of Lieutenant Colonel E. G. Atkinson, who had been looking after Staff Duties and Training but was expecting to be posted elsewhere. He asked for an additional Staff Captain, so that the A (personnel) and Q (logistics) functions could be separated, a Brigade Security Officer in addition to the Brigade Intelligence Officer, a Staff Officer RE, a Staff Officer RAOC and a Staff Officer RAMC. The enlarged staff would be larger than that of a normal infantry brigade, but reflected the much greater number of units under command.
Bob’s view prevailed and the Brigade remained as it was, with a staff increment as requested, but further rumblings about splitting it would continue and would come to a head in the following year. In the meantime, a number of officers arrived at Brigade HQ to fill both old and new positions. The first was Philip Dunne, who had also arrived back from the Middle East and who replaced Godfrey Nicholson as Liaison Officer. Nicholson, who had led 8 Commando’s No. 8 Troop before it was disbanded prior to the departure of Layforce, was a Member of Parliament and now focused his attention on Westminster.
On 18 March Alan Smallman became the Brigade Major, Bob’s chief of staff. Smallman had served in 3 Commando, including a spell as Adjutant, but after ARCHERY he was sent off first to talk to factory workers about the Commandos and then to serve as a GSO2 at COHQ , where he found himself involved in planning operations which never came off. One day he was stopped by Bob on the stairs and asked if he would like to join him, having been recommended by Haydon. This he was only too pleased to do.
A number of other old friends arrived. Roger Courtney, as he had hoped, had managed to get himself posted back to the UK to form what became No. 2 Special Boat Section, which was now attached to Brigade HQ. Brian Franks, who had been the Signals Officer in Layforce, in which guise he had accompanied Bob on the Bardia raid, and who was very highly regarded and much liked by him, became the Staff Captain ‘A’; towards the end of the year he succeeded Smallman, when the latter went on the Staff College course.
On 11 May Evelyn Waugh reappeared at Bob’s side. Waugh had written to Bob shortly after he heard of his arrival back in the UK, expressing his dissatisfaction with his return to the Royal Marines and his wish to rejoin the Commandos. Although the newly forming Royal Marine Commando had applied for him, he much preferred the prospect of a role in the Special Service Brigade. This necessitated his resignation from the Marines, but Bob managed to arrange his transfer to the Blues, albeit only after reassuring the Regimental Colonel that Waugh would never have to serve with them. Whilst waiting for this move to take effect, Waugh was temporarily attached to Brigade HQ , where in due course he was appointed the Intelligence Officer. Smallman, who had not met Waugh before, found that he got on very well with him and enjoyed his ‘puckish sense of humour’,2 but speedily established that he had to be talked into doing everything, as ordering him usually failed to work.
Another former member of 8 Commando who for a time seemed likely to be foisted on Bob was Randolph Churchill. Mountbatten was asked in person by the Prime Minister to take him back into the Commandos, and the CCO did not hesitate to agree, apologizing to Bob but arguing that this was a special case. In the event, Randolph decided to join the SAS, but at the end of May he was injured when a truck driven by David Stirling rolled over and Churchill, one of the passengers, damaged his spine so badly that he was hospitalized and later returned to the UK. Bob fully understood Randolph’s value as a conduit to the Prime Minister and, once he had recovered sufficiently, asked him to produce a proposal for a Long-Range Sabotage Group. This was duly done, but the activities were thought to be more properly in the remit of SOE.
On 11 April the Brigade HQ relocated to Ardrossan, familiar to the former members of 8 Commando as it was close to Largs and opposite Arran. The offices were in Seafield House, whilst accommodation was in the Glenfoot Hotel and the mess in the Kilmany Hotel. It was as convenient a location as anywhere in the British Isles: although the Commandos were scattered about at seaside locations around the country, much as they had been in 1940, five of them3 were at that time located in towns on the Firth of Clyde. Bob still had to do a great deal of travelling, meeting his numerous commanding officers, inspecting their units and attending exercises. One of these took place on the Isle of Bute not long after he arrived and involved searching for an enemy who had been unable to embark after a raid. Bob described it to Angie:
Philip – typical of him – caused alarm & confusion by quietly pointing out to the already nervous and harassed colonel who had set the scheme that the general idea was hardly tactful since I, the inspecting officer, had spent a good few days running away from the enemy in almost exactly similar circumstances!4
Bob was also required to pay frequent visits to COHQ ,
which at least meant that he could see Angie, who had elected to remain in London to continue to run her restaurant. The two of them went down to Broadlands, Mountbatten’s house, on occasion for the weekend, but if Bob was in London they would otherwise spend it at Hawthorn Hill.
The rapid enlargement of COHQ meant that Bob at first knew few of the staff, particularly those from the Royal Navy and RAF. One exception was Robert Henriques, who had served in 12 Commando and then been Smallman’s predecessor as Brigade Major, before being taken away by Haydon. Henriques, who had also established something of a reputation before the War as a novelist, had been a near contemporary of Bob’s at Lockers Park. Another was Wing Commander the Marques de Casa Maury, who was Mountbatten’s chief intelligence officer. Bobby Casa Maury, an amateur racing driver who had been part of Mountbatten’s social circle, had married Angie’s mother, Freda, in 1937. Bob liked him, but was frequently unimpressed by the quality of work of his department, not so much as to its form, which was excellent, but in its content, which was, in his view, all too often deficient.5
Bob was particularly pleased to hear that Antony Head had been pulled out of the Guards Armoured Division to head up the COHQ planning team. He was about to see a lot more of him, as the Commandos became involved in a number of operations. The first of these, which took place at the end of March, came too early for Bob or his staff to have anything to do with it. This was Operation CHARIOT, the raid on St Nazaire, in which a party formed substantially from 2 Commando and led by its commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Newman, embarked in an old destroyer, HMS Campbeltown, which was rammed into the gates of the Normandie dock and subsequently blown up, thereby denying the facility to any large German warship for the remainder of the War. Volunteers from many other Commandos also took part, sailing in a number of motor launches to carry out further demolitions. The operation was judged to be a great success, enhancing the reputation of the Commandos, but came at a considerable cost. Of the 662 Royal Navy, Commando and other Army participants, only 228 returned to England, 169 being killed and the rest captured, other than five men who escaped by way of Spain. Five Victoria Crosses were awarded among the many decorations, including one to Newman, who was taken prisoner, and another to his naval counterpart, Commander Ryder.