Commando General

by Richard B Mead

  Two other operations took place in the spring of 1942, the first being MYRMIDON, an attempt by 1 and 6 Commandos, under Lieutenant Colonel Will Glendinning of the former, to land at the mouth of the River Adour near Bayonne in south-west France to destroy military installations. It was aborted when a previously unidentified sand bar was seen to block the approach to the landing beach. The second was Operation ABERCROMBY, a landing at Hardelot, in the Pas-de-Calais south of Boulogne, by 100 men from 4 Commando under Shimi Lovat, at that time the second-in-command. The landing was unopposed, although contact was made later with the Germans, but nothing of great moment was achieved.

  Lovat, who shortly afterwards succeeded Lister as CO of 4 Commando, was now to participate in one of the War’s great disasters, albeit one from which he himself emerged with his reputation enhanced. He first heard of it from Bob, who arrived unannounced during a 4 Commando exercise at Dundonald Castle. Bob found himself initially pinned down by troops firing with live ammunition, but after much waving he was spotted, the firing stopped and he was able to tell Lovat that a major raid had been planned and that two commandos were to be used on the flanks to take out enemy batteries. The choice had fallen on 3 and 4 Commandos, and Lovat and Durnford-Slater were to report to COHQ immediately to be briefed by Haydon.

  The target of the raid was Dieppe. With no possibility of an invasion of the Continent in 1942, it had been decided to test the Germans’ strength by landing and holding a port for a short period, destroying its defences and any other military installations and sinking ships. The original plan for the operation, which was then to take place in early July, had included landing paratroopers on the flanks to neutralize the threat posed by two batteries. Due to bad weather the operation was postponed and very nearly cancelled, but it was revived in the following month, with the paratroopers replaced by the Commandos, who had been trained to scale cliffs. Moreover, the new Royal Marine Commando was also to be employed for the first time. The bulk of the troops, however, were provided by 2 Canadian Division.

  Operation JUBILEE was launched early on the morning of 19 August. The role of 3 Commando was to silence the battery at Berneval, to the east of the town. The men were embarked in small landing craft known as LCP(L)s, but on their way in they encountered a German inshore convoy with its E-boat escort, which attacked and scattered the boats. Only five out of twenty reached the beaches, but the men in four of them were unable to make any progress inland: their boats were then stranded by the tide and most were captured. The men in the fifth craft, led by the second-in-command, Major Peter Young, managed to work their way up to a position from which they could fire at the battery with small arms. They were able to distract the gunners so successfully that the battery thereafter ignored the ships lying offshore, and in due course Young withdrew his men satisfactorily.

  To the west of Dieppe, 4 Commando, which like 3 Commando included a small number of officers and men from the newly raised 1st US Ranger Battalion, landed two parties, one under Lovat, the other under his secondin-command, Derek Mills-Roberts. After fierce fighting by both parties, the battery was taken, the guns demolished and the small force taken off as planned.

  The Royal Marine Commando formed part of the reserve. With the main landing force in serious difficulties, Major General Roberts, the Canadian divisional commander, ordered it ashore as reinforcements. However, by that time the Germans had the measure of the battle, most of the landing craft were destroyed or disabled and the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Phillips, was fatally wounded. The few marines who landed were captured or killed.

  Whilst Operation JUBILEE was a complete failure in terms of its objectives, the actions of 4 Commando had been outstandingly successful and Young’s party had shown what could be achieved out of very little, given the requisite amount of skill and determination. They were the only bright lights on an otherwise very dark day.

  It was by now well understood that the Allies’ objectives in both the Mediterranean and north-west Europe could only be fulfilled by mounting a succession of large seaborne landings. One of the lessons of JUBILEE was that the Commandos could fulfil a highly valuable role in such circumstances. Supporting conventional troops in major amphibious operations was now to become their most important function for the remainder of the War.

  This had, in fact, already been demonstrated in a faraway operation which predated JUBILEE. Three months earlier, 5 Commando under Lieutenant Colonel W. S. S. Sanguinetti had participated in Operation IRONCLAD, the capture of the port of Diego Suarez at the northernmost point of the island of Madagascar, which it was feared would be made available to Japanese submarines by the Vichy French. The operation, which was otherwise carried out by infantry brigades, was mounted under the command of Major General Robert Sturges, GOC of the Royal Marine Division, and controlled by his staff. As a precursor to the main assault, 5 Commando landed silently and captured two batteries exactly to plan, going on subsequently to participate in other landings, which led in due course to the occupation of the whole island. It arrived back in the UK in November.

  With the advent of large scale landings, the old purpose of the Commandos, to carry out ‘butcher and bolt’ raids on the enemy coast, was largely devolved to special units. The first of these, given the cover name of 62 Commando, but more commonly known as the Small Scale Raiding Force, was set up shortly before Bob took command of the Special Service Brigade; whilst administered by the brigade, it was controlled operationally for the time being by COHQ , in conjunction with SOE. Unlike the other units, it had a dedicated force of motor boats and motor torpedo boats at its disposal and, when its achievements persuaded Mountbatten to increase its establishment, was placed under the command of Bill Stirling.

  The successes of 1941 had convinced Mountbatten that Norway should not be ignored, whilst Churchill was always keen to see large numbers of German troops tied up there. However, only one operation of any moment took place there in 1942. In MUSKETOON a small party, formed from 2 Commando and Norwegian members of SOE and led by Captain Graeme Black, landed at Glomfjord to destroy a power station, which supplied an aluminium plant in the area. Their objective was achieved with complete success, but the Germans surrounded and killed or captured all the men other than four who escaped to Sweden. Black, his deputy, Captain Joseph Houghton, and the others were later executed by firing squad in accordance with Hitler’s infamous Commando Order.6 In the light of the changing role of the other Commandos, Mountbatten now ordered the formation of the new 14 Commando to handle any further such raids in Norway and the Arctic. At the end of 1942, in the knowledge that this commando in particular, but possibly others as well, would require more specialist skills, the Commando Snow and Mountain Warfare Training Camp was set up at Braemar under Squadron Leader Frank Smythe, with Major John Hunt as his Chief Instructor; both were already notable mountaineers and the latter was later to achieve fame as leader of the first expedition to conquer Mount Everest.

  Even more specialized was 30 Commando, set up in September 1942 on the initiative of Ian Fleming, who was then working for the Director of Naval Intelligence, to operate alongside the forward troops in any landing, with the specific purpose of seizing enemy documents. Manned by technical experts and linguists, all with basic commando skills but trained additionally in others such as safe cracking, it was to feature in all the major Allied landings of the War. Like the SSRF, it was placed under the command of the Special Service Brigade for administrative purposes, but was operationally controlled by COHQ.

  The other new creation was 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando. Although 10 Commando had not been raised in 1940 as originally intended, due to the abrupt termination of recruitment late that summer, in mid-1942 it was decided that it should be resuscitated, but this time to consist of troops from the free forces of occupied European countries, specifically France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia. There was also a Miscellaneous Troop (No. 3), which consisted of enemy aliens, largely pre-war G
erman and Austrian refugees, who were fluent in German.

  Dudley Lister was selected as the commanding officer. Lister had been deeply disappointed when Bob was chosen over him to lead Layforce, and his disappointment was compounded when Bob was selected to command the Special Service Brigade. He began behaving increasingly eccentrically, even to the extent of abandoning his room in a hotel in Troon to live in a tent on the golf course. It was clear to Bob that he was no longer fitted for command in the field. On the other hand, he was admirably suited to raise the new commando, which began forming at Harlech in June.

  This also solved another problem for Bob, which was what to do about his brother Peter, who had returned to the UK when Oliver Lyttelton came back to succeed Lord Beaverbrook as Minister of Production. It was clear that he was unlikely to be required by the Sherwood Rangers, which by that time had reformed as an armoured regiment, and in any event he was unenthusiastic about going back to the Middle East. He was an acting major, but initially there was no spare vacancy in the Special Service Brigade for someone of that rank. However, 10 Commando required a second-in-command and Peter got the job. He was to serve in it with distinction for the rest of the War.

  During 1942 four other developments took place, all of which were to have a major impact on the Commandos. The first of these, one of Haydon’s last decisions before leaving the Special Service Brigade, was the establishment of the Commando Depot, later called the Commando Basic Training Centre, at Achnacarry, the seat of the chiefs of Clan Cameron, not far from Fort William. Until then, each Commando had been responsible for its own basic training, both directly in and around its base and by sending its men for specialist training at Lochailort. Now it was decided that all new recruits should complete the course at Achnacarry, whilst Lochailort was handed over to the Royal Navy for landing craft training. Some of the instructors, including Captains Fairbairn and Sykes, transferred to Achnacarry.

  The officer selected to command was a remarkable figure, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Vaughan. He had served in the ranks during the Great War, rising to become a regimental sergeant major before obtaining a commission. He had been the Administration Officer of 3 Special Service Battalion under Lister and then second-in-command of 4 Commando before Lovat. A tremendous disciplinarian, he turned out to be just what was needed to establish and run what turned out to be one of the finest training establishments of the War and the model for commando training ever since. Bob respected him greatly and invariably included him in the conferences which he held from time to time with all his unit commanders.

  The second development was the decision of the United States Army to form its own version of the Commandos, the Rangers. Bob was closely involved with getting the new force established, travelling to Northern Ireland on 26 June, a few days after the 1st Battalion began forming with volunteers from 34 US Division, to discuss its training regime and to make arrangements for its members to attend the course at Achnacarry. Unlike many British senior officers, who all too often looked on the Americans as inexperienced newcomers, Bob immediately treated them as equals and was rewarded by their full cooperation. In particular, he established a close personal friendship with the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel William Darby and, in order that they should gain experience of operations, arranged for fifty of his men to be attached to 3 and 4 Commandos at Dieppe. Towards the end of the year he was asked to visit 25 US Division to discuss the raising of a second battalion, which duly took place.

  The third development was of a different order altogether, but arguably made a greater contribution to defining the Commandos as a discrete part of the British Armed Forces than any other. One of the guiding principles of the Army Commandos was that they should be composed of volunteers, who would be attached from their parent regiments or services, to which, in theory at least, they were likely to return. As a result they continued to wear their own cap badges on the appropriate headgear, which for the majority was the field service or ‘forage’ cap, although others, notably those from the Household Brigade, wore service dress caps. This resulted in an appearance on parade which was far from homogenous. The exception was 11 Commando, which, to emphasize its Scottish origins, adopted the Balmoral bonnet, with a black hackle instead of cap badges. In due course the Balmoral bonnet was also adopted in the interests of uniformity by 2 and 9 Commandos, although their origins were not at all Scottish.

  On investigating the possibilities, 1 Commando, which had considered following the others, expressed a preference for the beret, a black version of which had been worn by the Royal Tank Regiment since 1924 and had now been adopted by the rest of the Royal Armoured Corps, whilst the Airborne Forces were given permission to wear maroon berets in mid-1942. It was argued by 1 Commando that this was a thoroughly sensible type of headgear, easy to maintain and to remove and stow away when necessary. Having decided that the most appropriate colour was green, they had examples made and approached Bob for his approval. He very much liked the idea, believing that it would cement the unity of the Commandos and should become mandatory for them all. He submitted the proposal to Mountbatten, who in turn approached the War Office. Authority for all members of the Special Service Brigade to wear green berets was published on 24 October 1942.

  The fourth development would turn out to be the most significant of all. The Royal Marines had already formed one Commando and were actively contemplating raising more.

  Chapter 15

  Reorganization

  If the early years of the War had been frustrating for the Commandos, they were even more so for the Royal Marines. As far back as 1923, the Madden Committee had recommended that they should form an amphibious strike force, but a parsimonious government declined to act on it. In the light of the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in the spring of 1940, a small RM detachment occupied the Faeroe Islands, the recently raised 2nd RM Battalion, still substantially untrained and under the command of Colonel Robert Sturges, took control of Iceland, whilst another force, put together hurriedly from the RM complements of a number of capital ships, held Åndalsnes in Norway to enable British troops to land in support of the Norwegians and later covered their withdrawal. The bulk of the troops for the abortive Dakar expedition came from 101 and 102 Royal Marine Brigades, but other than that part of the MNBDO which saw active service in Crete and suffered the same fate as Layforce, there was nothing more in the way of action. The Royal Marine Division, formed in 1940/41, remained unemployed.

  Following his appointment as CCO, Mountbatten, who was finding it difficult to recruit from the Army, approached the Adjutant-General Royal Marines, General Bourne, for help. Bourne agreed that a new commando could be raised from RM volunteers in the UK, and this was duly formed as the Royal Marine Commando in February 1942 and placed under the control of the Special Service Brigade. Bob spent four days with the unit on the Isle of Wight in July 1942, following which it was judged to be ready for inclusion in Operation JUBILEE.

  At a meeting attended by Bob at COHQ on 14 September, agreement was reached that a second Royal Marine Commando would be formed. In this case, however, it was decided to convert an existing unit, the 8th RM Battalion, which had originally been formed eighteen months earlier and which was not part of the Royal Marine Division. The original RM Commando was redesignated as ‘A’ RM Commando and the new one called ‘B’ RM Commando, but within weeks their titles were changed to 40 and 41 RM Commandos.

  This increment to the strength of the Special Service Brigade was made more necessary by the departure overseas of three Commandos in late October, the first deployment in such numbers since Layforce: 9 Commando, under Lieutenant Colonel Ronnie Tod, was sent to augment the garrison of Gibraltar, whilst 1 and 6 Commandos, under Lieutenant Colonels Tom Trevor and Iain McAlpine respectively, joined the force for Operation TORCH, the invasion of French North Africa.

  These were precisely the circumstances which Bob had envisaged when he wrote his recommendations on the Special Service Brigade shortly after his
return from Egypt. He had asked at that time for a second-in-command, and two months later Will Glendinning moved from 1 Commando to take up the position, with promotion to full colonel. Glendinning was now placed in overall charge of 1 and 6 Commandos and provided with a staff of two officers, one of whom was Randolph Churchill, now recovered from his injuries. As it was thought that the Vichy French would be more likely to surrender to the Americans than to the British, both commandos were augmented by US troops. These did not, however, come from the Rangers, although the 1st Battalion was engaged elsewhere in the invasion, and their training, as it turned out, did not equip them well for what was in store.

  For the landings on 8 November, both 1 and 6 Commandos were ordered to seize key French forts and batteries on either side of the Bay of Algiers and further to the west. Half of 1 Commando, led by the CO, took its objective without a shot being fired. The other half, under Tom Trevor’s cousin, Ken Trevor, encountered much more determined resistance and incurred casualties; but an attack by Allied aircraft, followed immediately by a charge, caused the French to capitulate. Although 6 Commando experienced difficulties when their boats were ineptly launched and then landed on the wrong beaches by untrained crews, so that the French were fully alerted, once again an air attack persuaded the Vichy defenders to surrender.