Commando General

by Richard B Mead

  The Allies now planned to move as fast as possible into Tunisia, and 6 Commando was sent on ships to take the port of Bône, sailing unimpeded into the harbour. It was joined there by 1 Commando a few days later. Thereafter 6 Commando was attached to 36 Brigade and employed as ordinary infantry, a role to which it was completely unsuited. McAlpine had a nervous breakdown and was evacuated, to be replaced in due course by Lovat’s second-in-command, Derek Mill-Roberts, who pulled the commando together and went on to win the DSO. Meanwhile, 1 Commando penetrated further west than any other Allied unit, landing at Bizerta from nine LCMs and four LCAs. It managed very successfully to hold up German reinforcements moving along the coast road, but was eventually attacked in such strength that it had to withdraw with heavy casualties before any Allied troops could come to its relief. Both commandos were now put into the front line as the Allied advance came to a complete halt and, with no replacements for their losses, had to be withdrawn to the UK in the following April.

  As the two commandos had been placed under other formations, Glendinning found that he was unable to exercise any control over them. Bob had no news other than a request for more green berets to be flown out and a postcard from Randolph Churchill. As a result, he sent Philip Dunne, who had consistently refused promotion from captain but was proving to be invaluable as a trouble-shooter, out to North Africa in early January 1943 to interview not only Glendinning and his immediate subordinates, but also the relevant Allied commanders.

  Glendinning told Dunne that he had suffered from having a very small staff, that he had been unable to persuade his superiors to grasp the proper role of the commandos, which had led to their use as infantry, and that the inclusion of the Americans, whose training and discipline was inferior to that of their British colleagues, had been unhelpful. On the back of his meeting with Glendinning and interviews with Lieutenant General Charles Allfrey, the Commander of V Corps, his BGS and the commanders of 78 Division and 36 Brigade, Dunne concluded that it was actually Glendinning’s personality and lack of leadership which had led to his being unable to control the two commandos or protect them from misuse.

  There was universal praise for 1 Commando, and it was clear that the overall opinion of the Commandos within the British Army had been greatly enhanced. Although 6 Commando had suffered from poor leadership in the early weeks, Mills-Roberts had impressed everyone and it was felt that he would restore its reputation. For Bob there were some significant lessons to be learnt from the campaign in North Africa, not least that a force of more than one commando sent on overseas operations should be led by a capable and forceful commander, who should be provided with an adequate staff, and used only for what it had been trained to do.

  A month before TORCH the Special Service Brigade HQ relocated to Sherborne, with its offices in the Castle. As both RM Commandos were on the Isle of Wight, No. 3 Commando was at Weymouth and No. 4 Commando at Winchester, the geographical emphasis, other than for training, had switched to the south, which was also much more convenient for Bob’s frequent visits to COHQ. There were some new arrivals, the most important of whom was Tom Churchill, who had tired of photographic interpretation and, remembering his brief but enjoyable stay with 8 Commando in late 1940, wrote to ask Bob if there was a role for him in the Special Service Brigade. Bob replied that he would be delighted to have him and succeeded in arranging a transfer, although there was no immediate vacancy on his staff. In the meantime, he sent Churchill on temporary attachments to a number of his units, including 2 Commando, which since St Nazaire had been commanded by Churchill’s brother Jack. ‘Mad Jack’ was something of an eccentric, who carried his bagpipes, a Scottish broadsword and a longbow and arrows with him on operations, but he was also a popular and highly effective leader. Tom Churchill also spent some time with Vaughan at the Commando Depot, before succeeding Atkinson at the Special Service Brigade as GSO1 Staff Duties and Training.

  Another welcome addition to the officers’ mess was Captain Basil Bennett, the Camp Commandant. In peacetime Bennett had been managing director of the Hyde Park Hotel, in which he had employed Brian Franks. At the age of forty-eight he was considerably older than any of his colleagues and had served in the Rifle Brigade in the Great War, during which he had been wounded three times. Well regarded by Bob and the others, especially Evelyn Waugh, he managed to make significant improvements to the catering in the mess, notably to the wine cellar, and was generally regarded as something of a father figure. Another addition to the HQ was Walter Cowan, who was attached as the Naval Liaison Officer. Captured in North Africa whilst serving with an Indian cavalry regiment, he had been released by the Italians in a prisoner exchange on account of his age.1

  Bob continued to fulfil a punishing schedule, inspecting units, attending exercises and continuing to apply his own very high standards. Following one of the exercises, Waugh wrote in his diary:

  Bob gave a conference to the troop leaders on the exercise, warning them that their training was elementary and their discipline weak, and threatening to disband them. Where he excels and commands my admiration is that he is able to say this without a sting, so that he rouses no resentment.2

  One significant advantage of the HQ’s new location was that Bob could see more of Angie in London and, on occasion, in Sherborne. She was now running the canteen at COHQ in Richmond Terrace and had also become very closely involved with the Commando Benevolent Fund, which was established on 11 January 1943 on the initiative of Mountbatten to provide financial assistance to the wives, widows and dependent children of those who had served in the Army Commandos. Bob was the first chairman and Angie herself was on the committee; more importantly, as most of the other members were serving officers, she established and ran the Ladies Committee, which carried out most of the fund-raising work during the War. A number of concerts and dances were held, and a major success was arranging for the CBF to be the beneficiary, jointly with the Airborne Forces Benevolent Fund, of the première of Laurence Olivier’s film of Henry V.

  By the beginning of 1943 it was apparent that no further Army commandos were going to be raised and that providing replacements for losses within the existing commandos would continue to present difficulties. One month earlier Bob had met the C-in-C Home Forces, General Sir Bernard Paget, to discuss the problem, only to be told bluntly that Home Forces would be unable to provide any help with recruitment. There were other potential sources, such as Anti-Aircraft Command, which was scaling down from its peak at the height of the Blitz, whilst good junior officers were being recruited directly from their OCTUs, but these were not sufficient to satisfy the demand. It looked as if the only solution would be to cannibalize some existing units, as a result of which 12 and 14 Commandos were first reduced and later disbanded to provide replacements for the others.

  Moreover, in the light of the requirement for substantial amphibious operations to establish footholds on the mainland of Europe, it was also becoming very evident that the role of the Commandos had changed. At the Commanding Officers’ Conference on 15 January:

  The Brigade Commander stated that owing to the general change in the war situation it was apparent that raiding for the sake of raiding was unlikely to be undertaken. Therefore Commandos must be prepared to carry out a role as specialised and highly trained infantry, possibly for protracted operations. In view of this it was necessary to think ahead of the likely requirements of Units, and consequent changes of establishment.3

  This involved re-equipping each commando with additional vehicles and heavier weaponry, such as machine-guns and 3” mortars. Bob, however, was also thinking about a much more fundamental reorganization of the Special Service Brigade itself: on 1 April he sent a paper to Mountbatten and to his own COs entitled ‘Role of the Special Service Brigade and the Desirability of Reorganization’, identifying three possible futures for the Commandos:

  (a) To be retained in their present form for employment in small scale raids

  (b) To be disbanded

 
(c) To be reorganised so that they may participate in large scale operations overseas and in large scale raids mounted from this country, either in a single force or in conjunction with the Field Force4

  As far as the first was concerned, Bob believed that such a commitment could be met with a force of only three Commandos, raising the question of what would become of the others. Unsurprisingly, he rejected disbandment, arguing that, in their short history, the Commandos had developed a morale, an esprit de corps and a fighting efficiency second to none in the British Army and had won admiration and respect from friend and foe alike. He thus settled on the third option but, with no fewer than seventeen units under its direct command – fourteen Commandos, the Brigade Signals Troop, the Commando Depot and the Commando Mountain Warfare Camp – he concluded that the current structure of the Special Service Brigade was too unwieldy.

  Having said that, his first recommendation was the formation of yet another unit, to be called the Holding Commando. This was to remedy a major deficiency in the existing organization, which was that, after major raids or lengthy overseas deployments, the Commandos involved were unfit for active service for many months whilst they re-formed and retrained. The solution was for the Holding Commando to take in all those who had undertaken their basic training at Achnacarry and post officers and men to individual Commandos as required.

  The second major proposal was a fundamental restructuring, whereby nine of the Commandos would be split into three groups of three, each group commanded by a full colonel with a small staff consisting of a brigade major, a staff captain and an intelligence officer. These groups would be capable of detachment from the Special Service Brigade for operations under other formations as required. The Special Service Brigade would continue to have direct control of 10, 30 and 62 Commandos and of the Commando Depot, the Holding Commando and the Commando Mountain Warfare Camp. Two Commandos, 12 and 14, would cease to exist. Other important proposals included amendments to the war establishments of individual units and the upgrading of weapons and transport in line with Bob’s meeting with his unit commanders on 15 January.

  Bob did not produce these ideas out of the blue; indeed, he took great care to keep both Mountbatten and Haydon fully informed of what he was going to recommend and reached agreement in principle with the former a month before the paper was submitted. Mountbatten was prepared to put his weight behind the proposals and, in particular, to press at the highest level for the promotion to full colonel of the group commanders.

  One of those proposed for this new role was Shimi Lovat, who had, however, recently been approached to move to another job, to which he was giving serious consideration. This may have been in part a consequence of his relationship with Bob, which had not always been an easy one. Bob had received a number of complaints about the behaviour of the CO of 4 Commando and had written to him several months earlier:

  To be absolutely frank with you I think you are inclined to be getting a reputation for arrogance which is a pity. Please rectify this.5

  Lovat had also been very critical about the formation of the various specialized Commandos, whose role he felt could have been just as well performed by the existing units. Nonetheless, Bob did value him highly as an aggressively minded officer, who had led a first-class unit with great success at Dieppe and was much admired by his own men and by those in other Commandos. He therefore bent over backwards to retain him, asking him to give the newly proposed organization his full consideration before severing his connection with the Special Service Brigade. He also added his support to a proposal by Lovat to bring the Lovat Scouts into the Commandos: the regiment, which had seen no active service during the War, had been raised by Lovat’s father and he had served in it himself. The proposal was turned down, but Lovat was grateful to Bob and this may have influenced his decision, which was to remain in the Commandos.

  There was some interesting feedback on Bob’s paper from some of the other Commando leaders. Derek Mills-Roberts, for instance, who was still in North Africa, was dubious about the status of the colonels commanding each group, comparing this unfavourably with the parachute brigades he had come across recently, which were all commanded by brigadiers. He suggested that the Commandos would be more influential as a division, with Bob in command and a couple of brigadiers beneath him.

  It was 2 May before Haydon returned the paper to Bob with a number of minor amendments, which were all agreed immediately. On 4 May Mountbatten wrote to the CIGS, summarizing the proposals and taking ownership of them himself. He also suggested that in future the Special Service Brigade should be allowed to recruit 40 per cent from the Field Army and 60 per cent from Corps Training Centres.

  Unfortunately, the letter was delivered to Brooke on the very day that he, Churchill and the other Chiefs of Staff left for the TRIDENT conference in Washington. The CIGS had many more important issues to address and it was 11 May before he signalled Mountbatten to say that he was unable to accept the proposals without consulting the Adjutant General. He asked Mountbatten to speak to both the Adjutant General and the VCIGS and to have them wire him the results of their discussions. Mountbatten did not write to the VCIGS, Lieutenant General Nye, until 25 May, and it was not Nye but the DCIGS, Lieutenant General Weeks, responsible at the War Office for matters relating to organization, who replied on 3 June, saying that further careful examination was required before he could discuss the proposals with Brooke on the latter’s return to the country two days later. On 24 June Weeks wrote again to say that the proposals had been approved in principle and were being submitted to the War Establishments Committee.

  Whilst awaiting a decision, Bob had been busy considering the ramifications of the proposed reorganization and particularly the composition and the commanders of the three new groups. On 12 May he wrote to Haydon, proposing that the commanders should be Lovat, with 1, 3 and 6 Commandos, Tom Trevor with 2, 5 and 9 Commandos and Durnford-Slater with 4, 40 RM and 41 RM Commandos. Ken Trevor6 would step up to command 1 Commando in succession to his cousin, Peter Young would replace Durnford-Slater in 3 Commando and Tom Churchill would, in due course, follow Lovat in 4 Commando, with Lovat’s second-in-command, Robert Dawson, acting in the meantime. All the other COs would remain in place.

  Before the War Establishments Committee could finally approve it, the reorganization was overtaken by two events. The first of these was the departure overseas of Bob himself, to conduct the operations described in the next two chapters. This did indeed result in a de facto reorganization of the Special Service Brigade, although not in the way that he had envisaged. Instead, it was simply the reverse of the earlier arrangement for Operation TORCH, when the Brigade Commander stayed at home whilst his deputy led the expeditionary force. This time it was the deputy who remained behind.

  The second event was much more momentous, in terms not only of the immediate organization of the Commandos and their employment for the remainder of the War, but also of their post-war role and composition. This was the wholesale conversion of the Royal Marine Division into Commandos.

  The RM Division had existed on paper since August 1940, when Bob Sturges was appointed as its GOC, but the absence of 101 and 102 RM Brigades, which were still in West Africa at that time, meant that the divisional HQ only opened in February 1941. It had been chosen to be part of Force 110 to capture the Canary Islands, only to have that operation cancelled, then selected once again for Operation IRONCLAD in Madagascar and this time be replaced by other formations. It was to suffer yet more disappointment in the autumn of 1943, when General Eisenhower refused Bourne’s offer of the division for Operation TORCH, on the grounds that it was composed of only two infantry brigades and lacked most of the supporting arms and services of a standard division. Bourne, however, remained stubbornly insistent on retaining the division as a discrete landing force, and it was only in early 1943, when he was succeeded as Adjutant General by Lieutenant General T. L. Hunton, that a greater degree of flexibility began to emerge within the Corps.
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  By that time it was already apparent that not only was there an immediate demand for Commandos in the Mediterranean theatre, but that the invasion of north-west Europe would require even more. In addition, it was now being suggested that they would prove valuable in south-east Asia. With little chance of wholesale recruitment from the Army being permitted by the War Office, at least in the UK, Mountbatten turned to the Admiralty to plug the looming gap. Both the First Sea Lord and Hunton turned out to be amenable, but as two RM Commandos were already in existence and an additional six could be formed from the RM Division’s battalions, they would only agree to the latter’s conversion on the condition that all the Commandos, both RM and Army, came under the overall command of a Royal Marine officer. Sturges was the obvious candidate, not only because of his previous experience in combined operations, but also because he had a sizeable and well trained HQ at his disposal.

  Mountbatten capitulated without hesitation. Bob’s proposals on structural reorganization were shelved and work began on the creation of a new formation, to be called the Special Service Group.

  Chapter 16

  Husky

  It had been decided in January 1943 at the Casablanca Conference that the next objective for the Western Allies, once they had defeated the Axis forces in North Africa, should be the invasion of Sicily. A planning HQ , Force 141, was set up in Algiers, to which Antony Head was attached as a representative of COHQ , but it was only as the campaign in Tunisia was drawing to an end in May that the senior commanders were able to find time to focus on the operation, codenamed HUSKY. The composition of the ground forces had by then been agreed. They were to consist of Eighth Army under General Sir Bernard Montgomery and Seventh US Army under Lieutenant General George Patton. Once Montgomery was able to find time to study the plans, which proposed dispersed landings, he had them completely recast, so that the two armies would land alongside one another in south-east Sicily, with Seventh US Army on the south coast and Eighth Army on either side of Cape Passero and up the east coast.