Commando General

by Richard B Mead

  Following their creditable performance in North Africa, it was decided at an early stage of planning that both Commandos and US Rangers would be employed in the landings. As far as the British were concerned, the force would consist of 3, 40 RM and 41 RM Commandos. In preparation for this, 3 Commando was sent initially to relieve 9 Commando in Gibraltar, where it stayed for six weeks before being relieved in its turn by 2 Commando and moving on to Algiers and thence to Egypt, in order to rehearse its role in HUSKY with 5 Division, which it would be supporting. Whereas 3 Commando was to sail to Sicily from Port Said and land on the right flank of Eighth Army, the two RM Commandos, whose task was to support 1 Canadian Division on the left flank, were to sail directly from the UK. In addition, one other unit was to land near to but separate from 3 Commando. This was the Special Raiding Squadron, now commanded by Paddy Mayne. It had been created after David Stirling was taken prisoner in Tunisia at the beginning of the year, at which time the SAS had been divided into the SRS and the Special Boat Squadron, the latter commanded by George Jellicoe.

  In the knowledge that three Commandos and the SRS would be employed in the Mediterranean and that they were likely to be reinforced by 2 Commando before very long, and in the light of the experience of 1 and 6 Commandos in Operation TORCH, Bob argued forcefully for them to be controlled by a Brigade HQ on the ground. He also sought permission to lead it himself, leaving Lovat as his deputy to look after the remainder of the Special Service Brigade in the UK. As Tom Churchill was to write later:

  Eastern Sicily.

  It was not without great difficulty that this permission was obtained, and many battles on paper and in conference rooms in the War Office had to be waged before the need for this arrangement was recognised. Our friends the Canadians helped us considerably in this respect, by saying that it would make their task easier if they had a Commando Headquarters to deal with, rather than with separate units.1

  In preparation for this, the Special Service Brigade HQ was split into two on 12 April. Bob, with Tom Churchill, Franks and Dunne, together with Major Griff Hunt in charge of ‘Q’ matters and much of the Signals Troop, set up Advance HQ at Prestwick. The officers were comfortably billeted in Troon in the house of the father2 of Ian Collins, formerly of 8 Commando and now working at COHQ. The rest of the staff, in what was now styled Rear HQ , remained in Sherborne before moving at the beginning of June to Cowdray Park, Midhurst. Waugh was no longer with them. He had never got on well with Lovat and was appointed Special Service Brigade Liaison Officer at COHQ , to be replaced at Rear HQ by Captain Hilary Bray.

  Advance HQ was soon joined in Scotland by 40 and 41 RM Commandos. Exercise ALBION was designed by Churchill to give the HQ specific practice in handling a force of Commandos in the field, and further exercises were held, most for the Commandos alone, but two in conjunction with the Canadians. Some of these took place on Arran, the first time that any Commando had visited the island since 1941.

  On 27 May Bob was summoned to a conference at the War Office, to find that it had been convened by Montgomery himself, who was visiting the UK for the first time since he had left for Egypt in August 1942. He was a stranger to Bob but well known to the Canadians, who had served under him in England, and it was clear that he was extremely popular with them. He explained his plans very clearly and expressed total confidence that they would be successfully executed.

  For the final full-scale rehearsal, carried out on the beaches between Troon and Irvine on 18 June, Bob and his staff embarked in HMT Derbyshire, the ship which would carry them to Sicily. Five days later, Bob went down to London for a final visit prior to his departure. There were two main objectives, the first of which was to see his new and second daughter, Emma Rose, who had been born on 12 June. The second was to meet Mountbatten for the last time before sailing for Sicily.

  The purpose of the meeting was for Bob to bring the CCO fully up to date with his dispositions for HUSKY, but Mountbatten used the occasion to bring Bob into the picture about the possible conversion of the Royal Marine Division into Commandos. There is no record of the meeting, but Mountbatten’s discussions with the Admiralty and the RM Office were then at an early stage and no decisions had been made as to the composition of the combined organization. Bob did, however, offer a view on this. Some five weeks later, by which time serious differences of opinion had begun to emerge between them, Mountbatten was to write to Bob:

  You will remember that it was you who first suggested that the Army Commandos should come under General Sturges, in order that the Army and the Marine Commandos should be a unified force. I shall always be very grateful to you for that suggestion, because I feel that it was a really important contribution and, incidentally, a very generous one on your part. 3

  Bob was, it seems, responding to this surprising new development off the top of his head, without any chance to pause for reflection. As Haydon was later to tell Mountbatten, ‘Brigadier Laycock’s mind must, at the time he gave you his opinion, have been filled with the details of Husky’,4 whilst Bob himself wrote, ‘I seem to have given the C.C.O a very wrong impression of my recommendation made in great haste before my departure for SICILY.’5 Bob had actually lunched with Sturges afterwards, during which he repeated what Mountbatten had revealed, but he had no time to consult with his subordinates. He left London the next day to make one final inspection in the south of England before leaving the country.

  Advance HQ re-embarked on the Derbyshire on 27 June, along with 40 RM Commando, under Lieutenant Colonel J. C. ‘Pops’ Manners, and the 48th Highlanders of Canada, whilst 41 RM Commando, under Lieutenant Colonel B. J. D. Lumsden, travelled with other Canadian troops in HMT Durban Castle. The convoy, which included many more ships carrying 1 Canadian Division, sailed from the Clyde late on 28 June.

  The Derbyshire had been recently converted into a LSI but was rather more comfortable than the Glen ships. Bob had a bedroom, bathroom and sitting room to himself, which annoyed Philip Dunne, who had to share a cabin. The food was delicious and the drink cheap and plentiful, but there was also serious work to be done. On 1 July the orders for the invasion were distributed to all units, which now had to prepare thoroughly for their specific roles. On 3 July Bob gave a briefing to all the officers, outlining the overall plan so that everyone could understand how they fitted in.

  Other than a number of alarms when parts of the escort were detached to deal with possible submarines, only one of which proved to be genuine and was destroyed by depth charges, the voyage was uneventful. The convoy passed Gibraltar on 5 July and made its way across the Western Mediterranean, which was surprisingly devoid of enemy aircraft. The seas were calm until the convoy arrived off the Maltese island of Gozo on 9 July, when the wind increased substantially and a heavy swell built up, casting doubt on the practicability of landings west of Cape Passero early on the following morning. By late evening, however, the wind had abated and, in spite of a swell remaining, conditions were such that the landing craft could be launched.

  At 01.10 on 10 July the LCAs carrying 40 RM Commando and the Brigade HQ were lowered and moved away from the ship, later taking position to the right of a navigational motor launch, with those carrying 41 RM Commando to the left. At 02.30 the ML hove to, uncertain of its position. Nevertheless, 41 RM Commando advanced towards the shore, the craft from the Derbyshire following soon afterwards and touching down on the beach near Punta Castellazzo at 03.00, about 400 yards west of the intended position.

  Both Commandos and the HQ moved quickly inland, experiencing only modest opposition, although casualties were incurred from machine guns firing on fixed lines, particularly in 41 RM Commando, which lost its second-incommand amongst others. The D-Day objectives, a number of batteries and strongpoints along the coast, were overrun by 06.00. There was some further fighting after daybreak, and 40 RM Commando was ordered to clear the hills immediately in front, which they did quickly, albeit with some casualties. To the east, contact was made with the Canadians.

  Br
igade HQ established a temporary location soon after landing but moved later to a house further inland, which turned out to have a good supply of wine, notably Marsala. Bob and Dunne insisted on having a photograph taken in front of the hogsheads to send to Waugh, whom they knew was partial to Marsala and would thus be annoyed at not being present. Later that day, Bob attended a conference at 1 Canadian Division’s HQ and received orders to move forward again on the next day to conform to the division’s advance. After taking up their new position, 41 RM Commando came under mortar fire, but a flanking movement by 40 RM Commando and some heavy mortar support from the Canadians drove off the attackers and, later in the day, the two Commandos were withdrawn into reserve.

  On the far right flank of the landings near Cassibile, 3 Commando had had a similar experience, meeting some resistance but capturing the target battery with no casualties. Only Peter Young was unhappy, as his LCA had gone wildly astray and he had missed the action. Durnford-Slater gave him the task of seizing a nearby fort, which restored his good humour.

  The SRS had also taken its D-Day objectives at Cape Murro di Porco and, two days later, Mayne and his squadron occupied the port of Augusta by themselves, handing it over to 5 Division on the following day.

  On 12 July Bob was ordered to report to Montgomery. He and Churchill took a boat out to HMS Hilary, the command ship for the force which had sailed from the UK, flying the flag of Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian. There they met Montgomery’s Chief of Staff, Major General Freddie de Guingand, who told them that the Eighth Army Commander was expected; but although a number of other senior officers came aboard, including Eisenhower, there was no sign of him. Returning to shore, they eventually met him that evening at the HQ of XXX Corps, which was commanded by Lieutenant General Oliver Leese, who was well known to Bob as the former Adjutant of the Eton College OTC. Montgomery was pleased with the performance of the Commandos and talked about other possible operations which were very much in line with what they had been trained to do.

  On the next day Bob and Churchill went to Montgomery’s Tac HQ and found both Mountbatten and Head there. After further discussions with the Army Commander, Bob escorted the CCO back to his own HQ and then on to 40 and 41 RM Commandos, who were congratulated on their achievements. There was no mention of the conversion of the Royal Marine Division into Commandos, and later that day Mountbatten and Head left for Malta.

  On the same day 3 Commando had carried out an operation which was to raise the stock of the Commandos considerably in the eyes of the British commanders, but at a high price. Durnford-Slater was summoned to a conference with Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey, GOC of XIII Corps, at which he was given orders to land behind the enemy lines further up the east coast at Agnone and then to march seven miles inland to seize and hold the Malati Bridge, across which ran the main road to Catania.

  Having been told to expect only Italian opposition, which would probably fade away as before, 3 Commando instead encountered German paratroopers, who had recently been dropped into the area. Notwithstanding this, a detachment led by Young reached the bridge and managed to remove demolition charges which had been set there. The Commando then established itself on high ground to dominate the road and succeeded in stopping the traffic, but the Germans threw everything they had at them, including a Tiger tank. Casualties began to rise and, with no relief in sight, Durnford-Slater ordered his men to break up into small parties and make their way back to the British lines.

  The operation had failed, but both Montgomery and Dempsey were delighted with 3 Commando’s performance and Montgomery later had the bridge formally named after it. Durnford-Slater received a bar to his DSO, Young a bar to his MC and there were numerous other awards. On the other hand 28 men were killed, 66 wounded and 59 missing.

  Bob heard about 3 Commando’s exploits for the first time on 14 July, when he and Churchill attended a conference in Syracuse to discuss future operations with Dempsey and the Flag Officer Sicily, Rear Admiral Rhoderick McGrigor. Like Leese, Dempsey was known to Bob, in his case as one of his Company Officers at Sandhurst.6 The conference continued on the next day, by which time the fate of 3 Commando had become clearer, as a result of which 40 and 41 RM Commandos were moved into XIII Corps to replace it for the next operation.

  Strong resistance by the newly arrived Germans meant that XIII Corps was brought to a halt on the Plain of Catania, south of the city itself. Operation CHOPPER was planned to relieve the pressure by landing the two RM Commandos and the SRS north of Catania, into which they would fight their way; they would then form a beachhead in the harbour, from which 17 Brigade of 5 Division would attack the enemy from the rear. All the units involved and Brigade HQ , now augmented by Randolph Churchill, embarked in two LSIs, only to have the operation cancelled due to intelligence on large enemy reinforcements. To compound their disappointment, that night there was a heavy air raid and one of the LSIs was hit, causing numerous fatalities and other casualties.

  Over the next few days it became apparent that Eighth Army was held up all along its line and, with no prospect of immediate employment, the Special Service Brigade was temporarily stood down. Tom Churchill managed to find a site for 40 and 41 RM Commandos and the Brigade HQ at Brucoli, which adjoined a good beach where the troops could bathe. On 22 July 2 Commando arrived from Gibraltar to join them, providing a welcome reinforcement after the losses incurred by 3 Commando.

  In order to keep the enemy on his toes, a number of feint landings were mounted in Operation LUSTY, carried out on the nights of 25/26, 28/29 and 29/30 July by forces of destroyers accompanied by landing craft. Franks accompanied the ships on the first night, Tom Churchill on the second and Bob on the third, but in spite of shelling the coast road there was no response from the coastal batteries and little evidence that the sorties had made any impact.

  With no operations imminent, Bob, Tom Churchill and Dunne flew to Tunis on 1 August and then on to Algiers the next day, to begin planning the Special Service Brigade’s role in the next phase of the War, the invasion of mainland Italy. Durnford-Slater was appointed acting Brigade Commander in Bob’s absence, with Franks remaining in Sicily as his Brigade Major. The new operations required the Special Service Brigade to be subdivided again, with 2 and 41 RM Commandos employed in Operation BUTTRESS, a landing by X Corps in the Gulf of Gioia on the coast of Calabria, and 3 and 40 RM Commandos and the SRS in Operation BAYTOWN, a landing by XIII Corps on the toe of Italy near Reggio. The Brigade HQ would also be split, with Churchill and Dunne accompanying Bob in BUTTRESS and Franks continuing to act as BM for Durnford-Slater in BAYTOWN. Bob found to his pleasure that the commander of X Corps was Brian Horrocks, whom both he and Churchill had known well as the Chief Instructor at the Staff College in early 1940.

  Algiers was the location for both Eisenhower’s Allied Forces HQ and General Alexander’s Fifteenth Army Group, and there were many old friends in the city. Amongst them was Bill Stirling, who, following the capture of his brother earlier that year, had founded the 2nd SAS Regiment from the remnants of 62 Commando, which had just been disbanded. Bob was interested in exploring future cooperation with the SAS, but Stirling also provided a potential solution to a new problem, which was what to do about Waugh, who had recently been compelled to resign from the Special Service Brigade in the UK.

  It had been Bob’s intention when he left England to bring Waugh out to join him with the first flight of reinforcements, leaving instructions to that effect at Rear HQ. On 9 July, however, Waugh was surprised to receive a letter from John Sooby, the Acting DAA&QMG at Rear HQ , instructing him to hand over his job to another officer and report to the Commando Depot. He appealed to Lovat, who replied confirming the order and saying that he would not be allowed overseas until passed fit for active service by Achnacarry. Waugh then took his case up to Haydon, who aggressively supported Lovat, and he therefore had no alternative but to tender his resignation, which was immediately accepted. Mountbatten was sympathetic, but refused to overrule his subordinate
s.

  It has been suggested that Bob had never intended Waugh to join him. There is no firm evidence for this, but it is not unlikely. Lovat was later to write that Waugh was ‘cordially disliked by every combatant officer in the brigade’7 and, although this may have been an exaggeration, his continuing pursuit of a varied social and literary life was certainly inconsistent with the commitment required of a Commando officer. It is possible that Bob was finding Waugh something of an embarrassment, but he was nevertheless very angry at his treatment by Lovat and Haydon. It was, however, a fait accompli, and all he could do was try to get him accepted elsewhere. He did eventually persuade Stirling to take Waugh, but the latter never served actively with the SAS, although he did go off with Randolph Churchill to Yugoslavia in the late summer of 1944, as part of the British Military Mission to Marshal Tito. Another casualty of the Lovat regime was Basil Bennett, but Bob succeeded in having him transferred to the Special Service Brigade HQ in the Mediterranean.

  The Waugh affair was an unwelcome distraction, but no more than that. Of much more concern was what was going on with the reorganization of the Commandos, which had now come to a head. Matters had moved on apace since Bob had left the UK, helped not a little by the CIGS being only too willing to see responsibility for the Commandos devolved onto the Royal Marines. On 18 July, following his return from Sicily, Mountbatten held a meeting with his Chief of Staff, Major General Peter Wildman-Lushington, himself a Royal Marine officer, and Haydon. Haydon was deeply concerned that the wholesale incorporation of the Special Service Brigade into the RM Division ‘might prove to be the thin end of the wedge as far as the Army Commandos were concerned’.8 It would, in particular, sever the link between himself, as the senior Army officer at COHQ , and the brigade. He preferred leaving it as it was. Mountbatten rejected this and, two days later, sent a signal to Bob: