The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran
Page 73
This growing international isolation and economic pressure only heightened Iran’s paranoia that the real goal behind U.S. actions was the over-throw of the Islamic Republic. Anti-Americanism remained a pillar of the government’s policies, and no real change in this regard was likely to occur while the revolutionary generation remained in power. The young men who took to the streets, overthrew the shah, and fought eight years of a bloody war with an Iraqi government backed by Washington now had gray in their beards, but their attitudes remained the same. Like the great Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, who wrote about the rise and fall of the great empires as repeated cycles in history, the supreme leader and his inner circle remained convinced that the West was declining and the next empire, Iran, was on the rise. The United States and its regional lackey, Israel, like the Soviets and communism before them, were going to collapse. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the United States was in retreat in the Middle East. While more realistic Iranian leaders like Javad Zarif understood that the reality was quite different, and Iran was never going to rival the United States in power, the fallout from the 2009 elections had marginalized many of these voices of reason.
While the 1979 revolution changed Iran’s government, the Islamic Republic maintained the age-old Iranian goal of being recognized as a regional power. “We should be the greatest power in the region and play a role accordingly,” said Hadi Nesanjani, who served in President Rafsanjani’s cabinet. While the new government was loath to put it in these terms, deeper even than the Shia religious motivations is an ingrained sense of Persian historical entitlement. As a nation, the Iranians predate all others in the region, with a lineage tracing back to the Persian Empire founded by Cyrus the Great. A seat at the Middle East table is their natural right; it is the United States that stands in their path. Building this historical precedent, the Iranian Revolution had added a mission as the new defender of the downtrodden Shia across the Middle East and, by extension, all Muslims resisting the West and Israel. Starting in Lebanon, facilitated by the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and most recently in Yemen and Bahrain, Iran provided a steady stream of military and economic support to these movements. This puts Iran squarely at odds with both Israel and the Sunni governments backed by the United States.
The Iran problem is an enduring constant in American foreign policy. Over the decades, every administration has had its moments with Iran. The country has been too strategically important to ignore. Various administrations have tried to woo it back into the Western fold, or talk of replacing the Islamic Republic with one more to Washington’s liking, but the results have been uniformly miserable. In the final analysis, Iran simply rejects any vision of the Middle East as imposed by the will of the United States. A famous quote by Ayatollah Khomeini puts it succinctly: “We will resist America until our last breath.” Unfortunately, Washington has helped perpetuate the animosity. The United States has displayed a callous disregard for Iranian grievances and security concerns. Giving a medal to a ship’s captain who just inadvertently killed 290 civilians and then wondering why Iran might harbor resentment is just the most obvious example of American obtuseness. An ill-conceived intervention in the Lebanese Civil War against the Shia, while at the same time backing Iraq, threatened the new Iranian government. Tehran’s response, to level a building full of marines and to take American hostages, still colors American thinking, equally understandably. Washington invariably took the wrong course with Iran. When diplomatic openings appeared, hardliners refused to talk and advocated overthrowing the Islamic Republic. When Iran killed U.S. soldiers and marines in Lebanon and Iraq, successive administrations showed timidity when hard-liners called for retribution.
Glimmers of optimism invariably give way to the smell of cordite and talk of war. In 2012, the prospects for conflict peaked again. Seasoned, pragmatic Iran watchers called for tougher sanctions to punish Iranian intransigence regarding its nuclear program. But punishing Iran for its intransigence also hardens Iranian leaders and justifies in their minds the need for a nuclear program, both for increased self-sufficiency and as a deterrent against Western aggression. Within the U.S. administration, discussions in the White House Situation Room turned to the possibility of pressing for sanctions against Iran’s central bank. As this is the means by which Iran receives payment for its oil exports, this would be a radical act, tantamount to an embargo of Iranian oil. “Iran could see it as a de facto act of war,” said one senior Obama administration representative.
Unfortunately, now neither side has much desire to work to bridge their differences. Distrust permeates the relationship. Three decades of twilight war have hardened both sides. When someone within the fractured governing class in Tehran reached out to the American president, the United States was unwilling to accept anything but capitulation. When President Obama made a heartfelt opening, a smug Iranian leadership viewed it as a ruse or the gesture of a weak leader. Iran spurned him. Obama fell back on sanctions and CENTCOM; Iran fell back into its comfortable bed of terrorism and warmongering. Soon it may no longer be twilight; the light is dimming, and night may well be approaching at long last.
Acknowledgments
The burden of writing a book frequently falls on the writer’s family. My wife, Heys, and my young son, Matthew, patiently endured the many days I spent ensconced in my study or away conducting research. My parents provided both their personal insights as well as continuous encouragement as this book morphed with each seemingly never-ending rewrite.
At last count, I interviewed well over four hundred individuals in the United States and overseas. They invited me into their homes and made room in busy schedules to share with me their recollections. Many sat for hours answering my questions and tolerated numerous follow-up questions and interviews. My chief regret is that so many of their fascinating stories could not be included in the final text. Several individuals deserve particular notice. The late Caspar Weinberger and William Odom offered their unique insights, and the former defense secretary’s family graciously approved my request to review his papers. Richard Armitage always found time to answer my questions. Admiral James Lyons’s memory and personal papers started me along many new and important paths to unraveling this history. Retired admirals Tony Less, Harold Bernsen, and John Poindexter kindly tolerated my frequent requests for interviews. Peter Wikul’s and Marc Thomas’s interviews filled in the details of some of the key military engagements against Iran during the late 1980s. My father, George Crist, offered up his papers and notebooks. The Islamic Republicc facilitated interviews with officials. Others who helped fill in key holes: James Parran, Anthony Zinni, John Abizaid, Hooshang Amirahmadi, Nazhatoon Riahi, George Cave, Jack Devine, Joseph Strasser, Richard Williams, Tim Weiner, Mark Perry, P. X. Kelley, Robert Harward, and Kevin Cosgriff. There were a number of others who provided invaluable assistance but need to remain anonymous. I am deeply grateful for their time and information.
The American public is fortunate to have the most accessible military archives in the world. The staffs at the Naval Historical Center, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Army Heritage and Education Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Special Operations Command were extremely helpful in obtaining and, in the case of the navy’s operational archives, declassifying many records. They allowed me to listen to hundreds of oral histories that provided recollections immediately after the events described. The staff at the old Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington Navy Yard opened their extensive collections and declassified many documents and interviews too. The staffs at both the National Archives and Library of Congress were ever gracious and helpful. I am also indebted to the scholars at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Cold War Studies and the National Security Archive for breaking loose so many documents from the U.S. government.
I am also grateful to The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, especially Michael Eisenstadt, Michael Knights, and Patrick Clawson. They allowed me to use their facilities and opened their Ro
lodexes for six months while I wrote the Clinton and Bush chapters. Their collegiality and insights helped immeasurably in an accurate telling of this story.
I am indebted to several people who aided me in this book. Michael Gordon, a great reporter, encouraged the book and helped open doors. My agent, Andrew Wylie, saw the importance of the subject and applied his considerable talents to the project from the outset. Dr. John Shortal graciously allowed an extended absence from a demanding job to complete the book. My dissertation adviser, Peter Garretson, helped in the early stages of what would become this tome. Susan Carroll helped with copyediting. John Partin, the recently retired historian at Special Operations Command, aided this project immensely at various stages. His wealth of knowledge about the history of special operations forces is unsurpassed.
I could not have had a better team supporting me than the professionals at Penguin. My editor, Scott Moyers, offered sage advice that sharpens the manuscript and broadens its scope to encompass the birth of conflict between the United States and Iran. Emily Graff worked tirelessly to get maps and photos, all the while cheerfully incorporating many last-minute changes to the text. I am also indebted to production editor Noirin Lucas and copy editor Nicholas LoVecchio, as well as my publicist, Liz Calamari, who developed a great strategy to market the book.
This book required several years to write. With each iteration and new lead the story and accuracy improved. The murky world of writing contemporary history is not always straightforward. I have tried to be as thorough and evenhanded as possible, putting aside my own biases in telling this important story. Any errors are mine alone and the conclusions in no way represent the views of the U.S. government.
Notes
Research for this book began nearly twenty years ago as part of a dissertation on the Reagan administration. As time passed, I continued my research, interviewing more current participants and reading more material as it became available and declassified. Anyone who has written contemporary history understands the challenges of finding primary source documents. Before 1989, paper records were catalogued and frequently preserved at various archives; since the U.S. government started producing memos and messages in electronic format, preservation has been haphazard at best. Many still reside on computers with the originating agency and have never made it into any organized archives. Many more have been deleted. I have a stack of CENTCOM documents declassified in 1993 that simply don’t exist anymore except in my files.
Many of the documents referenced were obtained through Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Review Requests. I submitted some of these requests and benefited from other researchers’ efforts. Both Donald Rumsfeld and Doug Feith declassified many documents related to the George W. Bush administration. Select documents and some oral histories held at the Naval Historical Center and the now defunct Marine Corps Historical Center at the Washington Naval Yard were reviewed and declassified at my request.
Fortunately, many people still keep notebooks and their own personal collection of key records. In researching the book, I interviewed hundreds of participants, many of whom served at the most senior levels of the U.S. government. This included off-the-record conversations with government officials, intelligence officers, and special forces operatives. I met with Iranian exiles and Revolutionary Guard defectors, and even family members of one Iranian executed for spying. A number made their papers and diaries available for me to examine. Unfortunately, constraints on the length of the manuscript prohibited many of their often fascinating stories from being included in the final manuscript. They, however, provided the author with a far greater depth of understanding of thirty years of history of the U.S. and Iranian conflict.
Others provided unhindered access to their personal papers. This included: Lieutenant General William Odom, Admiral James Lyons, General George Crist, the family of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and Captain Peter Wikul. The senior aide to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe, made available his own private diaries, in which he recorded daily meetings and significant conversations at the highest level of the U.S. government.
Iranian sources proved the most problematic, but I was able to interview a number of former and current Iranian diplomats and military officers, as well as read declassified intelligence documents. A number of former military and civilian intelligence officers shared their insight into Iranian actions. Iranian news media provided a wealth of information on both political and military issues. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service was invaluable in finding older Iranian new a sources.
There are several important archives that contain many linear feets’ worth of records related to the U.S.-Iranian conflict. The Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton presidential libraries contain many of the most important records, although many of the documents still remain classified. Several service archives hold records of the military activities against Iran. These include: The Air Force History Office in Washington, D.C.; the archives and oral histories collection at the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama; the U.S. Marine Corps archives, personal papers, and oral histories at Quantico, Virginia; the vast collection of documents and oral histories at the Operational Archives, Ship’s Histories, and Aviation History Branches at the Naval History and Heritage Command Center, Washington, D.C.; and the oral histories and personal papers held at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The latter holds the collections of two CENTCOM commanders, generals Binford Peay and Robert Kingston. Both the U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command historians provided access to some of their records. Several historians in the Joint History Office, Joint Staff shared their insights into U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The Library of Congress holds several important collections including those of Alexander Haig, Caspar Weinberger, and William Odom.
CHAPTER 1 “A LITTLE KING IN YOUR HEART”
1. Department of State memorandum, “The Huyser Mission in Iran: January 4 to February 4, 1979,” February 1979.
2. Robert Huyser, Mission to Tehran (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 1.
3. Jimmy Carter, Address to the Nation, “The Energy Problem,” April 18, 1977, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: President Jimmy Carter, 1977, volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 656–62.
4. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, volume 8, pp. 359–65.
5. There is considerable truth to the often cited quotation by American vice consul in Iran Robert Rossow, Jr.: “One may fairly say that the Cold War began on March 4, 1946.” The agreement signed in 1942 following the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran stipulated that all foreign troops would leave Iran within six months after the end of hostilities. By late 1945, the Soviets had made no effort to withdraw their troops, and they were backing two communist independence movements: in Iranian-controlled Azerbaijan and in the Kurdish areas of western Iran. This stance coincided with intimidating forward posturing of Soviet forces against Turkey, both along their common border and on the border to the north with Bulgaria.
On March 4, 1946, Rossow observed Soviet forces moving south from Tabriz, appearing to menace the Iranian capital of Tehran. An American army captain, Alexis Gagarine, who served as a military attaché to the shah’s government, reported seeing a column of twenty-five Soviet tanks headed to Tehran. The following day, British prime minister Winston Churchill issued his famous Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri, although, arguably, his remarks reflected more upon circumstances in Eastern Europe than in northern Iran. The United States objected forcefully, but in measured terms, convinced that Moscow was unwilling to go to war over Iran. Later that month, an Iranian delegation headed by Iranian prime minister Ahmad Qavam arrived in Moscow for talks. After the Iranians agreed to a joint venture to explore for oil in northern Iran, with a slice for Moscow of any oil discovered, Joseph Stalin agreed to withdraw Soviet forces. In May, S
oviet forces withdrew.
The crisis alarmed Washington. In October 1949, the Truman administration adopted NSC 47/2, which would guide American policy in the Persian Gulf for the next four decades. In short, NSC 47/2 advocated three main courses of action: 1) promote Western ties with regional leaders, 2) prevent Soviet penetration in the region, and 3) ensure that regional disputes did not undercut the United States’ ability to oppose Soviet aggression. American officials viewed the Persian Gulf, with its oil and warm-water ports, as too important to tolerate any Soviet penetration in the region.
6. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 1264.
7. Ambassador Theodore Eliot, Jr., Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, Virginia, April 24, 1992.
8. Consul General Morris Draper, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, February 27, 1991.
9. In support of this strategy, Cyrus Vance developed a strict criterion for U.S. arms sales to the Middle East, mandating that any new arms had to “uniquely strengthen the requester’s ability to perform military function” and could not be achieved with less sophisticated weapons.
10. William Odom, “The Cold War Origins of the U.S. Central Command,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Spring 2006, p. 61; Zbigniew Brzezinski, exit interview, February 20, 1981, Carter Library and Museum, at www.jimmycarterlibrary.org, accessed May 24, 2007.
11. Marilyn Berger, “Cyrus R. Vance, a Confidant of Presidents, Is Dead at 84,” New York Times, January 13, 2002, www.nytimes.com/2002/01/13/world/cyrus-r-vance-a-confidant-of-presidents-is-dead-at-84.html?pagewanted=all, accessed March 23, 2009.