The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict With Iran
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12. Overall, Vance abhorred the use of military force, despite, or perhaps because of, his own service as a junior officer on a destroyer during the Second World War. Having witnessed the Vietnam debacle unfolding on his watch at the Pentagon during the Lyndon Johnson administration, Vance was unenthusiastic about another similar scenario in the Middle East.
13. Harold Brown, quoted in Paul Starobin and Robert Leavitt, “Shaping the National Military Command Structure: Command Responsibilities for the Persian Gulf,” Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1985, p. 2. These differing views within the administration revealed themselves sharply with respect to arms sales to the shah and made for a schizophrenic Iranian policy. At the urging of Secretary Vance, the United States began reducing arms sales to the shah, in the process irritating the Iranian monarch by rescinding a pledge by President Ford to sell him advanced F-18 combat aircraft, a deal largely conceived between the shah and the plane’s manufacturer before it had even progressed through the appropriate U.S. government offices. In August 1978, Vance blocked a proposal to sell Iran thirty-one additional F-4 Phantom fighters. However, both Secretary Brown and National Security Adviser Brzezinski persuaded President Carter to continue the flow of arms to Iran, with the United States promising to provide Iran an astounding 648 artillery pieces to be delivered beginning in the early 1980s. Furthermore, the United States now agreed to replace the F-4 with more advanced F-16 fighters and to sell Iran highly advanced E-3 AWACS surveillance aircraft, which had only recently been deployed to NATO and European bases. The AWACS sale was later withdrawn after congressional opposition, joined by CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who testified that the sale posed a security risk if the Soviets induced one of the Iranian crews to defect.
14. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “The Future of Iran: Implications for the U.S.,” January 28, 1977, pp. 1, 3.
15. Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), p. 332.
16. Draft NIE, September 1978; Defense Intelligence Agency, “Assessment of the Political Situation in Iran,” September 1978.
17. John Stempel memorandum for Ambassador Sullivan, “While You Were Away…The place really didn’t turn to crap but it might have looked like it,” August 22, 1978, p. 1.18.
18. Gordon Winkler, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, March 23, 1989.
19. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “Iranian Dissidence on the Increase,” January 29, 1978, p. 1.
20. Ambassador Sullivan message to Warren Christopher, “GOI Discernment of Dissident Political Action,” April 25, 1978, pp. 1–3; Charles Naas message to State Department, “Uncertain Political Mood: Religious Developments, Tougher Royal Line on Demonstrators,” August 1, 1978, p. 2.
21. Stempel memorandum, “While You Were Away,” p. 2.
22. National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, “PRC Meeting on Iran, November 6, 1978,” November 3, 1978, p. 2.
23. Ibid., p. 3.
24. Mohsen Sazegara, interview with author, May 2009.
25. Ibid.
26. Henry Precht, interviewed by Charles Stuart, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, March 2000.
27. Consul General Charles McCaskill, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, July 7, 1993.
28. Interview with retired CIA officer, August 15, 2007.
29. Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), Human Resources Committee, “Focus Iran Part II: Action Review,” December 27, 1976, p. 3.
30. Interview with retired CIA officer.
31. CIA Human Resources Committee, “Focus Iran: Intelligence Committee Review of Request by Human Resources Committee for the United States Mission in Iran,” November 4, 1976, p. 2.
32. Lawrence Altman, “Dr. Jean A. Bernard, 98, Dies; Found Cancer in Shah of Iran,” New York Times, April 30, 2006.
33. Warren Christopher memorandum for President Carter, September 13, 1978, p. 2.
34. President Jimmy Carter letter to the shah of Iran, September 28, 1978.
35. Ambassador Sullivan message to Secretary of State, “Iran: Understanding the Shiite Islamic Movement” (031012Z), February 1978.
36. Sullivan message to Vance and Brzezinski, “Recommendations for President to Shah letter,” August 29, 1978, pp. 1–2. Initially, Sullivan believed that the shah too recognized these realities. On August 29, 1978, Sullivan, who had just returned from an inopportune two-month vacation in the United States, wrote to Vance and Brzezinski: “In the few days that I have been back in Tehran, it has become clear to me that the shah has made a fundamental political decision to transform his authoritarian regime into a genuine democracy.” Military and security officials, he wrote, were going along with it despite their trepidation regarding “The Great Beast, the people of Iran.”
37. CIA, National Intelligence Daily, Situation Report: Iran, January 6, 1979; Henry Precht letter to William Sullivan, December 19, 1978, p. 1.
38. Stansfield Turner memorandum for the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, “Meeting with Dr. Brzezinski,” October 27, 1978.
39. CIA, “Prospects for a Military Government,” November 1978, pp. 1–4.
40. William Sullivan message to Secretary of State, “Looking Ahead: The Military Option,” November 2, 1978.
41. Steven Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), p. 214.
42. Precht interview, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
43. Stanley Escudero, interview with author, October 5, 2006, and May 24, 2007.
44. Ibid.
45. Embassy Tehran message to Secretary of State, “Meeting with Ayatollah Shariat-Madari” (101740Z), January 1979, pp. 1–2.
46. CIA, intelligence memorandum, “Iran: Radicals in the Opposition,” January 12, 1979, p. 1.
47. Henry Precht memorandum to Harold Saunders, “Seeking Stability in Iran,” December 19, 1978.
48. George W. Ball, “Summary Memorandum for the President, Issues and Implications of the Iranian crisis,” December 12, 1978. As the crisis deepened, the State Department ordered the evacuation of American dependents. U.S. military transports flew out more than nine thousand dependents over the next few weeks, while the Pentagon began plans to evacuate between forty thousand and sixty thousand other American citizens living in the country. In his 1983 memoir Power and Principle, Brzezinski asserted that the State Department’s order had hastened the collapse of the shah’s regime by undermining confidence in his continued rule. But with oil exports stopped due to antigovernment strikes and massive demonstrations in every major city, the U.S. evacuation of its embassy dependents in Tehran had no more impact on the fall of the shah than the U.S. evacuation of its embassy in Saigon had on the demise of the South Vietnamese regime three years earlier. It merely reflected reality. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983).
49. Norb Garrett e-mail to author, April 16, 2010.
50. Paul Henze memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Thoughts on Iran,” November 9, 1978.
51. William Sullivan letter to John Golden, December 24, 1978, p. 1.
52. Huyser, Mission to Tehran, p. 18.
53. William Sullivan message to Cyrus Vance, “USG Policy Guidance,” 101820Z, January 1979, pp. 1–2.
54. Huyser, Mission to Tehran, pp. 78, 99.
55. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 376–78; Huyser, Mission to Tehran, pp. 48–63.
56. Said Zanganeh, interview with author, June 20, 2007.
57. The shah’s navy took delivery of thirteen Harpoon missiles before the revolution curtailed further deliveries from the United States. Two recen
t Arab-Israeli wars had vividly demonstrated to the shah the power of the missile age. In October 1967, armed with just two Russian Styx missiles, a small Egyptian patrol boat had sent the destroyer Eilat—a ship more than ten times its size and the flagship of the Israeli navy—along with forty-seven of her crew to the bottom of the Mediterranean. Six years later, the Israelis exacted revenge. Six French-built patrol boats, outfitted with smaller—but no less lethal—Israeli-made Gabriel missiles and advanced electronic countermeasure systems, foiled incoming missiles and decimated the Syrian and Egyptian naval forces in a series of dramatic engagements in the eastern Mediterranean. The following year, 1974, Iran purchased twelve similar French-built Combattante II missile patrol boats. All were to be armed with the even more advanced American-made Harpoon surface-to-surface missile. See Abraham Rabinovich, The Boats of Cherbourg: The Secret Israeli Operation That Revolutionized Naval Warfare (New York: Seaver Books, 1988).
58. Bruce Laingen message to Secretary of State, “Meeting with PM Bazargan” (121002Z), August 1979; also American Embassy message to Secretary of State, “Meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Yazdi,” undated.
59. Bruce Laingen, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 1992–1993.
60. General George Crist, USMC (Ret.), interview with author, February 22, 2007.
61. Admiral James Lyons, USN (Ret.), interview with author, November 6, 2006.
62. NSC memorandum,”Iran/Afghanistan,” March 20, 1980, p. 5.
CHAPTER 2 A NEW GRAND STRATEGY
1. Hamilton Jordan memorandum for President Carter, January 22, 1980.
2. Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), January 23, 1980, pp. 394–95.
3. Current Documents, U.S. Department of State, 1983, p. 157; Jimmy Carter, “The State of the Union,” January 23, 1980, Carter, Public Papers, p. 197.
4. See also “America Likes Its New Foreign Policy—Or Does It?” Economist, February 23, 1980, p. 45.
5. “Carter Takes Charge,” Time, February 4, 1980, p. 12. On the night of his State of the Union speech, see Jimmy Carter, Presidential Daily Diary, entry for January 23, 1980, www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/diary/1980/; William Odom comments, “Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski with Madeleine Albright, Leslie Denend, William Odom,” February 18, 1982, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Carter Presidential Project, p. 52.
6. President Jimmy Carter Presidential Directive/NSC-18, “U.S. National Strategy,” August 24, 1977, pp. 4–5.
7. Following a crisis in the Congo in December 1963, McNamara expanded the responsibilities of the Tampa-based command to include planning and executing of operations in sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. The U.S. military divides the globe up into large geographical commands, called unified commands, with responsibility for all U.S. forces regardless of service within their area. Strike Command, however, did not have a specific geographical area, but was given the mission of “providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified or specified commands. After considerable debate, the secretary of defense decided to expand the mission of STRICOM. On December 1, 1963, the new command’s boundaries included the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Jay E. Hines, “From Desert One to Southern Watch: The Evolution of U.S. Central Command,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2000, p. 43; Lawrence R. Benson and Jay Hines, The United States Military in North Africa and Southwest Asia Since World War II (CENTCOM History Office, January 1988), p. 30; General George Crist, “CENTCOM: The Bastard Command,” unpublished, 1989, p. 5.
8. As with the debate over STRICOM two years earlier, the chairman and army and air force chiefs of staff advocated having STRICOM assume the mission for controlling operations in Africa and the Middle East, deploying the U.S.-based forces in the event of a contingency. The navy and marine corps dissented. They wanted command responsibilities to remain the same, with Atlantic Command responsible for Africa and CINCNELM the Middle East. Not surprisingly, both of these were navy-dominated commands.
9. In a handy compromise, the Pentagon divided the Middle East between two four-star American commands: the army-dominated European Command and the navy-controlled Pacific Command, with the former having responsibility for the Middle East landmass while the latter covered Pakistan, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Oman. Crist, “Bastard Command,” p. 7; letter from Dr. John Partin, U.S. Special Operations Command to General George Crist, “Rapid Deployment Forces and Joint Command Arrangements for the Near East,” October 11, 1989, p. 1. Dr. Partin had served as the Readiness Command historian in the early 1980s.
10. On July 27, 1978, the National Security Council looked to address the growing crisis in Afghanistan by strengthening CENTO, of which Pakistan was a member. This included a $5 million investment by the United States in new communications equipment. The overthrow of the shah and the end of CENTO killed the idea before it came to fruition.
11. When pressed, Jones suggested to Brown that they could deploy for a short time two carriers or a marine brigade. Report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), “U.S. Military Response to Minor Contingencies in the Persian Gulf,” October 5, 1978, pp. 1–10.
12. Harold Brown, interview with author, August 25, 2008.
13. Brzezinski memorandum to President Carter, December 2, 1978, NSC Weekly Report No. 81, Jimmy Carter Library, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Weekly Reports, Box 41, Weekly Reports 71–81 Folder.
14. Lieutenant General William Odom, USA (Ret.), interview with author, August 28, 2007.
15. Tim Weiner, “Robert Komer, 78, Figure in Vietnam, Dies,” New York Times, April 12, 2000. Komer agreed with Brzezinski: “The Carter administration was very slow to awaken to the realities of the strategic vacuum in the Gulf.” Robert Komer Oral History, Office of the Secretary of Defense History Office, March 25, 1981, p. 102.
16. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Strategy and Defense Policy for the Middle East and the Persian Gulf,” May 10, 1979, p. 1, Appendix A, pp. 1, 6, 13, 22; also mentioned in an earlier internal memorandum of the Joint Chiefs, “Review of U.S. Strategy Related to the Middle East and Persian Gulf,” January 31, 1979, pp. 1–3.
17. General David Jones memorandum for Secretary Harold Brown, “Potential Joint/Combined Exercises in the Persian Gulf,” June 18, 1979, pp. 1–2; CINCEUR message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Potential Exercises in Persian Gulf” (0111507Z), September 1979, pp. 1–3; Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region,” November 23, 1979, Annex B, pp. 1–5, Annex C, pp. 1–2.
18. Only the chief of naval operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward—more proactive about the Middle East than most of his navy brethren—recommended anything substantive. He proposed forming a new Fifth Fleet for the Middle East and suggested that a carrier battle group be maintained on a permanent basis off the Iranian coast. Brown pressed the military to begin planning for the possible deployment of U.S. combat troops to the Persian Gulf. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 182–90.
19. The Joint Chiefs opposed the deployment in 1978, viewing Saudi motivations with suspicion. The deployment of these aircraft became complicated when Spain denied them landing rights on their flight from the United States to Saudi Arabia.
20. Brown interview.
21. Joint Chiefs of Staff message, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region” (071725Z), July 1979, p. 2; General David Jones memorandum for Secretary Harold Brown, “Potential Joint/Combined Exercises in the Persian Gulf,” June 18, 1979, pp. 1–2; CINCEUR message to Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Potential Exercises in Persian Gulf” (0111507Z), September 1979, pp. 1–3; Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region,” November 23, 1979, Annex B, pp. 1–5, Annex C, pp. 1–2.
22. Joint Ch
iefs of Staff message, “Middle East Exercises,” September 7, 1979, pp. 1–2; Harold Brown memorandum for General David Jones, “Potential Joint/Combined Exercises in the Persian Gulf/Northwest Indian Ocean,” May 25, 1979, p. 2.
23. A May 29, 1979, CIA report influenced the thinking of the national security adviser. “The departure of the Shah was a windfall for the Soviets,” the CIA report stated. “While they have not benefited directly, the new regime’s inherent weakness and its withdrawal from a regional security role have created power vacuums both with Iran and the area generally that they would like to exploit.” Brzezinski latched onto this assessment and rejected Vance’s views. CIA Intelligence Assessment, “Changes in the Middle East: Moscow’s Perceptions and Options,” May 29, 1979, p. iii; Olav Njolstad, “Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,” Cold War History 4:3 (2004), p. 30.
24. Harold Brown memorandum for President Jimmy Carter, “U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East/Persian Gulf,” July 11, 1979, pp. 1–3.
25. On November 15, 1979, General Jones relayed to the secretary of defense a rough force list that would be available to the new rapid force, from which forces could be tailored for various contingencies. This included three carrier battle groups, one corps-sized marine amphibious force, eight air force squadrons, and three army divisions (4th, 101st, and 82nd), including the elite XVIII Airborne Corps from Fort Bragg, the 194th Armored Brigade, and two battalions of Army Rangers. All told, 170,000 men were on tap for potential deployment under the rapid deployment force.
26. The four airfields were Masirah, Seeb, Thumrait, and Kasab. “Logistics Concept in Support of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF),” United States Readiness Command, J-4, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force J-4, April 15, 1981, pp. A5–A6.
27. Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, “U.S. Access to Facilities in the Middle East/Persian Gulf Region,” March 14, 1980, p. 1; Robert Komer memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Rear-Staging Areas in Egypt,” March 7, 1980, pp. 1–3.