Henry Knox
Page 15
A siege of Philadelphia began. Knox and Washington's other counselors believed that the British could not hold the city unless they destroyed the American fortifications guarding the Delaware River, which Henry had helped plan. Howe needed free passage on the river to open supply lines with the British navy before the Delaware froze. Without open river channels, the British would starve. For the Americans, the key was maintaining the river defenses for just a few more weeks until the cold weather and ice forced British ships to set out to sea.
With the British forces dividing their attention between Philadelphia and the Delaware Capes, Washington decided on Friday, October 3, to order a march to attack the enemy north of the city at Germantown, Pennsylvania. That same day, he announced to his men the victory by General Gates over Burgoyne at Freeman's Farm near Saratoga, New York, on September 19. After the series of defeats and missteps around Philadelphia, Knox was hoping for similar success "before we go into winter quarters.“20
At 6 P.M., the army moved out in four columns for the thirteen-mile march to Germantown, each man carrying forty rounds of ammunition. By dawn Saturday morning, General Sullivan's division drove back the British pickets and rushed forward. The surprised royal troops fled, leaving their baggage behind, and the Americans gave chase through the enemy camp, capturing several cannons before pushing on with victory within their grasp. Knox was riding with Washington with the rear troops under General Lord Stirling. As the redcoats retreated, about 200 took protection in a stone mansion owned by Benjamin Chew, a former chief justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The redcoats barricaded the windows, creating a formidable fortress. Washington paused as musket fire opened from the mansion. Several of his staff, including Adjutant General Timothy Pickering and aide Alexander Hamilton, thought the army should keep marching to meet up with the lead columns and ignore the barricaded troops. Some recommended storming the house if the redcoats did not quickly surrender, or leaving a regiment to keep them hemmed in during the battle.
Knox disagreed, however, and told Washington that it was against conventional military wisdom to bypass a fortification and leave enemy troops in a position to attack from behind. Washington agreed. Henry ordered his field guns to target the house. His men riddled the stone walls with grape and shot for an hour as riflemen pelted it with musket balls while the reserve troops halted on the road to Germantown. But the light three- and six-pound cannons caused only minor damage. The redcoats fired from windows at the American troops and the men trying to storm the house. Knox felt shots dart around him, and several of his gunners were hit. In desperation, troops began to call for the house to be set on fire. One man tried to approach the house with a torch but was shot. Knox's aide, Major Chevalier de Mauduit Du Plessis of France, and Washington's aide, Colonel John Laurens of South Carolina, volunteered to try. They crept up to the mansion and crawled to a window. Knox's aide climbed to the sill and forced open a shutter. A British soldier from inside screamed at him and pointed a pistol in his direction. Du Plessis responded sarcastically that he was taking a walk. A British officer demanded that he surrender or die, upon which another redcoat shot at the Frenchman and hit his own officer instead. The two aides raced back toward their troops under cover of American musket fire, and the British sent a line of shot in their direction. Laurens was hit in the shoulder, but Du Plessis was unharmed.
The delay at the Chew House cost the rear of the army a precious hour, when every moment was needed to reinforce the battlefront.
To add to the problems created by the cannon smoke, a heavy fog rolled in. Soon visibility was reduced to just twenty to thirty yards. At the vanguard of the American advance, an intoxicated General Adam Stephen became confused by cannon fire coming from the direction of the Chew House and believed the British were attacking the rear. He ordered his men to march in the direction of the booming guns, and coming upon their comrades under General Wayne's command in the heavy mist, they mistook them for hostile troops and fired. Wayne's men returned fire, believing the British were upon them.
The American lead columns were unable to see the enemy. Under the veil of murky fog, the British scrambled to re-form their lines and began to fire, forcing the American line to retreat and chasing them ten miles. The attempt to capture the Chew House by Knox and the reserve troops proved costly; the reserves were unable to help the front-line Continentals as they were pushed back by the royal troops. The initial hopeful signs of an American victory soon gave way to the realization of another crushing defeat. Washington ordered his troops to fall back. Knox's men were able to bring off all the artillery except for one gun. The Americans had 1,000 men killed, wounded, or captured in the Battle of Germantown from the 10,000-man force, while the British lost half that number from 9,000 men. The drunken General Stephen was cashiered out of the service and his division was given to the Marquis de Lafayette.
Three days later, from Perkiomy Creek, about twenty-seven miles from Philadelphia, Knox wrote a report of the battle to the Massachusetts Council. He blamed the fog for the defeat and failed to mention his advice to attack the Chew House. "In this unusual fog it was impossible to know how to support, or what part to push," he wrote. But he was nevertheless upbeat. "This is the first attack made during this war by the American troops on the main body of the enemy; and had it not been [for] the unlucky circumstance of the fog, Philadelphia would probably have been in our hands. It is matter worthy of observation that in most countries which have been invaded one or two battles have decided their fate; but America rises after a defeat!"
But in a letter to Lucy, he acknowledged that the failure at the mansion played a part in stealing victory: "To this cause, in conjunction with enemy's taking possession of some stone buildings in Germantown, is to be ascribed the loss of the victory.“21
Knox had lost several men in the recent battles and had been fortunate to avoid being wounded. He tried to fill his ranks with men from other battalions, but these troops were inexperienced in the use of artillery. Washington wrote Congress, which had reconvened in Yorktown, Pennsylvania, asking that artillery units from other areas be assigned to join the fight there.
The Continental Army settled into a siege of Philadelphia, as Howe's men continued to try to capture patriot forts along the Delaware to open an avenue for their ships. Henry sent his aide, Du Plessis, who had distinguished himself at the battles of Brandywine and Germantown, to head the artillery at the Delaware forts. During the day, Knox could hear cannon fire and could only wonder whose arms they were.
News arrived that Fort Montgomery, along the banks of the Hudson in New York, had fallen. Henry wrote Lucy on Monday, October 13, expressing exasperation that the inhabitants had not done more to support the post. "America almost deserves to be made slaves for her non-exertions in so important an affair."
Lucy was having troubles of her own. She had doubts if she had enough money or provisions to make it through the coming winter. Henry tried to console her in a letter: "I trust the same Divine Being who brought us together will support us. . . . I have sanguine hopes of being able to live this winter in sweet fellowship with the dearest friend of my heart." He assured her that the prospects around Philadelphia looked promising, and Gates's early success against Burgoyne in New York bode well for the cause. "For my own part I have not yet seen so bright a dawn as the prospect, and am as perfectly convinced in my own mind of the kindness of Providence towards us as I am of my own existence.“22
His optimism found justification when news arrived at camp on Wednesday, October 15, of Gates's stunning victory at Bemis Heights in a second battle of Saratoga on October 7 over General Burgoyne's 5,800-man army. The triumphs raised hopes that European nations would formally recognize American independence. As part of the celebration over Gates's success, Knox's men fired thirteen cannons from the artillery park at camp. Tories in the area scoffed at the almost unbelievable reports of Gates's victory and dismissed the celebrations as a delusional hoax. Howe issued a statement that t
he rumors were untrue and that, in fact, the British and Burgoyne had actually defeated the Americans. Henry wrote to Lucy: "They have been very angry for our feux de joie, which we have fired on several victories over Burgoyne, and say that by and by [we] shall bring ourselves into contempt with our own army for propagating such known falsehood. Poor fellows! Nothing but Britain must triumph.“23
An express arrived on Saturday, October 18, announcing that Burgoyne's men had laid down their arms at Saratoga and had negotiated a surrender agreement with the victorious American general, Horatio Gates. Knox's men again fired thirteen cannons in salute at a five o'clock parade to mark the occasion. Burgoyne formally surrendered at 2 P.M. on Friday, October 17, as his army paraded from its fortifications to the beat of somber drums. After laying down their weapons, the king's troops were escorted to Boston and boarded ships bound for England. Under an agreement of honor, they swore not to serve again in the war against America.
In Pennsylvania, Howe abandoned Germantown on Sunday, October 19, and concentrated his efforts on the American river fortifications. Three days later, a force of 1,200 Hessians attacked the shoreline of Fort Mercer at Red Bank in the afternoon but suffered heavy losses. The fort had been strengthened with artillery under the direction of Knox's aide, Du Plessis. On Thursday, October 23, six British ships maneuvered past the spikes of the chevaux de frize in the river and opened fire on Fort Mifflin on Mud Island and the American warships. Knox's artillerymen struck back with an unrelenting fusillade, sending shots crashing into the enemy hulls. The crews of the sixty-four-gun Augusta and eighteen-gun Merlin ran their ships aground and set them ablaze.
Washington wanted to attack the British troops in Philadelphia and liberate the city. At a war council on Wednesday, October 29, Knox advised against it, arguing that the troops were without blankets or provisions and that a setback would destroy the growing faith in America's chances that flowed from Gates's victory at Saratoga. He reminded Washington that this was a defensive war on their part, and their chances were much greater if the British were forced to attack their fortifications. "My opinion is to draw our whole force together, take post at, and fortify Germantown, considering it as our winter quarters." He stressed that "if they should come out, fight, and defeat us, we have a secure retreat and winter quarters.“24 The rest of Washington's generals agreed.
The success of Gates left many congressmen and military leaders wondering openly if the wrong man was leading the army. General Stirling wrote the commander in chief on November 3 with news that Washington's reputation was under attack by the ambitious Irish-born French brigadier general Thomas Conway, whom Washington had recently rejected for promotion. Two weeks earlier, Stirling had written to delegate Richard Henry Lee that "General Conway's merit . . . as an officer, and his importance in this Army, exists more in his own imagination, than in reality.“25
Knox attended another war council on Saturday, November 8, in which Conway was present. Tensions were high. Washington again wanted to attack Philadelphia, especially if the British concentrated much of their force on Fort Mifflin on the Delaware River. But Knox and the other generals again unanimously advised against the plan and gave their previous objections. Much of the army was still without adequate clothing, shoes, stockings, and blankets as the weather grew frigid. Two days later, the British found that the swift current of the Delaware had opened a deep channel that allowed them to sail past the guns on Mud Island with a floating battery armed with twenty-two twenty-four-pound cannons. The king's troops positioned the vessel within forty yards of Fort Mifflin and began a furious cannonade. The British came close enough to the fort to lob grenades within its walls, which soon were reduced to ruins. After five days of shelling, the garrison evacuated on Saturday night, November 15, taking with them all of the cannons. Two days later, Knox and two engineers were sent to Fort Mercer, farther up the river at Red Bank, to strengthen its defenses.
Meanwhile, General Conway decided to send a letter of resignation to Congress, saying that his lack of promotion endangered his rank in the French army and that his criticism of Washington had led to friction in the Continental force. He also asked the commander in chief for a leave of absence, which Washington denied until permission was granted by the government.
Congressmen also were wondering why Washington refrained from attacking Philadelphia. In a November 15 letter, Henry Laurens (father of Washington's aide John Laurens), who had replaced John Hancock as the president of the Continental Congress, acknowledged the criticism among delegates and the whispers that Washington placed too much faith in the judgment of Knox and Greene. Writing to his friend Major Benjamin Huger, a member of the Fifth South Carolina Regiment, Laurens warned: "You may be told Our General is under a pernicious influence of two General Officers [Knox and Greene]. Suspend judgment. I have seen the General's sentiments very fully and freely written to a friend on that subject. I will not believe a word of the whispers.“26
Some of the criticism was coming from within Washington's own force. Major General Thomas Mifflin told congressmen that Gates should be appointed president of a Board of War to reorganize the army. Frustrated by his failure to be promoted, Mifflin accused Washington of surrounding himself with fawning advisors such as Knox. To Gates, Mifflin wrote bitterly in a letter on November 15, complaining of a "deep-rooted system of favoritism which began to shoot forth at New York and which has now arrived to its full growth and maturity.“27
Knox returned from Fort Mercer to Washington's camp at White Marsh, about fourteen miles from Philadelphia, on Wednesday, November 19, and told the commander that it was critical that the fort be held. General Greene was sent with reinforcements, but British general Howe threw 2,000 troops, led by Cornwallis, over to the New Jersey side of the Delaware to strike the fort from land, a move that made the fortification untenable for its 350-man garrison. The fort was given up without firing a shot on Thursday, November 20. During the evacuation, the Americans torched everything useful: barracks, buildings, and food and military supplies.
The British now had control of the Delaware River and open supply channels to replenish the Royal Army.
Washington felt under tremendous pressure to attack. His reputation was at stake, and perhaps even his command of the army. Knox remained against an offensive strike, however, during a November 24 war council in which Washington's generals were divided. Ten thought it inadvisable to launch an attack and five supported a strike. Lord Stirling believed that with Cornwallis in New Jersey, an opportunity to crush Howe had arrived.28 Washington decided against "the impracticability of answering the expectations of the world without running hazards which no military principles can justify.“29
Congress, which was still convening in Yorktown, expected action. Rather than accepting the resignation of Thomas Conway, they sought a way to accommodate him despite his criticism of the commander in chief.30 While most of Congress supported Washington, a faction wanted Gates to head the army, including Representative James Lovell of Massachusetts, former delegate and army surgeon Dr. Benjamin Rush of Philadelphia, delegate Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant of New Jersey, and, of course, former delegate turned brigadier general Thomas Mifflin.
Washington asked his generals to put their advice on whether to attack Philadelphia in writing to appease Congress. Knox wrote on Wednesday, November 26, advising against a rash move to satisfy politicians. Speaking frankly, he said that although many pointed to the sagging reputation of the army, in truth, the Americans had no military tradition and were still learning to fight. When the war began, "we were contending for our all, for everything dear to humanity," Henry wrote. "Now it seems otherwise with many persons, whose anxiety for military fame seems to absorb every consideration." He realized that Washington's honor suffered by inaction, but he believed that most Americans still thought of him "as their Father, and into your hands they entrust their all."
Knox laid down several tactical reasons for advising against an attack of the city and urged
Washington not to risk everything in one single, decisive battle. Given the inexperience of the American army, it was unwise to fight when the disciplined British troops had equal numbers—and extremely hazardous to attack them with a comparable force when they had the protections of entrenchments, redoubts, and batteries. He estimated the Continental strength to be about 8,000 men and the redcoats to be about 10,000 strong. Even a small group of soldiers who were well fortified could defeat an assault from a much larger army. "I believe there is not a single maxim in war that will justify a number of undisciplined troops attacking an equal number of disciplined troops, strongly posted in redoubts, and having a strong city in their rear, such as Philadelphia.“31
Probably recalling the difficulty at the Chew House, Knox pointed out that the enemy had a daunting series of expertly engineered redoubts, which would have to be overcome one at a time before the Americans could even engage the main force of the royal troops. He reminded Washington of the well-deserved reputation of the British army, which learned at Bunker Hill the bloody consequences of storming a redoubt with unprotected troops. He thought the army would do better to fortify Germantown and build winter quarters, and invite the enemy to come out and attack their entrenched position. Knox stated unequivocally: "From the experience derived from reading, and some little service, and the knowledge of the strength of the enemies works, my opinion is clearly, pointedly, and positively, against an attack on the enemies redoubts, because I am fully convinced a defeat would be certain and inevitable.“32
Congress, however, desperately wanted Washington to liberate Philadelphia. On Thursday, November 27, Representative Lovell wrote to Gates: "We want you most near Germantown. . . . You will be astonished when you come to know accurately what numbers have at one time and another been collected near Philadelphia to wear out stockings, shoes and breeches. Depend upon it, for every ten soldiers placed under the Command of our Fabius [Washington], five recruits will be wanted annually during the war.“33 That same day, Congress appointed a new Board of War that included nondelegates and named General Gates as its president, granting him the power to reorganize the army.34 The act seemed to be a direct rebuff of Washington and his generals. Delegates also unanimously resolved on Friday, November 28, to appoint a three-man committee of congressmen Robert Morris, Elbridge Gerry, and the Virginian Joseph Jones to consult with Washington on an offensive campaign and to recommend against the army retiring to winter quarters. They also formed an inquiry to investigate why Fort Mercer had been abandoned.35