Henry Knox

by Mark Puls

  Washington agreed with Knox that only a draft would fill the army's needs and had explained its critical importance to another congressional committee that had recently arrived at Valley Forge. The commander in chief wrote Knox on Thursday, March 5, 1778: "I do not know what steps Congress intend to recommend to the States for filling their regiments, but I am certain that nothing short of the measure you mention will prove effectual. . . . I very much fear that the States will each proceed in different ways, most of them feeble and ineffectual.10

  The first week of March, Knox packed his bags for the return trip to Valley Forge. He and Lucy decided that she and their daughter would follow him to camp when the winter weather abated. Several wives of generals had made a home in camp, including Nathanael Greene's wife, Kitty, a close friend of Lucy's, Martha Washington, and General Lord Stirling's wife. As they parted, Henry and Lucy reminded each other that their separation would be short this time.

  After an uneventful trip, Knox immediately went about organizing the artillery and directing the cannons and arms that were daily arriving at Valley Forge. On April 18, Congress directed Washington to convene a war council of his generals to plot out a military campaign for the spring, and the commander asked for written opinions from his key advisors. The generals had already discussed three plans. The first was to remain in a defensive posture while training and instilling discipline in the army and new recruits in order to improve the army's proficiency. Some generals favored taking the offensive and making an attempt to liberate Philadelphia. The final option floated in discussions was changing the seat of the war and attacking the British in New York. Knox wrote a detailed opinion of the choices the Americans faced on Thursday, April 23. He thought that standing pat could be disastrous because not only would their army receive fresh troops, but so would the British.

  Knox wrote to Washington that: "If theirs should be the greatest and earliest received, we shall the infinite mortification to have waited for nothing but disgrace. We shall be obliged to make a defensive war with an inferior force, to be perfectly attendant on the enemy's motions, move when they move, halt when they halt, retire when they advance or [risk] everything on the hazard of a general action where the probability of success will be apparently against us."

  He kept in mind the need to maintain public support for the cause, believing that many would lose faith in American hopes if commanders declined to attempt a blow against the British. "Our friends, and those who wish to be our friends, will be dispirited, because we cannot protect them; neutrals will take an active part against us; the disaffected will be confirmed in their disaffection, and our army induced to desert. The enemy will be able to raise such numerous recruits from ourselves as when incorporated into their old troops, will enable them to garrison the conquered places without any sensible diminution of their principal force, which will be left free for new operations.“11

  Victory would cure many of the army's problems, he stressed. "Success in military matters procures applause, and covers every defect in planning or executing an enterprise.“12

  The chances of freeing Philadelphia through a prolonged siege did not seem promising, Knox explained to Washington. The army lacked the heavy battering cannons and military supplies needed for a protracted engagement, and given the British's ability to send reinforcements, such a plan would require 36,000 men. "I am afraid we should find great difficulty to obtain so large a number or subsist them." Instead, Knox favored leaving the enemy uncertain whether New York or Philadelphia would be their target.

  He saw several advantages in attempting a siege of New York, believing that New Englanders would be more supportive of the army if the war were carried north.

  "It is an enterprise of which the New England people are enthusiastically fond, and they would most cheerfully turn out as many men as to assist the Continental Army as would be required," he told Washington, estimating that the Continental force under the commander in chief could be boosted from 5,000 men to 25,500 merely by shifting the seat of the war. Knox believed that Massachusetts would provide 8,000 men, New Hampshire and New Jersey 2,000 each. New York could be counted on to supply 2,500 men and Connecticut another 4,500. About 2,500 Continental troops were already stationed in Albany along the Hudson River. He ticked off other advantages, such as better access to food and forage, navigable rivers to provide transport, and access to as many as fifteen large battering cannons from Boston, Providence, and forts along the Hudson. Knox laid out a detailed plan for recruiting and transporting troops as well as a blueprint for a two-pronged attack on Manhattan Island.

  "New York, in my opinion, is of much greater consequence to the Britons in their design of subjugating America than Philadelphia or any other place whatever," he wrote.13

  Washington's key advisors were divided on a plan of attack. Of the eleven generals who submitted their written opinions, only three joined Knox in recommending an assault of New York. Three, including Lafayette, wanted to stand pat and drill and train the army, while three wanted to pursue a siege of Philadelphia, and yet another general wanted to attack both cities.

  When Congress had asked Washington to hold a war council to consider the summer campaign, Knox's name initially was omitted from the list of generals who should be consulted. The omission was corrected two days later. Washington suspected that Knox's reputation had suffered during the controversy surrounding Conway and Gates and reaffirmed his faith in Henry in a letter on Saturday, April 25, to New York congressman Gouverneur Morris, who had served on the committee that had visited Valley Forge. "Prejudices may be entertained by some against General Knox, there is no department in the army that has been conducted with greater propriety, or to more advantage, than the one in which he presides; and owing principally, if not wholly, to his management. Surely whatever plans may be come into, the artillery will have no small share in the execution.“14

  Three days later, a letter from Major General Conway was read in Congress. He complained that his talents were being wasted in the outpost in Albany, removed from the scene of action in the war, and offered his resignation. To his surprise, Congress accepted. Many delegates had begun to view Conway as a malcontent and malignancy in the army. Eight states voted to accept the resignation, and only Virginia voted against his departure. Conway immediately wrote to Congress that he had been misunderstood and that he had not intended to resign. But Congress took no action to reinstate him.15 With the removal of Conway, the internal threat to the command of Washington and his key generals had passed.

  As the spring temperatures warmed the air, news arrived at Valley Forge that France had agreed to an alliance with the United States and had signed a treaty on February 6. Congress immediately ratified the treaty in a unanimous vote on Monday afternoon, May 4. Knox and the rest of Washington's commanders knew that the nature of the war had completely changed and momentum had shifted. They were no longer battling the powerful British alone; now they were in partnership with the formidable French army and navy. Many of their problems in obtaining supplies and provisions could be overcome, while the British, now involved in a global conflict, could no longer commit as much of their resources to America.

  Over the winter, Major General Frederick William August von Steuben, inspector general of the army, had drilled the soldiers in marching in formation and in using bayonets with remarkable success. He and Alexander Hamilton wrote the army's first military manual and imposed improved standards of hygiene. Knox watched as the soldiers marched with new precision. A cheer went up from everyone in the ranks: "Long live the King of France." Knox's men then fired another round of thirteen guns, which was answered by another general discharge of muskets and the cheer "Long live the friendly powers of Europe." Again Knox's men set off a thunderous explosion of thirteen cannons, and the soldiers responded with choreographed musket fire. The men cheered, "To the American States." With France changing the American prospects, Knox joined in the unanimous opinion of generals at a May 8 war council to decl
ine attacking either Philadelphia or New York until the military situation could be reassessed. Washington believed the British could no longer provide much reinforcement for the troops already in America.

  Signs appeared that the royal troops were preparing to evacuate Philadelphia. According to American intelligence reports, the British had moved their heavy cannons out of the city and were preparing wagons and teams of horses. Washington wrote Knox on May 17 that "this requires a state of readiness in us for marching at the shortest warning.“16 Knox responded the same day that the artillery was ready to move in a day or two but that he was waiting on horses from the quartermaster. He also said he was waiting on guns from New England and needed Greene to push through the shipping. Two thousand muskets were expected from Springfield and another 2,000 from Albany.17

  Lucy arrived at Valley Forge accompanied by her escort, Major General Benedict Arnold, on Wednesday, May 20. Friends were struck by the tender nature of Henry and Lucy's relationship as well as the way their personalities seemed to complement each other. General Greene commented to his wife that he found Henry and Lucy to be "a perfect married couple." Arnold also received a warm welcome at Valley Forge, where his heroics at Saratoga had been talked about throughout the winter. His limp—from a leg wound suffered in the battle—elicited sympathy mixed with admiration. As a result of the wound, one of Arnold's legs was now an inch shorter, which precluded him from assuming a field command. Washington gave Arnold an affectionate embrace along with a finely adorned epaulette and sword knot that a friend in France had presented to the commander in chief. Arnold's previous slight by Congress had apparently been forgotten after the delegates restored his rank and seniority.

  Knox and the other military leaders around Washington daily expected that the British would evacuate Philadelphia. They learned that the large cannons and the baggage of Howe's army had already been shipped down the Delaware River or sent by transports to New Jersey. New York City was likely the royal army's destination. The American army, however, still suffered from the effects of the hard winter and smallpox. They were too weak to force a battle. The anticipated English evacuation was delayed when the Frederick Howard Carlisle peace commissioners arrived from England with promises to repeal the Tea Act and to refrain from taxing the Americans in the future. The English also sharply criticized the American alliance with France. Nathanael Greene wrote to Knox, "Poor John Bull appears to be sick of his bargain and I believe would gladly be off, could he do it with any kind of decency. Finding he cannot subdue us by force, our enemy is trying to disunite us. They point out the folly of a connection with a country [France] differing from us in language, customs and religion—all of which, however, will avail nothing. Arms must decide the matter.“18 The American army was also delayed from action, awaiting reorganization by Congress. By Wednesday, May 27, the final plan was authorized and announced. Knox's artillery corps received a pay hike to better retain qualified officers and gunners. The pay of an artillery captain, for example, was boosted to $50 from just $20 a month, and the men in his regiment were generally paid 25 percent more than comparable soldiers in other departments in the army due to the added expense of serving in the artillery corps. His men had to buy their own supplies, which included items to maintain the cannons and horses. But Knox was given only three field commanders, which left him little room to promote men for heroism, initiative, or outstanding service.

  On Thursday, May 28, Washington appointed Major General Arnold to command the American troops in Philadelphia when the British finally left. In recent weeks, army soldiers had lined up to take an oath of allegiance to the United States under an order by Congress. On Saturday, Knox administered the oath to Arnold, who swore on his honor that "I, Benedict Arnold, do acknowledge The United States of America to be Free, Independent and Sovereign States and declare that the People thereof owe no Allegiance or Obedience to George the Third, King of Great Britain, and I renounce, refuse and abjure any Allegiance or Obedience to him.“19

  For the next two weeks, Knox kept his men ready to move. Washington could see no reason why the British had not already left Philadelphia; their baggage had been shipped out weeks earlier. He guessed that Howe and his replacement, General Henry Clinton, were waiting only for an American decision on a peace proposal they had offered Congress and for a separate offer from the Carlisle peace commissioners, sent by London.

  The delegates flatly rejected the Howe-Clinton peace proposal on Saturday, June 6, and sent away the Carlisle peace commissioners on Wednesday, June 17, 1778, resolving that the body would not consider a treaty for peace with the British monarch unless given an "explicit acknowledgment of the independence of these states, or the withdrawing of his fleets and armies.“20

  That evening Knox attended a war council held by Washington to decide whether to attack the enemy. Washington explained that now, with the arrival of recent recruits, the Continental Army had 11,000 men fit for battle, and he estimated the British force amounted to 12,000 men. They discussed the option of shifting the seat of the war to New York. Washington wondered if they should wait for the enemy to quit Philadelphia and make a stand in New Jersey or march directly to New York. Knox wanted to harass and annoy the British as much as possible but was opposed to a major assault on fortified Philadelphia. This opinion was shared by four others in the sixteen-man council, which unanimously rejected an attack on Philadelphia but was divided on an alternative plan of action. Knox and the other generals put their opinions in writing the next morning: "It appeared to be the general sentiment that it would be the most criminal degree of madness to hazard a general action at this time,“21 he wrote to Washington. Knox thought it ill-advised to attack the British, who could fire from behind entrenchments and batteries, and felt that attacking them in New Jersey was risky. For Knox, New York was the key position in America, linking the southern and northern states, especially New England. He wanted the army to wait until the British marched into New Jersey and then outrace them for the best position to battle for New York.

  Shortly after 11 A.M. that day, news arrived that the British had slipped out of Philadelphia before sunrise and the enemy fleet was sailing down the Delaware River and out to sea. Major John Andre, with whom Henry Knox had spent an engaging night discussing literature during his Ticonderoga mission, had made off with Benjamin Franklin's collection of books. The redcoats had crossed over the Delaware at Cooper's Ferry and Gloucester Point, about three miles from Camden, and into New Jersey. The royal army moved with 1,500 wagons in a procession that stretched twelve miles.

  General Arnold led the American division of Colonel Jackson's Massachusetts regiment to take possession of the city the next day, Friday, June 19, with orders to prevent disorder or vandalism. The main body of the American army was ordered to move out to Coryell's Ferry and cross the Delaware into New Jersey. Knox's artillery held the rear of the procession. Rain began to fall and the air became muggy in the early summer heat, making the march arduous and slow. Knox reached the Delaware by June 21 and spent the afternoon shipping the heavy artillery guns to the Jersey shore. He had an ample number of boats on hand to facilitate the crossing, but the rain, heat, and soggy roads stalled the army's progress in New Jersey. A gill of spirits was issued to each man.

  The British moved slowly as well, marching just forty miles in seven days. Washington sent troops and militia to harass the rear of their procession and further hinder their progress.

  Washington desperately wanted to strike a crippling blow to Clinton's army. At a war council held about six miles north of Princeton on Wednesday, June 24, however, Knox sided with General Charles Lee and all but one of the advisors present in opposing a major battle and favoring instead to increase the troops annoying the British march. Lee argued that the French alliance assured an American victory in a war of attrition and that it would be foolish to risk the army in a major battle. Despite the strides made by the troops during the previous winter, Lee felt that they could not defeat the ex
perienced and disciplined British soldiers. Knox agreed.

  Henry wrote to his brother the following day: "Had we a sufficiency of numbers we should be able to force them to a similar treaty with [defeated British general] Burgoyne; but, at present, have not quite such sanguine hopes.“22

  Knox kept his artillery corps in motion as the army pressed through heavy rainstorms, humidity, and intense temperatures in a determined attempt to catch the British and prevent them from reaching New York. Several men fainted with fatigue, and some collapsed and even died of exhaustion. By Saturday, June 27, the two armies were five miles apart: the Americans at Englishtown and the British at Monmouth Court House. Washington ordered an attack the next morning, fearing a delay would allow the British to reach an impregnable elevated position at Middletown Heights, twelve miles north. In the darkness, at 4 A.M., Clinton's red-clad soldiers began to move out. Intelligence reached Washington at 5 A.M., and General Lee was sent to lead an attack on the British rear while the rest of the Continental Army rushed to support the assault. The training and drilling Knox had put his men through in recent months would finally be tested under fire.

  As Knox and Washington approached the battlefront, they were mortified to see the American vanguard troops in full retreat. The fleeing soldiers reported that General Lee had failed to give his officers coordinated orders, and instead of pushing for a strike against the 2,000-man British rearguard, had ordered the 5,000 troops under his command to wait to advance. Washington was furious. Riding up to Lee, he screamed that he expected his orders to be obeyed and unleashed a tongue-lashing replete with sharp profanities until, in Brigadier General Charles Scott's words, "the leaves shook on the trees." Lee answered that he thought an attack was unwise. Washington took command of the troops and rallied the men to form ranks. He rode from one end of the line to the other exhorting them to fight. Knox's booming voice called men to make a stand. He ordered his cannons to open fire to buoy the soldiers' resolve and push back the oncoming English.