After the Sheikhs

by Davidson, Christopher

  In the early twentieth century, having fought off challenges from the Al-Rashid family from the northern province of Hail, the Al-Saud’s most celebrated leader—Abdul-Aziz bin Saud—consolidated Saudi-Wahhabi control over Riyadh, the dynasty’s capital, and the rest of the Najd province. Soon after, Abdul-Aziz extended his influence to the eastern province of Al-Hasa and eventually the western province of Hejaz, which had formerly been ruled by the British-backed Emir of Mecca, Sharif Hussein—to whom London had earlier promised an independent Arabian kingdom in return for his support for British operations against the Ottomans in the First World War.6 By 1932, with continuing support from the religious, Wahhabi establishment, Abdul-Aziz was in de facto control of most of the Arabian Peninsula and named his new kingdom—Saudi Arabia—after his own family and ancestors.

  Kuwait’s history is somewhat different, as religion has played a less prominent role while—as a much smaller territory—relations with foreign powers have been more significant. Nevertheless, as with the Al-Saud dynasty, Kuwait’s ruling Al-Sabah family is also very much a product of centuries-old tribal struggles. As a branch of the huge Bani Utub tribal federation, the Al-Sabah had migrated north out of the Arabian interior in the late seventeenth century along with another prominent Bani Utub family, the Al-Khalifa. Both settled in the fishing and trading post of Kuwait, before the latter left for the settlement of Zubarah on the Qatari Peninusla in 1766.7 By this stage the Al-Sabah were in firm control of Kuwait, and their ruler—Abdullah Al-Sabah—spent the next four decades consolidating his family’s supremacy over the sheikhdom’s political and economic affairs. In the nineteenth century Kuwait remained autonomous of the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, mostly due to the Al-Sabah receiving nominal protection from the Ottoman Empire.

  Under the rule of Mubarak Al-Sabah, also known as ‘Mubarak the Great’, Kuwait nevertheless began to move much closer to Britain, eventually signing an agreement in 1899 which guaranteed the sheikhdom British protection in exchange for London’s control over its foreign affairs. In part this new relationship was due to Mubarak’s troubled succession in 1886: having replaced his assassinated elder brother8 he needed to counter the Ottoman links still maintained by his predecessor’s supporters.9 On a more macro level the switch in protection was also due to the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and was intended to improve access to British-Indian markets, especially in pearls, which at that time were Kuwait’s most lucrative export. In any case, Ottoman influence greatly decreased, although subsequent Al-Sabah rulers briefly tried to use relations with Istanbul during the First World War as leverage over Britain.10 In the early 1920s, relations with Britain deepened further following a Saudi-Wahhabi attack on Kuwait’s Jahra fort11 which resulted in the deployment of British gunboats and the crafting of a British-backed border agreement between the Al-Sabah, the Al-Saud, and Britain’s mandated territory of Iraq.12

  Like Kuwait, the other small Gulf monarchies had entered into similar protection agreements with Britain, but in most cases they had done so much earlier. This was partly because of the more immediate threat and regular attacks they faced from the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance, and partly because the Ottoman Empire was less relevant to the various sheikhs of the lower Persian Gulf, with its agents making fewer visits there. But more important, at least from the British perspective, was that the British East India Company—which controlled the highly profitable maritime trade routes between Bombay and Basra—had begun complaining towards the end of the eighteenth century of disruptive ‘pirate attacks’ on their ships. While the authenticity of these complaints remains contested, with some historians contending that the Company was primarily interested in removing local trade rivals,13 Britain nevertheless responded to the Company’s concerns and mounted a series of naval and amphibious attacks in 1809 and 1819 on various ports in the lower Gulf. After the threat of piracy was removed Britain then began offering peace treaties or ‘truces’ to the several identifiable sheikhdoms in the area. In this way, their respective ruling families became recognised by Britain as the heads of ‘Trucial States’, having ceded control over their own foreign affairs and guaranteed no further pirate attacks in exchange for imperial protection. After several renewals the treaties were made permanent in 1853 under the Perpetual Maritime Truce: a durable and mutually beneficial arrangement that remained in place for more than a century.

  By this stage, the ruling Al-Khalifa family of Bahrain was well established, having not only signed the British treaties but also eventually hosting Britain’s regional base—the ‘permanent residency’. As descendants of the same Bani Utub clan that had departed from Kuwait in the 1760s, in 1783 they had invaded Bahrain and defeated its Omani-origin ruler of the time.14 They and their allies then moved their homes from Zubarah to the Bahraini towns of Riffa and Muharraq. Although attacked by the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance at the turn of the century and briefly occupied by Oman in 1802, the Al-Khalifa soon consolidated their hold over the archipelago, with Abdullah bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa and Salman bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa emerging as joint rulers.

  In many ways the ruling Al-Thani family of Qatar emerged from the shadow of the Al-Khalifa, with their ancestors having co-habited Zubarah and other parts of the peninsula under nominal Al-Khalifa control until 1867, when a Bahraini force attacked Doha, another Qatari settlement. Given that the attack was seaborne, it meant that the Al-Khalifa had broken the terms of their British peace treaty, prompting Britain to separate Qatar from the Al-Khalifa and offer formal recognition to Muhammad bin Thani, an influential tribal leader who had previously allied himself with the Saudi-Wahhabi movement. Within just four years, however, Muhammad’s son and successor, Jassim bin Muhammad Al-Thani, deemed Britain an unsuitable guarantor against renewed threats from Bahrain and moved into an alliance with the Ottomans—a relationship which continued until 1893 when Jassim refused to permit an Ottoman customs house in Qatar. In 1916, with no remaining Ottoman influence in his territories, Jassim’s son—Abdullah bin Jassim Al-Thani—finally signed Britain’s Perpetual Maritime Truce, thus bringing Qatar into the Trucial States.

  The ruling Al-Qasimi family of Ra’s Al-Khaimah in many ways bore the brunt of the British attacks in 1809 and 1819. Remaining weakened, they had to cede control of their second town, Sharjah, to a distaff branch of the family in 1869, and between 1900 and 1921 even fell under Sharjah’s control. Nevertheless, both Ra’s al-Khaimah and Sharjahs’ rulers signed the British treaties, and both were recognised as ‘gun salute’ states,15 given their strategic position close to British-Indian shipping lanes. Rising in prominence throughout the nineteenth century, in part due to the declining fortunes of the Al-Qasimi, was the ruling Al-Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi. As the dominant clan of the large Bani Yas tribal grouping, the Al-Nahyan had moved from the interior to the island of Abu Dhabi in the late eighteenth century, and—given their relative innocence in the alleged attacks on British shipping—were especially well placed to benefit from British protection. Ruled between 1840 and 1909 by Zayed bin Khalifa Al-Nahyan or ‘Zayed the Great’, Abu Dhabi was able to fend off repeated Saudi-Wahhabi attacks which allowed the Al-Nahyan to consolidate their control over much of the coastline of the lower Gulf. However, much like Qatar’s secession from Bahrain, the Al-Nahyan were soon forced to relinquish control over their second town, the fast-growing fishing and pearling port of Dubai. In 1833, following a significant tribal dispute, Maktoum bin Butti, also of the Bani Yas, and several hundred tribesmen left Abu Dhabi, moving up the coast to settle in Dubai. Sidelining the Al-Nahyan governors16 and declaring Dubai to be an autonomous sheikhdom, they soon entered into Britain’s Perpetual Maritime Truce, thus helping protect the nascent Al-Maktoum dynasty from a number of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah-launched attacks. In the 1880s and 1890s, under Rashid bin Maktoum Al-Maktoum and then Maktoum bin Hasher Al-Maktoum, Dubai’s influence expanded greatly as it became an effective free port for the region, attracting large numbers of disgruntled merchant families from other sheikhdoms and even from towns on t
he Persian coastline.17

  The other Trucial States, much smaller, existed alongside Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ra’s al-Khaimah, and Sharjah. Some were short-lived, being temporary British-recognised breakaways from their larger neighbours before eventually being reabsorbed as Britain lost interest. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of distinct ruling families had managed to solidify their control of such territories. Ajman and Umm al-Qawain, sandwiched between Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, were ruled respectively by the Al-Nuaimi and Al-Mualla families. While Hamriyyah, also along the lower Gulf coastline, was ruled by the Al-Shamsi tribe, and Dibba, on the Indian Ocean coastline, was ruled by another branch of the Al-Qasimi.

  Further down the Indian Ocean coastline, the port city of Muscat had been controlled interchangeably by the Portuguese, the Ottoman Empire, and Persian governors until Abu Hilal Ahmed bin Said was elected as Imam of Muscat in 1744 following the final expulsion of Persian influences. Consolidating his hold over other parts of Oman, Ahmad had effectively founded the Al-Said dynasty, which, under his second successor—Sultan Said bin Sultan Al-Said—assembled a slave-trading empire in the early nineteenth century stretching from the island of Zanzibar off the east coast of Africa to Gwadar, in present day Pakistan. However, following Britain’s outlawing of slavery in 1833 the Al-Said’s revenues began to decline, as much of Oman’s trade was with British colonies. And in 1856, following Sultan’s death and a subsequent succession struggle within the family, British mediators intervened, effectively separating the Sultanates of Muscat and Zanzibar in 1861. In 1871 the Al-Said dynasty was again re-shaped by British interests, with London becoming concerned that Sultan’s Muscat-based successor, Azzam bin Qais Al-Said, was becoming too powerful after uniting tribes from the interior. Funding his main rival, Turki bin Said Al-Said, Azzam soon lost the struggle, and Turki manoeuvred Oman into a much closer relationship with Britain, with his successors signing a treaty of friendship in 1908.18

  Britain and the early order

  The origins of all the Gulf monarchies were thus to some degree moulded by British interests, or in some cases disinterest. The ruling dynasties of the Trucial States were direct creations, while Kuwait’s Al-Sabah and Oman’s Al-Said owed much of their survival to British protection. Meanwhile the Al-Saud benefited from the power vacuum in central Arabia resulting from the weakness of the British-backed Emir of Mecca. One of the most important aspects of Britain’s control over the region was the political support provided to specific families. This was especially evident in the Trucial States, where the various peace treaties provided rulers with protection from external and internal threats—including rival families and tribes inhabiting the same territory. Moreover, the documents all included clauses requiring the rulers to sign on behalf of their ‘future heirs’,19 thus guaranteeing further British support for their dynasties.

  By the beginning of the twentieth century Britain’s position became even clearer, with the Viceroy of India20 remarking in 1903 that ‘…if [internal disputes] occurred, the sheikhs would always find a friend in the British Resident, who would use his influence as he had frequently done in the past, to prevent these dissensions from coming to a head, and to maintain the status quo’.21 Similarly, in the late 1920s, following a series of fratricides in the region,22 the Political Resident called for an even stronger British position, claiming that ‘Unless and until [the British] are prepared to interfere much more than they have done in the past, and are prepared, if necessary, to bolster up a weak sheikh, however much they might regret it, the only other course will be to continue shaking hands with successful murderers.’23

  In parallel to this protection, most of the Gulf monarchies were obliged to cede much of their control over foreign policy to Britain. Again, the Trucial States provide the best example, as although they remained ‘independent Arab sheikhs in special relations with His Majesty’s Government’24 and had transferred no territorial sovereignty to Britain,25 they were nonetheless required to sign collectively an ‘exclusivity treaty’ in 1892. Three clauses were included, forbidding the rulers from entering into agreements with non-British parties, from allowing non-British parties to visit their territories, and from selling or mortgaging any part of the territories unless it was to British agents.26 In practice, the clauses helped Britain thwart other European powers from gaining a foothold in the Persian Gulf, especially France which had been trying to increase its influence in Oman, and Germany which had begun to construct the Baghdad railway.27

  Also helping Britain to keep the Gulf monarchies, or at least the Trucial States, within a dependent and sustainable relationship were the new economic structures that began to form, especially in the early twentieth century. Having previously relied on animal husbandry, basic re-export trading and—in the coastal towns—fishing and pearl diving, the various sheikhdoms began to move away from mere subsistence activities in the 1920s, with Britain seeking to channel large sums of ‘locational rent’28 to most of the ruling families with whom it had entered into protection agreements. In particular, rent was provided in return for landing rights for British aircraft en route from Europe to India and the maintenance of British-built airbases in their territories. After building military airbases in Salalah in southern Oman and on the Omani island of Masirah,29 a base was also established in Sharjah,30 and in the early 1930s agreements were signed with both Sharjah and Dubai to allow civilian aircraft to land.31

  Similarly, oil, or rather oil exploration concessions, provided another means of channelling rent directly to the ruling families. In 1922 fresh agreements between most of the Gulf’s rulers and Britain required the former to eschew any oil concessions that were not supported by the British government.32 And in 1935, after sizeable oil discoveries had already been made in Kuwait and Bahrain, the London-based and British Government-backed Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC)33 formed a wholly owned subsidiary, Petroleum Concessions Ltd., which was to be the sole operator of concessions for all of Britain’s Gulf protectorates.34 Unsurprisingly, a British ultimatum was then issued, binding the rulers to deal only with Petroleum Concessions.35 By the late 1930s, the concessions were providing a very high stream of income for the ruling families, even in those territories where oil had not yet been discovered, a good example being the 1937 concession signed by IPC with the ruler of Dubai. Even though oil was not discovered in the sheikhdom until thirty years later,36 the ruler nonetheless received an ‘advance’ lump sum of 60,000 rupees, and was given an annual income of 30,000 rupees. Moreover, he was promised a 200,000 rupee payment upon the discovery of oil, and a further three rupees for each barrel extracted during the prospecting process.37

  Together, these air landing rights rents and the various oil concession payments were viewed by Britain as strategic subsidies which would help reinforce the status of the Gulf monarchies and thus prolong the selfenforcing, low-cost nature of the peace treaties. On the one hand, the new rents were understood to reduce the likelihood that Britain would have to resort to coercive measures to maintain its relationships. In 1939 the Political Resident even remarked that ‘…a key reason for the goodwill between the British and the rulers was that negotiations over air and oil gave the rulers a square deal which carried a money bag rather than a big stick’.38 While on the other hand, according to the India Office, the new rents were understood to have provided ‘greater protection for the chiefs of tribes who were willing to co-operate… and to protect them from any danger that they might face as a result of their co-operation’.39 Specifically, the new rents facilitated the setting up of prototype, pre-oil versions of the aforementioned rentier states. Received directly by the ruling families and their governments, the rents were in turn used to distribute some wealth to their populations rather than having to rely on taxation from merchants.

  Overall, the new British-influenced political and economic structures that emerged kept most of the region’s monarchies in power well into the twentieth century. It is no coincidence,
perhaps, that every sheikhdom involved in the British protection treaties was by the 1950s also in receipt of at least one form of British rent payment. Indeed, in much the same way as Britain’s earlier political support for breakaway sheikhdoms such as Dubai and Qatar, its intervention on behalf of a favoured member of Oman’s ruling family in the 1870s, and its military assistance for Kuwait in the 1920s, the new rents also became an important part of the survival and in some cases creation of Gulf monarchies. In the case of Ajman, for example, the lack of air landing rights or oil concession payments became such a source of concern that the sheikhdom was purposely selected to host a British military base—an agreement which netted Ajman’s ruler an annual rent of 10,000 rupees and allowed him to reduce taxation in his sheikhdom.40 Similarly profiting from British rents was the Sharqiyin tribe of Fujairah—a semi-autonomous Indian Ocean coastline territory nominally controlled by Sharjah. In 1951, concerned that the Sharqiyin were being courted by the American-Saudi oil giant, Aramco, Britain moved to lock the area into another IPC concession. In 1952 the Shariqin’s chief41 was duly upgraded to the status of the other Trucial States’ rulers: this allowed the IPC to begin payments, and Fujairah was declared to be independent of Sharjah.42

  Conversely, when sheikhdoms were deemed to be no longer of strategic interest to Britain, or their ruling families were proving problematic, Britain moved to cut payments and in extreme cases facilitated the collapse of dynasties. Hamriyyah and Dibba, for example, were quietly reabsorbed by Sharjah, as without rent payments their respective rulers were in no position to maintain sufficient loyalty from resident tribes. Similarly, the Indian Ocean coastline town of Kalba, which in 1936 had been recognised by Britain as a sheikhdom with its ruling family receiving rent for air landing rights, was reabsorbed by Sharjah in 1951. Britain had already ceased payments after failing to build an airbase and had chosen not to intervene following a series of fratricidal killings within its fragmented ruling family.43 Other examples included the Al-Kaabi family of Mahadha, close to Oman. Despite repeatedly presenting his case to Britain in the late 1950s for both recognition and the need for rent payments in return for providing soldiers to help guard oil exploration parties, he was refused and Britain allowed Mahadha to fall under the control of Muscat’s Al-Said.44