After the Sheikhs

by Davidson, Christopher

  Independence and state formation

  By the time of Abdul-Aziz bin Saud’s death in 1953, Saudi Arabia had already become an internationally recognised state45 with rulership having been handed on to his eldest sons, albeit with some turbulence. The first to take over was Saud bin Abdul-Aziz, who then abdicated in 1964 in favour of his more reform-focused younger brother, Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz. Following Faisal’s 1975 assassination at the hands of a younger relative,46 he was succeeded by Khalid bin Abdul-Aziz, who was then succeeded in 1982 by Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. Since Fahd’s death in 2005 another of Abdul-Aziz’s sons, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, has been king, having already effectively ruled Saudi Arabia as Fahd’s crown prince and regent since 1996.47 In parallel to the now very elderly Abdullah, and underscoring the ongoing centrality of the original Saudi-Wahhabi pact to the Saudi state, the religious community continues to be led by the Al-Sheikh family—the direct descendants of Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab.48 Presently led by the one-eyed Abdul-Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the Al-Sheikh remain in control of key positions in government, especially in justice and education, and maintain close family ties to the Al-Saud through intermarriage.49 Together with other relatives and allies they also continue to dominate a number of state-backed bodies such as the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, thus forming the official religious establishment in Saudi Arabia.

  Since Saud’s accession, Saudi Arabia’s government has been run by a Council of Ministers. Established by charter, it has served as both the executive and the legislative body of the Saudi state, with all of its members being appointed by royal decree.50 In 1992, after a number of demands and petitions made to the ruling family by both liberal and conservative opponents in the wake of the Kuwait crisis51 and the return of western troops (including female soldiers) to the region, Fahd instigated a number of reforms aimed at appeasing the religious community while also providing the state with a greater veneer of accountability.52 Collectively, the new ‘Basic System of Governance’ or ‘Basic Law’ re-confirmed Islamic Sharia law as the basis for all legislation in the state, while also establishing new regulatory bodies to monitor government performance and separate the judiciary from other parts of the government—albeit with judges still being appointed by the king. To provide a greater degree of stability for the ruling family and to guard against internecine disputes or coups d’état, the 1992 reforms also clarified that succession would be limited to male descendants of Abdul-Aziz.53 In this way, Fahd sought to enshrine in law some of the stabilisation mechanisms later observed by Michael Herb in his aforementioned work on dynastic monarchies.54 In 1993, in a further effort to promote accountability, Fahd established a new Consultative Council or majlis al-shura. Although, as with the Saudi judges, all involved were appointed by the king.55

  Under Abdullah, little has changed. The Consultative Council now stands at 150 members, but each is still appointed, sitting for four-year terms. Its powers remain weak, with its ability to call ministers to question or launch investigations into governmental affairs being very limited, despite supposedly being allowed to propose legislation.56 The only significant development in recent years was an election in 2005 for municipal councils. But this too was severely restricted, with only half of the seats being elected, with only male candidates and voters being permitted, and with councillors enjoying little power as central ministries continued to dictate regional and municipal policies.57 Fresh elections should have been staged in 2009, but these were cancelled on the grounds that the government needed time to study how best to ‘expand the electorate and the possibility of allowing women to vote’. Although elections were eventually staged in late 2011, seemingly as a concession to the Arab Spring movements elsewhere in the region, the same restrictions remained in place with no women being involved and with only half of the seats being elected.58

  As with Fahd, Abdullah has also tried to address the succession issue and strengthen the Al-Saud as a dynastic monarchy. In 2006 an Allegiance Commission or Hayat al-Bayah was set up, ostensibly to allow for some degree of consensus within the family over appointing new rulers and also to facilitate the dismissal of kings by the rest of the family in the event of illness or other problems.59 Although limiting the powers of Saudi Arabia’s religious police in recent years and—in 2007—separating the Supreme Court from the Al-Sheikh-controlled Ministry for Justice,60 Abdullah has otherwise followed Fahd’s strategy of reinforcing the Saudi-Wahhabi alliance. In particular, he has ensured that only the state-appointed, Riyadh-based Council of Senior Religious Scholars has the ability to issue a fatwa or Islamic legal pronouncement in Saudi Arabia, thus reducing the influence of religious figures elsewhere in the country.61

  In 1961 Kuwait joined Saudi Arabia as an independent state, after Britain formally withdrew its control over the increasingly prosperous and autonomous sheikhdom. Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah duly proclaimed himself ‘emir’ and the United Nations granted recognition to the emirate of Kuwait, while the US had already established a consulate before Britain left, and had even begun to process Kuwaiti visas.62 Almost immediately, however, British troops had to be re-deployed following Iraqi claims on Kuwait. But by 1963 a new government in Iraq relinquished these claims63 and over the next two decades the Al-Sabah dynasty consolidated its position. The family has since ruled unopposed, with Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Jabar Al-Sabah suffering only a brief exile in 1990 following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and being quickly reinstated in 1991 following the US-led multinational Operation Desert Storm which ousted Iraq’s forces. Jabar was succeeded in 2006 by his crown prince, Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, who represented a different branch of the family. But due to Saad’s poor health he was peacefully deposed and replaced by another member of Jabar’s line, Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jabar Al-Sabah, who continues to be Kuwait’s emir.

  Following independence, Abdullah was quick to draw up a new constitution for Kuwait and to establish a new parliament, the National Assembly. As discussed later in this book, Kuwait’s merchant population had long been involved in various consultative institutions, given their relative wealth and political influence, so democratic or rather consultative traditions were much more ingrained in Kuwait than in Saudi Arabia. The first parliamentary elections were staged in 1963, with all literate male Kuwaitis being eligible to stand for the fifty seats.64 Significantly, and much like the Al-Saud rulers, Abdullah also sought to strengthen the Al-Sabah as a dynastic monarchy by confirming in the constitution that the Al-Sabah were the inviolable rulers of Kuwait, and that future rulers must always be descendants of the long-serving former ruler of Kuwait, Mubarak Al-Sabah. The constitution also required the prime minister to be a member of the ruling family, and allowed the emir to appoint fifteen of the sixteen cabinet positions. Moreover, political parties were banned, and the emir was able to dissolve parliament as he saw fit and to pass emergency laws when parliament was not sitting.65

  But despite these restrictions, the parliament proved more vibrant than anticipated, with various outspoken blocs forming—including Arab nationalists and Islamists—and with some tribes even holding ‘primary elections’ to select their preferred parliamentary candidates.66 Endless debates and controversies—few of which could be resolved given the inherent tension from having elected members of parliament alongside appointed cabinet members—led to unapproved budgets and the stalling of various development projects. While the government tried to boost support for their preferred parliamentary blocs, often by naturalising further tribes in exchange for loyalty, the emir eventually chose to step in and dissolved parliament in 1976.67 Only after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran did the emir re-open parliament, expecting greater government support due to uncertainties over Iran’s intentions. Even then, he was prudent to offer loyal parliamentary candidates further advantages: the number of electoral districts was increased from ten to twenty-five, and more naturalisations took place, mostly in the new constituencies. Moreover, in an effort to placate the Islamist blocs and gain their l
oyalty, the emir called for greater restrictions on alcohol and on the celebrating of Christmas and other non-Islamic events.68

  By the mid-1980s Kuwait’s parliament was again under threat, with the Iran-Iraq War continuing to destabilise the region and with a series of car-bombings and an assassination attempt on the emir. In 1986 Jabar duly dissolved parliament, and it remained closed until after the trauma of invasion and liberation.69 During this period the only space for political discussion was in the more traditional setting of Kuwait’s meetinghouses or diwaniyas. Since its reopening in 1991 the parliament has remained a source of controversy, having been closed down on several more occasions by the current emir. Such closures have usually been in order to prevent uncomfortable questioning of the prime minister—up until recently Nasser bin Muhammad Al-Sabah. Thus its powers are still very limited, with the ruling family and its ‘sovereign’ appointees continuing to dominate the emirate’s executive, in something of a neo-patriarchal model. Nonetheless, despite weariness, declining voter turnouts,70 and general disillusionment with the system, elections have continued, having last been staged in early 2012. And on some occasions parliamentary opposition has managed to push through key reforms, notably the 2006 ‘Orange Movement’ decision to reduce the number of electoral districts down to just five—an effort to tackle the corruption and voterigging which was alleged to be taking place in many of the smaller electoral districts.71

  Much like the Al-Saud and the Al-Sabah, the ruling families of the former Trucial States have also ruled unopposed since their independence. In Bahrain’s case, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifa ruled from 1961 until his death in 1999 when he was peacefully succeeded by his eldest son, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, who continues to rule. Succession in Qatar has, by contrast, been much more complicated, with Ahmad bin Ali Al-Thani being deposed in 1972, one year after Qatar’s independence, by his cousin Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani. Then, in 1995 Khalifa was dramatically deposed by his second wife’s eldest son, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani. Nevertheless, the overall authority of the Al-Thani dynasty has never come under serious question, with the family remaining in tight control of Qatar. In Abu Dhabi, after succeeding his unpopular older brother with some degree of British assistance in 1966,72 Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan enjoyed a long and relatively untroubled reign. His death in 2004 was closely followed by the succession of his eldest son and long-serving crown prince, Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But following a secret family agreement reached in 1999 which saw Khalifa’s ambitious younger half-brother, Muhammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, being appointed as deputy crown prince,73 Muhammad was then immediately upgraded to crown prince following their father’s death—despite Khalifa having two adult sons. Since then, Muhammad has risen to become one of the most powerful members of the Al-Nahyan family, controlling most key policy areas in the emirate. In neighbouring Dubai, the Al-Maktoum family had a similarly long-serving patriarch, with Rashid bin Said Al-Maktoum ruling from 1958 until his death in 1990. Survived by four sons, his eldest—Maktoum bin Rashid Al-Maktoum—duly succeeded. However, and as something of a precursor to the Al-Nahyan succession arrangements, he appointed one of his younger brothers—Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktoum—as crown prince in 1995, rather than one of his own sons. Between then and 2006, when Maktoum died, Muhammad was Dubai’s de facto ruler, and thus his eventual succession in 2006 was little more than a formality.

  The ruling families of the smaller former Trucial States have, like Qatar, been a little more prone to internecine disputes and ‘palace coups’. In Sharjah’s case, only a year after independence its ruler Khalid bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi was assassinated by an exiled former ruler, Saqr bin Sultan Al-Qasimi. Turning to Khalid’s most educated younger brother, the ruling family appointed Sultan bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi as ruler. In 1987 Sultan’s passed-over elder brother, Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, briefly seized power before Sultan was able to reassert control.74 Similarly, in Ra’s al-Khaimah the succession process has been bumpy, although the ruling Al-Qasimi family’s authority has never been directly contested. As discussed later in this book, the emirate’s long-serving ruler, Saqr bin Muhammad Al-Qasimi, had appointed his eldest son, Khalid bin Saqr Al-Qasimi, as crown prince in 1961. But in 2003 the aging Saqr had switched crown princes, choosing one of his younger sons, Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi.75 Although Khalid was forced into exile, his return to Ra’s al-Khaimah following Saqr’s death in 2010 prompted a brief crisis before Saud was eventually confirmed as the new ruler.

  The period immediately before and after the Trucial States’ independence from Britain in 1971 deserves special attention, as it has had important ramifications for these monarchies’ subsequent state formation process. In 1968 the British government announced that within just three years it would dismantle all of its bases and treaties ‘east of Aden’, in an effort to cut imperial expenditure and focus more resources on Britain’s struggling domestic welfare system. The ruling families of the Trucial States were so alarmed by the prospect of their protector’s departure that they even offered to subsidise the deployment of British troops in the region after independence was granted.76 Britain’s solution, however, was to encourage the various rulers to form a cohesive federation that would provide their sheikhdoms with at least some degree of collective security.

  Various meetings and negotiations took place, but it quickly became apparent that Bahrain and Qatar were unwilling to form a state with their less developed neighbours,77 with both declaring themselves independent emirates in summer 1971. To make matters worse, Ra’s al-Khaimah was also baulking at joining the federation, as it too held ambitions to become an independent state. Moreover, on 1 December 1971—the day before Britain’s official withdrawal—Iran had seized three contested islands belonging to Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah, thus further alarming the remaining Trucial States rulers. Nonetheless, the following day a six member federation of United Arab Emirates was inaugurated,78 and the next month Ra’s al-Khaimah reluctantly agreed to join. Given that Abu Dhabi commanded the bulk of the UAE’s oil reserves it became the federal capital and its ruler, Zayed, was installed as the UAE’s first president with Dubai’s ruler, Rashid, as vice president.79

  Much like Kuwait, Bahrain began its period of independence with an attempt at building a parliament as the ruling family sought to involve the influential merchant community. A constitution was drawn up detailing a fully elected body with an all-male electorate, and the first ballots were cast in 1973. Political parties were forbidden and the unelected prime minister—Khalifa bin Salman Al-Khalifa—was a member of the ruling family. Nonetheless some political blocs did form, and a brief period of vibrant debate ensued. But within just two years the emir moved to dissolve the parliament. Members had begun to dispute the Al-Khalifa family’s enthusiasm for an American military presence in Bahrain and were frustrated over the lack of land reform, with the Al-Khalifa continuing to own most of the island’s territory. Moreover, parliament had crossed another red line by calling for a more transparent state budget as oil revenues boomed.80 Thus, for most of the 1980s the only spaces for political discussion in Bahrain were in more traditional settings, in particular the majalis for Sunni citizens, and the ‘mourning houses,’ or mataams for Shia citizens.81 By the early 1990s, with deepening security ties between the Al-Khalifa and the US, and with rising unemployment and falling incomes, hundreds of Bahrainis petitioned the emir for a reinstatement of the 1973 parliament, but only an appointed advisory council was established. Further opposition and fresh demands in the 1990s—detailed later in this book—were similarly unsuccessful, with the emir refusing to re-open parliament.

  By 2001, however, the ruling family chose to return to earlier neo-patriarchal strategies by holding a referendum on a ‘National Action Charter’ that would supposedly transform Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy. In 2002 a new constitution was duly implemented on the basis of the charter which promised the creation of a bicameral, halfelected parliament, the abolishing of much maligned ‘security cour
ts’, and a new requirement that half of all judges were to be elected. In 2006 ‘political societies’ were even approved,82 bringing Bahrain the closest of all Gulf monarchies to accepting political parties. However, the charter also re-designated the emir as ‘king’ with Bahrain becoming a kingdom rather than an emirate, and the king remained in control of all key appointments, including the prime minister and all of the cabinet ministers. Crucially, he also retained the power of approving or rejecting all proposed legislation.83 But interestingly, in parallel to the Khalifa bin Salman-controlled government, the king also set up a new Economic Development Board (EDB), which was gradually assigned more and more control over Bahrain’s economy. Given that the EDB is chaired by the king’s eldest son and crown prince, Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, and given that—until recently at least—Khalifa bin Salman’s ministers had to answer to the EDB,84 Bahrain provides a good example of how state formation in the Gulf monarchies has often been manipulated in order to manage ruling family divisions. Broadly speaking, the Al-Khalifa dynasty has become factionalised into conservatives led by the prime minister and a number of key members of the royal court, and reformists, led by the crown prince. The king, rather precariously, has had to sit somewhere in the middle.