The Final Mission of Extortion 17

by Ed Darack

  To block this terrorist and insurgent flow, the Army established a small base in the middle of the valley: Combat Outpost Tangi, or COP Tangi. Only an acre in area, the outpost included a small satellite position, Observation Post Tangi, or OP Tangi, sitting on a prominent ridge 300 vertical feet higher and a third of a mile west of the main outpost. John and other Apache pilots used the ridge as a landmark, calling it the Peninsula because it resembled one jutting into the valley at the point where the Tangi takes a sharper turn north. Pitch Black Apache pilots knew the Peninsula well, as they frequently responded to insurgent and terrorist attacks on COP Tangi and its observation post. Ultimately, the attacks worked, and the Americans abandoned the base. “Actually watched a young soldier get shot in the head and die at that observation post,” John recalled, noting that there was an ever-present ominous sight at the toe of the Peninsula where the ridge met the Green Zone: a black Taliban flag.

  Because of its proximity to Kabul and its strategic significance to the insurgency, U.S. commanders in Afghanistan prioritized quelling enemy activity in the Tangi. “One of the key mission sets that Task Force Knighthawk undertook was supporting the Kabul Security Zone,” explained Captain Dan Bair, a Black Hawk pilot-in-command and member of Task Force Knighthawk at FOB Shank. As a result, commanders tasked SOF units to lead the fight in the valley. Chosen by Knighthawk’s command as the SOF aviation planner, Bair not only planned the aviation side of every SOF mission but also acted as the liaison between the ground units and the aviation side. “All of their raids were intelligence driven and intelligence triggered,” Bair said, “so we had to be ready to go within typically just a few hours.”

  To develop their picture of the enemy in the Tangi and surrounding areas, SOF planners relied on a host of intelligence products. While these included HUMINT, the majority came through technical means, including data from MC-12 Liberties, RC-12 Guardrails, U-28As, and Predators monitoring targets inside Afghanistan, plus RQ-170 Sentinels collecting information about the insurgents’ and terrorists’ upper-echelon command inside Pakistan. By fusing intelligence of all types, analysts identified key individuals, their allegiances, backing, past deeds, and intentions, and then drafted a list of leaders, giving each a value status. Leaders and their lieutenants garnered the tag “high-value target,” or HVT. “Then those HVTs get objective names, which are usually up to the whims of the analysts themselves,” an anonymous senior intelligence officer told me. “Sometimes we’d use cities, sometimes sports teams. Sometimes we don’t even know their actual names.”

  Special operations intel analysts focusing on the Tangi identified terrorist cells with ties to two Pakistan-based groups, the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. Individuals loyal to and under the command of the Taliban maintained a presence in the eastern Tangi Valley, while those associated with the Haqqani Network held the western Tangi and the adjoining Chak Valley as their territory. All extremely violent, the groups sought to rid the Tangi and its surrounding area of the U.S. and coalition presence; hence the mortar and rocket attacks against FOB Shank, east of the Tangi.

  Detailed view of northern aspect of FOB Shank, showing Task Force Knighthawk’s compound, JSOC compound, and helicopter airfield, circa 2011. Credit 26

  To the west, near the town of Saydabad, insurgents frequently attacked COP Saydabad, a U.S. Army and Afghan National Army combat outpost. During one attack, insurgents under the command of a Haqqani leader, intent on forcing travelers on the Kabul-Kandahar Highway to pay tolls, nearly breached the perimeter of the combat outpost. “We came and shot ’em all up,” John recalled. “Another time they attacked a convoy of local Afghan fuel tanker trucks. By the time we got on scene, there must have been 30 big trucks, all loaded with fuel, burning like mad, every one of them.”

  Special operations intelligence revealed that a man named Din Mohammad, whom they identified as Objective Dunlap, was the leader of Taliban forces operating in the eastern Tangi Valley. Data sourced from within Pakistan showed that Objective Dunlap and his second-in-command, Qari Tahir, whom intel analysts dubbed Objective Lefty Grove, took direct orders from the Pakistan-based Taliban shadow governor of that region of Afghanistan. Dunlap’s reign came to a swift end on June 6, however, as the result of a SOF raid. The vast majority of such missions throughout Afghanistan resulted in surrender, but “not that night,” said John. “He aimed his AK at the special operators. Never a good idea.”

  Lefty Grove immediately stepped in to fill the void left by Dunlap and further sought to consolidate power throughout the Tangi Valley, including the western aspect. However, two Haqqani Network operatives, whom intelligence analysts named Objective Green Lantern and Objective Universal Soldier, maintained a tight grip over the western Tangi and the neighboring Chak Valley.

  “It’s called getting a hit,” the anonymous senior intelligence officer mentioned above said. He explained how most SOF raids begin, including the one supported by Extortion 16 and 17. After analysts build the intel picture of an objective, they gain the wisdom to predict his next move or moves. “And you continually monitor him with signals intelligence. And he’ll do something or call someone, or start moving toward someplace that we’ve identified as a triggering mechanism, something that, based on his pattern of behavior, indicates he’s going to do something, and that’s the hit,” he said, explaining that satellite and cellular phones identify an individual with a unique “digital fingerprint.”

  Dan Bair’s ability to quickly plan the aviation side of raids like that supported by Extortion 16 and 17 stemmed from the relationships that those of Extortion Company and the Pitch Black Apaches maintained with the members of the SOF ground teams. Extortion Company supported over 90 percent of JSOC raids, and the Apaches supported all of them. “The units receiving support from conventional aviation wasn’t anything new; we just took that job over once we got to Shank,” Bair explained, adding that as FOB Shank neighbors, they frequently would get face-to-face time with the SOF personnel. Everyone knew one another on a first-name basis. “We were really well-oiled from the get-go. We were really tight-knit with those guys.”

  Bair said that planning the air side of SOF missions required a few hours. “If they came to me and said, ‘Hey, we got a hit but need to go now,’ I could make things go a little quicker. But they were comfortable with the lead time that we had established,” he said. Safety and survivability guided Bair’s planning process, with a hard-edged emphasis on security whenever missions planned to enter the Tangi.

  As soon as JSOC planners notified Bair of an intel hit, he would study the most recent IMINT of the objective target area and then work with the Extortion Company pilots who would fly the mission to select LZs for the infil and exfil and choose routes into and out of the target area. Bair worked closely with both Bryan and Dave to plan the mission that Extortion 17 would fly, Dave drawing on his experience from his time planning and flying JSOC operations in Iraq. Terrain, including that which enemy fighters could use to hide, ranked as the most important among a host of criteria that Bair and the Extortion pilots used to select LZs, noting that only a few areas proved suitable for Chinooks, and that the policy of never using the same LZ twice for an operation further complicated their planning calculus.

  Bair’s planning process also included Apache integration, ensuring that AH-64s constantly maintained coverage of ground units for the duration of the operation. Using imagery provided by the SOF units that Knighthawk would support, Bair produced a mission packet for all the aviators, describing and showing LZ locations and so-called release points (RPs). Passing the RP on an infil flight marks the beginning of the most critical phase of the mission, when the helicopter slows to land and comes closest to the ground, making it most susceptible to enemy fire. “The Extortion pilots had to go from full flight to a pinpoint landing in a relatively short amount of time. It was my job to make sure those guys had the best situational awareness of that portion of each mission as possible,” Bair said.

  Area
where Extortion 16 and 17 inserted a task force of U.S. Army Rangers and attachments on August 5, 2011, to capture or kill “Objective Lefty Grove” (Qari Tahir), then senior Taliban commander in the Tangi Valley. Credit 27

  While supporting dangerous JSOC raids such as that of August 5–6 accounted for 50 percent of Extortion Company’s missions—approximately 180 SOF missions total for their deployment—no flight could ever be seen as routine when the helicopters’ engines spun to life at Shank. Prior to a mission, each pilot and crewmember ran through his respective preflight checklist. Then pilots would receive their weather brief, shifting their outlook from machine to mission. Task Force Knighthawk’s intelligence officer would brief the pilots on the enemy threat, and “that’s when the energy would start to build,” recalled Buddy. “Then we’d get our brief from Dan, and it was off to the races. The adrenaline really gets going once we’re strapped in and we do our radio checks.”

  Extortion pilots then conducted their startup procedures, bringing all systems up to 100 percent. The air mission commander, who typically flew as pilot-in-command of Chalk 2, would then radio to flight lead that they were Readiness Condition One, or REDCON 1, meaning “good to go.” The pilots then would perform a “power hover check” to ensure that their performance levels matched those that they had computed prior to the mission. With permission from Shank’s air traffic control tower, the aircraft would make its Alpha call, the time of which was logged by air traffic control down to the second. Then the craft would speed into the night.

  “We’d get out over the LZ first,” said John of the AH-64 Apache gunships’ role in raids, “to provide cover for the Chinooks, and if necessary hit some unoccupied areas around the LZ with gun bursts to keep any potential enemy ambushers’ heads down and their fingers off triggers.” For JSOC raids and most all other mission types they flew, the Pitch Black Apaches would fly as a two-ship attack weapons team (AWT), each AH-64 operated by two pilots. After arrival at the LZ, they would orbit with their TADS system slaved to the Apache’s 30mm chain gun to immediately fire upon any targets that presented themselves. With the lead Apache flying lower than the trailing AH-64, they scanned their TADS around the area of the LZ, searching for any activity, while the forward pilot of the lead ship scanned for the inbound helicopter or helicopters using his NVGs. Then the Apaches helped guide the Chinook flight to the LZ while giving condition reports. “As they’re doing their radio callouts coming up to their release point, we let them know if the LZ is cherry or ice—that is, hot or cold,” John explained. “If it’s cherry, then they go around and we take care of the enemy. If it’s ice, they land.”

  Soon after leaving Shank on JSOC missions, Extortion pilots would contact the Apaches orbiting and awaiting their arrival. In addition to the AH-64s, others in the “stack” might include F-16 Fighting Falcon fighters, A-10 Thunderbolt II attack aircraft, a Predator, an RC-12, a U-28A, an MC-12, and an AC-130 gunship. With that number of aircraft in the sky above an LZ, scanning for a variety of potential threats with NVGs, thermal infrared, and even cell phone and two-way radio intercepts, technology, determination, and skill stacked the odds as much in favor of the inbound Chinooks and their passengers as possible.

  “We sometimes have conversations with the passengers on the way in—find out what was new in their lives, if they’d caught a game, just small talk,” Buddy recalled. At points the pilots and planners determined to be specific numbers of minutes from landing, the aviators would transmit that they had passed those marks. “Then, at the one-minute callout, we’d wish the guys good luck and then they’d unplug from the ICS and unbuckle their seat belts and get ready to go out and do their thing, and that thought always had me in high adrenaline mode,” Buddy said. Often, as Extortion flights approached an LZ, they would receive some visualization assistance from above. Air Force Special Operations AC-130 gunships, bristling with weapons including a 105mm howitzer, also carried powerful infrared spotlights for an “LZ burn.” When requested, pilots would see a 100-by-100-meter square of infrared illumination invisible to the enemy but clearly visible through NVGs.

  Two Extortion CH-47D Chinooks on final approach in a landing after a rare daytime extraction in Maidan Wardak Province, Afghanistan, in support of a successful Joint Special Operations Command Logar Set raid in 2011. The Navy DEVGRU (SEAL Team 6) SEAL in the foreground holds a captured member of the Taliban (lower left). Credit 28

  Once past the RP, Extortion flights would make their 30-second call, and the Pitch Black Apaches would transmit their final LZ condition brief—cherry or ice. The final seconds of the infil always proved the most adrenaline-filled, flying fast enough to avoid potential enemy rounds but not kick dust into a brownout, then flaring at the last moment to come to rest just as the helicopter reached the ground.

  An AH-64 Apache target acquisition and designation site–pilot night-vision system forward-looking infrared view of a Mobile Assault Force flight insertion in 2011. Extortion Chinooks delivered members of DEVGRU SEALs to a destination far enough from a target to be out of audible range of that target, and there they would offload onto dirt bikes and all-terrain four-wheel vehicles. The SEALs would proceed overland to a predetermined hide, cache the vehicles, and approach the target on foot. For exfiltration, they would proceed in reverse order. Credit 29

  Once on the ground, Extortion flights would transmit, “Down and safe” as the Apaches and other aircraft continued to scan from their orbits. Their passengers would exit the Chinooks in a matter of seconds. Most missions carried personnel who departed helicopters by foot, but for certain missions, called Mobile Assault Force missions, they would drive off on four-wheel quads and dirt bikes. The pilots and crew would either return to Shank or fly to another of the FOBs or COPs in the region to refuel, then wait at REDCON 2, just as Spencer Duncan, Alex Bennett, Patrick Hamburger, Bryan Nichols, and Dave Carter waited in Extortion 17 to return to the focal point of support: the SOF personnel on the ground.

  Though commanded from the Mouse Maze at Balad, the JSOC task force in Afghanistan in 2011, Task Force 3-10, technically fell under Task Force 5-35, SOCOM’s Afghan task force at that time. Like JSOC units that CW4 Dave Carter supported in Iraq, however, those in Afghanistan functioned essentially as their own force type, answering to their in-country command, which in turn answered to their command in Balad. JSOC further divided Task Force 3-10 into commands corresponding to Afghanistan’s regional commands. JSOC’s Task Force East, commanded by senior members of DEVGRU, a salient component of JSOC, conducted operations in Regional Command–East, which included the Tangi Valley area. Task Force East placed JSOC personnel into two primary teams at FOB Shank: Team Darby, also known occasionally as Task Force Red, was composed of members of the 75th Ranger Regiment, like those transported by Extortion 16 and 17, while Team Logar, or Task Force Blue, was composed of DEVGRU SEALs. JSOC also placed members of the Air Force 24th Special Tactics Squadron and East Coast/West Coast SEAL teams at Shank to support Team Logar and Team Darby, which was named after William Darby, the founder of the Rangers.

  “We called the mission set the Logar Set,” explained an anonymous source familiar with JSOC operations supported by Task Force Knighthawk. “They would take turns. One night Darby would conduct a raid, with Logar remaining behind to head out as an immediate reaction force if needed. Then Logar would do a raid, with Darby standing by as an immediate reaction force.” The latter, known as an IRF, is a unit that is fully briefed on a raid and observes its progression but is prepared to render aid should the mission stray off course.

  Team Logar consisted of a troop (typically ranging from 15 to 20 men) from DEVGRU Tactical Development and Evaluation Squadron Three (TACDEVRON THREE), called Gold Squadron and nicknamed “the Crusaders.” In 2011, DEVGRU, based out of Dam Neck, Virginia, comprised four colored-coded assault tactical development and evaluation squadrons, including TACDEVRON TWO, or Red Squadron, members of which undertook the successful bin Laden raid just weeks prior to Dave’s
arrival at Shank on July 17. JSOC command composed Team Darby with personnel numbers similar to those of Team Logar, with the core of Darby consisting of members of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

  One of the operation sets JSOC units developed included antiterrorism and counterterrorism contingency actions for the 2008 Democratic National Convention, where SEALs from DEVGRU and personnel from the Army Combat Applications Group (Airborne), or CAG (by 2011 renamed Army Compartmented Elements, or ACEs, but better known as Delta Force), took the lead. “The same Development Group and CAG guys that Dave flew in Iraq requested that he and other pilots from his unit support some of their training for the convention,” an anonymous source familiar with Dave’s deployments and the training explained. Dave supported mountain training in the Fort Carson, Colorado, area, and then JSOC personnel used the 160th SOAR for their urban training in and around Denver. “All sorts of reports of black helicopters hit the news around that time. And they really were black helicopters,” said this source.

  Dave rejoined the JSOC antiterror fight just over a week after arriving at FOB Shank, when an RC-12 Guardrail intercepted a hit from one of Objective Green Lantern’s cellular phones. “Green Lantern was on JPEL, so he was a real prize,” said an individual familiar with the operation that unfolded shortly after JSOC learned of the hit. JPEL, or Joint Prioritized Effects List, included the most violent, powerful, and important terrorist leaders in Afghanistan, many of whom had direct contact with senior Haqqani Network and Taliban leaders in Pakistan. Special operations planners used a convention for JPEL that numerically indicated the importance of the objective, with JPEL-4 being the lowest and JPEL-1 being the highest-priority targets in the war. Team Logar planned to conduct the raid on Green Lantern, while Team Darby stood by as their IRF.