The Final Mission of Extortion 17

by Ed Darack

  Dave’s first flight in-country supported Extortion’s so-called Operation Green Lantern on the night of August 4. While JSOC never named operations, Extortion pilots and crew identified the missions using the convention that included the objective name. “I was on the controls for the infil on August 4,” said Buddy Lee, who flew with Dave. Although Dave had accrued many more hours than Buddy, the Extortion Company commander always executed the first landing for someone new to the unit to provide the same type of familiarization that Extortion Company underwent when they first arrived at FOB Shank during their left seat–right seat flights with the outbound unit they replaced. Alex Bennett and Spencer Duncan flew as machine gunners on the Extortion Chinook that Dave and Buddy piloted, Chalk 2, as Buddy commanded the mission, with Bryan Nichols piloting the lead Extortion Chinook for the raid. Two Extortion ships delivered the SEAL strike force near a compound deep in the Chak Valley, Green Lantern and Universal Soldier’s domain, just west of the Tangi Valley. After smoothly landing and unloading the strike force, the two Chinooks returned, refueled, and waited at REDCON 2.

  Just as military pilots rarely consider any combat air mission to be typical, none of the ground operations conducted by Teams Darby and Logar was ever repeated in exactly the same way. JSOC planners, however, did structure them similarly. In the case of Operation Green Lantern, prior to the Extortion pilots lifting the strike force into the sky, surveillance aircraft orbited above the target’s location, which was positively identified by either an MC-12 Liberty or an RC-12 Guardrail onsite as part of the stack. Further complementing the ISR package, planners would typically use the electro-optical scanners of a Predator and/or a U-28A. Thirty to 60 minutes prior to the moment planners timed the Extortion Company Chinooks to land the assault force, any combination of an AC-130 gunship, F-16s, A-10s, and other tactical and ground aircraft would “check in on station” to aid with surveillance. The additional platforms, combined with dedicated ISR assets already on station, would help build and maintain a robust level of situational awareness. An AH-64 AWT would then arrive, orbiting the target location.

  Planners chose LZs based on a balance of access and stealth for the ground forces’ mission. If they were mounting a Mobile Assault Force raid, planners chose LZs miles distant from the target. This allowed strike force members to approach the target on vehicles, then cache the vehicles and finish the approach on foot, facilitating surprise. More standard infils used LZs from just more than a half mile to two miles from where the strike force personnel would move by foot, quickly and silently, to the target location, relying on locals’ acclimatization to hearing helicopters at all hours of the day and night.

  Once on the ground, strike forces coordinated their movements with the stack of aircraft through a special operator trained as a Joint Terminal Attack Controller, or JTAC, who used a number of radios to speak with aircraft and the tactical and joint operation centers at Shank and other bases. JTACs coordinate air-strike packages, transmitting “9-line briefs,” detailed and highly structured instructions for air-to-ground bomb, missile, rocket, and gun attack missions set off with a call of “Cleared hot,” “Cleared to engage,” or “You’re approved” once all parties have confirmed strike criteria. They also help coordinate medical evacuations and search and rescue operations. Green Lantern’s JTAC, Staff Sergeant Andrew Harvell, a combat controller from the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron, managed the air stack as the strike force approached the target.

  Operation Green Lantern progressed as planned for the SEALs, meaning that the Team Darby IRF never launched. As with other raids, the Team Logar strike force surrounded buildings that intel had identified as most likely to house key enemy targets and then commenced “callouts,” ordering those inside to emerge. If they complied, the force would detain and question the suspects—if they complied.

  “We got the call, spun up, and launched for the exfil portion of the op,” Buddy recalled. This time, Dave flew the Chinook, impressing Buddy with his prowess and his calm and collected demeanor. Extortion pilots knew that the second flight into the area of a raid carried much greater risk than the first, as the enemy had been alerted and knew that the Chinooks would return, although not when and from what direction. Most Chinooks that have taken enemy fire received it during exfil flights. With Dave on the controls, Buddy felt fully confident in the experienced pilot flying the aircraft despite the inherently enhanced risks.

  Special operations commanders required that all JPEL operations be “capture or kill,” formally approved by Task Force 5-35, with capture the preferred outcome because of the potential for HUMINT. And while most culminated in capture, some objectives ultimately chose the second option, including Green Lantern. “Suicide by SEAL,” explained John Edgemon. “He chose to stand and fight.” Green Lantern’s dispatch in a hail of rounds left Universal Soldier as the senior commander in the Chak and western Tangi valleys, and he would continue to stir unrest in the area. Not 24 hours later, however, another SIGINT aircraft intercepted a hit from yet another terrorist leader, this one much closer to FOB Shank. It was Lefty Grove, who had stepped in to fill the power void opened in the eastern Tangi Valley with the death of Objective Dunlap. Lefty Grove also sought to gain control of more of the area.

  Dave, Bryan, Pat, Alex, and Spencer learned of their mission for the August 5–6 period-of-darkness in the early evening of August 5, 2011. Along with pilots CW4 Rick Arnold and CW2 Jeremy Collins, door gunner Sergeant John Brooks, and FEs Sergeant John Etuale and Staff Sergeant Brandon Robinson, they would launch a two-ship mission carrying a strike force of Team Darby Rangers into the heart of the Tangi Valley. After a series of briefings, including one with Knighthawk planners, the strike force, consisting of four squads of Team Darby Rangers, a JTAC from the 24th Special Tactics Squadron, a cultural support team member, and a military working dog—48 passengers total—loaded into the two Chinooks, mission call signs Extortion 16 and Extortion 17.

  Based on a standardized risk assessment system that all Army aviation units use, the flight to insert the strike force against Lefty Grove was considered high risk because the night was almost moonless. However, with an aggregate cockpit experience count of 10,699 hours, including Dave Carter’s 4,596 and Rick Arnold’s 4,480 at the 10:40 p.m. moment of liftoff, the pilots ranked as some of the most experienced in the military. Furthermore, with Bryan, Dave, and Jeremy having successfully supported the raid against Green Lantern the night before as pilots in separate aircraft—a night with nearly the same poor illumination as that of the Lefty Grove operation—the passengers boarded with complete confidence.

  Extortion 16 and 17 made their Alpha calls and then rocketed west, ultimately destined for a side-by-side pair of 70-by-70-meter LZs five miles inside the Tangi Valley. Extortion 17, with Bryan as pilot-in-command, took the lead, with Extortion 16, flown by Jeremy as pilot-in-command and Rick as air mission commander, following in Chalk 2.

  Intelligence revealed that Lefty Grove had traveled to Kamran (see the map on here), a tiny village on the north side of the Tangi Valley, a half-mile from the site of the abandoned COP Tangi, to conduct a number of shura meetings with villagers to attempt to influence them to join his ranks. Planners chose an LZ one mile southeast of the target building in a dry field in the Green Zone. Awaiting the two Extortion Chinooks, an AWT consisting of two Task Force Knighthawk AH-64 Apache gunships, Pitch Black 45 and Pitch Black 70, orbited the LZ at a radius of nine miles. In the front seat of Pitch Black 45 (often referenced in radio calls by the JSOC units they supported as just Black 45 or Black 1 for brevity), CW2 Randell DeWitt searched for the two inbound Chinooks with his NVGs while Captain Greg Sievers, in the rear seat, scanned the LZ through the helicopter’s TADS for potential threats. “We always flew left-hand orbits, as that gave our sensor a greater range of motion,” explained Randell of their counterclockwise flight pattern. The TADS system uses a monocle that the pilot can rotate to the side, allowing the pilot to flip down his NVGs. “So
we can have one guy watching for the aircraft and another paying attention to the LZ,” said Randell, “with the gun slewed to the TADS sensor, ready to fire right where it’s looking.”

  Flying a half-mile behind Black 45 and 500 feet higher at 1,500 feet above the ground, Pitch Black 70’s pilots, CW2 Scott “Q” Quiros and CW3 Greg Robertson, the AWT mission commander, scanned the mud walls, earthen houses, open fields, and stands of trees surrounding the LZ as well, seeking any potential small-arms or RPG shooters. In recent months, aircraft in the area had reported a total of 17 RPG shots fired at Army helicopters.

  Hours before Black 45 and 70 arrived in the central Tangi, an Air Force MC-12 Liberty circled thousands of feet above the suspected location of Lefty Grove, scanning for the terrorist’s cellular phone. At 6:56 p.m., the aircraft’s sensors positively identified the objective’s phone, mapped its location to an accuracy of within 100 feet, then maintained continuous surveillance of that location, which was the complex planners had previously identified as most likely housing him: a group of buildings 400 feet north of the Green Zone in Kamran village. Through the night, a number of other aircraft would arrive and depart, including an RC-12 Guardrail, a Predator to send continuous video feed to a number of operations centers, an AC-130 gunship to provide heavy firepower if needed, and a U-28A to perform a variety of ISR tasks and act as a communication relay in the constrained valley for the ground assault team. Flying on the Extortion flight for the infil, an Army Ranger JTAC using the call sign Stryker 23 would be able to communicate with all other assets and his joint operations center, even if his satellite communications radio malfunctioned, by using the U-28A as a bridge.

  As Extortion 17 passed the infil flight’s RP, Randell gave the LZ ice call, and the Chinook touched down a couple of minutes before 11 p.m. Extortion 16 landed seconds later, both sets of rear wheels settling after a steep flare to zero forward airspeed on the LZ “burned” from 7,000 feet above by the AC-130.

  The mission was in full swing, but with the enemy situation evolving so that planners felt they might need to unleash the IRF, Bryan, Dave, Pat, Spencer, and Alex continued their wait at FOB Shank.

  Like John Edgemon and the other Pitch Black pilots, CW2 Randell DeWitt loved flying the Apache in combat. Operating the AH-64 was not his first taste of the Army, however. Once he completed his basic training, Randell had supported the Army’s Special Forces as an intelligence analyst, although he was not a Green Beret himself, deploying on a number of occasions to Iraq as part of a Special Operations Team Alpha, or SOT-A. Randell loved being on the ground, but the Army altered his MOS, precluding him from deploying into the field.

  “I really wanted to support the troops the best way, which in my opinion is with guns in the air,” Randell recalled. So, knowing nothing about helicopters other than what he had learned as a member of a ground unit, he submitted his package to Fort Rucker with the intention of becoming an Apache pilot. After graduation from flight school, he deployed to Iraq, although the unit he deployed with did not participate in much combat because there was limited need for attack ships during that period of OIF. “We just burned holes in the sky.” Then he deployed in October 2010 to FOB Shank for a yearlong combat tour. “That’s where I really got to support guys on the ground, like I wanted to do entering flight school.”

  While working with Special Forces prompted Randell to become an Apache pilot to support ground forces, another event in that war solidified his resolve. During an assignment as a recruiter in his home state of Oklahoma, he asked his young cousin Clint Williams if he would like to join the Army. To Randell’s surprise, Clint joined to become a scout in a cavalry brigade. “We actually just missed each other twice: once passing through Balad, and then again in Mosul by seven minutes.” But toward the end of his contract, Clint was looking forward to returning home. He had received a Purple Heart from an IED strike in June 2006 and was worried about another strike. A month before his return date, Clint called Randell, who told his cousin he would soon depart for flight school. Clint, who had already purchased land to build a home, responded that he was about to head out on another patrol. The two ended the conversation by discussing just missing each other in Mosul. “At two the next morning, I got the call that he got killed,” Randell recalled.

  “All the Pitch Black pilots took their jobs protecting guys on the ground and Chinooks very seriously,” explained an anonymous Task Force Knighthawk pilot. “Randell would die to defend fellow American warfighters—not even a question. He really takes it to heart. It’s really ingrained in him.”

  After Extortion 16 and 17 sped back toward FOB Shank, the Team Darby assault force (consisting of 47 warfighters and one dog) quickly assembled and moved north roughly a tenth of a mile to the edge of the Tangi Road, also known by American forces as Main Supply Route Georgia. Moving quickly northwest, they took care to avoid any disturbed dirt on or beside the main roadway—a sign of an implanted IED. Just under 30 minutes into the ground phase of the assault, with Team Darby less than a quarter-mile from the target building housing Lefty Grove and the small band of Taliban fighters, Randell sighted eight men carrying AK-47s and RPG-7 launchers moving swiftly across the Tangi Road into the Green Zone. Randell, who had maintained radio contact with the JTAC, Stryker 23, since moments after the infil, contacted him and reported the Taliban fighters’ location. They were moving toward Team Darby’s position.

  At first Randell thought they were members of the Afghan National Army. “But then I realized that they were enemy fighters.” He could see the men positioning themselves to ambush the strike team. With Captain Greg Sievers flying the Apache, Randell zoomed the helicopter’s TADS FLIR sensor, slaved to the aircraft’s 30mm gun, onto the enemy group, observing them on an eight-by-eight-inch black-and-white screen in the cockpit (the monocle can also display the TADS feed, but at a much lower resolution). The Taliban then took positions behind a stand of trees. Just seconds later, at the southern edge of a large cemetery, Stryker 23 eyed the fighters through his NVGs and immediately cleared Pitch Black 45 to engage them. “I WASed the gun and selected a 10-shot burst,” Randell said, explaining that the Weapons Action Switch, or WAS, powers the selected weapon system on the aircraft, in this case the Apache’s M230 30mm chain gun.

  Called an AWS, or Area Weapon System, the M230 fires rounds to hit throughout an area rather than one specific point. The Pitch Black Apaches used high-explosive dual-purpose rounds that included a shaped charge inside to penetrate armor and serve as an antipersonnel munition. They explode on impact, sending shrapnel in all directions, essentially loosing the equivalent of 10 hand grenades per second into an impact area. After a few 10-shot bursts, the 8 fighters, later confirmed to be Pakistani Taliban militants, lay dead.

  A different group of three, however, then ran into the Green Zone. Called “squirters” by American pilots because they “squirt” out of an area when squeezed by a raid, they ran out of sight of the Apaches. Slasher 02, the AC-130 orbiting 7,000 feet above the area, tracked them for a few hundred meters as they ran northwest away from the approaching strike force, but the gunship lost them in the labyrinth of the Green Zone.

  In the predawn darkness of August 6, the Rangers of Team Darby cordoned off and searched all of the complex’s designated primary target buildings. They recovered two AK-47s, six hand grenades, an RPG launcher, and six two-way handheld radios but found no trace of Lefty Grove or any of his lieutenants.

  As the assault team began interrogating detainees, ISR aircraft detected possible enemy fighters leaving the compound area from outlying buildings. They grouped together, moved among the mud walls of Kamran in the dark, split apart, and then regrouped. But they carried no identifiable weapons, so the Pitch Black pilots and the Slasher crewmembers could not establish PID. Their proximity to innocent civilians would have precluded the AC-130 and the AH-64s from firing even if they could identify hostile intent due to collateral damage ROEs. Furthermore, the Taliban, having learned over the decade-
long war that their cell phones could betray their locations, might have removed their batteries or simply ditched their phones once they detected the strike force approaching, essentially erasing their digital fingerprints from detection by aircraft such as the MC-12 and RC-12.

  Observing the operation in real time, courtesy of the U-28A and Predator overhead, and listening to tactical updates from Stryker 23 and others on the ground and in the air, Task Force East commanders convened to discuss the evolving situation. At 1:40 a.m., Slasher 02 transmitted that they had regained visual contact with the small group of suspected fighters who had squirted into the Green Zone. The AC-130 crew located them inside a compound in Zmuc Zukly, a village in the middle of the Green Zone just over a mile and a half northwest of Lefty Grove’s complex around the north-trending bend in the Tangi marked by the ridge the Apache pilots called the Peninsula.

  Seconds later, the pilots and crew of Extortion 16 and 17, after waiting at Shank for two and a half hours, learned of their next operational role: insert the Team Logar IRF. “Not to reinforce the Rangers of Darby, who continued to move through the Lefty Grove complex,” said a planner involved in the operation, “but to set up a blocking position to the northwest for those on the move.” Team Darby had not completed their operation, and abandoning their objectives to pursue the squirters might mean leaving critical people and troves of vital information in unsearched buildings.

  Prior to the IRF call, planners at Shank’s JSOC compound had pored over reports and imagery to determine the most appropriate course of action to find and capture or kill Lefty Grove and his fighters. The initial IRF plan consisted of a force of 17 Task Force Logar personnel to bolster Team Darby. Because the squirters might have included Lefty Grove or his key lieutenants, and because more of the suspected fighters might have egressed to the northwest to avoid interdiction by the Rangers, the strike force approached from the southeast. But planners including Lieutenant Commander Jonas Kelsall, who led Team Logar, believed a force larger than 17 to be more appropriate.