The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander

by Erich Topp

  The Geneva conference of the foreign ministers of the four Allied powers in May 1959 exhausted itself in propaganda speeches on both sides. This formal conference was followed by secret meetings among the four powers about the future of Berlin, initiatives that spanned the spectrum from compromises on part of the West to attempts at blackmail, such as threats to close the land approaches to the city, on part of the Soviets. The talks oscillated between definite dead ends and a feverish search for a practical solution, for suspending the meetings would have led to a dangerous confrontation.

  We in Washington assessed the situation as follows: The formerly united front of the NATO members had virtually collapsed. As always in situations like this one, everybody talked about the need to take a firm and united stand. But only the Americans let it be known that they were ready to block the Danish straits and to mine the Dardanelles should the Soviets decide to deny us access to Berlin. The Americans were the only ones ready to defend the rights of the West "without giving an inch," as Eisenhower said. This we should never forget.

  In contrast to the firm determination of the U.S. government, the U.S. press brought up the proposal to place Berlin under the control of the United Nations to meet the Soviet pressure. As one paper wrote, "Out of this nettle danger, we pluck the flower, safety." Backed by the federal government, the German Social Democratic member of parliament Fritz Erler rejected this suggestion with two arguments: (1) The fate of Berlin would be subject to unpredictable majority votes in the United Nations, where especially neutral countries were likely to change their mind frequently; and (2) Such a solution was likely to put the question of German reunification on the back burner as far as world opinion was concerned. What saved the situation in the end was Khrushchev's visit to the United States. This U.S.•-Soviet summit meeting stressed the equal ranking of the two superpowers and paved the way for a reconvened conference in Geneva to work out a compromise.

  Once, in a discussion with Guttenberg and Dr. Swidbert Schnippenkotter of the political section of the embassy, the Berlin Crisis became our central topic. Guttenberg was convinced that the Soviets were intent on using Berlin as an excuse to perpetuate the division of Germany. For the Russians and their satellites, a reunited Germany, possibly even occupying a leading position in Western Europe, was the ultimate nightmare. Thus, Khrushchev's attempt to solve the Berlin problem in an aggressive fashion was psychologically motivated and contrasted with the actions of the western powers.

  Schnippenkotter feared with some justification that a blockade of Berlin would not only harm political activity in the city but endanger the very idea and mission of the city itself. Berlin had to remain an oasis of freedom from which, in many different ways, rays of hope reached out to East Germany and the other Russian satellites. It was a place that offered temporary asylum to the victims of repression and tyranny whose plight touched the conscience of mankind.

  Guttenberg was optimistic and suggested that in the face of the open Soviet threats the West must be ready to harden its stance politically and increase its strength militarily. Whether there would be enough time to hold on to all presently occupied positions remained to be seen. Guttenberg thought that Khrushchev had achieved two goals by challenging the West: the desired summit meeting with Eisenhower; and the de facto recognition of the status quo in Europe as it had emerged after the war.

  Against these notions Schnippenkotter advanced the analysis of the political section of the embassy. For him the Americans had few illusions about the meeting. There was nothing that suggested in any way a revision of existing policies. The first priority of the United States was national security. None of those in positions of authority expected a change in policy from anyone. The only positive thing about the visit was the expectation that such a meeting might contribute to improved mutual understanding and gain more respect for and from the other side. This analysis assumed that neither side was interested in developments that could lead to an irreparable loss of prestige. The dangers that such a meeting could open up were well understood. Schnippenkotter concluded that the true test of statesmanship is to remain watchful while at the same time trying to reduce tensions with the other side.

  Guttenberg then spoke about the impact of the Berlin Crisis on the West German public. He argued that the West Germans were quite aware that Berlin had become the playball of superpower interests on which Bonn could exert little influence. The tension between the power blocs was very complex in nature, and the media did not help by presenting the issue in an either simplified, distorted, or exaggerated manner. Many developments were being discussed in a sensationalist tone. Guttenberg agreed with us that the superpowers in their statements did not only play to the politicians on both sides but also tried to influence public opinion. For the citizens of West Germany this meant living daily with danger and the threat of war. One could label this passively as the Cold War or actively as psychological warfare. Living under such tensions and suspense is likely to wear you out. Politically, the permanent crisis over Berlin no longer engaged the average citizen on a daily basis. Therefore it was paramount to remind the German nation again and again of the importance of Berlin as a living symbol and to demand the reunification of the country.

  Guttenberg's credo: Only the reunification of a free Germany can ultimately solve the situation of Berlin. To keep up this demand is crucial for realistic reasons even if the Soviet Union refuses to talk about the issue. It is in the interest of the West to maintain Berlin's present status until a final solution is worked out. The East has announced its intention to change this status gradually in its favor. All negotiations have failed so far because the two standpoints are absolutely incompatible. The West must succeed in convincing the East that it will not be able to achieve its offensive goals. Only through such a step can we lay the foundation for real negotiations. Only then the Soviet Union will understand that a socalled interim solution would entail not a modification of Berlin's status but a major change.

  French President de Gaulle, whose past policies made him look anything but an "appeaser," reached conclusions in 1959 that still pass inspection some thirty years later:

  1. We must work for detente as before, put an end to all actions and speeches designed to provoke the other side, increase trade and cultural exchanges, and encourage tourist exchanges.

  2. We must continue to pursue balanced disarmament, especially with regard to strategic weapons, to alleviate the pressure on mankind and the temptation to bring about total destruction.

  3. East and West should cooperate in providing aid for the underdeveloped areas of the world as well as work together in the great projects of science and technology on whose results man's future depends.

  On September 15, 1959, Khrushchev arrives at Andrews Air Force Base for an eleven-day visit of the United States. Bright sunshine, strong security measures, and precautions. The crowds are curious but remain reserved. A few hesitant shouts of "welcome" only after the motorcade has passed. Eisenhower is seated in the car between the Khrushchevs. Khrushchev seems somber, serious. Mrs. Khrushchev is more the mother type, occasionally waving to the spectators. In his speech at the airport Khrushchev talks much about peace. He emphasizes Russia's leading role in the sciences and mentions the first rocket that has landed on the moon. "The weight of the moon has increased in comparison to the Earth." Those words likely contained a genuinely felt realization.

  How did Americans react to Khrushchev's visit? "The man who came to teach and not to learn." Khrushchev has completely misunderstood the western mentality. The West remains calm; Khrushchev shouts everything from the rooftops. The West desires moderate progress; "Khrushchev is going for the millennium." The West wishes to restrict the arms race; Khrushchev wants to sweep the entire problem aside with a kind of Christmas card pacifism. He does not like to discuss those things over which he has some control, such as mutual inspection of military facilities, Laos, Tibet, and so on. The things that no one can manage he wants to do at once. It is
truly astonishing that he wants to cooperate with the Americans on the moon but not on earth. He does not mince words when it comes to making his point of view clear. He is a symbol of his country, full of vitality, self-possessed, resolute, proud, eager to discuss matters. In the end he has done us all a favor by visiting the United States. He has drawn the line. Personal contacts are no substitute for policy. The visit has brought the Allies of the United States back to reality.

  On September 21, the talk between Khrushchev and U.S. labor union leaders ended with total disagreement. Walter Reuther, the leader of the United Automobile Workers, made it clear to Khrushchev that the unions oppose communism: "We do not believe in any form of dictatorship. We like our own system with its guaranteed freedoms." In the discussions Khrushchev came across as amiable as long as he talked about matters of little consequence. But he could become quite insulting when he insisted on being correct about details. For example, a discussion about self-determination had to be broken off because Khrushchev became too enraged. Reuther commented on his meetings:

  Mikoyan was easier to talk to because he was able to listen to the arguments of the other side and address them in a calm manner without giving up for a moment his communist convictions. With Khrushchev it was easy to exchange superficial platitudes; once you say something profound or provocative, he will become excited and insulting. A dangerous, emotional man.

  In August 1960 I had a meeting with a Mr. Hermsdorf of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He offered details about the U 2 planes and the shooting down of Gary Powers over the Soviet Union, which Khrushchev had exploited for propaganda purposes at the summit conference. This aircraft is made from wood and plastic, has long wings, no catapult seat, and no landing gear. It is difficult to be picked up by radar and carries eight different cameras whose combination of lenses can even detect camouflaged targets. The flights have been carried out for years but are dependent on favorable weather conditions. Other intelligence targets, particularly ports, are being investigated by one-man midget submarines. Both the flights and the submarine operations have brought casualties. I was surprised that the CIA admitted it had difficulties getting recruits for such missions. The American soldier has much patriotic motivation, but he is not the kamikaze type. The open admission that such flights have been undertaken for years and will be continued seems to suggest that U.S. policy has hardened again.

  Hermsdorf, the CIA man, has done much for the United States, especially in Central America. He also performed valuable services in connection with the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany by being very helpful to certain politicians at the time who have risen to influen tial positions today. He has been awarded the German Federal Order of Merit.

  f iermsdorf died in early November 1960 of cancer. Dr. Georg Federer, our Consul General in New York City, Erich Stratling of the German Embassy, and my wife and I were present at Hermsdorf's funeral. It was an impressive ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery, which is reserved for Americans who have earned the gratitude of their nation. It was a wet, foggy morning. After the memorial service in the chapel the coffin was draped in the American flag and drawn on a gun carriage to the gravesite. Two marines folded the flag according to an ancient ritual and handed it to Mrs. Hermsdorf. Barely visible through the fog, a bugler on a nearby hill played taps, a tune made famous by the film, From Here to Eternity. Finally, three salvoes were fired by a squad of marines. A very impressive, unforgettable moment of farewell.

  While the pressure on Berlin continued through 1961 and 1962-the East began to erect the Berlin Wall in August 1961 without much reaction from the West-the crisis over Cuba came to a head. One must interpret the Cuban Missile Crisis as a symbol of changing perceptions in the application of military force. Military power is as effective as always, but the aspects of its application have undergone a transformation. Clausewitz defined war as the "continuation of politics with the help of other means." For him, war amounted to the ultimate but also legitimate means of imposing a decision upon another state of the international system. Today all efforts on the part of the superpowers to enforce political decisions by military means have become questionable.

  This has been so for all practical purposes since the Korean War. General MacArthur was kept from practicing on the battlefield what he and generations of other military leaders before him had learned at their service academies, namely, to break the military power of the enemy by all means and to end the conflict as quickly as possible with minimal loss of life.

  The causes behind this change in the exercise of military power are easily understood:

  1. In contrast to earlier times, even a limited shift in power can have global repercussions (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran).

  2. In the nuclear age superior weapons guarantee neither the survival of the attacker nor that of the defender. A limitation and selection of appropriate means must be made by the political leadership.

  3. The international balance of power has changed. Instead of a balance between several powers we have today latent tensions between two dominant superpowers as well as the presence of a great number of emancipated young nations that exploit these tensions. They often in terpret the principles of international law in an arbitrary fashion. The lack of constraint among these new nations when it comes to the use of military force must be compensated for by circumspect and cautious behavior on the part of the superpowers.

  4. Social stratification, man himself, and his manipulation by the means of mass information and propaganda undergo constant transformations whose speed outpaces the ability of regulating institutions to adapt to this process.

  5. The fast pace of technological development has led in certain areas to doubts as to the objectives of innovation.

  To solve certain problems-for example, the test ban on nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space, or underneath the oceans-presupposed the application of new technological procedures in order to be able to verify and control compliance with treaties. All these societal and technological changes suggest that power can only be exercised in a responsible manner if it is proportional in scope to the challenge it seeks to meet. This means in particular:

  1. The variety of challenges must be matched by a broad spectrum of possible solutions within the range of political, economic, and military options; the most drastic solution of all being the forever incalculable risk of using nuclear weapons.

  2. Today's immense quantity and quality of military weapons, as well as the increased possibility of them being misused, requires careful political control over their application.

  3. The transformation in the exercise of military power leads on both sides to tacitly accepted attempts to limit the exercise of force by drawing political and military borderlines that are being recognized by both sides. First attempts at political limitation were the disengagement plans that would have created militarily weakened zones. So far they have remained mere plans. An example of military limitation is the idea of socalled sanctuaries, protected zones that are not absolutely safe from enemy action but are tacitly recognized by both sides on the basis of threats and counterthreats that create an uneasy balance. In the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, U.S. warships with the assistance of British and French units protected international sea-lanes against attacks by Iran. These vessels remained more or less unmolested because both sides recognized the advantages of such a sanctuary with all its implied limitations.

  4. One can say in the broadest sense that war as a means of solving differences between the great powers has lost much of its former significance and that force can only be applied in a limited way. Blaise Pascal once wrote: "Justice without power is helpless. Power without justice is tyranny. Therefore we must strive to harmonize power and justice with each other to make what is just strong and what is strong just."

  The Cuban Missile Crisis is an excellent case to demonstrate this shift in the exercise of power.

  I had an extended correspondence about the origins and course
of the Cuban Missile Crisis with Colonel Dr. Friedrich Beermann, who stayed on in Washington after I assumed my next assignment. I became a witness to the beginning of the crisis with a high level of information when I participated in the Amphibious Warfare Course for Senior Officers from September 10 until December 7, 1962, in San Diego. One must remember that after Castro's revolution and the transformation of the island into a socialist state, Cubans in exile had staged a liberation attempt in April 1961, the Bay of Pigs affair. This action had been funded by the Americans, had been planned by the CIA, and had been carried out with President Kennedy's consent. The operation failed largely because Kennedy refused to commit U.S. forces.

  In April 1962 the United States launched Exercise Landphibex off the coast of North Carolina and in the Caribbean. Some 40,000 marines took part along with the aircraft carrier Forrestal. The exercise culminated in a simulated amphibious landing on a U.S. island in the Caribbean. It was meant as a warning to Cuba and the Soviets. Cuba had become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and begun to expand its military potential well beyond any legitimate need for self-defense. The Americans monitored this build-up carefully. U 2 spy planes photographed the entire island from an altitude of some 60,000 feet. The planes carried the latest in photographic equipment. The pictures were so accurate and advanced in resolution that you could read on them the headlines of a newspaper.

  Early in 1962 it was learned that several thousand Soviet military advisors worked on the island, that MIG jets had been delivered to the Cuban air force, and that an air defense system was being installed with Soviet assistance. In the meantime, the Pentagon and the CIA discovered a so-called missile gap in the U.S. defenses. There had been a heated discussion about this subject during the most recent presidential election. The new President Kennedy was determined to close the missile gap as part of a nuclear expansion program. For months this subject made headlines in the American media.