The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander

by Erich Topp

  The CIA claimed to have evidence that the Soviets were likely to respond by installing medium-range missiles on Cuba because in their estimation there was no missile gap and the U.S. expansion program shifted the strategic balance to the advantage of the Americans. The U.S. government warned the Soviets in writing against such a step, which would trigger the gravest consequences. To beef up his warning Kennedy gained congressional approval to call up 150,000 military reservists if necessary-a limited military demonstration.

  By mid-October 1962, aerial photographs proved beyond doubt that Kennedy's warning had not been heeded. The Soviets had begun building launch sites on Cuba for medium-range missiles. The U.S. government reacted by forming a crisis management team and decreed that all crucial information and possible actions be kept strictly secret for the time being. In a meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Kennedy brought up the subject of medium-range missiles on Cuba and their possible consequences, but he left Gromyko in the dark as to the full extent of his information.

  The crisis management team worked out three alternative lines of action: aerial bombardments, an invasion, or a blockade. All preparations were carried out in such a way as to be likely to find the support of U.S. allies at a later point. The three alternatives led to appropriate military preparations. Squadrons of fighter-bombers and air defense units were transferred to Florida to carry out possible air strikes. For the invasion options, the U.S. Navy concentrated amphibious and fleet units in the Caribbean, ostensibly for an exercise that had been planned independently of the present crisis. And for the third alternative, a blockade, fleet units stood by in naval bases close to Cuba. In all three options one had to take into consideration that Khrushchev might overreact, perhaps even launch a preventive nuclear strike. To guard against this possibility strategic bombers were kept airborne around the clock and all other SAC units placed on fifteen-minute readiness alert.

  When Kennedy accepted the risk of a nuclear exchange, he said openly: "In their efforts to defend their vital interests, nuclear powers must avoid at all cost a situation in which the enemy has to choose between a humiliating retreat and nuclear war." By building up his chain of risks in a consistent manner to the point of threatening to use his nuclear arsenal, Kennedy not only reassured the uneasy peoples of Central and South America but above all gained credibility with the Soviets, as could be seen from some of Khrushchev's reactions.

  The political, military, and legal deliberations lasted only a few days. Then the government decided in favor of a blockade, which could be escalated depending on the response of the other side. Since a blockade constituted an act of war under international law, it was appropriately camouflaged as a "defensive quarantine." This nomenclature made it easier to gain the support of the Allies through diplomatic channels. The legal justification for the U.S. step was drawn from the charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), whose members come exclusively from the western hemisphere. Any involvement of the United Nations was deliberately shunned because it might have enabled the Soviets to adopt certain countermeasures in waters controlled by them. Kennedy's diplomatic finesse gained him the support of the OAS nations. In the last phase of the preparations, just before his feverishly awaited public announcement, Kennedy worked out all essential details, dispatched spe cial envoys to the various NATO member states, and briefed his cabinet and the Congress. One hour before his speech, Kennedy called in the Soviet ambassador.

  Given America's obsession with unlimited freedom of the press and the journalists' fierce competition for sensational stories, it is almost a miracle that such an important and extensive political, military, and diplomatic operation could be kept secret until the moment of Kennedy's speech. Some tricks along with the deliberate dissemination of misinformation created some confusion. In the end, when some of the details were beginning to seep through, a patriotic appeal to the leading publishers achieved the intended result. That, too, should not remain unmentioned.

  Simultaneous with his step to announce his decision to the public, Kennedy undertook additional measures. Dean Acheson informed the European NATO countries and had personal visits with President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer. The United States introduced a resolution in the Security Council of the United Nations to ban the further construction of Soviet missile bases on Cuba and to have the already installed facilities removed. Likewise, the leadership of the OAS approved the measures of the U.S. government. The U.S. ambassadors to Guinea and Senegal in Africa intervened in those countries in order to revoke Moscow's landing rights there for flights to Cuba. All these measures worked so well that the Soviets found themselves faced by a united front. In order not to humiliate Khrushchev, Kennedy offered at the same time to cooperate with the Soviets once the crisis had been cleared up.

  A retrospective analysis of the crisis reveals a number of miscalculations as well. We know today that there was no missile gap when Kennedy took over. The accelerated nuclear expansion program was also based on a misinterpretation. The Soviets underestimated the U.S. resolve not to tolerate nuclear weapons in Cuba under any circumstances. But these mutual miscalculations led to measures and countermeasures in the political, military, and diplomatic arena that were in line with the respective challenges. The "quarantine" with its limited time frame and geographical coverage and with its selected use of military force gave the Soviets time to sort out their options and possible consequences.

  But above all was the realization that in pursuit of one's country's vital interests one should never place the enemy in the dilemma of having to choose between humiliation and full-scale war. The conflict could be localized by limiting the means of military force and by taking advantage of political and diplomatic options. International solidarity prevented the export of the conflict to other regions. There was no new crisis over Berlin; the U.S. missile bases in Turkey were not attacked. The confrontation of the two highly armed nuclear powers was restricted to the use of conventional forces in pursuit of their respective political objectives.

  The Cuban Missile Crisis also demonstrated the importance of sea power, again under the perspective of the changed application of military force in modern times. The strategy of the free world is intimately linked to the problem of being able to move without restriction across the oceans and through the air. Naval superiority in the Atlantic is as crucial as our control of the air space above it. The Atlantic Ocean is and will remain the core of our western alliance.

  In both World Wars the Atlantic and its peripheral waters played an important role. NATO could not function, indeed could never have come about, without the option of reinforcing and resupplying military forces in Europe, of building and securing bases overseas, of being able to freely exchange raw materials and manufactured goods. In southeastern Europe, Greece and Turkey could never have been joined to the alliance without the reassurance that other NATO countries controlled the Mediterranean and rendered it a safe supply route. The same applies to Norway and Denmark in northern Europe. Their future, along with that of Germany and England, would be seriously threatened if the Allied navies could not control and defend the North Sea and the North Atlantic. To secure the freedom of the seas is a vital necessity if the free world wants to reach its national and international goals. To gain and to maintain supremacy at sea is a precondition for survival in case of a major conflict.

  The Cuban Missile Crisis underscored the role of sea power in the context of a dangerous struggle between the two nuclear powers. The use of U.S., British, and French fleet units during the Iran-Iraq War assured the flow of oil to the western world. In the future the members of NATO will have to rely on sea power just as they have in the past. A true partnership between North America and Western Europe requires that the vital sea lanes of the Atlantic remain open under all circumstances.

  In October 1961 our time in Washington came to an end. Ambassador Grewe thanked me for my work and saw our departure as a human loss. "Toujours on perd, toujours on gagne. " Dr. Hans-G
eorg Wieck of the embassy's political section, with whom we had closely collaborated, gave us a farewell dinner. Later I saw him again in Bonn in the planning division of the Ministry of Defense. As our ambassador to NATO and as head of the Federal Intelligence Service he would become known to the public.

  Our last evening in Washington, somewhat improvised, was spent at the Stratlings, their other guests being Seymour Bolten from the CIA, Jim O'Donnel from the State Department, Dr. Dalma of the Munchener Merkur, and the Bavarian State Secretary Franz Heubl. Bolten argued that the Germans must try to understand the U.S. situation with its unique political legacies and inevitabilities. On the other hand, the Americans should make a greater effort to understand that the Germans are one people divided by the Iron Curtain. We Germans should trust the Americans. They are communism's natural enemy and consequently our natural ally. To act in panic betrays defects in political leadership. Such actions bring back old notions of Germany playing one side out against the other, as at Rapallo, and lead to instability. In both nations subgroups exist with strong prejudices. Only strong political leadership based on a realistic assessment of the world situation can reduce these prejudices over time.

  Since then there have been several times of tension between the United States and the Federal Republic. They prove how little people have learned from the past and how futile our efforts have been in changing the old misconceptions.

  On November 18, all our friends are there to see us off. They even sing "Muss i denn zum Stddtele hinaus" for us. Then we take the train, parlor class, to Stamford, and from there on to Darien to say goodbye to our now "American" daughter Ingrid. Two more days with the Walters in Upper Montclair.

  Professor Helmuth Walter is one of the great men of German science. I knew him from World War II when he had designed and built the motors for the Vl and V2 rockets as well as the so-called Walter propulsion system for U-boats. A man of true genius, he had been cashiered by the British after the war and eventually ended up in the United States. I met him again for the first time in Washington when we were both guests of the German naval attache. At the time Walter worked for the Worthington Corporation in New Jersey. From that point on we renewed our friendship through visits and correspondence even after I had gone back to Germany. I sat on the board of directors of his firm in Kiel, which Walter had built up from scratch after the war. He constructed a stationary prototype of his Walter propulsion engine for the Federal Defense Ministry. Unfortunately the Navy decided against using this system, which is independent of external air intake, when it built its new generation of U-boats.

  One of the two remaining evenings we spent at the Metropolitan Opera. They performed Tosca, an unforgettable experience. The last evening we decided to go to the Apollo Theater in Harlem. Our friend Conny Beckmann had recommended the place and spoken enthusiastically about the velvet-skinned, brown Negro women who danced at that theater. We took a taxi to get there. The driver spoke German. He had visited Germany and fallen in love with it. His brother, a dentist, had married a German. When my wife asked him whether he, too, would like to marry a German girl, he replied that as a cab driver his chances would be fairly slim.

  Inside the Apollo Theater we were the only whites. Everyone else was black. The presentations, the audience-everything reflected the black mentality, and that at a noise level ten times higher than what our ears were used to. Wild movements and gestures, and outcries that made us fear for our lives. During one of the wildest scenes we spied Professor Walter at the lighted entrance. Relieved, we allowed him to escort us out of the room. Mrs. Walter only shook her head and said they and their friends would never have even thought of entering this witches' cauldron. Well, in those days it was still possible; nowadays you would risk your life.

  On November 21 we left New York for Europe under bright, sunny skies. Shortly before our departure I wrote to a friend of mine:

  I find it wrong to blame the Americans whenever the slightest thing goes wrong for the West. They are and have been our most faithful allies and have done much for us in the past. 1 must think of the Berlin Air Lift of 1948, of our high standard of living, and not least of the fact that during the recent crisis over Berlin the Americans were the only ones to respond with an effective military build-up in order to improve their negotiating position vis-A-vis the Russians.

  On both sides one encounters people who are interested in undermining the good relations between the United States and Germany. Again and again they fire ideological broadsides against U.S. capitalism, against interventionism, and against the American economic system even though it has created a gross national product greater than that of West Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union combined. After living in the United States for four years, I am prepared to say that "intellectual" anti-Americanism, although dangerous, has so far not succeeded in threatening the Atlantic Alliance. I hope this bridge across the Atlantic will continue to withstand such quarrels in the future.

  Chief of Staff, Fleet Command, October 1963 to October 1965

  The Fleet Commander was Vice Admiral Heinrich Gerlach, an extraordinarily sensitive, almost nervous man of high intelligence. Thanks to his unconventional measures, especially in matters of personnel and training schedules, we were able to get the modernization of the fleet under way. In our view combat conditions had undergone such changes that the Navy would find it difficult or be altogether unable to fulfill its mission with traditional means, particularly in view of the enemy's numerical superiority. Until well into World War tI the human eye had been the most important and often the only sensor aboard a vessel to spot the enemy. Twenty years later modern devices like radar, sonar, active and passive sensors, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and infrared supply such a wealth of data that the human brain is not equipped to process it reliably and satisfactorily in the short period of time before a decision must be made.

  Our first basic problem therefore required that we master this massive flow of information to gain a picture of the tactical situation and to assess it accordingly. The second basic problem was how to respond to fast modern missiles of considerable range that gave us only a brief time to initiate countermeasures. The answer to these changed conditions on the battlefield lay in the introduction of electronic data processing. It would support and accelerate the following aspects of military leadership: situation analysis; situation assessment; decision making; and command and control. While it was relatively easy to improve the data processing capacity and response time of individual vessels, the next step had to be to expand these capabilities at the level of the entire combat force in order to enable the force commander to meet his leadership responsibilities properly.

  The Link 11 System connected individual fleet units through automatic data exchange and created a complete picture of the local situation, thus making its assessment easier. In addition the system allowed for the immediate transmission of command decisions with regard to fire control and target selection. It became the basis for a quick, coordinated, and economical response by the combat units in question. In order to meet the three demands of improved data processing capability, reduced response time, and automatic data linkage, we created the shipboard systems SATIR for our guided missile destroyers; AGIS for the PT boats of the 143 class; and PALIS for the PT boats of the 148 class as well as for the Hainburg class destroyers.

  To integrate the Fleet Command into the system and to allow for the coordination of measures at the highest level, the Fleet Headquarters had to be tied into the process. Its coordinating and command function required direct linkage to various other echelons such as air defense, the coastal radar organization, Telecommunications Unit 70, the Navy's logistics control center, the various NATO commands, the naval air force, and other fleet units. Above all it was crucial to provide the political leadership without delay with a picture of the situation, something that is especially crucial in times of international tensions and also in the exercise of maritime control measures.

  Next to th
ese basic challenges I found it important to imbue my staff with a better esprit de corps. One vehicle was to hold regular briefings, conferences, and talks with the officers, meetings that were also open to the civilian officials on our staff. My main goal was to avoid an atmosphere of "splendid isolation" in which nothing but the Navy mattered. Instead, I wanted the political and social questions of our days to be included in our deliberations.

  For example, the assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944, with its problems relating to obedience, duty, and conscience, was one of the subjects we discussed in our meetings. I believe that this day cannot be compared to other national memorial days such as those that commemorate the founding of the Second Reich, the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, the Battle of Jutland-all days that in the past provided outlets for patriotic fervor. July 20 is a very different day for us. It is a day for contemplation, a day for painful memories; a kind of national day of mourning that stands for difficult and dark times, for times of shame and humiliation; a day that brought a ray of hope and today allows us to breathe a little easier.

  July 20 also reminds us of the long chain of failed revolutions in the past century of German history. If for 200 years now the history of France is being marked by a series of generally successful and progressive revolutions, German history over this span shows a long chain of abortive or at the very least unfortunate revolutions: 1848; 1918; 1933; July 20, 1944; and June 17, 1953. So far only the peaceful "November Revolution" of 1989 has set a different tone.