The Valkyrie Option

by Markus Reichardt

  The second change is the omission of a phone call made by General Fellgiebel at the Wolfsschanze just as Stauffenberg was arming the bomb. Fellgiebel made the call for no other purpose but to reassure himself and calm his nerves. But the call and its timing were absolutely crucial in the failure of the Bomb plot. Fellgiebel's call caused one of Keitel's aides to disturb Stauffenberg and von Haeften much earlier. Thus in history they not only did not arm the second explosive device but also failed to keep in in the briefcase with the armed bomb, thus preventing it from being triggered by the primary explosion and thus adding its strength to the carnage. All historians and analysts who have studied the 20th of July agree that this omission more than anything else caused the failure of the assassination attempt. The flimsy barracks in which the meeting was held on that fateful morning of July 20, 1944 has often been blamed for being too insubstantial to allow the force of the explosion to kill Hitler. That is not entirely true. The heavy oak table on which the Führer was resting at the moment of the explosion contributed as much to his survival as the dissipation of the explosion. However, had the second bomb gone off, there is no doubt that even in so flimsy a structure Hitler would have been killed by the sheer force of the explosion. This would not necessarily have been an instant death but the probability that internal injuries would have killed him within the day is virtually 100%.

  In all instances I have tried to give preference to their actual behaviour rather than fit a small change of personality into the plot to speed it along. Thus many of the ststements made are real, just shifted in time. I therefore would argue that the two small changes that I introduced to change the timeline are plausible. There are no inevitable paths of history heading towards pre-determined outcomes as postulated by some crackpot, but high-impact political scientists and demagogues. Neither of the two changes would have required significant interventions to come about. And yet the resultant changes could have been fundamental. The point is that there was no inevitability about either of these two small events and yet the outcome was far-reaching.

  Sources used:

  Throughout the novel I have sought to rely on biographies and autobiographies of the main characters. Once one has taken history off its original path one should try and stay within the realms of the probable, i.e. seek to have the various players react as they would most likely have reacted based on our historical knowledge of their actions and character. For those interested I have assembled a list of the key sources in an array of languages which I consulted in the writing of this book as well as some commentary that explains why I have preferred one interpretation over another.

  The central figure is, of course, Claus von Stauffenberg and the main biographies are Peter Hoffmann‘s Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg und seine Brüder [114] as well as Wolfgang Venohr Stauffenberg - Symbol des Widerstands ; Eine politische Biographie [115] These biographies are complemented by Konstanze von Schulthess, Claus von Stauffenberg’s youngest daughter who wrote a very personal account of her mother‘s life. Few books possess the power to communicate the important role of wives in the Third Reich and in particular the wives of the men of the Widerstand. The quiet support of these partners in what often were very enlightened, modern relationships was critical to the moral fibre of many of these men.[116] The work of Dorthee von Meding Mit dem Mut des Herzens: Die Frauen des 20 Juli which covers many the fates of many of the wives of other members of the Widerstand is the standard reference work for this.[117]

  The really interesting aspect of Stauffenberg’s biographies in german as well as english literature is the persistence of often poorly argued attempts to portray him and many of his fellow conspirators as true democrats or to find another manner in which to seperate his ideological and worldview from the militaristic values so prevalent in Germany at the time. A detailed reading of the sources available, in my view demonstrates that Stauffenberg was neither a democrat nor a progressive, but someone who grew up in a conservative public-service orientated household with deep historical traditions connected to Prussian military traditions in which soldiers were servants of the state and the nation. Beyond this the strong influence which the nationalist poet Stefan George exerted on him and his brothers should signal the sceptical view of any egalitarian worldview among the family. On also has to bear in mind that Claus was the first in his family to opt for a military career and who is recorded as having a pretty low view of some nations, notably the Poles in September 1939. Initially his reaction to Hitler’s rise to power was positive because Hitler promised a strong and proud Germany. Bearing in mind that his mentor, Stefan Georg ideoloised the man of action who made realistic choices in the interest of his people, the alliance with the Poles in Warsaw which takes place in this novel may, despite Claus initial low opinion of the Poles, not be beyond the realm of the possible. In the end, i believe Claus would have acted pragmitically at every stage of events in order to preserve his people and country. It was this pragmatism and desire for decisive action which drove this crippled officer to do what other, uninjured officers with better opportunities failed to do. Aside of the loyal adjudant, Werner von Haeften and his wife, Stauffenberg ultimately acted alone.

  To understand the sequence of events in Berlin and in the Wolfsschanze on the 20th of July 1944, the works by Peter Hoffmann and Joachim Fest are indespensible.[118] For context a brief overview over the various attempts on Hitler’s life can be found in Will Berthold Die 42 Attentate auf Adolf Hitler [119] Joachim Fest’s Staatstreich provides the best introduction to the key personalities of the 20th of July[120] and provides some indication what role personalities such as von Witzleben could have played after a successful coup. In addition biographies of Carl Goerdeler, Adam von Trott, Helmuth von Molkte and Julius Leber are critical to understand how a post-Hitler German Government might have functioned.[121] For the greater ideological visions (or phantasies) of the intellectuals among the resistance (such as the Kreisau Circle), Hans Mommsen is the key source.[122]

  To understand the troubled relationship between the German anti-Hitler resistance and the western allies between 1933 and 1945 Klemens von Klemperer and Patricia Meehan are important.[123] Both show clearly the many missed opportunities arising from the British attitude towards the Widerstand even before the war.

  The biographies of the key men of the 3rd Reich who could have influenced events on July 20th have shown me that none of them – Himmler, Göring, Kaltenbrunner, Dönitz or Borman - would, after the death of Hitler had the nerve or power to use the ‘Führerprinzip‘ by which divided and ruled the Reich.[124] The memoirs of SS-General and Head of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Walter Schellenberg, are a self-serving source best treated with cautioun even though they, are apart from Goebbels controversial diaries, the only primary source from one of the 10 most powerful men in Germany at the time.[125]Written immediately after the war when Schellenberg was dying, one wonders how much self-justification and showmanship influenced his recollections.

  Peter Padfield’s biograpy of Himmler makes a credible case for the argument that the pathetic creature who played out his fantasies as Reichsführer SS, feared defeat from at least late 1943 but made no credible attempts to influence events.[126] I doubt he would have had the strength of character to act decisively once Hitler had died. That would have created an opportunity for a stronger person like Schellenberg as I set out in the novel. .

  So much has been written about Rommel that recently a book entitled Mythos Rommel (the Rommel mythology) was published.[127] One of the very few German war leaders lionised by friend and foe alike, Rommel often comes accros as larger than life in many of the biodgraphies. This is unfortunate as in my view Rommel, was not only a good self-promoter, but also a brave, decisive opportunist. Key to his success was his decisiveness, his ability to inspire and to think out of the box, rather than any grand strategy. Apart from the Mythos Rommel book, the best biographies of the desert Fox have been written by english authors.[128] Rommel’s limitations would have revea
led themselves on the Eastern Front had he been posted there as I set out in the book.

  Compared to Rommel, key Waffen-SS leaders such as Dietrich and Panzermeyer were recognized as good soldiers but of course are more controversial. Because of that their biographies most probably could only be written by a non-German.[129] While there is no doubt that both were Nazis of the first hour, Dietrich in particular appears to have become more thoughtful based upon his observations of Hitler in later years. The discussion with Rommel in the opening chapter took place exactly as described. And Rommel was right, the Waffen-SS alone could have plunged the post-Hitler Germany into a civil war, Dietrich would have been key to preventing that.

  Mommsen’s work shows that Speer was indeed intended as the armaments minister of the post-Hitler government but this was a matter of pragmatism and not without its critics within the movement. The conspirators simply acknoedlged that this was not an area where one could change horse in mid-stride, and should in now way be interpreted as a signal that Speer was a moderate. Afetr the war Speer devoted his life to repairing/managing his image desperate to conveay the image of a non-ideological technocrat that does not correspond to the supporting documentation. We also know that he did visit a Konzentrationcamp and had a fairly good idea of what was happening there.[130] To understand the men who kept Speer“s war production going almost to the end, the biographie of Hans Kehrl is one of the most intersting sources, especially when considering the short-term possibilities that a re-organised weapons manufacturing sector could have generated.[131] Kehrl was a fan of Henry Ford’s massproductions methods and most probably would have accomplished great things if given free reign on the matter. Overall the best work on the German war economy, which occassionally tends to drown the reader in detail, is Adam Tooze The Wages of Destruction. , but Overy is also very useful. [132]

  As the most succesful tank commander in the world, Michael Wittman’s biographie also sometimes drowns the reader in technical and often unsubstantiated situational detail.[133] While his biographer clearly ideolises Wittman, he nevertheless manages to potray a credible image of a pragmatic and most probably non-ideological man. This is the image I have used. Regarding the actions of the Josef Kammhuber, General of the German nightfighters which lead to the ventual dismissal of Air marshall Harris, Max Hastings seminal Bomber Command shows that Kammhuber was straining at the leash to do just what the novel describes.[134]

  .

  Operation Bernard, in which the SS used konzentrationcamp inmates to forge allied currencies is real but the use of the forged money on a scale indicated in this novel never took place.[135] In contrast the massive scale of technology theft planned and executed by the western allies as described here, was indeed carried out and Georg, in his Unternehmen Patentraub , makes a credible claim for this theft to have been at the heart of America“s post-war technological advances and subsequent economic dominance.[136]

  The Italians had by 1944 been reduced to the role of on-lookers. This situation is of significance for the novel, as the confusion of the Wehrmacht’s withdrawal northwar plays a role in getting the British entangled in the resurgent nationalist politics of the Balkans in a manner that almost forces their divergence from the Americans. For an overview of the players and events see Hibbert and Deakin.[137]

  On the British side, the towering figure of the great Prime Minister and self-promoter Winston Churchill overshadows many others. There is no doubt that Churchill was crucial to Britain’s sustained war effort, especially in 1940. However, he may not have been quite as crucial as he would like to portray himslf as Corrigan has suggested in Blood, Sweat and Arrogance.[138] Martin Gilbert's 8000 page long biographie is not the best place to seek to understand this complex individual because Gilbert level of detail loses all but the most determined reader. Also Gilbert, I think lost critical distance to the subject along the way. In possible recognition of this he wrote, In Search of Churchill[139] which I believe is a much better way to understand the personality. Other sources which also provide excellent insights into Churchill’s personality and work are Walter H Thompson’s autobiography Churchill’s Bodyguard [140] as well as Roy Jenkins‘ Churchill which is more accessible because it is more compact.[141] Churchill’s efforts to rewrite his role in history have more recently also been attacked by authors accessing previuously closed archives in the 1990s such as John Charmley.[142] Another more sympathetic perspective is offered in the biography of Alanbrooke, as well as his technical advisor and a collection of chapters covering his relationships with the various theater commanders. [143] It is frequently the case that the true measure of greatness can only be gauged from the impressions of those who worked form the great man. Someone who was overshadowed till the end was Anthony Eden who has been treated rather well by biographers, possibly because of his long-standing loyalty to Churchill.[144]

  Nigel Hamilton’s massive 3-volume biography of Monty also suffers from lack of critical distance to the topic. As Monty, like Churchill, spent much of the post-war era polishing his image, his memoirs are of limited value. By contrast Alister Horne and David Montgomery's The Lonely Leader - Monty 1944-45 [145] seems to me the best source to understand this introvert, socially awkward professional soldier. Montgomery did not necessarily have the best relationship with his son, but afetr the death of his wife, none was able to reach him on a human level as David was. The book paints the picture of a sensitive individual, emotionally stunted by his loveless youth and who entire ambition was to excel in his profession. Here, rather than in hamilton, we find many indications of the ultimate humanity of this great British soldier. His ambition and social awkwardness also lie at the heart of his problems with Eisenhower as Norman Gelb has shown so clearly.[146] Considering the self-aggrandizing nature of Monty’s memoirs, Gelb view that Monty is primarily to blame for this bad relationship makes sense. [147] Similar ex-post facto twisting of facts for personal image improvement can be found in the Bomber Harris book on his life’s work, which some would call a war crime. [148]

  A key issue driving the british response to the new German government in this novel is the increasingly critical manpower situation in mid-1944. Just as Staufffenberg tried to kill Hitler, the British manpwer situation reached the point where in irretrievably fell behind the Americans, never to recover. Alanbrooke and Monty saw this very clearly, as did Churchill. Britain’s foremost military historian, Max Hastings, has set out the details of the situation in his book Overlord, and I believe it would have been a central consideration for the allies in accepting Rommel’s game of a peaceful withdrawal.[149]

  Eisenhower is a controversial figure and I have tended to skirt around the more adoring biographies (e.g. Ambrose) due to his open hatred against the German people (something he seemed to share with his President). The argument put forward by James Bacque, that Eisenhower willfully let thousands of German POWs starve is hard to ignore.[150] Irrespective of the morality of his actions, there is agreement that Ike’s political skills outpaced his military ones considerably. A short, but unusually insightful study of the man can be found in Shavelson, as well as in David Eisenhower.[151] Goodwin’s potrayal of the US home front complements this while also being possibly the best source on life in the White House during the war. [152]

  I found it equally difficult to remain neutral towards FDR who in his insistence on unconditional surrender prolonged the war. His primitive hate of the Germans based on fragmentary impressions of a visit a generation before the war repeatedly altered allied startegy to their disadvantage. The naive faith in the Russians and the ability of the United Nations to tame them is a pre-cursor of the 2000s neo-con belief that they alone understood how the world worked. Gratefully the distance has allowed the development of a revisionist view which as exemplified by Thomas Fleming, which have beguin to unpick some of the crassest myths around FDR. [153] Fleming is particularly good at showiung hoew frustrated New Dealers were at the forefront of turning the war into an ideological conflict for the f
uture of the planet. The social engineering espoused by the more extreme New Dealers around FDR was social engineering of the worst kindand it prolonged the war causing thousands of unnecessary deaths. In part due to this I have spared myself many of the hagiographies of FDR. His blind hate against Germans was crippling for the Widerstand and led to millions of eastern Europeans being subjected to soviet overloardship for half a century.[154]

  I have changed little about the 1944 election except to high-light the close links between big business and all political parties at a time when American business still traded with the enemy. The intervention on the part of the Catholic Church is made up. [155]

  It could be argued that I have potrayed Roosevelt unnecessarily indecisive, but authors such as Larabee and Persico[156] have shown that Roosevelt’s style was always to decide after thoroughly sounding out sentiment around him. At the same time FDR loved to ensure that only he had access to all relevant information. Whenever he lacked this unique overview, the president chose to wait. In particular Persico, the authority on US spy services during that time, builds a credible argument taht Roosevelt only appeared decisve because he had numerous information servives taht worked only for him. Based upon this unique knowledge he was more comfortable with decisions. Roosevelt’s antipathy against Germans would have blindsided him towards the opportunities created by Stauffenberg if he had succeeded. This would have given the Germans a key advantage in those first few days as set out in this novel.