The Valkyrie Option

by Markus Reichardt

  Just how much Roosevelt conducted a one-man foreign policy can be seen in Gellman, Ferrel and Moskin.[157] As sources for the drifting apart of post-war aims between the British and Americans, I relied on Fenby, Cook, Beschloss, Mastny, Lowenstein et al., and Ruskin.[158]

  For insights into the people around FDR, Larabee is an excellent source together with the memoirs of the most reactionary member of the President’s inner circlke - Admiral Leahy.[159] As Sherwood shows, other than Leahy only Harry Hopkins enjoyed FDR’s trust and by mid 1944 Hopkins was dying.[160]

  Insights into the lives of US commanders are found in larabee as the autobiography of the most competent, quiet Generla Bradley.[161] The more colourful patton has been covered by Martin Blumenson's Patton.[162] As Editor of Patton’s papers, Blumenson is one of a rare breed of biographers who manage to combine deep mastery of detail with the creation of an accessible biography. More detailed and slightly less accessible are Carlo D’Este and Ladislas Farago.[163]

  For insights into the lives of US soldiers in 1944 I relied heavily on Ambrose, Miller, Mason and in particular the meticolous autobiography of Al Irzyk.[164] The Al Irzyk of the novel is based on the real person. Who as a tank commander of the 4th Armoured Division experienced patton’s command of the 3rd Army as it stormed through France.

  The Warsaw Uprising has created a large literature, in part because everything that remained in Poland was destroyed by the Nazis after they suppressed the revolt. As a result everthing had to recorded anew for future generations. Too much of this is first-hand and partisan. For the ego-political context, Mastny remains the best source.[165] Details concerning the airlift to Warsaw and the way Stalin sabotaged it can be found in Orpen and Davies.[166] For information on the Polish pilots who return to Warsaw, I have relied on Lynne Olson & Stanley Cloud For your Freedom and Ours: The Kosciuszko Squadron[167] which is a masterful introduction into the role the Poles played in keeping the British war effort alive before 1942. The point taht they were fighting in British uniforms and units but not ultimately as British soldiers, is true as set out in the encounter between Premioer Mick and Eden.

  To ‘understand‘ French politics for the period, I have relied on Anthony Beevor and Artemis Cooper.[168] The crippling effect of the poor relationship General De Gaulle had with the allied command has been set out by Simon Berthon in his Allies at War[169] .

  Until recently insight into Russian/Soviet perspectives were constrained by the Cold War. That has now changed and the books by Axel, Shukman and Werth are indespensible, in particular Albert Axel Stalin's War through the Eyes of his Commanders und Russia’s Heroes 1941-45.[170] Some may argue that I have potrayed Stalin and Beria too unidimensional . However other than more gory, murderous details, nothing has come to light as a result of the new scholarship by Volkogonov, Montefiore, Ryfield und Medvedev that changes my view of these individuals as mass murderers and psychopaths.[171] Information concerning the Soviet nuclear project can be found in Holloway Stalin and the Bomb.[172] Recent publications that give an insight into the daily lives of Russian soldiers are apart from Werth, the autobiographies of Abdulin und Bessonov.[173] Both have served as role models for the ruissian soldiers and units in this novel.

  An overview over Balkan politics can be found in Glenny[174], while Mazower remains the best source on German-occupied Greece and the years that followed.[175] Mazower’s great strength lies in his ability to access sources from a range of languages, alllowing him inter alia to show taht it was indeed Stalin’s choice whether to take Greece or not in late 1944 (p.353). In historical reality Stalin chos to avoid setting a precedent which could give the western allies an opening to intervene his takeover of Ruomania, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia and Poland. Should Sdtalin have lost faith in the western allies as might have happened as a result of the British approach to the Warsaw Uprising in this novel, taking Greece would have been easy for him.

  Finally, it is important to get a general impression of the 1944/45 context and two books are essential reading for this: Barry Turner Countdown to Victory: Soldiers and Civilians tell the Story of the Final Battles for Europe 1944-5, and Max Hastings ARMGEDDON: The Battle for Germany 1944-45.[176] Both studies highlight that the view of modern-day history books which tend to view 1945 as the last cleaning-up act of an already decided war is a fallacy. Neither FDR nor many of the western commanders were confident that after driving the Wehrmacht out of France and the failed Ardennen offensive the conquest of Germany was a pre-ordained, predictable process. On the contrary, 1945 saw some of the hardest, bloodiest fighting on the part of the Wehrmacht despite the clarity of defeat. Turner cites Roosevelt as being unwilling in early 1945 to commit to being able to end the war that year. While in retrospect things may seem inevitable, it has been the objective of this novel to show that this is not the case.

  * * *

  [1] Michael Reynolds Steel Inferno - 1st SS Panzerkorps in Normandy Spellmount Publishers ; Staplehurst ; 1997 p.196.

  [2]. Sepp Dietrich in a report to Rommel, June 14th, Max Hastings Overlord p.174.

  [3]. cited Heinz Hoehne The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS Penguin Books ; London ; 2000 p. 530. Hoehne goes on to stress that the entire ‘unity of purpose’ between Rommel and the Waffen SS commanders in the West rested on the assumption that Hitler would not be killed but arrested and tried. He does however not present substantive evidence for this and this is therefore disregarded as a factor. Although Rommel was known to favour arresting and trying Hitler, and it is likely that Dietrich would also have preferred that option, it does not appear credible that this would have been the formal basis for a deal. Hausser and Bittrich most probably were too far gone in their antagonism towards Hitler’s military failure to care. This certainly can be assumed to have been Dietrich’s position.

  [4] M P Remy Mythos Rommel p.285

  [5]5 For the series of Rommel's meetings with Hitler in June 1944 see Hastings, Overlord, pp.174-175.

  [6]. As recounted by both Lang and Panzer Meyer after the war. C Messenger Hitler's Gladiator p.132.

  [7]. Remy p. 286

  [8] The phrase used during his discussions with his son Manfred during convalescence from the air attack of 17/07/1944. quoted in L Hart (ed.) The Rommel Papers p.486.

  [9]. The Lonely Leader for info on Monty HQ arrangement pp.129/130

  [10] figures from Montgomery Memoirs p.258

  [11].Hastings, Overlord, p. 23, p.48., p.221 , p.231.

  [12]. M Baigent & R Leigh Secret Germany: Claus von Stauffenberg and the Mystical Crusade Against Hitler ; Jonathan Cape ; London ; 1994 ; pp.34/5.

  [13].M Baigent & R Leigh Secret Germany: Claus von Stauffenberg and the Mystical Crusade Against Hitler ; Jonathan Cape ; London ; 1994 ; pp.34/5.

  [14] ibid p.42

  [15]. In history Fellgiebel tried to reach Stauffenberg telephonically before Stief could get to him. His phone call went to Keitel's aide who immediately sent an NCO Sergeant Vogel to collect Stauffenberg. Vogel called out before opening the door but obviously interrupted von Haeften and the Colonelas they were arming the bombs. It seems that they had just completed the first one. But Vogel's interruption and continued presence in the doorway proved decisive. In view of his presence neither von Haeften nor Stauffenberg had the presence of mind to simply slip the second device in with the armed bomb. There is no doubt that the detonation of the first would have set off the second. This would have produced an explosion powerful enough to kill most of the men in the briefing room. Some have claimed that Stauffenberg simply did not take the second device along for fear of carrying a noticeably heavy briefcase, but in view of von Haeften's carrying around of the briefcase containing both bombs all morning, this does not hold water. Under Vogel's gaze the two conspirators shoved papers on top of the bomb and walked out; each carrying a briefcase with a single bomb inside. Later on their way out von Haeften tossed the unused bomb from the moving car. Had Fellgiebel not called there would have been two bombs in Stau
ffenberg's briefcase capable of producing an explosion fatal to most occupants of the briefing room. Fest (1997) p.258-259.

  [16]. Guderian may have become disillusioned with Hitler but he never was a recognized member of any part of the Widerstand, instead choosing to serve the Third Reich to its bitter end.

  [17] Peter Padfield Himmler - Reichsführer SS Cassell & Co ; London ; 2001 ; pp.490-491. Although much of it is speculation, Padfield has built a convincing circumstantial case for the argument that Heinrich Himmler knew about Stauffenberg's motives and that he saw the Colonel's role as one which would allow him to take advantage of events no matter how they unfolded. Heinrich Himmler was nothing if not an opportunist and a schemer. It would have been this opportunism that would have guided his response to events of July 20th and which in the final analysis would have made him less of an opponent once the mesmerizing power of his master had been removed by the bomb.

  [18]. A Bullock Hitler A Study in Tyranny Penguin Books ; Harmondsworth ; rev. ed. 1962. pp. 740-743

  [19] A Bullock Hitler A Study in Tyranny Penguin Books ; Harmondsworth ; rev. ed. 1962. pp. 740-743

  [20]. Baigent & Leigh pp. 46-47. / It is often asserted (e.g. Berthold pp.225-7) ,that Stauffenberg placed the briefcase in such a way that there was nothing between it and Adolf Hitler and that only the subsequent action by Colonel Brandt who needed legroom in order to lean over the table caused it to be on the other side of the tables solid table slab where 10 centimetres of solid oak table top protected the Führer. Hoffman (1992), finds no evidence that would support this actually took place. It has also never clearly been explained how pushing a briefcase to another side of a supporting slab would enable a person to lean further over the tabletop. Since Colonel Brandt was among the casualties there is no way of deciding the matter. However none of the SS official investigations indicates this course of events. Eyewitnesses unanimously place Stauffenberg about two meters from the Führer who loved his personal space. I find it therefore more than likely that this 'move of the briefcase' was invented to explain the failure of the bomb to kill Hitler to the laymen who would not instinctively understand that a flimsy structure like the Lagebarracke of that day would have allowed the blast of a single bomb to dissipate quite harmlessly

  [21]. This section partially based on David Irving Hitler's War 1942-1945 Papermac ; London ; 1983 pp.662-663.

  [22].This section based on David Irving öring - A Biography MacMillan ; London ; 1989 p.430.

  [23].Joachim Fest Staatsstreich Goldman Verlag 1997 ; p.267.

  [24].Padfield Himmler Cassell & Co ; London ; 1990 p.491

  [25] Padfield Himmler p.501

  [26]

  [27] Barry Turner Countdown to Victory: Soldiers and Civilians tell the story of the final battles for Europe 1944-5 Hodder & Stoughton ; London ; 2004 p. 351/2

  [28] Joseph E Persico Roosevelt’s Secret War (Random House ; New York ; 2002, p.322

  [29] see documents cited in J Heideking & C Mauch American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler: A documentary History ; Westview Press ; Boulder Colorado ; 1996 documents 34 – 49.

  [30] Doris Kearns Goodwin No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Elanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II Touchstone/ Simon & Schuster ; New York ; 1995, p.530/531 / Persico pp.414-419.

  [31].This scene is based on actual events that morning at Monty's HQ Nigel Hamilton MONTY - Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944 ; Hamilton ; London ; 1983. pp.743-746

  [32] For more on this side of Monty”s character see The Lonely Leader and Nigel Hamilton”s Monty vol 2 pp.539-589.

  [33] D Fraser Knight's Cross - A Life of Field Marshall ERWIN ROMMEL HarperCollins London ; 1993 p.309

  [34].

  [35] On his deathbed in 1976 Montgomery remarked ‘Now I have to go to God and explain all those dead young men at El Alamein.’

  [36] Cited in Albert Axel Russia’s Heroes 1941-1945 Constable Publishers ; London ; 2001 ; p.194.

  [37] Norman Gelb IKE & MONTY: Generals at War Constable ; London ; 1994 p.288

  [38] Norman Gelb IKE & MONTY: Generals at War Constable ; London ; 1994

  [39]. Monty Memoirs p.271. There are many sources pointing to extremes to which British manpower was stretched – some even American see Harry G Butcher Three Years with Eisenhower W Heinemann London 1946. p. 535. / Max Hastings OVERLORD: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy 1944 (Michael Joseph ; London ; 1984, p. 48.

  [40] Max Hastings Bomber Command Pan Books ; London ; 1999, p.234/5.

  [41] quoted in J Charmley Churchill’s Grand Alliance – The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-1957 Hodder & Stoughton ; London ; 1996 ; p.58

  [42] Linda McClain ‘The Role of Admiral W D Leahy in United States Foreign Policy’ Ph.D. University of Virginia (19840 p.231.

  [43] For actual text of memorandum, see J Heideking & C Mauch American Intelligence and the German Resistance to Hitler: A documentary History ; Westview Press ; Boulder Colorado ; 1996 document 55 pp.250-252.

  [44] Persico p.324/5/6

  [45] Cited in Max Hastings ARMAGEDON MacMillan ; London ; 2004 p.488

  [46] cited in Michael Beschloss The Conquerors Simon & Schuster ; New York ; 2003, p. 190.

  [47] Eric Larabee Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His lieutenants & their War Harper & Row ; New York ; 1987, pp.34/5.

  [48] FDR quotes cited from M Beschloss The Conquerors p. 95/6

  [49] Russian vernacular for ‘the Boss’

  [50] cited in Max Hastings ARMAGEDON MacMillan, London ; 2004 p. 492.

  [51] Loosley paraphrased from A Speer Inside the Third Reich p.213 / Overy Why the Allies Won Jonathan Cape ; London ; 1995 p. 207

  [52] Such documents were indeed produced at the Kreisau circle, see Hans Mommsen Alternative zu Hitler Verlag C H Beck; Munich ; 2000 pp.207-230

  [53] cited in Hastings ARMAGEDON MacMillan, London ; 2004 p. 490.

  [54].Ladislas Farago Patton: Ordeal and Triumph Mayflower paperback London 1969 p.257/8.

  [55].George Bruce The Warsaw Uprising Rupert Hart-Davis ; London ; 1972 ; pp.73/4.

  [56] Cited in Martin Gilbert Road to Victory Heinemann ; London ; 1986 .p.1196

  [57] cited from Martin Gilbert Road to Victory p. 1026.

  [58] Phyllis Auty TITO Penguin Books Ltd. Harmondsworth, Middlesex England ; 1974 ; p.223

  [59] Ralph Bennet Behind the battle: Intelligence in the war with Germany 1939 – 1945 Pimlico ; London ; 1999 p. 225-7.

  [60] Norman Davies Rising’44 The Battle for Warsaw MacMillan ; London ; 2003 p. p.298

  [61] Adapted from Norman Davies Rising’44 The Battle for Warsaw MacMillan ; London ; 2003 p. pp.268,271/2.

  [62] Description by Nurnberg War Crimes trial Attorny Francis Biddle, Ann and John Tusa The Nuremberg Trial London 1983 p.171

  [63] Historically the Naples meeting took place a day later on August 12th, 1944.

  [64] Phyllis Auty TITO Penguin Books Ltd. Harmondsworth, Middlesex England ; 1974 ; p.280-283.

  [65] Auty p. 264

  [66] Auty p. 249.

  [67] Roy Jenkins CHURCHILL Pan MacMillan London 2002 p. 753 The papal audience did indeed take place and the two did find common ground in their anti-communism.

  [68] John Charmley Churchill’s Grand Alliance Hodder & Stoughton ; London; 1996 p.110

  [69].Ladislas Farago Patton : Ordeal and Triumph Mayflower Paperback 1969 p. 61

  [70] cited in Barry Turner Countdown to Victory Hooder & Stoughton ; London ; 2004 p. 32.

  [71]Anthony Beevor & Artemis Cooper Paris after the Liberation 1944-1949 Penguin Books 2004 Revised edition p. x-xi.

  [72] Anthony Beevor & Artemis Cooper Paris after the Liberation 1944-1949 Penguin Books 2004 Revised edition p.ix.

  [73] Warren Kimball ‘Churchill, Roosevelt and Post-War Europe’ in RAC Parker Winston Churchill: Studies in Statesmanship Brassey’s ; London ; 1995 p. 143

  [74] Beevor p. 20

  [75] Much of the information is taken from Gitta Sereny The G
erman Trauma Penguin Books 2001 p.314

  [76] adapted from Gitta Sereny The German Trauma Penguin Books 2001 p.280/ Joachim Fest Speer The Final Verdict Phoenix Press ; London ; 2001. p. 182.

  [77] Cited in Beevor p. 56.

  [78] J Fest Speer p.356

  [79] Although some authors such as Norman Davies claim that Churchill knew about the FDR-Stalin agreement concerning the Curzon line, Martin Gilbert Churchill and America Pocketbooks ; London ; 2006 ; p.317. asserts he did not, and only discovered it when he next met Stalin in Moscow.

  [80] Historically Churchill only learned at the 1944 October talks in Moscow that his bargaining position over Poland, acceptance of the Curzon Line in return for genuine Polish independence from Stalin, had been given away by Roosevelt in one of his private meetings with Stalin in Teheran. M Gilbert Churchill and America ; Pocket Books ; London ; 2005.

  [81] Anthony Eden The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning Cassel ; London ; 1965 p.433

  [82] Based largely on Churchill’s actual response to the Morgenthau proposal

  [83] These are quotes from Churchill’s correspondence with FDR prior to the conference and some during their exchange.

  [84] Mark Mazower Inside Hitler’s Greece Yale University Press ; London 1995, p.xiii-xvii.

  [85] G Jukes Kusnetsov in Harold Shukman ed. Stalin’s Generals Phoenix Giant/Weidenfeld & Nicolson ; London ; 1993 p.111

  [86] Telegram from Churchill to Hopkins 9 December 1944

  [87] Cited in David Stafford Churchill and Secret Service The Overlook Press ; N.Y. ; 1998 p.282.

  [88] This controversy has been finally laid to rest by the research of John Earl Haynes & Harvey Klehr VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America Yale University Press; New Haven ; 2000, p.139-143.

  [89] John Earl Haynes & Harvey Klehr VENONA: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America Yale University Press; New haven ; 2000, p.141.

  [90] Cited in David Stafford Churchill and Secret Service The Overlook Press ; N.Y. ; 1998 p. 282