The Sword and the Shield

by Christopher Andrew

  115. Line X in Paris also succeeded in penetrating an unquantifiable number of US companies and subsidiaries in France.

  116. k-5, 460.

  117. Though Mitrokhin’s note merely records that Andropov recommended the award of the Order of the Red Star, it is barely conceivable that the recommendation was turned down. Kesarev’s assistant, Yuri Ignatyevich Rakovsky, was recommended for accelerated promotion. k-5, 470.

  118. Mitrokhin noted the following payments to ALAN which were recorded in his file: 409,000 francs for the period 1973 to 1976 (probably his basic salary with additional sums for particular items); 100,000 francs (undated) for information on the design of infra-red detectors; 40,000 francs (also undated) for samples of the detectors; 50,000 francs in September 1973 for two samples of missileguidance systems; payments of 71,000 and 100,000 francs in 1974 for technical documentation; 40,000 francs in 1974 or 1975 for unidentified technical samples; 89,400 francs (purpose unspecified) in 1975; 110,000 francs in 1977 for documentation on missile guidance; 60,000 francs and approximately 200,000 francs (30,000 convertible roubles) in December 1977 (purpose unspecified); and 200,000 francs (purpose unspecified) in mid-1978. On the assumptions that these were all separate sums and that there were no other payments unrecorded by Mitrokhin, this would make a grand total of 1,429,400 francs. k-5, 460.

  119. k-5, 460.

  120. Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, p. 97.

  121. Bourdiol was arrested in 1983 and later sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, as a result of intelligence provided by the French agent FAREWELL. Wolton, Le KGB en France, p. 245; “Ariane: un ingénieur français incarcéré pour l’espionage,” Libération, (December 2, 1983); Early Warning (March 2, 1984); Reuter reports (June 16, 1987). There is no identifiable reference to Bourdiol in Mitrokhin’s notes.

  122. Mitrokhin’s incomplete notes on payments to KARL record that from January to November 1979 he was paid a monthly salary of 13,200 francs and an additional sum of 32,000 francs; and that from January to October he was paid 12,000 francs a month plus a single payment of 34,000 francs. KARL worked as a KGB agent from 1972 to 1982. k-5, 367-9.

  123. k-5, 367.

  124. On the FAREWELL case, see Wolton, Le KGB en France, part 5, and Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, ch. 17. FAREWELL was first identified as Vetrov in Andrew and Gordievsky, Le KGB dans le monde, pp. 619-23.

  125. Raymond Nart, head of the DST Soviet section, writing under the pseudonym Henri Regnard, gave the first public account of what had been learned from the FAREWELL operation in December 1983 in an article published in the journal Défense Nationale.

  126. President Mitterrand, whose mind turned naturally to conspiracy, subsequently began to suspect bizarrely that the FAREWELL information might somehow have been planted on the DST by the CIA “as a way of testing socialist France and me personally,” in order to see whether he would hold it back or pass it on to the Reagan administration. Favier and Martin-Roland, La décennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, pp. 94-8, 271-3.

  127. Mitrokhin’s notes contain the following comparative figures for the numbers of agents run by KGB residencies controlled by the FCD Fifth Department:

  On January 1, 1975 the Rome residency had 23 agents (18 of them active) and 6 confidential contacts, as well as 4 agents in the Soviet community. A year later it had 21 non-Soviet agents (16 active), 7 confidential contacts and 9 Soviet agents (k-13, 135).

  128. See above, chapter 17.

  129. See above, chapter 17.

  130. Mitrokhin’s notes do not include any examples of the intelligence obtained by DARIO and his female recruits from the Foreign Ministry.

  131. k-10, 101-3, 107, 109. Mitrokhin’s notes imply in 1956 that DARIO was also instrumental in the recruitment of MAGDA, an employee of the foreign ministry press department; k-10,100,103. Mitrokhin’s notes also record the recruitment in 1970 of an agent in the Foreign Ministry, codenamed STRELOK, by Georgi Pavlovich Antonov. STRELOK subsequently became “reluctant to co-operate” (k-4, 80, 158; k-2, 221, 231, 268).

  132. k-16, 285. Mitrokhin notes that by 1965 LEDA “had lost her intelligence access.”

  133. k-10, 97, 109.

  134. k-10, 109.

  135. See above, chapter 17.

  136. k-10, 63. Mitrokhin’s notes do not give the date at which the various ciphers and surveillance lists were handed over by QUESTOR. In view of the Centre’s dissatisfaction with the declining amount of intelligence obtained from QUESTOR by YEFRAT in the later 1950s, however, the bulk of the material was probably handed over in the mid-1950s.

  137. Mitrokhin interpreted YEFRAT’s file as placing the responsibility for the bankruptcy of the Italian firm on his mismanagement (k-7, 4, 193; k-16, 338, 419; k-18, 153; k-20, 94). In addition to being assisted by his wife TANYA, YEFRAT was given as deputy resident the illegal Aleksandr Vasilyevich Subotin (codenamed PIK), who had gained an Italian passport in the name of Adolfo Tolmer (k-16, 98, 285).

  138. YEFRAT also cultivated CENSOR’s wife, KAPA; Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the outcome of the cultivation (k-16, 419; k-18, 153).

  139. YEFRAT later took part in PROGRESS operations. In 1962 DEMID recruited his brother TIBER, who worked in the accounts department of the interior ministry, to act as radio operator for SAUL, a Lithuanian Catholic priest and KGB agent then studying at the Vatican. DEMID, CENSOR and QUESTOR continued to provide intelligence until at least 1963 (k-16, 419; k-10, 63; k-5, 688-91). After YEFRAT’s departure, his former deputy, PIK, worked for the legal Rome residency until 1965, acting as LEDA’s controller from February 1962 to September 1963 (k-16, 285).

  140. k-2, 66. Mitrokhin’s notes give no indication of whether IKAR continued to work as a KGB agent after his return to Italy.

  141. k-5, 102.

  142. k-9, 23; k-10, 126.

  143. k-12, 516. IKAR, PLATON, ENERO and ARTUR were not the only SCD recruits in the Italian embassy in Moscow. Mitrokhin’s notes also refer to the case of POLATOV (or POLETOV), an assistant service attaché, recruited by the SCD in the late 1970s, but give no details (k-10, 124). There may have been further embassy agents not mentioned in Mitrokhin’s notes.

  Other Italians recruited by the SCD in Moscow included an official in the legal department of the Italian interior ministry, recruited with the assistance of VERA, a swallow from the Polish SB (k-2, 273); and RITA, a female employee of the Fiat company recruited in 1976 (k-10, 132).

  144. k-27, 240.

  145. k-22, 72; k-26, 66; t-2, 158.

  146. k-5, 256.

  147. Cf. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 459.

  148. k-14, 262, 383. BUTIL broke contact in 1979 after his firm had failed to win Soviet contracts.

  149. k-5, 420, 423.

  150. The Italian businessmen identified in Mitrokhin’s notes as Line X agents in the 1970s and/or early 1980s were CHIZ (k-14, 567), ERVIN (k-7, 37), KOZAK (k-14, 174), METIL (k-14, 383), PAN (k-12, 593) and TELINI (k-12, 389). It is unclear whether SAUST, a business consultant cultivated by the KGB, was actually recruited (k-14, 568).

  151. Mitrokhin’s notes identify a total of seventeen Line X officers stationed at the Rome residency for all or part of the period 1974-9 (k-5, 459).

  152. k-5, 353, 425. The Soviet ambassador in Rome, N. S. Rhyzov, had opposed the establishment of a Soviet consulate in Milan in order to provide cover for a KGB residency in northern Italy, but the foreign ministry in Moscow gave way to pressure from the Centre (k-5, 422).

  153. k-5, 353, 357.

  154. k-5, 357.

  155. Mitrokhin’s notes give few details on MARIO save that he was recruited in 1972 and usually met his controller in the Soviet Union (k-6, 192).

  156. k-14, 264; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40. As in other countries, Line X agents in Italy were also used to obtain ST from US sources (k-5, 236).

  157. vol. 6, app. 1, part 39. Mitrokhin’s notes identify KULON and his research institute.

  158. k-5, 425. Mitrokhin’s notes do not indicate w
hat happened to UCHITEL and Kuznetsov’s other agents after his expulsion. It would have been normal practice for them to have been put on ice.

  159. k-2, 415.

  160. k-2, 217; k-3, 112.

  161. k-2, 225, 243; k-20, 348.

  162. k-2, 250, 275; k-4, 71; k-10, 52; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 39, 41.

  163. k-2, 230, 242; k-13, 133; k-20, 347; k-21, 34; k-26, 68.

  164. k-2, 274. Mitrokhin’s notes transcribe his codename alternately as ACHERO and AGERO. The most likely codename is ACERO, pronounced “achero”—the Italian for “steel.”

  165. k-7, 126.

  166. k-7, 48.

  167. k-2, 212, 216, 220, 224, 229, 257-8; k-21, 32.

  168. k-2, 211, 249.

  169. k-2, 240, 271; k-25, 188. METSENAT’s controllers in the Rome residency were, successively, Vladimir Yevgenyevich Strelkov, Anatoli Yegorovich Abalin, Valentin Mikhaolovich Yatsura and Konstantin Kazakov.

  170. k-1, 1; k-2, 214, 222, 244; k-13, 143; k-14, 687.

  171. k-13, 153, 148.

  172. k-13, 148. The active measures statistics were much in line with those for the previous two years. In 1975 the Rome residency reported that “3 documentary [forged document] operations were carried out; 10 conversations of influence were held; 1 press conference, 1 conference [were arranged]; 4 oral reports were disseminated; 48 articles were published; 6 questions were asked in Parliament; 1 delegation was assembled and sent out; 4 appeals were drafted; 4 mailing operations were carried out; an Italy-Spain committee was set up; 2 leaflet operations were carried out and 2 anonymous letters were sent out” (k-13, 135). The active measures statistics for 1976 were as follows:

  articles placed [in the press]: 63

  conversations of influence: 6

  appeals made: 9

  working group organized: 1

  booklet distributed: 1

  leaflet operation carried out: 1

  anonymous letters distributed: 2

  demonstration held: 1

  parliamentary questions: 2

  question in the Senate: 1

  “Round Table” meeting held: 1

  Of the total number of articles printed, 28 of the press articles were designed to discredit the Main Adversary; 21 alleged CIA interference in Italian affairs. The residency also claimed to have made “active use” of the “Italy-Spain” committee. Four active measures operations were intended “to discredit Maoism as an anti-socialist tendency.” k-13, 151.

  173. Mitrokhin’s notes probably contain only an incomplete record of new agents recruited by the Rome residency during the period 1977-83. Among them, however, were ARO, who worked for the Ansaldo company in Genoa and was recruited at some point between 1978 and 1981 (k-14, 439); CLEMENT, a member of the international department of the Christian Association of Italian Workers (ACLI), recruited in 1978 but put on ice in 1981 after he had failed to supply intelligence of much significance (k-14, 395); KARS, an Italian physicist who worked as a Line X agent in both Italy and the United States in the early 1980s (k-14, 264; vol. 6, app. 1, part 40); KOK, a sinologist recruited in 1977 for operations against the PRC (k-13, 153); and KOZAK, the owner of an Italian engineering company, who was recruited not later than 1978 (k-14, 174).

  174. k-14, 687.

  175. k-7, 48.

  176. k-10, 109; k-25, 188.

  177. k-7, 126.

  178. k-13, 112.

  179. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 10.

  180. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, pp. 19-20.

  181. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 629-31.

  182. “Order of the Chairman of the KGB,” no. 107/OV, September 5, 1990.

  Chapter Twenty-eight

  The Penetration and Persecution of the Soviet Churches

  1. Lenin, Works, vol. 35, pp. 89-90; Shipler, Russia, pp. 270-1. KGB persecution of Islam and Judaism will be covered in volume 2.

  2. Stalin may also have been influenced by the desire not to alienate his Anglo-American allies by continued religious persecution at a time when he was pressing them to open a second front. Pospielovsky, “The ‘Best Years’ of Stalin’s Church Policy (1942-1948) in the Light of Archival Documents.”

  3. The work of Michael Bourdeaux and his colleagues at Keston College has impressively documented the vitality of religious life in the post-war Russian Orthodox Church, despite continued persecution and a mostly subservient hierarchy. See, inter alia, Bourdeaux, Risen Indeed.

  4. Luchterhandt, “The Council for Religious Affairs.”

  5. vol. 5, sec. 9.

  6. Meerson, “The Political Philosophy of the Russian Orthodox Episcopate in the Soviet Period,” p. 221.

  7. Revesz, The Christian Peace Conference, pp. 1-4.

  8. k-1, 232.

  9. k-1, 214.

  10. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” pp. 61-2.

  11. Mitrokhin did not see the file on the 1961 WCC Central Committee meeting. Another file noted by him, however, identifies ADAMANT as Nikodim; vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 28.

  12. “WCC Gives Eight-point Lead to Member Churches,” Church Times (August 29, 1969).

  13. “Elusive Goal” (leader), Church Times (August 29, 1969).

  14. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” pp. 61-2. On Buyevsky’s role in the Moscow Patriarchate’s foreign relations Department, see Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 266.

  15. Letter from the Bishop of Bristol to the Church Times (September 7, 1973); Smith, Fraudulent Gospel, pp. 2-3.

  16. Babris, Silent Churches, p. 472.

  17. Document cited by Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” p. 62.

  18. KGB Church records temporarily accessible to journalists after the disintegration of the Soviet Union indicate that, at some stage after Nikodim’s death in 1978, Yuvenali was given his former KGB codename ADAMANT. (It was not unusual for KGB codenames to be recycled.) Michael Dobbs, “Business as Usual for Ex-KGB Agents,” Washington Post (February 11, 1992).

  19. Pawley, Donald Coggan, pp. 244-8.

  20. k-1, 24.

  21. Polyakov, “Activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1991,” p. 152.

  22. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 226-9.

  23. Daily American (September 8, 1978). On September 29, 1978, less than a month after Nikodim’s death in the Vatican, John Paul I also died suddenly, thus becoming the shortest-lived pope since Urban VII died of malaria twelve days after his election in 1590.

  24. See above, chapter 28.

  25. k-1, 30.

  26. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 215-16. On the authenticity of the report, see Oppenheim, “Are the Furov Reports Authentic?”

  27. “His Holiness Patriarch Pimen’s Address Before Panikhida in the Patriarchal Cathedral of the Epiphany in Moscow,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1984), no. 3.

  28. See, for example, Pimen’s telegram to Brezhnev of December 17, 1976 in Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1977), no. 2, pp. 3-4.

  29. “Soviet Peace Fund Awards,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 4.

  30. “His Holiness Patriarch Pimen Awarded by the World Peace Council,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 6.

  31. “World Conference: Religious Leaders for Lasting Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations among Nations,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1977), no. 7, pp. 2-3 and no. 8, pp. 17-64.

  32. k-1, 23; vol. 6, ch. 10. The Patriarchate was also involved in another KGB-sponsored production in 1982, the World Conference of Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe, which again attracted about 600 participants.

  33. “Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Conferring the Order of the Red Banner of Labor upon Patriarch Pimen of Moscow and All Russia,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1977), no. 9, p. 3.

  34. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 217.

  35. The full text of the letter from Yakunin and Regels
on was published in Religion in Communist Lands, vol. 41 (1976), no. 1.

  36. Lefever, Nairobi to Vancouver, pp. 64-5; Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 355-68; Hudson, The World Council of Churches in International Affairs, pp. 286-7.

  37. Norman, Christianity and the World Order, pp. 1-2, 90 n. 62.

  38. Lefever, Nairobi to Vancouver, p. 65; Babris, Silent Churches, p. 475.

  39. vol. 6, ch. 10.

  40. Harriss, “The Gospel According to Marx,” p. 63.

  41. vol. 6, ch. 10.

  42. “Interview Given by Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev and Gallich to a Novosti Press Agency Correspondent,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 5.

  43. vol. 6, ch. 10.

  44. Smith, Fraudulent Gospel, p. 68.

  45. The text of the founding declaration of the Christian Committee was published in Religion in Communist Lands, vol. 6 (1978), no. 1. On the work of the committee, see Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 373-81.

  46. k-21, 203.

  47. Documents of the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights in the USSR, 12 vols. (Vol. 3 consists of English translations; the remainder contain reproductions of the original Russian texts.) See also Scarfe (ed.), The CCDBR Documents: Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers’ Rights in the USSR.

  48. k-1, 65. On Varsonofy’s resignation from the Christian Committee, cf. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 379.

  49. k-27, 488.

  50. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 379.

  51. k-1, 50. On Fonchenkov’s public career, cf. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 380-1.

  52. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, p. 428.

  53. Albats, The State within a State, p. 46.

  54. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 422ff.

  55. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 430-9.

  56. It is impossible, however, to rule out the possibility, that Fonchenkov had become genuinely sympathetic towards Yakunin. Mitrokhin’s notes on his career as agent DRUG are limited to the 1970s.