The Sword and the Shield

by Christopher Andrew

  57. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 439-41.

  58. Lefever, Nairobi to Vancouver, pp. 3-5, 67-70, 73, 75, appendix A.

  59. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, p. 20.

  60. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 197.

  61. vol. 6, ch. 10, n. 1.

  62. Mitrokhin’s notes on the file of agent VORONOV, for example, record that during his period in New York State in the late 1970s and early 1980s, he “was tasked to identify among his parishioners people who had a progressive and sympathetic view of the USSR—government workers, political party [members], union members, workers at scientific research institutes, diplomatic personnel, immigration officials, clergymen and church employees who were involved in the registration of births, marriages, and deaths [for assistance in the documentation of illegals] and agents of Zionist and anti-Soviet organizations” (vol. 6, app. 2, part 4).

  63. Kalugin, Spymaster, p. 197.

  64. vol. 6, app. 2, part 4

  65. vol. 6, app. 2, part 4.

  66. vol. 8, ch. 6, paras. 16-17.

  67. vol. 8, app. 3, para. 20.

  68. Albats, The State within a State, p. 46. Confirmation of DROZDOV’s identity was provided by the release early in 1999 of a 1958 report on his recruitment, allegedly on “patriotic” grounds, by the Estonian KGB. Though the report refers to the agent only by his codename, his year of birth and career details are identical with those of Aleksi. James Meek, “Russian Patriarch ‘was KGB spy,’” Guardian (February 12, 1999).

  69. “Metropolitan Aleksiy’s Speech at the Founding Conference of the ‘Rodina’ Society,” Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate (1976), no. 2.

  70. Albats, The State within a State, p. 46.

  71. Bociurkiw, “Suppression de l’Église gréco-catholique ukrainienne;” Pelikan, Confessor between East and West, ch. 8; Floridi, “The Church of the Martyrs and the Ukrainian Millennium,” pp. 107-11; Tataryn, “The Re-emergence of the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church in the USSR,” pp. 292-4.

  72. k-1, 246.

  73. The intelligence agencies of the USSR, Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania were represented by heads and deputy heads of directorates (k-1, 106).

  74. k-1, 106. Mitrokhin’s notes do not make clear which, if any, of the KGB representatives at the conference came from the FCD.

  75. Though seeking confirmation of the report, the Centre took the alleged Vatican conspiracy seriously and drew up plans for a press exposé of it, if further details could be obtained (k-1, 2).

  76. k-1, 71.

  77. Babris, Silent Churches, pp. 149-50.

  78. APOSTOL, RASS and SLUGA are not identified in Mitrokhin’s notes (k-1, 2).

  79. k-1, 3, 110. It is unclear whether the PETROV who studied at the Russicum was the cleric with the same codename later sent to North America.

  80. k-1, 81-2, 109. ANTANAS arrived in Rome in January 1968; Mitrokhin does not record the date of arrival of VIDMANTAS.

  81. k-1, 83-4. A KGB file also records that in October 1969 DAKTARAS visited Rome to attend “a gathering of bishops” (k-1, 2).

  82. k-1, 2. Dudás appears in KGB files, in Cyrillic transliteration, as Dudast.

  83. k-1, 2.

  84. k-1, 133.

  85. k-1, 133.

  86. k-1, 36, k-5, 11, k-19, 82.

  87. Unlike the similar 1967 conference, the 1975 conference was attended by the Cubans. On this occasion, however, there was no delegation from Romania. k-1, 13.

  88. k-1, 13.

  89. k-1, 246.

  90. Borecky, Bishop Isidore, “The Church in Ukraine-1988;” Tataryn, “The Re-emergence of the Ukrainian (Greek) Catholic Church in the USSR;” Polyakov, “Activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1991,” p. 152.

  91. k-1, 146. The KGB estimate may have been too low. Published estimates for 1990, admittedly at a time when active persecution had almost ceased, were significantly higher; see Ramet (ed.), Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, pp. 355-6.

  92. k-1, 73.

  93. k-1, 146.

  94. Ellis (ed.), Three Generations of Suffering; Bourdeaux, Gorbachev, Glasnost the Gospel, p. 121.

  95. k-1, 214.

  96. Penton, Apocalypse Delayed.

  97. k-1, 241.

  98. Recollections of one of the deportees, Vasili Kalin, cited by James Meek, “Cult-busters Fight ‘Sins of False Witness,’” Guardian (February 12, 1999).

  99. k-1, 91.

  100. Among the evidence ignored by the KGB conspiracy theorists who saw the Jehovah’s Witnesses as vehicles for American ideological subversion was the fact that, from the First World War to the war in Vietnam, they consistently represented the largest group of Americans imprisoned for conscientious objection. In 1918 their leaders were imprisoned for contravening the American Espionage Act, though their sentences were overturned on appeal. Penton, Apocalypse Delayed, pp. 55-6, 142. Sadly, some of the conspiracy theories survived the collapse of the Soviet system.

  101. k-1, 241. In reality, Jehovah’s Witnesses behave in many ways as model citizens. Since 1962 they have been instructed to obey all human laws not directly in conflict with those of God. Penton, Apocalypse Delayed, p. 140.

  102. Antic, “The Spread of Modern Cults in the USSR,” pp. 257-8.

  103. k-1, 92.

  104. k-1, 91. There is no reference in the files noted by Mitrokhin to any successful KGB penetration either of the Jehovah’s Witnesses” Brooklyn headquarters or of its west European offices.

  105. k-1, 91.

  106. k-1, 73.

  107. Antic, “The Spread of Modern Cults in the USSR,” p. 259.

  108. Polyakov, “Activities of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1991; p. 147; Van den Bercken, “The Russian Orthodox Church, State and Society in 1991-1993,” p. 164.

  109. Walters, “The Defrocking of Fr. Gleb Yakunin,” pp. 308-9.

  110. Yakunin, “First Open Letter to Patriarch Aleksi II,” pp. 313-14. Father Gleb was in dispute with the Patriarch over the decision by the Holy Synod in October 1993 that Orthodox clergy would no longer be allowed to stand as candidates for political office. He went ahead with his candidature in the elections two months later, was elected and then defrocked. Walters, “The Defrocking of Fr Gleb Yakunin,” p. 310.

  Chapter Twenty-nine

  The Polish Pope and the Rise of Solidarity

  1. k-19, 515.

  2. See above, chapter 16.

  3. k-19, 516.

  4. On the arrests, see Karpiński, Poland since 1944, pp. 196-7.

  5. Cywiński later read Wałęsa’s acceptance speech for the 1983 Nobel Peace Prize at the ceremony in Oslo which Wałęsa was unable to attend.

  6. k-19, 516.

  7. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 126.

  8. See above, chapter 16.

  9. k-19, 429. Bardecki cannot, of course, be blamed in any way for receiving, among his Western visitors, two men whom he had no possible means of identifying as KGB illegals.

  10. k-19, 516.

  11. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 127.

  12. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 264.

  13. k-19, 516.

  14. Karpiński, Poland since 1944, pp. 200-1.

  15. k-19, 473.

  16. k-1, 45.

  17. k-19, 515.

  18. k-19, 506.

  19. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 289.

  20. The KGB claimed in 1982 that there were 26,000 Catholic priests in Poland (k-19, 506).

  21. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 403.

  22. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 321.

  23. k-1, 11.

  24. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 285.

  25. k-1, 11.

  26. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 184.

  27. vol. 8, ch. 8; vol. 8, app. 3. Tischner cannot, of course, be blamed in any way for receiving, among his Western visitors, an apparently well-recommended Canadian publisher seeking his help for a book on Polish missionaries, whom he had no possible means of id
entifying as a KGB illegal.

  28. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 373.

  29. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, p. 299; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 191.

  30. k-20, 208.

  31. k-20, 163.

  32. k-20, 211.

  33. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 217-18.

  34. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 310-12; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 308.

  35. k-1, 19.

  36. k-20, 245.

  37. k-20, 245.

  38. k-20, 220.

  39. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” p. 116.

  40. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 246.

  41. k-20, 221.

  42. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 246.

  Chapter Thirty

  The Polish Crisis and the Crumbling of the Soviet Bloc

  1. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 117, 129-30.

  2. k-20, 221.

  3. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 48-9.

  4. k-20, 342.

  5. k-20, 34.

  6. k-20, 35.

  7. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 247-8.

  8. k-16, 409.

  9. vol. 8, app. 3. Neither Bardecki nor Mazowiecki can be blamed in any way for receiving, among their Western visitors, someone whom they had no possible means of identifying as a KGB illegal.

  10. t-7, 156.

  11. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 250.

  12. k-20, 10, 26.

  13. k-19, 29.

  14. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 254.

  15. k-20, 28.

  16. t-7, 154. On January 22 Mikhail Zimyanin returned to Moscow from a fact-finding mission in Poland and gave an equally gloomy report to the Politburo (Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 255-6).

  17. k-19, 511.

  18. t-7, 155.

  19. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 271-4.

  20. k-20, 309.

  21. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 276-84.

  22. k-20, 110.

  23. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 130-1.

  24. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, ch. 24. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 293-307.

  25. At the time, opinions within the Centre were divided on whether the KGB had been involved in the assassination attempt. About half the FCD officers with whom Oleg Gordievsky discussed the attempt were convinced that the KGB would no longer contemplate such a risky special action, even if it were subcontracted to the Bulgarian intelligence service. The other half, however, suspected that Department 8 of Directorate S, which was responsible for assassinations, had been involved; some told Gordievsky they only regretted that the attempt had failed. (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 639.)

  26. k-20, 101, 104.

  27. k-20, 104.

  28. k-20, 102. Olszowski was regarded as a KGB co-optee (k-19, 26).

  29. k-20, 103. On June 7 Aristov, Kulikov and Pavlov telegraphed the Politburo to urge “the necessity of a direct dialogue with S. Kania about his departure from the post of the First Secretary” (k-20, 57).

  30. k-20, 105.

  31. k-20, 53.

  32. k-20, 52.

  33. k-20, 55.

  34. k-20, 54.

  35. k-19, 385.

  36. k-20, 54, 102, 112.

  37. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 97-8.

  38. k-19, 110.

  39. k-19, 115.

  40. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 94-5.

  41. k-19, 115.

  42. k-19, 115.

  43. k-19, 117.

  44. k-19, 113.

  45. k-19, 102.

  46. k-19, 106.

  47. k-19, 105.

  48. k-19, 103.

  49. k-19, 104.

  50. Kramer (ed.) “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 132-3.

  51. CPSU Secretary K. V. Rusakov told Honecker after Kania’s sacking, “We noticed that lately a difference began to appear between Kania and Jaruzelski in their approaches to basic questions. Jaruzelski began to show more and more readiness to accept violent measures in dealing with counter-revolution. We began to work with Jaruzelski. When doing this, we were influenced by the fact that Jaruzelski possessed greater authority in the army and also enjoyed the support of the ministers” (k-20, 338).

  52. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 315-16.

  53. k-20, 303.

  54. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 133-4.

  55. k-20, 311.

  56. k-20, 327.

  57. k-20, 307.

  58. k-20, 304.

  59. k-20, 327.

  60. k-20, 308.

  61. Ustinov denied, not wholly convincingly, that Kulikov had actually referred to the possibility of Soviet military intervention; Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 134-7.

  62. k-20, 315, 316.

  63. k-20, 340.

  64. k-20, 315.

  65. k-20, 325.

  66. k-20, 293.

  67. k-20, 324.

  68. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 334, 339.

  69. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 106-7.

  70. k-20, 329.

  71. k-20, 297.

  72. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 107.

  73. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 336-7.

  74. k-20, 297.

  75. k-20, 316.

  76. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 337-9.

  77. k-20, 323.

  78. k-20, 296.

  79. k-20, 298.

  80. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 343-4.

  81. k-19, 53.

  82. k-19, 321.

  83. k-19, 23.

  84. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 108; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.

  85. k-20, 249.

  86. k-19, 23.

  87. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.

  88. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 307-9.

  89. k-20, 249.

  90. k-19, 261.

  91. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 117.

  92. k-19, 381.

  93. k-19, 380.

  94. k-19, 411.

  95. k-19, 312.

  96. k-19, 252.

  97. k-19, 253.

  98. k-19, 257.

  99. k-19, 258.

  100. k-19, 261. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the content of Brezhnev’s message to Jaruzelski. On prosecutions after the declaration of martial law, see Swidlicki, Political Trials in Poland 1981-1986.

  101. k-19, 642.

  102. k-19, 311.

  103. k-19, 324.

  104. k-19, 326.

  105. k-19, 328.

  106. k-19, 337.

  107. k-19, 339.

  108. k-19, 128.

  109. k-19, 124.

  110. k-19, 143. Kiszczak expressed his thanks for material and technical assistance already received; Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the nature of this assistance.

  111. k-19, 143.

  112. k-1, 15.

  113. k-19, 135.

  114. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 376-7.

  115. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 388-9.

  116. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 131.

  117. k-19, 143.

  118. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 381-2.

  119. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 132-3.

  120. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 134-6.

  121. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 136-7.

  122. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 137-8.

  123. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 395-6; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 387-8.

  124. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 388-9; Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 396-7.

  125. k-16, 500.

  126. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 249.

  127. Dobbs, Down with
Big Brother, pp. 265-9; Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989, ch. 6.

  128. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 288.

  129. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).

  Conclusion. From the One-Party State to the Yeltsin Presidency

  1. Jukes, “The Soviets and ‘Ultra.’” Though Jukes’s conclusions are debatable, his 1988 article remains a pathbreaking study.

  2. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991. Dr. Kennedy-Pipe’s otherwise valuable book is only one example of the continuing underestimation of the role of Soviet foreign intelligence even in some of the most recent work by leading Western scholars.

  3. The significance of SIGINT was made clear by David Kahn’s pioneering The Codebreakers, published in 1967. Though a bestseller, however, its contents appeared to stun, rather than to inspire, most historians of international relations.

  4. A growing minority of international relations, history and other departments in British universities now offer courses on intelligence, though on a much smaller scale than in north America. There is a flourishing British Study Group on Intelligence, with a largely academic membership, and an increasing number of similar groups in north America and continental Europe.

  5. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 7.

  6. Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union, p. 219.

  7. Two of the leading historians of the Bolshevik Revolution, Orlando Figes and Richard Pipes, agree on describing the Cheka as “a state within a state.”

  8. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 73-4.

  9. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 468-70. It was a sign of the difficulty encountered by many Western historians in interpreting the Terror that Conquest’s was the only full-scale history of it published during the life of the Soviet Union.

  10. Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, p. 258.

  11. k-25, 78. On the punitive use of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals.

  12. k-25, 79. There is no suggestion in Mitrokhin’s notes that Voloshanovich was working for the KGB.

  13. See above, chapter 20.

  14. frag. 1,7. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the precise charges leveled against Korobov or of the length of his sentence.

  15. k-3b, 136.

  16. I am grateful to Dr. Clarissa de Waal of Newnham College, Cambridge, for these recollections of Tirana in 1992.

  17. A further 3 percent were KGB co-optees.