The Story of Psychology
Page 96
A similar answer applies to the old question about where our ideas come from: They are the product of experience and learning as filtered through and shaped by built-in neural propensities. Language acquisition is a case in point. The child’s brain has specialized areas that are able, with little help, to perceive syntactical patterns, extract meaning from speech, and group related objects into abstract categories. When the built-in wiring is defective, learning is difficult or impossible. One who is innately low in verbal ability cannot deal with difficult abstractions, no matter how much experience he or she has.
We need not restate contemporary psychology’s answers to certain other ancient questions: how perception works; how the mind solves problems; how we reason and why we often reason invalidly; how and when our actions are determined by emotions, conscious judgment, and the interplay of the two; and how selfish or altruistic, hostile or kindly patterns of behavior are constructed out of latent tendencies by familial and social experiences.
Certain other questions, however, have been called “luxury problems.” Ignorance of them does not impede scientific progress or affect the daily routine of research; seeking to answer them therefore seems unnecessary, and most psychologists, accordingly, ignore them. The nature of consciousness is one such; its use or function in human psychology is unclear, and for many years most researchers, including cognitive psychologists, neglected it and paid attention to more manageable phenomena. But as we have seen, consciousness is now receiving attention in several quarters, and this suggests that as psychology probes ever deeper into cognitive processes, it will find that consciousness plays a major role in mental phenomena and that it can no longer be considered a luxury problem. As has often been pointed out, the most sophisticated computer is vastly inferior in important ways to any ordinary person precisely because it is not conscious of itself as an entity.
Even freedom and will, two concepts all but missing from psychology for some decades, have lately come back into view. Behaviorists had swept them aside as mentalist illusions, and even cognitive psychologists had avoided them because a freely willed act seems an uncaused act—a concept anathema to science. But cognitive psychologists have been unable to sidestep or ignore choice—a meaningless concept if one insists that past and present forces determine what the individual chooses, and yet an inescapable and observable phenomenon.
An answer now proposed by a number of psychologists is that the operating system of the mind can run in a self-reflective mode, examining its own thoughts and behavior, deliberately evaluating the outcomes of various actions and possible actions, deciding which is the best, and intentionally choosing to carry it out. When we do not pursue this process, we make choices for less conscious reasons—the condition Spinoza referred to as human bondage. When we choose on the basis of self-reflection and evaluations, we approximate human freedom. Albert Bandura has made much the same point time and again. In his therapeutic research on “self-efficacy,” he has argued that freedom should not be conceived of negatively as the absence of external coercion but positively as the exercise of self-influence: “Through their capacity to manipulate symbols and to engage in reflective thought, people can generate novel ideas and innovative actions that transcend their past experiences…By the exercise of [self-regulation] they help to determine the nature of their situations and what they become.”41 This is the very core of his current agentic theory, mentioned above: “The evolutionary convergence of advanced symbolizing capacity enabled humans to transcend the dictates of their immediate environment and made them unique in their power to shape their life circumstances and the courses their lives take. In this conception, people are contributors to their life circumstances, not just products of them.”42
Where do we go from here?
Every issue of Annual Review of Psychology is full of forecasts and predictions of the future of the field. Many of them suggest that on a number of fronts psychology is breaking through into previously unknown and unimagined realms of knowledge and that the broad, sweeping, crude formulations of the past are giving way to narrow, specific, testable theories. However, contrary to this view of a fragmenting science, much of what we have seen above shows that in recent decades the many psychological sciences have been overlapping and interacting despite the absence of an all-embracing megatheory.
But we have also seen that one candidate for a Theory of Everything is knocking on the door, if not yet admitted. Martha Farah, you will recall, said that cognitive neuroscience might become the overarching theory of psychology because it is a cellular-systems explanation of how the brain acts during all the classical processes of cognitive psychology: how we learn, think, behave; why we differ from each other; the sources of personality. In sum, “All these things are in principle explainable by various levels of brain activity at various levels of description.” For good measure, she later added, “Neuroscience is showing that character, consciousness, and a sense of spirituality are all physical functions of the brain.”
Maybe… but it is not clear to everyone how neuroscience can become the Theory of Everything, although it will surely be a major component of that theory. For even if all the mental processes that make up mind are the result of physical functions of the brain, the great—indeed, the greatest—of questions, currently unanswered, is: How do those physical functions become our own individual thoughts, memories, hopes, joys, sorrows? Or as asked earlier in this book: How do our neural processes become us?
Whatever the tomorrow of psychology is, it is almost certain that many of the discoveries of the future will, like those of the past, prove useful to humankind in ways ranging from the trivial to the highly consequential—from tips on child care and memory improvement, say, to the radical improvement of education and the reduction of racial and ethnic hatreds.
Finally, to a far greater extent than ever, psychology surely will satisfy that purest, noblest, and most truly human of desires, the wish to understand. Albert Einstein once said, “The most incomprehensible thing in the world is that the world is comprehensible,” but psychology is proving the great man wrong. It is making our comprehension of the world comprehensible.
* The 50,000 figure is an estimate carefully calculated from many sources by APA’s Online Research Office. The Bureau of Labor Statistics says ten thousand (see www.bls.gov/emp#data); apparently, BLS uses a rigorous criterion in its count.
* Much of the funding of basic psychological research has been coming from NIMH, but in 2005–2006 the director announced that in the future funding priority would be assigned to basic research aimed at understanding and treating mental illness, while basic research of a more fundamental kind would get lower priority, if any. The result may be a considerable shrinkage of federal funding of basic research in psychology (National Science Foundation: Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development FY 2003, 2004, and 2005).
Notes
PROLOGUE
1. Herodotus, The Persian Wars, bk. II, chaps. 2–3.
2. BBC News, April 29, 2004, citing report of findings in northern Israel as reported in Science.
3. George A. Barton, The Royal Inscriptions of Sumer and Akkad (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1929), p. 61, cited in Jaynes, 1976:181.
4. Jaynes, 1976:69–70.
5. Ibid.:72–73.
6. Herodotus, The Persian Wars, bk. I, chap. 209.
7. Bruno Snell, in The Discovery of the Mind (Harvard University Press, 1953), says that this development was definitely post-Homeric.
8. Carnegie Institution of Washington Yearbook, 1923, 22:335–337, cited in Thackray and Merton, 1972:491–492.
CHAPTER 1
1. Bertrand Russell, 1945:3.
2. De Anima, chap. II.
3. Cited in Theophrastus, On the Senses, 50–58.
4. Democritus, frag. 9, in C. Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy (New York, 1909).
5. Bertrand Russell, 1945:43.
6. On the Sacred Disease (epilepsy). This ma
y have been written by one of Hippocrates’ followers, but it is generally held to be faithful to his ideas.
7. Quoted in Diogenes Laertius, Plato, 27.
8. See the Meno dialogue.
9. See the Phaedo dialogue.
10. See the last book of the Republic.
11. Republic, bk. VII.
12. Phaedo.
13. Republic, bk. IX, 571.
14. Ibid., bk. IV.
15. Robert Watson, 1978:36.
16. Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia, “Aristotle.”
17. Robinson, 1989:ix–x.
18. De Anima, bk. II, chap. v; bk. III, chaps. vii–ix.
19. David Ross, Aristotle (1964), quoted in Robinson, 1989:25.
20. De Generatione Animalium, quoted in Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia, “Aristotle”:1163.
21. De Anima, bk. III, chap. iv.
22. Ibid., bk. II, chap. ii.
23. Robert Watson, 1978:67.
24. Robinson, 1989:34–35.
25. De Memoria, 2, 45lb, 17.
26. David Murray, 1988:30.
27. Robert Watson, 1978:69.
CHAPTER 2
1. Theophrastus, On the Senses, 47.
2. Quoted in Bertrand Russell, 1945:243.
3. Diogenes Laertius, Lives, “Epicurus,” 118.
4. Ibid.:23.
5. Bertrand Russell, 1945:233.
6. Zeller, 1870:503.
7. Bertrand Russell, 1945:255–256.
8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives, “Zeno,” 58.
9. Bertrand Russell, 1945:266–267.
10. Ibid.:278.
11. On the Nature of Things, bk. III.
12. Tacitus, Annals, xv, 61; Suetonius, Nero, 35.
13. Epictetus, Discourses, frag. 1.
14. Discourses, I, 12, 21; frag. vi, 25.
15. Ibid., bk. IV, sec. 440A.
16. L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science During the First Thirteen Centuries of our Era (New York: Macmillan, 1923), I, cited in Robert Watson, 1978:83.
17. Plotinus, Enneads, IV, 8, 1.
18. Bertrand Russell, 1945:288–291.
19. Boorstin, 1983:100.
20. De Spectaculis, 30.
21. Ad Uxorem, I, 1–3.
22. De Anima, bk. IV.
23. Ibid., bk. V.
24. Ibid., bk. XII.
25. Ibid., bk. XVI.
26. Commentary in “John the Evangelist,” xxix, 6, and “Sermon 43.”
27. On Christian Doctrine, cited in Robert Watson, 1978:98.
28. In The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers (Christian Literature Company, 1886), vol. 1:227.
29. On the Trinity, bk. X, chap. xi.
30. City of God, bk. XIII, 19; bk. XIV:2–6.
31. Confessions, 1886 ed.:145ff.
32. City of God, bk. XI:26.
33. Alexander and Selesnick, 1966:53–54.
34. Confessions: 145ff.
35. David Murray, 1988:53.
36. City of God, bk. XIV, chaps. 24 and 26.
37. On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists, quoted in Durant, 1950:962.
38. David Murray, 1988:58, 62.
39. “Treatise on Man,” Q.83, A.3, in Summa Theologica.
40. “Treatise on Man,” Q.82, A.3, in Summa Theologica.
41. Bertrand Russell, 1945:454–455.
42. David Murray, 1988:64, citing Cardinal Mercier, The Origins of Contemporary Psychology (1918), and R. Brennan, History of Psychology from the Standpoint of a Thomist (1945).
43. David Murray, 1988:77.
44. F. Watson, 1915.
CHAPTER 3
1. Bacon, 1905 [1605]:167.
2. Robert Watson, 1978:146.
3. Passions of the Soul, excerpted in Flew, 1964:136.
4. Discourse on Method, part IV.
5. Ibid., part IV.
6. Meditations, “The Existence of Material Things.”
7. Treatise of Man: 21.
8. Hothersall, 1984:30.
9. Fancher, 1979:29–30.
10. Robert Watson, in Benjamin, 1988:46.
11. Passions of the Soul, article XXXI.
12. Ibid., article XLI.
13. Ibid., “What Sensation Is.”
14. Ibid., article LXXIX.
15. Fancher, 1979:36–37.
16. Robert Watson, 1978:164–165.
17. Ethics, part V, preface.
18. Ibid., part I.
19. Ibid., part III, props. 6 and 7.
20. Alexander and Selesnick, 1966:100.
21. Robert Watson, 1978:166.
22. Boorstin, 1983:395.
23. Leviathan, part I, chaps. 2, 7.
24. Ibid., chap. 46.
25. Ibid., chap. 1.
26. Ibid., chap. 2.
27. Ibid., chap. 3.
28. Ibid., chap. 3.
29. Ibid., chap. 3.
30. Hobbes, 1658, quoted in David Murray, 1988:94–95.
31. Essay, “The Epistle to the Reader.”
32. Ibid., introduction.
33. Robert Watson, 1978:191.
34. Essay, bk. 1, chap. 4, secs. 8–9.
35. Ibid., bk. II, chap. 1, para. 1.
36. Ibid., chap. 1, para. 2.
37. Ibid., chap. 23, para. 12.
38. Ibid., chap. 23, paras. 15, 29.
39. Ibid., bk. IV, chap. 3, para. 6.
40. Ibid., “The Epistle to the Reader.”
41. Principles of Human Knowledge, no. 92, in New Theory of Vision: 159.
42. Ibid., para. 18.
43. Hume, 1956 [1738], introduction, vol. I:5.
44. Ibid., part 4, sec. 6.
45. Ibid., part 1, sec. 4.
46. Ibid., part 3, sec. 6; vol. I, part 4, sec. 1.
47. Ibid., part 4, sec. 2.
48. Boring, 1950:194.
49. Ibid.:196.
50. Hilgard, 1987:5; Brooks, 1976.
51. Robert Watson, 1978:214.
52. Leibniz, 1696, XIV, 10.
53. Bertrand Russell, 1945:584.
54. From Journal des Savants, June, 1695, quoted in Flew, 1964:150.
55. Critique of Pure Reason, preface.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., excerpt no. 105 in Herrnstein and Boring, 1965.
58. Boring, 1950:249.
59. Leary, 1978; Leary, 1982.
CHAPTER 4
1. Biographical details from Fancher, 1979; Boring, 1950; and Dictionary of Scientific Biography, “Mesmer.”
2. H. F. Ellenberger, in Benjamin, 1988:136–137.
3. Council et al., 1996; Kirsch & Council, 1992.
4. Blakeslee, 2005.
5. On Lavater: Asendorpf, 1986. Darwin’s statement is quoted in J. Graham, “Lavater’s Physiognomy in England,” Journal of the History of Ideas 22:561–572.
6. Details on Gall and phrenology are from Fancher, 1979; Boring, 1950; and the Dictionary of Scientific Biography, “Gall.”
7. Gall, Sur les fonctions du cerveau, etc., excerpted in Herrnstein and Boring, 1966:211. Omissions not indicated.
8. Fancher, 1979:52.
9. Details on Flourens are from Fancher, 1979.
10. Details on “Tan”: Broca, 1861.
11. Hunt, 1982b:220.
12. Boring, 1950:72.
13. Lowry, 1971; Boring, 1950; Robert Watson, 1978; and David Murray, 1988.
14. Quoted in Lowry, 1971:81.
15. Hearnshaw, 1987:124.
16. Dictionary of Scientific Biography, “Johannes Müller”; Fancher, 1979.
17. Müller, Handbuch der Physiologie, bk. V, excerpted in Rand, 1966 [1912]:538, 541–542. Omissions not indicated.
18. James, 1948 [1892]:12.
19. Müller, Handbuch der Physiologie, bk. V, law VII, excerpted in Rand, 1966 [1912]:542.
20. David Murray, 1988:170.
21. Müller, Handbuch der Physiologie, bk. V, law VIII, excerpted in Rand, 1966 [1912]:543.
22. Boring, 1950:101.
23. Weber, “Über den Rau
msinn und die Empfindungskreise in der Haut und im Auge,” excerpted and translated in Herrnstein and Boring, 1966:141.
24. Based on Weber, as quoted in Herrnstein and Boring, 1966:141ff.
25. David Murray, 1988; Hothersall, 1984; Boring, 1950.
26. Weber, Der Tastsinn, excerpted in Rand, 1966 [1912]:557, 559.
27. Hothersall, 1984:134.
28. Koenigsberger, 1965 [1906]; Fancher, 1979; Dictionary of Scientific Biography, “von Helmholtz”; Boring, 1950.
29. Boring, 1950:42.
30. David Murray, 1988:195–197; Brooks and Brooks; 1978.
31. Brooks and Brooks, 1978.
32. Helmholtz, Treatise on Physiological Optics, chap. 26, excerpted in Shipley, 1961:105, 108–109.
33. Ibid.: 101–103
34. Robert Watson, 1978:249–250; Balance and Bringmann, 1987.
35. Balance and Bringmann, 1987.
36. Quoted in Balance and Bringmann, 1987.
37. Fechner, Elements of Psychophysics, cited in Robert Watson, 1978:241.
38. Cited in David Murray, 1988:183.
39. James, 1948 [1892]:23.
40. Edwin G. Boring, in Benjamin, 1988:168.
41. James, A Pluralistic Universe, quoted by Edwin G. Boring in Benjamin, 1988:169.
42. Edwin G. Boring, in Benjamin, 1988:169; Robert Watson, 1978:248–249.
43. Boring, 1950:294–295.
CHAPTER 5
1. Wundt’s diagram for such an experiment is in Woodward and Ash, 1982:186.
2. Wolfgang G. Bringmann et al., in Benjamin, 1988:190–191.