Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta
Page 31
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, DC, 14 OCTOBER 1971
GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 48
AWARD OF THE CIVIL ACTION HONOR MEDAL FIRST CLASS
IV. 2. The Civil Action Honor Medal, First Class has been awarded by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam for outstanding service during the period January 1968 through 24 September 1970 to the 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 1ST SPECIAL FORCES and its assigned units.
The Citation reads as follows:
The 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP has distinguished itself as an outstanding, Combat-Experienced unit, which always displays an enthusiastic spirit of service. Since January 1968, the 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, in addition to its combat operations against the Communist forces has collaborated closely with the Vietnamese Special Forces in its effort to implement civil affairs projects. These countless projects encompassed economic, educational, social and public welfare and transportation; assistance to refugees; and construction of churches, markets, medical facilities, schools, bridges and roads. With the achievement of these splendid results, the 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP has contributed significantly to the pacification and rural development program of the Vietnamese Government and at the same time has strengthened the existing bond of friendship between the Vietnamese and American people.
APPENDIX II
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAR After Action Report
AC Aviation Company
AHC Assault Helicopter Company
ALC Air Lift Company
ALO Air Liaison Organization
AO Area of Operations
AP Associated Press
APD Airborne Personnel Detector
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
AW Automatic Weapons
BDA Bomb Damage Assessment
C&C Command and Control
CCC Command and Control Central
CCN Command and Control North
CCS Command and Control South
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CO Commanding Officer
Co Company
COL Colonel
CPL Corporal
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
FAC Forward Air Controller
FFV Field Force Vietnam
FOB Forward Operational Base
H&I Harassment and Interdiction
HE High Explosive
HQ Headquarters
ICC International Control Commission (commissioned by the Geneva Conference of 1954 to police the cease fire between North and South Vietnam
KIA Killed in Action
LLDB Luc Luong Dac Biet (Vietnamese Special Forces)
LRRP Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LSM Landing Ship Medium
LT Lieutenant
LTC Lieutenant Colonel
LZ Landing Zone
MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MAF Marine Amphibious Force
MAJ Major
MG Machine Gun mm millimeter
MSG Master Sergeant
MSS Mission Support Site
NCO Non Commissioned Officer
NCOIC Non Commissioned Officer In Charge
NVA Army of North Vietnam
OPCON Operational Contingent
OPLAN Operations Plan
PC Patrol Craft
PCE Patrol Craft Escort
PCS Permanent Change of Station
PLT Platoon
POW Prisoner of War
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RON Remain Over Night
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade
SF Special Forces
SFC Sergeant First Class
SFGA Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SGT Sergeant
SLAR Side Looking Airborne Radar
SOG Studies and Observations Group
SP4 Specialist Fourth Class
SP5 Specialist Fifth Class
SSG Staff Sergeant
TAOR Tactical Area of Responsibility
TASS Tactical Air Support Squadron
TDY Temporary Duty
TOC Tactical Operations Center
U.S.N.R United States Navy (Retired)
USARV United States Army Vietnam
USASF United States Army Special Forces (also USSF)
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USMC United States Marine Corps
VC Viet Cong
VNAF Vietnamese Air Force
WO Warrant Officer
WP White Phosphorous, Willy Peter
APPENDIX III
“Debriefing of Ranger Operation Conducted by 1st, 3rd & 5th Companies, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, (29-30 Sep 66)
1. Company and US Advisors:
1st Company (-) (VN 73), SFC Winder, SSG Jantz; 3rd Company (VN 84), CPT Moore, SGT Nichols, CPL Benjamin, SP4 Dyer; 5th Company (VN 91), LT Hamilton, LT Deaton, SFC Sommerhof
2. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations vicinity XT012753.
3. Summary of Operations. The 3d Company infiltrated the AO on 290900 Sept at XT012732. From the infiltration LZ, the unit marched on an azimuth of 350 degrees to XT 012753 and halted for one hour; the patrol turned on an azimuth of 130 degrees for three hundred meters. At this location, the two lead platoons were taken under fire by a VC force of unknown size. After a brief firefight, the 3rd company assaulted the VC position, causing the VC to withdraw.
The 3rd Company began a search of the immediate are as soon as the VC withdrew. The point of contact was on the southern edge of a large VC complex of bamboo structures. After a forty five minute search of the area, the company had observed 16-20 structures, including a large kitchen, a bicycle repair shop, two ammunition caches and approximately 12-15 shelters, assumed to be a barracks. (Numerous interviews revealed that many other structures were observed in the complex; but were not searched by the ground party). The kitchen was furnished with large earthenware crocks which contained pickled fish, and cooking pans, approximately four to five feet in diameter containing cooked rice; numerous other cooking utensils were also observed. The shelters did not have bunks; they consisted of thatched roofs and sides, but had no flooring. Each shelter had an outside entrance to an underground shelter. There was a bicycle repair shop which contained hand tools, such as hammers, wrenches, screwdrivers etc., and some shovels. There were two ammunition bunkers; the bunkers looked like craters, approximately eight feet in diameter and each had thatched overhead cover and no sides. The contents of the bunkers included small arms ammunition, small arms repair parts, Bangalore torpedoes, C-4, anti-tank mines, 25 containers of documents, a canister of opium and a duplication machine. (Make or origin of manufacture was not determined on any of the above items.) Another cache revealed large quantities of medical supplies, including vitamins (liquid) and penicillin. (Origin of medical supplies is unknown.) VN Rangers reported that they observed several typewriters and sewing machines (Singer type), in the complex. In the complex, a SCR 1694 radio (French make) was destroyed by the Rangers. The 3d Company departed the VC complex on an azimuth of 130 degrees for approximately one hundred and fifty meters to XT011751 and was attacked by a force of VC at three points. The VC force was estimated at two companies. The VC laid down a heavy volume of fire. AW and SA. The US advisors could not identify the MG fire. The 3d Company maintained contact with the VC element for approximately ninety minutes overall. During this period of time, a total of nine airstrikes were called on the VC position. Results of this contact were 3 VC KIA; friendly casualties were one US WIA, Benjamin, fragments in the left forearm and twelve VN WIA. The 3d Company called for reinforcements at 291605 hours.
The 5th Company was infiltrated on an LZ at XT007752; one Ranger was KIA by friendly fire during infiltration. The 5th Company was giving an azimuth of 90 degrees and four hundred meters by the FAC to effect linkup with the 3d Company. The 5th Company moved for three hundred meters to actually
linkup with the 3d Company. Enroute to linkup the US advisors with 5th Company stated that they crossed several trails that were well used, and saw a complex of bamboo structures at XT010754. In this vicinity, a VC KIA was observed and a Mosin-Nagant 7.62 Carbine was captured. One contact was made with 3d Company, one platoon from the 5th Company moved forward to cover the withdrawal of the 3d Company towards the LZ at XT006753. The remainder of 5th Company secured the LZ for evacuation of the 3d Company wounded and for the infiltration of 1st company (-) at 291845 hours. The Battalion (-) then formed a perimeter of defense on the eastern edge of the LZ for the remainder of the night. Airstrikes were directed on possible reinforcement routes throughout the night. A flareship and a C-47 (PUFF) provided air cover for the night.) Except for sporadic sniper fire, the night was uneventful and no further contact was made with the VC. All three companies were extracted out of the AO by 300855 September. There were many well used trails throughout the AO, many which appeared to lead into and out of the VC complex and could facilitate small vehicles and oxcarts. No booby traps or punji stakes were observed. There were no open bunkers, foxholes or trenches in the AO. There were apparent OP’s or LP’s in the AO. There were no signs of cultivated areas within the AO; one well was reported to be located in the vicinity of the kitchen in the VC complex. The VC uniforms varied; mixed green and black, green and khaki and full green uniforms were observed. VC weapons which were identified, included the French MAS 36, AK-47 assault rifle, K-50 Chicom SMG, SKS 7.62 Russian carbine, K-66 SMG and the Russian Chicom model 1944 Mossin-Nagant Carbine, 7.62 caliber. Captured material included (1) K-50 SMG, (1) K-66 SMG, (1) Mauser rifle (1) Rifle make unknown, (1) sewing machine (Singer), (2) pair binoculars, Make unknown, (2) Pocket compasses, (2) overlays of the IA Drang battle that took place with the 1st US Cavalry Division Nov 1965. Several dozen documents and personal items.
The estimated body count (60) enemy KIA is by US Advisors and VN Rangers.
4. Terrain Analysis. Movement within the AO was relatively easy. Secondary growth consist of scrubwood trees, vines, elephant grass and broadleaf evergreen. There was double and triple jungle canopy which afforded complete concealment from the air. The soil consisted primarily of sand, mixed with a small amount of clay. No running streams were observed throughout the AO.”37
During this operation Corporal Benjamin sustained shrapnel wounds but was treated in the field and continued the mission.
Another Ranger operation was conducted on October 2nd and 3rd 1966 to explore a previously identified regimental headquarters that had been bombed by B-52s a month earlier in September. The 1st and 5th Companies, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion and the 9th CIDG Company from Camp Trai Bi were inserted on the 2nd. The following is the debriefing report from the Operation 12-66 After Action Report.37
Debriefing Report Ranger Operation conducted by 1st and 5th Companies, 91st Airborne
Ranger Bn, and the 9th CIDG Company (SF Camp Trai Bi) 02-03 Oct 1966.
1. Company and US Advisors:
1st Co. (VN 93): LT Hamilton, SFC Winder, SP4 Dyer; 5th Co. (VN 91):LT Deaton, SFC Sommerhof, SSG Jantz; 9th CIDG Co.:SFC Pickleson, SP4 Taylor
2. Mission:To conduct search and destroy operations of known VC Regimental complex, vicinity XT050665.
3. The 1st, 5th and 9th companies were infiltrated on an LZ at XT053660 on 020745, 0755, and 0805, respectively. All three companies moved from the LZ in a column formation heading generally northeast through the AO. 5th company made contact with three VC. Fire was exchanged and the VC fled as the 5th company deployed on line. The US advisors called for an airstrike north of the company. Rockets were fired on the VC and two were probably KIA because of the large amounts of blood seen after the strike; the VC were not recovered. Two of the VC were armed with bolt action rifles and the third had an AW. Minutes after the strike, 9th company saw six VC moving west from the northwest corner of the LZ. Fire was exchanged and one VC was WIA. All three companies continued moving northwest through the AO. 1st company located a cache at XT056664; two huts and two hundred kilos of rice were destroyed by fire. One M-14 mine (US) was located near the cache. 5th company located a cache at XT058667; two huts and two hundred kilos of rice were destroyed by fire. All companies changed direction and headed for coordinates XT053678, to the northwest. 1st company saw a newly constructed tin hut in the vicinity of XT053678 and destroyed it with a shape charge. Near the tin hut, there was an ambush position on an east west trail; there were punji traps on both sides of the trail and AW positions covering the trail and the obstacles. All three companies moved to XT053681 and established a perimeter of defense for the night, ambush positions and patrols provided security for the main force. A newly dug ambush position was discovered on the west bank of the river at XT054682. Patrols dispatched north and south on the west side of the river reported that the VC had built ambush positions at virtually all possible fording sites between XT053 and XT054683. At 021945 one VC with an AW walked west on a trail at XT053683. The VC was fired upon but escaped apparently uninjured. With that exception, no contact was made after the companies had stopped for the night. At 030700 all companies formed with platoons on line and conducted a thorough search and sweep operation back through the AO, heading generally southwest. All three companies entered a VC regimental complex for a thorough search. During the search, one VN Ranger was KIA by a sniper, the sniper was fired upon and believed to have been wounded, but escaped. The KIA was extracted from an LZ at XT046664 at 031330. In the VC complex, two wells were destroyed by shape charges; two large kitchens and twenty barracks were burned. (The size of the kitchens and barracks were comparable to the size of a GP medium tent). Two thousand kilos of rice were burned and five hundred pounds of squash were, if you will, squashed. US C rations were seen in small quantities. Several of the structures had been partially damaged (B-52 strikes in early September) but were being repaired, and many new huts were being built in the vicinity of the B-52 strike zones. Three rope ladders, each one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet long, were hung from trees used as OP’s. The ladders were destroyed. The entire complex was constructed within a continuous rectangular shaped communication trench. Underground tunnels led from this trench to underground shelters, on the inside of the perimeter (see sketch). Several huts and entrenchments were observed around the complex, outside of the perimeter, probably positioned for watching trails. All three companies moved from the VC complex to the original LZ at XT052660 and were helilifted back to the base camp without incident. The last lift was extracted at 031525 hours. The VC which were seen in the complex wore mixed black and civilian attire; this may have been a labor party sent to restore the complex. US advisors stated that the B-52 strikes had hit the center of this complex and damaged or destroyed thirty percent of the structures within it.
4. Except for the debris which was strewn about by the B-52 strikes, movement was relatively easy in the AO. The jungle canopy averaged sixty feet in height from the ground, undergrowth consists primarily of broadleaf evergreen and scrub trees. Trees averaged sixty to one hundred and twenty five feet in height and six inches to eighteen inches in diameter. There were many streams in the AO, but none within the VC complex.”37
APPENDIX IV: THE BATTLE OF HUE, 1968, FROM A VIETNAMESE PERSPECTIVE
The Following document was produced by the South Vietnamese government after the 1968 Tet Offensive to document the real hatred and savagery demonstrated by the North Vietnamese and the local VC forces in their attack on the imperial city of Hue. It is included here as a reminder to all the readers who were not there that the Vietnam conflict was a nasty affair that took place for a reason. In spite of the brutality and atrocities wreaked upon them by the Communists, the people of Hue emerged with hope and resolve for a future free of oppression. This document was provided by Dennis McVey.
APPENDIX V: TIPS OF THE TRADE
This document courtesy of Dennis McVey.
Special Forces Combat Recon Manual
Republic of
Vietnam
POI 7658, Patrolling FTX
Prepared by Project Delta (B-52, 5th SFG)
HQ. NhaTrang
Attached are “Reconnaissance Tips of the Trade” prepared by Detachment B-52. Commanders of all units are encouraged to disseminate, widely, the information contained therein. The information presented in the attached “Recon Tips” is very appropriate for use in unit and individual training of US and indigenous personnel. Such information can be of significant value to units engaged in conventional patrolling as well as special reconnaissance units.
Detachment B-52, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces assembled the original document. Assistance was provided by personnel of B-52, MACV Recondo School and 5th SFGA Combat Orientation Course School, who contributed from their knowledge and experience. Special credit is given to MSG Norman A. Doney, 1 SG, CCC Recon Company for his assistance.
This document has been reviewed and annotated by Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces. For easy use and reference the document has been organized into annexes.
General Tips of the Trade
While on a mission, minimize fatigue because the tired become careless.
If you show confidence, your team will have confidence.
If the team leader loses his temper it will affect his judgment. Keep cool and think ahead, always keeping an alternate plan in mind. Don’t be afraid to take advice from your team member.