The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  The United States, concerned about Japanese aggression against China, put continual diplomatic pressure on Tokyo to end the war. Tokyo refused. As tensions grew Japan gained permission (through German persuasion) from the Vichy French to occupy French Indochina. Japan had also signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940. America was incensed at these moves, and in August of 1941 put an embargo on oil shipments to Japan.[253] This was a disaster for the Japanese because they obtained about 80 percent of their oil from the United States.[254]

  Japan decided war with the west was the only course open to them, and they began meticulous preparations for attacking the United States, British, Dutch, and Australian military units in the Pacific. The plan was to damage the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor then systematically move south, capturing the oil and resource-rich areas of the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Realizing the impossibility of successfully invading Australia or America, the plan required seizing large regions of the Pacific around their main objectives (Java, Singapore, Malaya, Borneo), thereby forcing the Americans and their allies to attack through the perimeter and march island by island to the Japanese homeland. Japan beleived Americans ought to tire of the war quickly, especially with defeats at sea and bloody island invasions sapping their morale, causing them to seek a negotiated peace. Japan would retain China plus whatever remained of her island empire. Many Japanese leaders realized a long war doomed Japan, but they hoped their calculations were correct and the United States and its Allies would quit after a short but bloody war.

  Some historians argue the United States forced the Japanese into war with its oil embargo. These historians think the US left the Japanese no choice; therefore, the United States brought the war on itself with short sighted polices leaving the Japanese without options.

  This position is brainless. All the United States was asking of Japan was to stop slaughtering the Chinese. Is that so hard? The Japanese simply desired war, even though many other options were open to them. If Japan pulled back from Indochina and stopped attacking in mainland China, the United States probably would have kept the oil flowing. America was deeply isolationist, and President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to avoid a war with Japan. Of the many courses of action open to Japan she decided only one was valid; thus, by absolutely rejecting all US demands she left war as the only option. National honor and the transition from a “have not” to a “have” nation all played key roles in Japanese thinking, but no matter how one slices it America was not threatening Japan or trying to expand American territory in the east. Expansion and war were Japanese national policies long before 1941, and China was the main target. It is interesting to note the USA had no plans to attack Japan over China. Because of isolationist sentiments, if Japan did nothing the USA’s only recourse was to economic sanctions.

  The decision for war in 1941 may have revolved around intelligence gained from the German seizure of a British ship carrying memos from a British war cabinet meeting. In the memos Britain stated it had no resources for defending its Asian Empire. Japan may have acted because this allowed them to capture Britain’s Imperial holdings and limited them to one bona fide adversary, the US Navy.

  Japan’s history included conducting surprise attacks before declaring war. Historically, these surprise attacks, such as Port Arthur before the Russo-Japanese War, heavily damaged the enemy’s naval capabilities giving Japan the edge. In 1905, Russia’s fleet had to sail long distances from the Black Sea to Japanese home waters and only then was able to engage Japan’s fleet. The Japanese were waiting, and they sallied forth at the best moment for the decisive battle with a tired and demoralized Russian enemy. After one splendid victory, shattering the enemy’s fleet, Russia requested terms. Knowing this, the US prepared for a surprise attack . . . right?

  Deciding Factors In the Pacific

  The Japanese would lose the war based on some of the factors listed below in no particular order:

  1. Japan’s false assumptions were the foundations of defeat. For example, Japan believed its fighting spirit was superior to the West. Japan viewed war as a spiritual fight most of all, and only Japan possessed the necessary spirit to win. Japan, limited by its prewar assumptions, stuck with their original war plan; however, the US Navy came up with stunning new ways of advancing across the Pacific which the Japanese failed to match. All their major prewar assumptions proved false.

  2. The Americans broke the Japanese codes which led to American victories at Midway, the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and other critical engagements. Assume Japan broke the American codes while the Japanese codes remained secure and the importance of code breaking becomes clear. Japan would know the US Fleet’s location, thus giving Japan a major advantage in each battle. Midway would turn into a terrible American loss, as would Guadalcanal and other crucial engagements.

  3. Lack of Japanese war-production capability. The island nation of Japan had a good ability to turn out war materials; however, that capacity was far below that of the United States alone. Add in the production of Britain and Japan was completely outclassed. For example, this chart is the merchant ship tonnage produced during the war:

  USA 33,993,230 tons

  Japan 4,152,361

  UK 6,378,899

  Italy 469,606

  4. Lack of production flexibility in developing better aircraft types, ships, or even small arms during the war. Japan could not effectively bring its war experience to its production lines, and failed to design newer and better weapons to place in the field.

  5. Lack of doctrinal flexibility. Once the Japanese decided how to fight the war they stuck with those ideas. Meanwhile, the Allies changed war itself. Island hopping was one innovation destroying the Japanese assumption that each occupied island must fall for the Allies to reach their homeland. Japan’s planners also failed to account for the effect of submarine warfare on their merchant fleet. Japan’s merchant fleet incurred heavy damaged before the Japanese responded, and even the late response remained insufficient.

  6. Staying with traditions too long. Because of the Japanese traditional belief in the decisive battle (one all or nothing battle), it became axiomatic to think about naval warfare those terms. The idea became an unstated assumption—which is the worst kind of supposition. This tradition (unstated assumption) remained unexamined and therefore unchallenged. Recognizing such an assumption is necessary for unclouded thinking. In fact, in a modern naval war the size of World War II many battles would take place and no one of them would be completely decisive. Another unstated, but natural, assumption was Japan would win the decisive battle. Even after several losses Japanese admirals kept saying that if they could bring the Americans into the decisive battle Japan could win the war. Japan’s leaders needed to recognize there were “decisive” battles, but Japan had lost them. In the Japanese mind this failed to compute, as Japan must win the decisive battle.

  The Japanese assumptions about America refusing to fight long wars were closer to reality in 1940 than one might think. In War Plan Orange, the battle plan for war with Japan, US Naval planners assumed a war must be won quickly or US citizens would revolt. Even in 1919, Orange planners assumed the war must be won in less than two years or voters would tire of the effort and make the political decision to quit. The redoubtable Admiral Mahan concluded the American public could not even tolerate a two year conflict. He believed, as did the Japanese, that American society was fickle and had no stomach for hardships. Naval planners predicted that Orange (Japan) would wage a war of endurance trying to outlast the US. It is plain that the original Japanese assumptions were near the mark. It was the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor, Japanese brutality, and effective propaganda management that allowed the US to fight on past two years. (P. 26-30, War Plan Orange, Miller, 1991, US Naval Institute).

  The stage was set for the largest naval war in world history, and it started with the United States, Britain, Holland, and Australia being frequently humiliated at the hands of the experienced and well prepared Japanese.

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  JAPANESE CENTRIFICAL OFFENSIVE

  1941 & 1942

  In my opinion, war is the art of ambush, and Admiral Yamamoto’s attack on Pearl Harbor was an excellent ambush.[255] Redact out Japanese bad luck at Pearl Harbor and the war’s history is different. Most documentaries covering the Japanese attack detail US errors, bad luck, and missed clues to the coming surprise attack. Seldom do such programs point out the Japanese errors or their extremely poor luck.[256] The key Japanese error was failing to launch a planned third wave attack against oil and dry dock installations at Pearl Harbor. Their bad luck included not finding the American carriers in port and not getting the declaration of war delivered on time. Japanese errors and bad luck actually exceeded the bad luck and errors of the Americans.

  Overwhelming US errors are well summarized in congressional investigations concluding there was a lack of “air mindedness” among American commanders. Also, while many calculated Japan would strike they assumed the strike location was the Philippines. Because of this false assumption when information came in suggesting an air attack on American units people were thinking Manila (in the Philippines) rather than Pearl Harbor. As a result surprise was total. The United States paid a heavy price for this surprise in men and material at Pearl Harbor.

  The Western Democracies were unprepared for modern war. They were lacking the men, equipment, training, and the hard attitudes necessary for victory. Peace movements following World War I are partly to blame. Peace movements argued anything was better than war. The US only slowly awoke to the fact that some things are worse than war. Slavery and murder at the hands of power-mad dictators for example, but it took time for the average person to see the truth. War or slavery was the choice. War it would be, but a war the Western Democracies were ill prepared to fight.

  Pearl Harbor was not the main objective of the overall Japanese offensive. Japan’s main goal was capturing the oil and resource-rich areas to the south of the Philippines, including Dutch Borneo, Sumatra, and Malaya. The attack on Pearl Harbor was aimed at crippling the striking power of the US Fleet long enough for the Japanese to seize their new empire and establish a defensive parameter. Japan needed to take key South and Central Pacific islands, build airfields, and fortify their positions against the eventual assault by the United States Navy.

  Pearl Harbor

  On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, at about 7:50 AM, 353 Japanese aircraft, flying in two waves, struck the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.[257] The US Pacific Fleet was smashed in one of the most successful attacks in history. The United States was at peace when the attack struck. Japanese diplomats in Washington DC were required to deliver a declaration cutting off all negotiations about thirty minutes before the attack. This message substituted for a formal declaration of war; however, Japan’s Washington Embassy did not have a good typist that day (it was Sunday and the secretaries were gone) so translating and typing the document took too much time. The result was the critical message telling America that Japan was breaking off diplomatic relations (going to war) arrived over an hour late. By then Pearl Harbor blazed with the wreckage of the US Fleet, and over 2,400 Americans lay dead from the assault.

  The late delivery of this crucial message was a political blunder of the highest order—right up there with the Zimmerman Telegram of WWI. This was now a sneak attack. Admiral Yamamoto himself stated, “I can think of nothing that would infuriate the Americans more . . .” He knew America well, and realized a sneak attack would drive the United States to crush Japan. After Pearl Harbor no terms were possible. Another result of Pearl Harbor was unintended; the sneak attack completely united the heretofore deeply divided nation. Prior to the raid, the United States was split between the isolationist and those wanting to enter the European war. Roosevelt promised in a speech for his unprecedented third term that he would not send US troops into a European war. Now that Hitler was conquering Europe the promise looked increasingly dumb; however, the Japanese attack coupled with Hitler’s declaration of war on the USA freed Roosevelt and Congress from any restraints.

  Figure 56 Pearl Harbor Air Raid, December 7, 1941

  The Pearl Harbor raid destroyed the mighty US battleships, but ships at sea dodged destruction and three US aircraft carriers, the raid’s main target, were at sea. This was blind luck and nothing else. Japan’s bad luck should include the fact that the Japanese took several precautions to ensure the carriers were at Pearl before the attack, but every one of the precautions failed. Providence dispensed two vital breaks to the United States of America: the first was an attack coupled with a political blunder that united the nation as nothing else could, and second was the miraculous deliverance of all its most vital aircraft carriers.

  Admiral Nagumo, the leader of the strike force hitting Pearl Harbor, decided to forgo the third wave attack on Pearl Harbor aimed at the construction yards, dry docks, and oil facilities. Because of this decision, made over the objections of the officers on his bridge, the United States was to have critical dry dock and oil facilities throughout the coming months when the Japanese had the edge in the Pacific. It was a poor decision, but Nagumo’s reasoning contained a bit of logic. He knew his force of six aircraft carriers were essential for the main thrust into the Southern Pacific. Nagumo also realized his main targets were not at Pearl Harbor, and he did not know where they were. If a US carrier surprised him he might have one or more of his carriers lost or heavily damaged. Nagumo stated it was going to be a long war (a different attitude from some of his superiors) and the aircraft, pilots, and ships would be needed. He did not want to lose them on a mission to tidy up the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nagumo’s first wave had lost 9 aircraft, but his second wave lost 20. A third wave assault might cost a lot more. In addition, waiting around for a third wave to return would take hours, and every hour exposed his fleet to assault by US submarines or carriers. His objective, crippling the US Fleet, was attained, so why incur additional risks?

  Looking back over sixty years Nagumo’s error appears appalling; however, we should try to put ourselves into the situation at the time of the attack and realize Nagumo focused on a broader picture that included the South Pacific. What really hurts Nagumo, from a historian’s point of view, is all his fellow officers were in favor of the third wave assault. None-the-less, Nagumo’s strike force sunk the US Fleet at a cost of 29 aircraft lost. A cheap victory.

  Japans’ Southern Offensive

  1941 & 1942

  Japan’s southern offensive was superlative. The closely planned attacks went off precisely and professionally with spectacular results. Everywhere Japan was ascendant. On most islands, such as Dutch Borneo, there was virtually no resistance, although Dutch engineers set the oil fields on fire, and the Japanese beheaded them for their trouble. Hong Kong, after light resistance, surrendered on Christmas Day 1941. There were two keys to the region: Singapore at the end of the Malay Peninsula (British), and Manila Bay in the Philippines (American). In both cases troops were available in sufficient numbers to put up a good fight, but in both cases, Japanese commanders utterly out generaled the Allied commanders, while inflicting appalling troop losses on the ill prepared Dutch, British, and US forces.[258]

  Singapore

  From Singapore the British could control the oil rich areas of the South Pacific. If this bastion held the Japanese would have trouble getting their merchant shipping back to Japan. When analyzing the defensive position at Singapore the English calculated an assault would most likely come from the sea. Of course, the British knew an assault could come down the Malaya Peninsula, but they assumed any such attack through the dense jungle would take months, giving them time to react. Unfortunately for the British the key to the area was no longer Singapore harbor, it was air power. The British long ago pulled most of their first line aircraft out of Malaya, and the remaining planes needed maintenance. The Japanese spotted the few completed air bases and quickly destroyed the sparse numbers of English aircraft. Japan
easily gained total air supremacy.[259]

  Even though resources were scarce, Churchill sent two of Britain’s most powerful ships to defend the Asian fortress: the Prince of Whales (a battleship) and the Repulse (a battle cruiser) along with four destroyers. When Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, commander of this striking force, gained intelligence of Japanese landings underway on the Malaya Peninsula he was determined to strike. He called for air cover from land-based aircraft, and he counted on darkness and poor weather to keep his ships invisible until he was on the Japanese transports, but luck had abandoned the striking force. On December 10, 1941, the weather cleared, no air cover appeared, and a Japanese submarine found the two large ships and reported their position. An all-out air attack sunk both ships in minutes.

  The sinking of these two capital ships was an important moment in history. Never before had capital ships under power at sea and ready for battle been destroyed by aircraft. For a decade, the battleship admirals had claimed aircraft could not sink a battleship underway and ready for action—at least not easily. Aircraft had easily sunk battleships moored in port with surprise attacks, but this time fully manned and ready battleships swiftly slid beneath the waves after an air attack at sea. About 300 years of history also slid beneath the waves as aircraft now ruled the seas, and ships carrying those aircraft became the capital ships of the fleet.[260]

  The British in Singapore were now without air cover or naval assets. Still, it seemed they should be able to significantly delay or stop a Japanese attack down the peninsula. In this they failed. British troops were not sufficiently trained in jungle warfare, did not possess the right equipment, and their commanders were unable to get a handle on how to stop the rapid Japanese advance. The Japanese were experienced jungle fighters and quickly outflanked defensive lines placed by the British. Consistently forced back, the British set up one defensive position after another, but flanking attacks, infiltration or landings from the sea jeopardized each site. Simple equipment, like the bicycle, hastened the Japanese advance leaving the British defenders reeling. Moreover, the Japanese brought tanks. British commanders thought the jungle was much too dense for tanks; nevertheless, like the Ardennes forest in Belgium, the Allies were mistaken once again. With tanks and bicycles the Japanese advanced rapidly keeping the English defenders off balance and preventing the construction of adequate lines of defense. By January 1942, the Japanese stood at the northern gates of Singapore.