The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  Figure 57 Japanese Advance on Singapore

  Singapore is an island, and the recently reinforced British forces should have held out against the exhausted Japanese force for months. Instead, Singapore was immediately subjected to artillery bombardment and aircraft attacks. The Japanese rapidly crossed to the island and captured the fortress in February of 1942. Approximately 130,000 men surrendered. It was a great defeat and the largest surrender in English history. Very few of these men ever saw Britain again. They would die of starvation and physical abuse in Japanese slave labor camps. The privates paid a high price for the ineffectiveness of their generals, as usual.

  This disaster falls completely upon the British commanders for failing to prepare the peninsula for defense through properly training and equipping their men, preparing dug in defensive positions well ahead of time, and properly positioning their lines. Another general was displaying similar incompetence in the Philippines, only this commander was American.

  The Philippines

  General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), an American icon lionized by the nation during and after World War II, was the man in charge of defending the Philippines and the vital harbor at Manila Bay. In this he utterly failed, causing thousands of men to die needlessly or suffer horribly at the hands of the merciless Japanese.

  Prior to World War II the United States, as nations always do, planned for a war with Japan.[261] The planners assumed Japan would invade the Philippines at the outset of war. War Plan Orange (the code name for the plan; orange being the code word for Japan) called for a retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and the small island of Corregidor guarding the entrance to Manila Bay, the best harbor in the region.[262] The Japanese would have to take Bataan to control the Philippines. MacArthur was to fall back to fully prepared positions on Bataan and Corregidor then hold out until the United States could send help. In fact, Washington knew help was impossible to send in a timely manner; as a result, the men on Bataan and Corregidor were doomed in all but the most favorable circumstances. The point of the defense was to prolong the conquest and remain a thorn in Japan’s side for as long as possible.

  Figure 58 Japanese conquest of the Philippines 1942

  MacArthur rejected this “defeatist” attitude and decided to defend the Philippines at the landing beaches and expel the invader. This was an unwise decision. The war planners in Washington knew the striking power Japan could bring against the isolated and distant islands and they knew the Japanese would have the initiative.[263] MacArthur decided on a defense requiring the American and Philippine forces to attack and repel the invader upon his landing. If the enemy took the beaches he would fight them all the way to Manila. Unfortunately, the Philippine forces were far from first line troops, and the American forces were few and without adequate equipment for such an adventure. In addition, MacArthur had no idea where the Japanese would land.

  It gets worse. MacArthur utterly failed to prepare a defense on Bataan. Moreover, no food or medical supplies were stored on the peninsula. MacArthur failed to follow orders, and he failed to develop a backup plan in case his new plan collapsed. American troops would pay the price in blood for MacArthur’s incompetence in this critical matter.

  Figure 59 Japanese assaults on Bataan 1942

  The Japanese landings took place in the northern areas of Luzon on December 10, 1942, and then quickly moved south toward Manila. Regretfully, for the Americans, the critical battle had already taken place. After warnings that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, and pleas from his air commanders to allow them to strike Formosa where the Japanese air forces were concentrated, MacArthur did nothing. Soon thereafter, MacArthur’s entire air force was destroyed on the ground by Japanese air raids. Without air cover the navy was forced to leave stripping the islands of everything except infantry forces. Japan moved forward with complete air and naval superiority. There was no hope now.

  Figure 60 Japanese Conquest 1942

  In spite of the loss of his air force and his naval support, MacArthur insanely went forward with his plan to meet the invader north of Manila. Japan’s excellent veteran troops with air and sea support routed the combined Filipino and American forces. The Japanese then began maneuvering to surround Manila where the Japanese assumed the Americans would make their last stand. This assumption helped with the withdrawal to Bataan. As a complete military disaster stalked the defenders, General Wainwright (MacArthur’s second in command) managed to reposition key units allowing the army to reach Bataan. However, MacArthur failed to prepare Bataan for a siege and the hastily retreating army took little food or medical supplies with them. Wounds, disease, and hunger proved to be an enemy every bit as strong and effective as the Japanese at eliminating the defenders.

  Bataan’s American and Filipino troops threw back Japanese attacks, including amphibious assaults on the western beaches; however, they continued falling back. Starving and ragged men fought while suffering from malaria and constant gnawing hunger. Food rations diminished to one thousand calories per day. Japanese artillery pounded the men, enemy aircraft bombed and strafed their positions, and to all this Allied soldiers possessed no effective answer. MacArthur kept demanding help from Washington, but after the defeat at Pearl Harbor no help was possible. The US Navy was just holding on around Australia, and the destruction of MacArthur’s air force doomed ships trying to gain access to Bataan, except occasional submarines and PT boats. The defenders fought on until May 8, 1942 when Wainwright surrendered the last of his emaciated command on Corregidor. The Philippines had fallen.

  MacArthur missed the surrender because he was in Australia demanding that Wainwright fight on. Escaping by PT boat on February 22, 1942, along with the president of the Philippines, he then went by aircraft to the comforts of Australia. After Wainwright surrendered MacArthur demanded he be court-martialed. President Franklin Roosevelt had appointed MacArthur as the US Army’s commander for the Pacific Theater of War. The starving dying men he left behind would never understand Roosevelt’s decision.[264]

  After the surrender of the Filipino and American forces the Japanese subjected the men to the vilest murder and torture. Japanese soldiers thought surrender was dishonorable, and quitting proved you were not a soldier. Few of the more than eighty thousand American and Filipino prisoners of war would return. Over twelve thousand died in the Bataan Death March alone. Meanwhile, from Australia, MacArthur avowed to the press corps, “I shall return . . .”[265]

  While the conquest of Bataan and Singapore continued, Japan also pushed a rapid advance through the South Pacific. Sea control was critical, thus, a combined Allied force of American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) ships under Admiral Doorman (Dutch navy) attacked the Japanese at the Battle of the Java Sea on February 27, 1942. The small fleet was making a last gasp attempt to slow the Japanese juggernaut. Due to poor coordination among the Allied ships, and excellent tactical control by the Japanese commanders, a smaller Japanese force annihilated the ABDA force.[266] ABDA lost 5 cruisers, 5 destroyers, and 2,300 sailors. The disaster is right up there with Pearl Harbor. Japan lost four loaded transports. By May 1942, the Japanese fleet of eleven battleships, ten aircraft carriers, eighteen heavy cruisers, and twenty-eight light cruisers plus numerous destroyers had campaigned from Pearl Harbor to the Indian Ocean without the loss of a single major ship. Along the way they destroyed or damaged every battleship in the US Pacific fleet, damaged the US Far East squadron at the Philippians, annihilated the ABDA naval force, chased the Royal Navy from the southern seas, and forced the Australian navy back to its home waters. Total victory sailed with Japan. The only forces left in the Pacific that threatened them were the three US aircraft carriers that Japan missed at Pearl Harbor.

  Admiral Yamamoto, Japan’s chief of naval operations, was lobbying for an effort in the Central Pacific to lure the US carrier fleet out to its destruction in a decisive action. He knew the United States would out produce Japan in a long war so he thought it a necessity to destroy the US aircraft car
riers now, before the US Fleet recovered from its defeats. The Japanese high command wanted to continue the push to the south and draw the US Fleet into an action there. Yamamoto argued the US Navy must believe a vital asset was in jeopardy before they would choose to do battle with the more powerful Japanese Combined Fleet. He believed actions in the south would not draw the US Navy into battle. By attacking and seizing Midway Island he threatened Pearl Harbor by putting it in bomber range. The Doolittle raid on Tokyo (April 18, 1942) decided the matter.[267] If a US carrier task force could threaten the emperor[268] that threat must be eliminated; thus, the high command agreed to Yamamoto’s plan but with substantial changes.

  Admiral Yamamoto’s plan was overly complex. It divided his forces in the face of the enemy, and it assumed the Americans would not fight unless forced to by dire circumstances.[269] Most military types will tell anyone who will listen that if you have the larger force use it all at one point of assault and gain absolute superiority over the foe. The Japanese plan put four carriers away from the main action at Midway. Two large carriers sailing with an invasion fleet to Port Moresby planned to return in time for the Midway action, but why take them so far away, and put them at risk, so near the date of the big show? These carriers failed to join the action at Midway, and this reduction of striking power haunted the Japanese fleet at the battle.

  Yamamoto’s plans began to go wrong quickly. At the Battle of the Coral Sea on May 4 through 8, 1942, only pilots from the aircraft carriers saw the other fleet. For the first time in history two fleets fought it out never coming in sight of one another. When it was over, the US Navy lost the heavy fleet carrier Lexington and the Japanese lost a light carrier (Soho). In addition, the US Fleet carrier Yorktown suffered extensive damage. The loss of the Lexington was a hefty blow to the US Navy. On the surface, it seemed the Japanese won another victory; however, two Japanese fleet carriers Shôkaku and Zuikaku lost a large number of aircraft and pilots, plus they suffered battle damage and returned to Japan for repair and replenishment of pilots and aircraft. Thus, two fleet carriers were lost to the Midway operation and the Japanese invasion fleet turned back, thereby failing to invade Port Moresby. The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first strategic defeat for the Japanese navy.

  The Japanese may have wondered why two US aircraft carriers happened to be hanging around the Coral Sea at that particular moment in time. It was not bad luck. The code breakers at Pearl Harbor’s station Hypo deciphered parts of a key Japanese code and through brilliant analysis unscrambled Yamamoto’s plan. Admiral Nimitz, now in charge of the US Pacific Fleet, had trusted his code breaking genius, Commander Rochqfort, and sent his carriers to intercept the Port Moresby invasion fleet. He would trust this same man and his team’s analysis again when they declared that Japan’s next objective was the tiny island of Midway. Nimitz sent ALL three of his available carriers to fight the Japanese fleet at Midway. By holding zero back Nimitz took a huge risk with his last and best naval units. Literally everything would ride on their performance and luck.

  The Battle of Midway

  June 4 to June 6, 1942

  Many historians consider the Battle of Midway as the turning point of the Pacific War, and one of the most important naval battles of all time. It is a complex battle where decisions by Nagumo (same admiral who led the Pearl Harbor attack), and persistent bad luck doomed all four fleet carriers of the Japanese strike force. Instead of ambushing the Americans and sinking their carrier fleet, the opposite occurred. For the US Navy and its three available carriers the Battle of Midway was an immense gamble. Battle damage to the USS Yorktown at the Battle of the Coral Sea, and six month repair estimates, only added to the risk. Nimitz ordered the repairs done in three days. American construction crews accomplished this marvel, and the Yorktown was off to the battle.[270]

  We cannot go into all the details of the battle here, but the results were four Japanese fleet carriers burned and sunk, and one American fleet carrier (the damaged Yorktown) was lost to Japanese submarine action after being badly damaged by air attacks. Japanese personnel losses were high as well (over 2,000), and all of those lost were highly trained and experienced flight crew members. Some blame Admiral Nagumo for the loss, complaining he lacked aggressiveness; nevertheless, the planners were actually responsible for the loss, because they cut the striking power of the Japanese carrier fleet by one-half in side show actions at the Coral Sea and the Aleutian Islands. Better luck would have helped the Japanese. One of their critical search planes launched behind schedule and spotted the US fleet much too late. In carrier battles, the first carrier to spot the other fleet and launch its aircraft has an immense advantage. The Japanese search pattern was not as concentrated as it could have been because the Japanese were operating on the assumption the US Navy would be absent.[271] In the matter of searching for the other fleet the Americans enjoyed a large edge in its very-long-range Catalina seaplanes operating out of Midway, and American intelligence reports predicting the enemy fleet’s approach headings.

  American luck, determination, and bravery played a large role in the battle. Commander Wade McClusky Jr, leader of a flight of USS Enterprise Dauntless dive bombers (SBD) running low on fuel, spotted a lone Japanese destroyer traveling at high speed and changed course to mimic the destroyer’s heading.[272] He found the Japanese carrier fleet and, unplanned, arrived over the enemy carriers concurrently with a flight of Yorktown’s SBDs led by Commander Maxwell Leslie.[273] Both attacked simultaneously without coordinating the attack. Japanese air cover was missing in action. The Zero fighters were landing to refuel after annihilating two flights of outdated American torpedo planes. Up until this moment in the battle numerous American attacks had scored no hits while suffering large losses.

  During this instant America’s only good weapon, the Dauntless dive-bomber, appeared above the Japanese carriers. Three Japanese fleet carriers became sinking infernos, helped along to their doom by their ordinance crews leaving bombs and torpedoes improperly stowed, adding to the damage when they detonated.[274] The remaining Japanese carrier, the Hiryu, struck back heavily damaging Yorktown, but Hiryu was sunk in turn by Dauntless strikes from the USS Enterprise.[275] The damaged Yorktown was later sunk by a Japanese submarine.

  Losing four first class carriers and their crews was a massive blow to the Japanese navy.

  In several books on the battle, the titles sum up most people’s views on the action: Miracle at Midway, by Gordon Prange, and Incredible Victory, by W. Lord. Nimitz risked it all and won. After Midway, Yamamoto realized it was necessary to go over to the defensive and await the US Navy’s assault on the Empire’s vast new perimeter.

  The South Pacific and Indochina

  As all this transpired, the Japanese army was trying to conquer the rest of Indochina and New Guinea. The Japanese army and navy were also pushing south down the Solomon island chain toward Fiji and New Caledonia to establish air bases and make supplying Australia problematical for the Americans.

  Since Japan was having trouble conquering China they decided to isolate the country by cutting off all outside help. To this end, they captured all of China’s major coastal harbors and towns by 1940. Japan attacked and gained control of Burma, cutting the Burma Road that was bringing supplies to the Nationalist Chinese. The United States flew supplies over the Himalayan mountains to China month after month in an effort to keep China in the war. Keeping China fighting and tying down Japanese resources there was a major US war aim.

  In Burma, the Japanese administered a resounding defeat upon the English. Now the Japanese controlled all of Indochina and its vital natural resources. Burma was lost because of superior Japanese jungle fighting methods, Japan’s complete control of the air, superior numbers where it counted, and the toughness of the Japanese soldiers.[276] Japan was now on the border of India, but with long supply lines. Many feared Japan would go forward and conquer at least part of India; however, Japan’s resources were stretched to the limit. In fact, she had overextende
d herself dramatically. This error would compound other Japanese mistakes, thus making the defense of her newly won empire much harder.

  In New Guinea, the Japanese again proved their robust nature. Since the invasion convoy bound for Port Moresby turned back after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese decided to assault the port by crossing the Owen Stanly Mountains dominating the center of the island. The Allies, as usual, thought this mountain range was impassable because of height (over 6,000 feet high), extremely rugged terrain, and the uniquely hostile jungle. The Japanese thought otherwise, and attacked over the Kokoda Track in July of 1942. The Australians fought all the way but fell back just the same. The Australians and Americans dug in just outside of Port Moresby, determined to make a last stand.[277] In January 1943, thirty two miles from Port Moresby, the Japanese force received orders to turn back because of events on Guadalcanal. Reluctantly, the Japanese began their retreat. Nonetheless, the accomplishment of crossing the Owen Stanly range against stiff Australian resistance was a remarkable military accomplishment. The retreat also showed the psychological effects of war, as the same Japanese soldiers who went forward eating grass while shrugging off disease and the effects of battle while they were winning, lay down and died after they started losing. Victory gives men hope and purpose while defeat saps them of life itself.