The Super Summary of World History

by Alan Dale Daniel

  Port Moresby remained under Allied control. Later, after a fierce set of battles on the border between India and Burma, the British forces successfully blocked the threat to India. In the Solomon Islands the Japanese were still advancing south down the island chain, building airbases as they went and putting garrisons on each island. The code breakers found clues the Japanese were building an airbase on the island of Guadalcanal. Another chapter in the Pacific War was about to open.

  Guadalcanal

  August 7, 1942 to February 9, 1943

  This was the campaign (note: not a battle, a campaign or series of battles) that broke the back of Japan’s offensive power.[278] Midway certainly took the initiative away from the Japanese Empire, but Guadalcanal damaged their military nearly beyond repair. The Japanese losses in merchant shipping during the campaign were high, and this was one of the weakest areas of Japanese war preparation and production. Japanese and American losses in the campaign were steep. The difference was the Japanese faced a much harder task making up their losses in men (especially aircrew) and materials.

  Ground Losses:

  US—1,768 dead

  Japan—25,600 plus another 9,000 dead of disease (estimates)

  Naval Personnel Losses:

  US and Allies—4,911

  Japan—3,543

  Ship Losses:

  Allied—29 (does not include merchant shipping)

  Japanese—38 (does not include merchant shipping)

  Aircrew Losses:

  US—420

  Japan—1,200 (estimates)

  Aircraft Losses:

  US—615

  Japan—880 (estimates)

  The campaign for Guadalcanal centered on Henderson Field and air control. The US Marines landed on the island of Guadalcanal August 7, 1942 at the behest of Admiral King, the US Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral King realized a Japanese airfield at Guadalcanal was a threat to Australian supply lines; conversely, the US lacked the resources for such an early offensive move. Accepting the risk of defeat, King ordered a US Marine assault. (Like all leaders, he accepted the risk of getting a lot of other people killed) After an unopposed landing the marines successfully captured the nearly completed Japanese airfield. Completion of the airfield by the troops and engineers was urgent because Japan was moving swiftly to annihilate the US effort.

  On the night of 8 August 1942, the US Navy and its Allies suffered a signal defeat at the hands of a Japanese cruiser force commanded by Vice-Admiral Mikawa off Savo Island. The Japanese skillfully avoided two Allied picket destroyers, completely surprising several Allied cruisers. Four Allied cruisers were sunk (one Australian, three American), plus one cruiser and two destroyers were damaged. 1,270 Allied sailors died, and 790 wounded.[279] The Japanese suffered light damage on three of its cruisers and about fifty killed. The Japanese force was set to destroy the still loaded transports and the supplies stacked high on the beach when, mysteriously, Vice Admiral Mikawa withdrew as he was on the verge of total victory. Why he failed to bombard the unprotected transports is a hard question. Admiral Mikawa stated aircraft could attack his ships at first light unless he got out of flight range. The decision was a tide-turning event. If he sank the supply transports and bombarded the supply stacked beaches a swift withdrawal would have been the only choice for the Americans. To protect seven cruisers Vice-Admiral Mikawa sacrificed an early and decisive win at Guadalcanal.

  Some people reading about naval warfare erroneously think warships are the key to victory. The king of the seas is the transport—the lowly supply ship—that trundles along without glory or much of anything else. The carrier may be the queen of the seas and all the other warships the royal entourage; however, they all exist to get the cargo ship to its destination quickly and safely. That is why the Germans knew they could win the war with England if they could sink enough transports. All the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and carriers in the English naval inventory would mean nothing if the transports were sunk. Who can eat a battleship? Do the soldiers, no matter how brave and resourceful, stand a chance without bullets? As Japan found out on Guadalcanal, troops who are starving to the point of death seldom attack enemy positions acceptably.

  Recall that the US code breakers were unable to read Japan’s codes for months because of cipher changes after Midway; however, the United States did have a unique source of intelligence during the Solomon campaign, the Australian Coast Watchers. Hiding in the jungle with radios they transmitted vital information to the Americans on Guadalcanal. To illustrate; if US Marine pilots knew early enough Japanese air attacks were on the way they could scramble their Wildcat fighters and climb above the incoming raiders, then dive down on them as they approached the island. This tactic inflicted additional Japanese losses because the Wildcat performed best in a dive. Failure to warn the Wildcats soon enough would mean much higher US losses. Without the Coast Watchers every Japanese raid would be a near surprise.

  The numbers of naval and air assets favored Japan at the start. Because of the threat of continued Japanese assaults on the transports, Admiral Turner, in overall charge of the Guadalcanal operation, decided to withdraw the navy along with the precious transports that were still partially loaded. His decision left the marines in the lurch without sufficient supplies, ammunition, or equipment. For months the US Navy opted for small convoys delivering just enough ammunition and food to Guadalcanal for the troops and airmen to carry on.[280] Somehow, with a minimum of supplies and support, the US Marines and US Army held on halting several Japanese assaults on Henderson Field’s perimeter. If Japan’s troops broke through and took the airfield it would be over for the invaders. Henderson Field was the key to the campaign.

  Both navies began to understand that controlling the Slot was vital to winning the island contest. As a result, a number of naval battles took place around the Solomon Islands deciding the fate of the marines and army troops on Guadalcanal every bit as much as the ground fighting. Some of the sea battles were: the Battle of Savo Island, Battle of the Eastern Solomon’s, Battle of Cape Esperance, Naval Battles of Guadalcanal, the Battle of Tassafaronga, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. In these exchanges both navies suffered high losses. More than once the US Navy was down to one operational carrier (the Enterprise once, and the Hornet once). In this naval war of attrition Japan could only lose. American production and training capability were coming on line and with it a massive outpouring of new and better equipment with torrents of well-trained men to accompany that equipment. Japan boasted an excellent navy at the war’s beginning, the equal of any in the world with its high training standards, fine ships, and aircraft. With this kind of force there is a need to strike swiftly and withdraw. In a war of attrition, the side with the largest army (or navy) and the best production ability wins.

  While Japan’s generals were planning another large offensive to throw the Americans off Guadalcanal, the Japanese merchant marine reported they lacked the shipping to support an attack. Japan needed all its transport capability to keep shipping war materials to the home islands; thus, no transports could be spared for Guadalcanal. Japan decided to leave the island. The Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal was a perfect operation. The Americans discovered the retreat after an unopposed offensive found a few starving, sick, and abandoned Japanese troops.

  Midpoint in the Second World War Europe: Key Decisions

  July 1942 - June 1944

  By mid-1942, important milestones approached the warring parties. In the East, Russia held on at enormous cost, saving Moscow, but the Germans retained the initiative. In the West, France was conquered, but England fought on while Spain stayed out.[281] In the Atlantic, German submarines won some significant victories, but Allied losses remained low enough to sustain the war effort. On the Pacific front, Japan swept all before it until the Coral Sea and Midway where she suffered strategic defeats.

  Each warring power now faced a few critical decisions:

  1) The Allies knew they must stay on the offensiv
e and keep the Axis on their heels. In war conferences between the British and Americans prior to December 1941, they agreed Germany must be defeated first. The Allies continually held conferences during the war to decide what course of action was best for all concerned. This kept the Allies on the same page allowing a coordinated response to disorderly events. Good planning was a hallmark of the Allied powers.

  2) Japan’s Pacific defeats made the decisions for them. Japan’s reverses put it on the defensive. She was smarter than Hitler in this respect because Japan at least recognized the changing situation. The empire could attempt to make headway against China, but even this would be difficult. Japan decided to defend its gains with fierce efforts aimed at causing her antagonists unacceptable losses. In retrospect, this was an appropriate decision because Japan was overextended and probably should have made this decision sooner.

  3) The best German generals knew they had lost the war. However, Hitler demanded offensives in the East with the aim of destroying the USSR. This was another bad foundational decision by the Fuehrer. Germany’s best move was to adopt the strategic defensive, retreat to better lines of defense, and use its still ample mobile reserves to demolish Soviet advances.[282] The Germans would hope to bleed the Soviets until they decided to quit, and then attack in the west. However, Hitler demanded new offensive victories. This decision was opposed by the German general staff, and held extraordinary risks.

  Axis (mis) Management

  Both Germany and Japan conquered huge resource-rich areas with large numbers of people that, if used correctly, would add immeasurably to their industrial and military power. If Hitler had convinced people in the conquered areas of Russia and Eastern Europe to work and fight for him millions of additional men would be available to supplement his industrial and armed forces. If the Japanese had worked at creating a true cooperative effort within their conquered territories they too might have enjoyed additional war making potential. Fortunately for the Allies, the Axis utterly squandered these potential assets.

  By mismanagement on a scale beyond comprehension Japan and Germany turned conquered peoples against them, failing to obtain a good return on the raw materials and physical assets they captured. The Axis planned for wars of conquest, but they failed to effectively plan for the well-organized use of their conquered resources during the war. They assumed that once these assets were seized they would simply do what they wanted with them (including the people). To their consternation people resisted murderous oppression and raw materials failed to simply up and move themselves to factories in the homeland. The skilled workers who knew how to extract the raw materials often ran away to avoid the oppressors. Those staying were enslaved, so they worked slow and made many “mistakes.”

  A key element in this lack of resource management was failing to convince conquered peoples to join the fight against the Allies (especially the Russians). There were exceptions, but as a rule, people “liberated” by the Japanese and Germans found them harsh taskmasters. As a result, they came to resent their Axis overseers and refused to serve as their soldiers. Compare this result to the communist Chinese who recruited the central government’s own people to fight for them in China’s civil war. Had the Axis consistently convinced even a small percentage to join their camp a lot could have changed. This failure by the Axis to show proper concern for people falling under their sway was central to their loss of WWII. It seems no single decision drove this course of action. This was just collective stupidity on an extraordinary scale.

  Hitler Attacks in the East

  1942

  ( . . . or What’s in a name?)

  In the summer of 1942 Hitler began operations to capture large amounts of land and resources south of Moscow. In this region there were ample supplies of oil, grain, and raw materials that could help the Nazi war machine. The attack’s direction surprised the Soviets and initially allowed the Germans to make good ground. Note that Stalingrad was NOT originally a major target of the advance.

  As the German offensive wore on the front expanded. It was like going up a funnel rather than down; thus, German units became widely separated. Non-German units began to move into the line to fill the voids left by the expansion of the front. German units were superior to Italian, Romanian, and other friendly Axis forces in the quality of their equipment and training. Even in static defense non-German units could not repel a strong Soviet attack. As the Germans moved into Stalingrad the Soviets began reinforcing the city. If the Germans had moved swiftly the city would have fallen early, but hesitation resulted in disaster. As at Leningrad, the failure to take Stalingrad in a timely manner had dire unforeseen consequences. At Leningrad the result was a long siege where the Soviets retained the city. At Stalingrad the results were crippling German losses of men and material.

  Figure 61 German Summer Offensive 1942

  Before the battle at Stalingrad began the German general staff recommended bypassing the city, but Hitler thought he must conquer the city named after his archenemy. In making this irrational decision, Hitler condemned his forces to the type of battle every German general wanted to avoid. The entire point of the German Blitzkrieg was maneuver, that is, avoid the WWI style clash of attrition. Fighting in Stalingrad was committing the German Army to the wrong type of fight. Moreover, Hitler ordered his Sixth Army into a head-on clash against a Soviet army outnumbering his troops and fighting on smashed city terrain ideal for defense. Worse, the Soviets were receiving ample supplies and reinforcements. Worse yet, on the flanks of Stalingrad non-German units were in place because of a lack of Nazi units, and these flanking forces were not positioned for in-depth defense. The German line was therefore very weak at vital points on the flanks of the city.[283]

  After a colossal struggle the Sixth Army reached the Volga (the river running on the eastern side of Stalingrad) leaving only a few Soviet pockets of resistance. At Stalingrad it was said even the rats fled the city, only men remained. Homo sapiens alone could inflict or withstand such slaughter. The battle’s descriptions are unbelievable. During the horror of the fight inside the city, Soviet General Zhukov was assembling forces outside the city on the German flanks. After months of building up, he was ready to spring his great trap. It was winter, and the freezing conditions impeded movement by the mixed Axis forces; conversely, these same conditions were ideal for the Soviet counterstrike designed to break through positions held by non-German troops and encircle the German Sixth Army in Stalingrad.

  It was November of 1942 when massive Soviet attacks surprised and scattered Romanian units guarding Stalingrad’s flanks. A shallow Soviet double envelopment surrounded von Paulus’ army in the city. General von Manstein, leading a counterattack by the redoubtable Forth Panzer Army, tried to reach the trapped men but fell a few miles short. Von Manstein ordered Von Paulus to attack toward him to complete the breakout. Von Paulus refused saying it was impossible; however, the trapped general previously radioed Hitler requesting permission to break out, but Hitler refused (There’s a surprise). Hitler’s “not one step backward” order condemned the German Sixth Army and the foolishly loyal von Paulus to a sub-zero deathtrap.

  After withstanding weeks of Soviet bombardment, little food, dwindling ammunition, and no heat Von Paulus surrendered his army in January of 1943. Over 330,000 German soldiers were killed or captured in the pocket, and probably a year’s worth of production from German factories vanished. Total losses for the Wehrmacht in the fight for Stalingrad were approximately 750,000. This was a grave defeat for the Wehrmacht and Germany, and they never recovered. Remember, the USSR suffered worse defeats in 1941 and not only survived but also regrouped, launching large counterattacks before Moscow. The fact that this defeat could finish Germany shows how thin their prospects of victory were in June of 1941. Stalingrad, with its constant attrition of German forces followed by the death of an entire German Army, wrecked all chances for success. The Soviets were on the offensive and receiving massive amounts of supplies from the USA and the United Kin
gdom. After Stalingrad, the power-hungry Stalin would strike until he possessed Hitler’s head and Germany’s homeland.

  Hitler fought on, ordering one more offensive (limited—at Kursk), but the war in the East was impossibly lost. As usual, Adolf Hitler continued issuing “stand fast” orders only to witness his men’s extinction in the thunder and fire of massive Soviet mechanized assaults. Operation Bagration’s annihilation of Army Group Center[284] in June of 1944, blew open the door to Germany by virtually eradicating the Wehrmacht’s ability to defend the fatherland. Hitler’s unmitigated incompetence lost Germany’s best troops in the snow and mud of the USSR. He was next.

  Eastern Front 1942 and 1943—Advance to the Black Sea from Stalingrad

  War In The Atlantic

  January 1942 and beyond

  In January 1942, Admiral Donitz sent his U-boats west to attack shipping along the Atlantic seaboard of the wholly unprepared United States. Only a few submarines were available for this task, and the long voyage was a difficult mission for the Germans. The German submariners packed every inch of their undersea boats with food and supplies. To assist the assault, the Germans thought up special types of submarines called Mulch Cows that carried supplies to the central Atlantic and resupplied the submarines on station, thereby allowing them to remain in the critical war zone much longer.[285]

  This assault on US shipping in American home waters was a phenomenal success. US merchant ships sailed alone, no convoys, and often sailed at night while US cities continued to burn their lights, creating perfect silhouette targets for the Germans. Often, the subs attacked at night on the surface using deck guns rather than the more valuable and limited torpedoes.[286] The British hounded the United States to adopt the convoy system, which Admiral King, commander of the US Navy, refused to do in spite of the fact the US Navy knew from WWI that convoys worked. Three hundred and ninety-seven (397) cargo ships hit the ocean bottom between January and June of 1942. This was a naval and logistics disaster. Admiral Earnest King was the man solely responsible for the failure to adopt convoys, a known remedy for submarine attacks. As merchant ships sailing along the US Atlantic coast plunged to the ocean floor, King steadfastly maintained that he did not have enough escorts for convoy protection and stated that a weakly protected convoy was worse than no convoy.[287]