Listening In: The Secret White House Recordings of John F. Kennedy

by Ted Widmer

  JFK: Yeah.

  SMATHERS: But they want to try and get a settlement then and …

  JFK: Who’s Southern?

  SMATHERS: Huh?

  JFK: Who’s … Well, you explained to them what I think their problem is?

  SMATHERS: Yes.

  JFK: And they’re conscious of it, are they?

  SMATHERS: Yes, sir.

  JFK: I see.

  SMATHERS: Yes, sir, and they, they really, they all agree that this fellow shouldn’t be there. I said, “Why in the hell did you get him there …”

  JFK: Yeah.

  SMATHERS: … for Christ’s sake.

  JFK: Yeah.

  SMATHERS: Well, he said, he was the man, I don’t know, a couple of big railroad presidents wanted him.

  JFK: Yeah.

  SMATHERS: But there’s, there’s some real bright fellows and the one I talked to is bright?

  JFK: I’d let him work in the offices preparing the material, but I’d let some real charming fellow …

  SMATHERS: That’s right.

  JFK: … be their front man.

  SMATHERS: Dan Loomis19 ought to do it, see. He’s a …

  JFK: Well, I don’t think, you know, they’re not playing for marbles now ’cause we’re in it.

  SMATHERS: That’s right.

  JFK: So I don’t think they ought to worry about whether Wolfe’s feelings are hurt. If he’s not the right fellow to accomplish what we want, then …

  SMATHERS: That’s right.

  JFK: … they ought to get the guy with more charm than anybody else. I mean, let Wolfe mastermind it, but let this guy put it …

  SMATHERS: You’re right.

  JFK: … in a much more gracious, graceful way. That’s my judgment to them.

  SMATHERS: Well, I’m not, I’m just making it my own judgment.

  JFK: Yeah.

  SMATHERS: … and at least leaving you out, if it’s all right.

  JFK: But I’d put it pretty strong.

  SMATHERS: Well, I am.

  JFK: OK.

  SMATHERS: All right, sir.

  JFK: Right.

  SMATHERS: That Star editorial doesn’t bother you, does it?

  JFK: Which one?

  SMATHERS: Last night.

  JFK: I didn’t read it, fortunately.

  SMATHERS: Well, it’s …

  JFK: What was it on? You?

  SMATHERS: No, it was on you. [laughter] You know, you know, I … If it was on me, I would scream early. [laughter] As I said yesterday, oh, Christ, Drew Pearson20 is getting ready to write a mean one on me again about some colored property my father owned.

  JFK: Oh, well, we don’t even think about that crap. We got so many that I don’t read all those.

  SMATHERS: I know it. I think you’re doing fine. I say you’re strong. God damn, you’re gonna carry Florida.

  JFK: OK, OK, see you later.

  SMATHERS: OK.

  JFK: OK.

  SMATHERS: Bye-bye.

  CALL TO LOU HARRIS, AUGUST 23, 1963

  JFK was a voracious consumer of political information, whether it came from newspapers, friends, or professional pollsters. In the latter category, Lou Harris was a favorite, dispensing quick and sometimes hard information, with efficiency and topicality. Born in 1921, Harris was four years younger than Kennedy, and in his own way was bucking the political establishment, bringing up-to-the-minute information from the American people to the salons and solons of Washington. In 1960, JFK hired him to conduct polls for his campaign, and Harris continued to advise him during his presidency. In 1962, Harris devised the system of computer analysis of key precincts that would allow news organizations to project winners of elections.

  JFK: Hello.

  HARRIS: Mr. President.

  JFK: Lou, how are you?

  HARRIS: Just fine, sir. We’re going to the field with a study here, and I just wondered on a number of things, what you might want in. We’re going to test a lot of these pairings, like Goldwater and Rockefeller, and Romney, and I thought maybe Nixon, what do you think about that?

  JFK: Um.

  HARRIS: See where he sits.

  JFK: Of course, he’ll run the strongest, won’t he?

  HARRIS: I think he might. I also think he’d probably be a pretty good opponent.

  JFK: Yeah.

  HARRIS: But then, what about [unclear], what do you think about him?

  JFK: Yeah, he doesn’t have the strength, but, I mean, put him in. You’ve kept Romney at those same figures, didn’t you? I thought that you were going to change them.

  HARRIS: No, sir, to be perfectly frank about it, the Newsweek fellows got hold of them, and there’s nothing I could do about them. I don’t think he came out that strong.

  JFK: No, as a matter of fact, it was submerged by the Eisenhower story.

  HARRIS: Yeah. Which I think was all right, don’t you?

  JFK: Yeah. It doesn’t make any difference.

  HARRIS: It’s a good way to show where their real strengths lie.

  JFK: Of course, Eisenhower’s strength is rather special, Nixon would be a better test.

  HARRIS: Nixon would, yes. If there’s any Republican …

  JFK: That’s right, he’s not a party figure, because of that military background.

  HARRIS: Now we are going to get a full read on the whites, on this whole Negro thing, that’s something people want very strongly and I think especially …

  JFK: I have the impression this thing’s cooled off a bit, but I may be wrong.

  HARRIS: Well, I think we will find that out. We’re also going to do a before and after on this March on Washington thing. A lot of people say … But unless something will take place, I’m not sure it will have that much effect one way or the other.

  JFK: Yeah, yeah.

  HARRIS: Then on the other issues, I want to get a read to see how much good the test ban has done here.

  JFK: Yeah, I’d be interested in that.

  HARRIS: And whether they’ve fallen at all for this idea that all of a sudden we’re great pals with Russia. [unclear] We’ll have something, it will break at the time of the railroad strike. See if there’s much credit on that. There’s some indication there is credit from the last one on that.

  JFK: Yeah, yeah.

  HARRIS: And then the whole area of foreign aid. See how much that has done.

  JFK: And the tax cut? Say, that tax cut vote was pretty bad before. What was your question, Lou?

  HARRIS: We’ve got three on tax cut, actually. You know, I’m coming [out?] with something on that, Mr. President, which I think will put it in perspective. The fact is, if you ask people if they’re in favor of a tax cut, and you’ll get about two to one in favor of a tax cut. But then you ask them, do you think that if we don’t have a tax cut, or if we have a tax cut, do you think that will help the economy of the country, and there you get about two and a half to one.

  JFK: Yeah.

  HARRIS: And [then you ask], would you rather delay the tax cut until the budget is solid, and then you get about a fifty-fifty split.

  JFK: Yeah, that’s right. I understand that.

  HARRIS: So the answer is, I think, is, that as long as the tax cut is justified … concern it will help the economy … I think it will go … some of the people [skip] trying to defend the idea that—of it will. It’s never been called that way …

  JFK: Yeah.

  HARRIS: I think you’ve been absolutely right in the way you’ve pushed it, the last couple months. That beginning, when [unclear] got up and tried to convince people that spending is a sound idea … was just murder on it.

  JFK: Well, I thought I’d make a television speech before it came up for a vote.

  HARRIS: Well, I think that’s good. Do you think it will go through?

  JFK: Well, I think so but I’m afraid the Republicans will try to put a limitation on it. God, they are obstructionist! I haven’t really talked much about it, but I …

  HARRIS: The other thing is, if
you think it would be helpful to have a whole series on Congress, because I think people are really getting sort of fed up with Congress.

  JFK: Yeah.

  HARRIS: I don’t see why you should be the one to take the rap on it.

  JFK: Why don’t you …

  HARRIS: I have this feeling, Mr. President, that people are more and more aware on the issues, and know the congressmen less, than the other way around. In Washington, you get the feeling that it’s only the congressmen that count, and the issues don’t matter. I think if we can point that out, it would be very helpful.

  JFK: I think if you could ask if they approve or disapprove of Congress, a lot of these things …

  HARRIS: That’s right, I could ask a whole series on that.

  JFK: When will you be finished?

  HARRIS: We’ll have this back out, probably at the end of next …

  JFK: I think you’ve had good interesting stuff. I think the Eisenhower was an interesting, sort of, new, different thing.

  HARRIS: Right.

  JFK: Where is Gallup? What’s he doing these days? Does he have a new one coming up?

  HARRIS: Well, I don’t know. He had an awful thing on Negroes the other day, asked whites, “Do you think Negroes in your community really have an equal chance? Or do you think they get a bad break or something?”

  JFK: Yeah.

  HARRIS: I don’t know. I think I’d give him a fifty [unclear] to be perfectly honest, that’s what I’ve heard. We’re picking up quite a number of papers now.

  JFK: Are you?

  HARRIS: Yes, sir. They would syndicate it, we’re going to dry run it, right up to Labor Day. But then the Detroit Free Press, the Knight papers picked it up, the [unclear] papers. Newsday up here in New York.

  JFK: I should think every city that didn’t have Gallup, that wasn’t a paper that didn’t have Gallup, would love to have you.

  HARRIS: Well, I think we can get that. Now Mr. President, I do have a couple of ideas on ’64 that I think have some merit, one on the whole South thing, and one on this education issue. I’ll be down Tuesday, and I’ll talk to Evelyn about that.

  JFK: OK. OK.

  HARRIS: … if you’d like to see me.

  JFK: I think the problem of the South, of course, those last figures were pretty bad, Gallup had me beat …

  HARRIS: Well, he’s got you so far out in the East, and so low in the South. I’m sure that Eisenhower would be ten points over on the North, I mean the East, and eight points below in the South. So I think …

  JFK: Is that right? You don’t think we’re in that bad shape in the South?

  HARRIS: No, sir, and I can’t believe that 74 percent. That’s running as well as you did in Massachusetts. And I can’t believe it. And my concern there is, he’s going to have you falling ten points in the next three months. Which is bad. I think it’s far more leveled out than that. On the South, I feel very strongly now that I think that, maybe you don’t do it until after the session, but I think the governors are far better than the senators at this point, they’re the guys that really have the political muscle. And I think a great deal can be done there. I have some ideas, should I write something out?

  JFK: OK, fine, I’ll see you next Tuesday.

  CALL TO MAYOR RICHARD DALEY, OCTOBER 28, 1963

  As the Civil Rights Bill moved forward across the summer and fall of 1963, Kennedy needed to muster all of his allies to advance the cause. When an Illinois Democratic congressman named Roland Libonati defected, there was only one recourse, and that was to call the legendary political boss of Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley. Daley was an old friend who still wielded extraordinary influence and had helped Kennedy carry the crucial state of Illinois in 1960. In this call, Mayor Daley minces no words, telling the President that Libonati will “vote for any goddamned thing you want.” But Daley’s grip was slipping; Libonati did not support the bill. He did, however, pay the expected price, and was not a candidate for renomination in 1964.

  JFK: … with that Judiciary Committee trying to get this Civil Rights together …

  DALEY: Yeah.

  JFK: Roland Libonati21 is sticking it right up us.

  DALEY: He is?

  JFK: Yeah, because he’s standing with the extreme liberals who are gonna end up with no bill at all. Then when we put together, he’ll, gonna vote for the extreme bill. Then I asked him, If you’ll vote for this package which we got together with the Republicans which gives us about everything we wanted, and he says, “No.”

  DALEY: He’ll vote for it. He’ll vote for any goddamned thing you want.

  JFK: [laughter] Well, can you get him?

  DALEY: I surely can. Where is he? Is he there?

  JFK: Well, he’s in the other room.

  DALEY: Well, you have Kenny, tell Kenny to put him on the wire here.

  JFK: Or would you rather get him when he gets back up to his office? That’s better, otherwise, ’cause he might think …

  DALEY: That’s better. But he’ll do it. The last time I told him, “Now look it, I don’t give a goddamn what it is, you vote for anything the President wants and this is the way it will be, and this is the way we want it, and that’s the way it’s gonna be.”

  JFK: That’d be good.

  DALEY: I’ll get him as soon as he gets back to the …

  JFK: [laughs]

  DALEY: What are they trying to do, they got you hanging under …?

  JFK: Well, we’re gonna, we have a chance to pull this out.

  DALEY: Yeah, but …

  JFK: But you see, of course, these guys, they …

  DALEY: What the hell’s the matter with our own fellows?

  JFK: That’s why, well, it’s good. Krol was … Philadelphia. Billy got him, and if you can get Libonati.

  DALEY: Well, I’ll [catch?] Libonati.

  JFK: OK, good.

  DALEY: Bye now.

  JFK: Thanks, Dick.

  PRESIDENT KENNEDY MEETS WITH NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE (NAACP) LEADERS IN THE OVAL OFFICE, JULY 12, 1961

  * * *

  Attendees included: Medgar Evers, Mississippi NAACP field secretary; Calvin Luper, Oklahoma City NAACP Youth Council president; Edward Turner, president of the Detroit NAACP branch; Jack E. Tanner, Northwest Area Conference NAACP president; Rev. W. J. Hodge; Dr. S. Y. Nixson; C. R. Darden, president of the Mississippi NAACP State Conference branches; Kelly M. Alexander, member of NAACP board of directors; Kivie Kaplan, chairman of NAACP Life Membership Committee; and Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, chairman of the NAACP board of directors.

  On September 27, 1940, in one of the first Oval Office conversations ever recorded, A. Philip Randolph of the Brotherhood of Railway Porters stood before Franklin Roosevelt and asked for better treatment for African-Americans. In the two decades that followed, there had been occasional breakthroughs—the integration of the armed forces, Brown v. the Board of Education, the integration of Little Rock—but they came too slowly for African-Americans impatient for full citizenship.

  The generational shift signaled by Kennedy’s election and the empowerment promised by his speeches only hastened this desire for change, in ways that the Kennedy administration was not at first prepared for. Painfully aware of the thinness of his mandate, JFK liked to quote Thomas Jefferson: “Great innovations should not be forced on slender majorities.” His inaugural address, so eloquent on the subject of freedom around the world, was nearly mute on the great question of how the United States would finally live up to its creed at home.

  But there was no stopping history. Kennedy had connected with African-American voters who sensed that they too might enjoy a New Frontier; more than 70 percent of them voted for him, nearly double what Adlai Stevenson had received four years earlier, and their support may well have elected him. On January 21, 1961, the day after Kennedy’s inaugural address, an air force veteran named James Meredith submitted his application to the University of Mississippi (without noting his racial identity). That
spring, an interracial Freedom Riders traveled on integrated buses through the South, challenging the segregated bus terminals as an example of systemic racism that oppressed African-Americans.

  By the time the Oval Office tapes began to roll in the summer of 1962, the Kennedy administration had come some distance but still had work to do to catch up to where the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement wanted it to be. These tapes record that work in gripping detail, as President Kennedy uses all of the power of his office to persuade reluctant Southern governors to accede to federal power. The forces of resistance were strong; many American newspapers denounced the Kennedy administration, and a significant majority of American voters disapproved of the rapid pace of change. Ever attentive to public opinion, Kennedy knew that he was losing more voters than he was gaining as he began to lead on Civil Rights. But the moment had arrived, in ways that were increasingly obvious. As JFK worked to build a new foreign policy that included Africa and Asia, it was embarrassing to live in a federal city that was still segregated in most ways. The occasional sting of Soviet insults on the subject added to the pressure to bring American reality in line with American rhetoric. Sometimes it seemed that the fates themselves demanded change. One of the most crucial secret messages of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a private note from Kennedy to Khrushchev, was carried away from the Soviet embassy by a young African-American bicycle messenger.

  And history argued for movement in other ways. The centennial of the Civil War spoke urgently to those attuned to nuance, as Kennedy surely was. Sometimes that parallel was overt, as when Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., stood before the Lincoln Memorial and delivered the speech of his life. At other times, it was muted; when Kennedy signed an executive order commanding federal troops to prepare to enforce the integration of the University of Mississippi, he did so on a table that had belonged to Ulysses Grant, a fact he did not reveal to the media.

  As the tapes rolled into the summer and fall of 1963, it was clear that the administration had crossed the Rubicon. Despite polls that indicated he was losing six or seven white voters for every new black voter he gained, Kennedy was determined to deploy the full powers of the presidency to advance the cause. On the great day of the March on Washington, within moments of Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” peroration, the leaders of the Movement were in the White House, talking strategy. Appropriately, A. Philip Randolph was there urging a president forward, using nearly the same words he had used in the Oval Office twenty-three years earlier. But this time, history had caught up to him. These conversations indicate a president committed to a meaningful Civil Rights Bill, although that bill did not become law until 1964, in a very different political environment.