The Mystery of the Lone Wolf Killer

by Unni Turrettini

  Breivik makes it clear that he doesn’t regret his actions: “In fact, I would do it all again, without any hesitation, if I was given the chance.” In this statement, Breivik is justifying what he had yet to do. He had become one with his ideology, his cause. Although he never participated in any of the violent activities with which he was associated, in his writings he has now crossed the line. He comes across as cornered, as if there is no other way out. It is as if, through his manifesto, he was able to write himself into a state where he could commit murder, mass murder. He needed to convince himself that these planned killings were warranted; and the more he wrote, the more he believed it. By the time he was gunning down teenagers execution-style, he was wholly convinced that he was in the right.

  McVeigh had no regrets either. On the contrary, he was satisfied that he had accomplished his mission. He later admitted qualms about the children in the day-care center situated just above his Ryder truck. He had never intended to harm children.

  “The day-care center,” he later said, according to Michel and Herbeck. “If I had known it was there, I probably would have shifted the target.” He claimed to take no pleasure in killing; however, he had no trouble justifying the bombing.

  NOT A RACIST?

  At one point, Breivik, the interviewer, asks Breivik, the soon-to-be killer, how he would describe himself as a person. Breivik refers to himself as a laid-back type and quite tolerant on most issues: “Due to the fact that I have been exposed to decades of multicultural indoctrination, I feel a need to emphasize that I am not in fact a racist and never have been.” He points out that he was baptized at age fifteen, and that his godmother and her husband had come to Norway as political refugees from Chile. “In retrospect I understood that they were Marxist political activists, but I didn’t comprehend these issues at the time. Our two families have been very close throughout my childhood and youth. I’ve had several non-Norwegian and Muslim friends. I spent a lot of time with Onor, a Turk, Jonathan, an Eritrean, Raol and Natalie from Chile, Arsalan Ahmad Sohail, Faizal and Wazim from Pakistan. I’ve had dozens of non-Norwegian friends during my younger years, Bashir from Somalia, Pablo from Chile, Odd Erling—adopted from Columbia, Lene—adopted from India have been good friends and a couple of them still are today.”

  Once yet again, Breivik is emphasizing that he is not a racist and that he was exposed to a multicultural environment when growing up. To him, it seems important to stress this point. In Norway, no one expressing racist views is taken seriously. He wants to gain the reader’s recognition and sympathy.

  When he asks himself why he has so many non-ethnic Norwegian friends, Breivik explains a moral code that had driven his actions since his teen years and into his adulthood. He reiterates how, when in trouble, he expected his friends to back him up. “The majority of people who shared these principles of pride was [sic] the Muslim youths and the occasional skinhead. However, even back then, the Muslims outnumbered the skinheads 20 to 1. Being a skinhead was never an option for me. Their dress codes and taste of music was unappealing and I thought they were too extreme. I hated rock then and I still do.”

  Most critics of immigration aren’t Nazi skinheads. Yet many people who criticize the immigration politics in Europe are put in the neo-Nazi box, and Breivik was trying to work around this.

  Breivik knew that if he was perceived as a racist, he wouldn’t be taken seriously in Norway or in any other country. He knew that racism was a sign of uneducated people. He wanted to show that he had thought the matter through, and that he was reasonable and intelligent. The police confirmed that he did have Muslim friends, and that he had no problems with his multicultural relationships.

  The next part of the “interview” goes on to establish his credibility and his sanity, an issue he knew would be a major question, regardless of whether or not he survived his attacks. He wanted it to shine through his manifesto that he was an educated, intelligent person, and that he had proven that by being a successful businessman and ultimately through the writing of his manifesto.

  It’s no surprise then that his next question to himself is this one: “Violent Muslim gangs in European cities are not exactly a new phenomenon. Tell us about your experiences growing up in the urban multicultural streets of Oslo.”

  In this answer, Breivik attempts to show the readers that the Muslims, not the Norwegians, are the racists. He adds more about his wanting to gain respect and credibility among the Western Oslo demographic. He also offers his take on tagging, hip-hop, and gang activity:

  “Even at that time, the Muslim gangs were very dominating in Oslo East and in inner city Oslo. They even arranged ‘raids’ in Oslo West occasionally, subduing the native youths (kuffars) and collecting Jizya (loot) from them (in the form of cell phones, cash, sunglasses etc.). I remember they systematically harassed, robbed and beat ethnic Norwegian youngsters who were unfortunate enough to not have the right affiliations. Muslim youths called the ethnic Norwegians ‘poteter’ (potatoes, a derogatory term used by Muslims to describe ethnic Norwegians). These people occasionally raped the so called ‘potato whores.’ In Oslo, as an ethnic Norwegian youth aged 14-18, you were restricted if you didn’t have affiliations to the Muslim gangs. Your travel was restricted to your own neighborhoods in Oslo West and certain central points in the city.”

  It is difficult to establish whether what Breivik describes here is reality, part of his imagination, or stories he had read and adopted as his own. Most likely it’s somewhere in between. Oslo had a lot of problems relating to gang violence in the 1980s and 90s, but it is not clear whether or not Breivik was ever a part of that scene.

  Anger begins to color his words as he recollects how the culture seemed to be changing: “I gradually became appalled by the mentality, actions, and hypocrisy of the ‘Marxist-Jihadi youth’ movement of Oslo disguised under more socially acceptable brands such as: SOS Rasisme and Youth against Racism. And the group, Blitz, who literally hijacked segments of the hiphop movement and used it as a front for recruitment.”

  He says he had heard of and witnessed hundreds of Jihadi-racist attacks, more than ninety percent of them aimed at helpless Norwegian youths “who themselves are brought up to be suicidally [sic] tolerant and therefore are completely unprepared mentally for attacks such as these.” This happens while the Marxist networks in the hip-hop movement and the cultural establishment silently and indirectly condone it, he says, and he emphasizes that there is no political will to ensure that justice is served on behalf of these victims. “I remember at one point thinking, ‘This system makes me sick.’”

  Breivik was well aware, as most acquainted with the dark side of Muslim faith are, of the so-called honor killings where a family, usually a male family member, kills a daughter who dates, or even hangs out with, a non-Muslim man. A Muslim girl raised in Switzerland, Germany, the UK, France, or Norway has a good chance of encountering young men who aren’t Muslims. Women’s groups estimate twenty thousand women a year may be victims of “honor killings.”

  The interviewer (Breivik) then asks if Breivik ever contributed to violence against Muslims in Norway:

  “During these years, I heard of hundreds of cases where ethnic Norwegians were harassed, robbed and beaten by Muslim gangs. This type of behavior was in fact acts of racism or even based on religious motives (Jihadi behavior), although I failed to see that connection then due to lack of knowledge about Islam; I saw the practical manifestations and I didn’t like it at all. The only thing you could do was to take the necessary precautions, create alliances or be subdued by them. If you made any attempt to create a ‘Norwegian gang’ you would be instantly labeled as a Nazi and face the wrath of everyone, in addition to the Muslim gangs. They, however, were allowed to do anything while being indirectly cheered by society. So in other words, we were trapped between the ‘wood and the bark.’ This is still the case in all Western European major cities. They are allowed to consolidate, while we are not.

  “I never took part
in any of their activities and I never participated in any Blitz demonstrations either. To me, that would have been too hypocritical seeing that the Muslim gangs and their ‘racist/Jihadi’ behavior was tolerated by the police, media and the violent left wing extremists (ANTIFA) like ‘Blitz’ and ‘SOS Rasisme.’ I left the hiphop community and the gangs when I was 16 and never looked back.”

  Finally, Breivik explains more about his involvement with gangs and how their music (metal bands) disgusted him. Again, he mentions people he’d grown up with, and their attitudes and ideology. He says: “The big irony was that they (skinheads) were a lot more ‘normal’ than us during this period. They were peaceful, while we were violent. They followed the law and rules while we broke the law and ignored the rules again and again.” He explains that at the same time, “the hip-hop community was cheered by the media, praised as the pinnacle of tolerance among the new generation, while THEY (skinheads) were condemned for their political views, systematically harassed and beaten by non-white gangs, extremist Marxist gangs (Blitz etc) and the police. It’s quite ironic and shameful.”

  He provides this last part as another example of how the so-called extreme right movement wasn’t necessarily violent, but how, on the contrary, they were the peaceful ones. The violent groups, according to Breivik, were the leftist, socialistic ones that responded to politics using their fists.

  In the next part of Book 3 of his manifesto, Breivik writes from a diary he had been keeping. His personal reflections at this time were fueled by the excitement of keeping a log on the Knights Templar and to what he terms his “preparation phase.”

  Breivik had at that point written himself to murder. He was driven by his private war on Islam and his inability to effectively speak against it or take action through political channels. True, he hated the inequity of multiculturalism. And most of all, he hated being unable to express his anger and frustration. He would express it, though, and soon.

  By not allowing those who disagree with the Norwegian policy of multiculturalism to express their beliefs, by putting them in a box labeled extreme right or neo-Nazi, society drives them elsewhere. To extremist groups, to the Internet, and perhaps to darker places within themselves. If people felt they could speak freely, the EDL (English Defense League), and other groups like it, would have fewer followers.

  Because of Breivik’s war on Islam, innocent people died. Yet it wasn’t Islam or the Muslims that drove him to murder; it was his inability to openly protest and try to change, in a democratic way, what he saw as an inequitable system. He had a ready-made enemy, one his government dictated he must accept, even if that enemy didn’t accept him and his culture. And that is the ultimate irony of multiculturalism. Although its intent is to bring people together, it all too often drives them apart.

  When speaking to Steven M. Kleinman, Director of Strategic Research, The Soufan Group, I asked him why extremists such as Breivik pick this particular religion to hate. He replied that the question was both simple and deeply complex.

  “The simple element has to do with proximity and opportunity,” he said. “If we rolled back the clock a generation, I doubt Breivik (and people with his world view) would have invested the time in preparing extensive manifestos against Islam (much less taking such horrific action). By living in Norway, the probability that Breivik’s life would ever be touched—directly or indirectly—by a single Muslim (much less a community) would have been remote.” The absence of a Muslim community would not have stopped Breivik, because his ultimate enemy was the government that he felt repressed him. He would have found and embraced another ideology. His target might have been what he viewed as politically correct journalists. It might have been Labor Party politicians. Regardless of the ultimate adversary, he would have found a cause worth killing for.

  Kleinman went on to point out that the discovery of deep resources of fossil fuels in the North Sea in the 1960s essentially shielded Norway—unlike Europe, the United States, and Japan—from the heated geopolitical issues surrounding the Middle East, because Norway wasn’t dependent upon a constant flow of oil from that region.

  He also pointed out that in the past thirty years there have been fifteen terrorist attacks on Norwegian soil, compared to more than two thousand incidents in the United States over the same period of time. The numbers are much smaller, but the social impact is greater.

  “The complex element involves economics, geography, and, most important, psychology,” Kleinman told me.

  “The socioeconomic forces that produced the flow of émigrés, refugees, and displaced persons from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe changed everything. The geographic chasm that kept the type of extreme xenophobia operating in the mind of a person like Breivik in relative check was lost. As a result, Breivik and those within his ‘in group’ (that is, the many who were looking for scapegoats, enemies of the state, and threats to the prevailing way of life) finally found their ‘out group’ (comprising anyone not like them).”

  Of course, Breivik didn’t fit in his country’s “in” fringe groups, but he continued to try. Islam was an easy choice as a target.

  “I think a case could be made that Islam was simply the most appealing and accessible target of opportunity,” Kleinman said. “If the immigrants who were establishing communities throughout Europe, competing for jobs, and taxing the region’s social resources had been Jewish, Coptic Christians, Buddhists, or even followers of the Baha’i faith, the lethal combination of ethnic difference, competition for increasingly scarce economic resources, and the apparent deep-seated need to protect a way of life from what they viewed as foreign invasion would have spurred people like Breivik to act.”

  Kleinman said Breivik’s manifesto can be described as extensive, but not extensively researched. “Rather than leading to rational conclusions, it seems he worked backward from his conclusions so that his sources and analysis would all lead the reader to a predetermined point,” he said.

  “One might go so far as to describe Islam as a gift to Breivik. He had an enormous capacity for hate, vitriol, and conspiratorial perspective; what he lacked, however, was an appropriate target for this heinous energy. He found one in Islam.”

  CHAPTER EIGHT

  “. . . NO SAFER PLACE ON EARTH. . . .”

  THE DAY EVERYTHING WENT WRONG

  And we have a very clear message for you: We know who you are, where you live and we are coming for you. If not today, then tomorrow, if not in 10 years, then in 50 years.

  —ANDERS BREIVIK MANIFESTO

  One hundred eighty-nine minutes of terror. No one stopped Breivik from parking his van with the bomb in front of the entrance to the building hosting Norway’s government and prime minister. Seven minutes after the bomb exploded, eight people were dead and more than two hundred injured. The lone wolf then had almost one and a half hours on the island of Utøya to slaughter his victims. Sixty-seven people were shot to death there, two others died trying to escape, and 102 were shot and injured. Breivik knew that no one would stop him, at least not before he had completed his mission. He was well aware that no one on the island, not even the security guard, would be armed.

  In the end, even he thought the police took too long to come and stop the massacre. He called them himself to surrender. Numerous times. The two times he got through on the emergency line, the voice on the other end didn’t appear to take him seriously. Breivik hung up and continued killing.

  In the wake of July 22, 2011, the Norwegian government appointed a commission to study the details of that day and to find the answers to three key questions: What happened on July 22? Why did it happen? How could our society have let this happen?

  The July 22nd Commission, as it was called, worked for a year to find out what went wrong that day. It concluded that the attack on the government buildings in the center of Oslo could have been prevented through effective implementation of already-adopted security measures. The authorities’ ability to protect the people on Utøya also fai
led. Breivik could have, and should have, been stopped sooner. In addition, the Commission concluded that more security and emergency-preparedness measures should have been implemented. Surprisingly, it also concluded that the government’s communication with the general public and media had been adequate in the aftermath of the attacks. Perhaps the Commission members felt they had to dilute their negative findings with something positive.

  The Commission’s oftentimes vague and repetitive findings, assembled in a report consisting of almost five hundred pages, focused on four areas. These were: ineffective preventive security intelligence; the false sense of security that prevails in Norway; lack of police preparedness; and, finally, law enforcement’s failure to communicate with the victims and each other during the attacks.

  INEFFECTIVE PREVENTIVE SECURITY INTELLIGENCE

  “When initiating the ‘chemical acquirement phase,’ in end November/early December, I must admit I was filled with some angst,” Breivik wrote. “This was after all a critical phase, perhaps the most dangerous of all phases. If I messed this phase up, by being flagged, reported to the authorities etc. I would be neutralized before I could finalize my operation. Even when taking all possible precautions; I estimate it is a 30% chance of being reported to the system protectors at the national intelligence agency during this phase.”

  Breivik was flagged by the Police Security Service (PST) for ordering chemicals, yet no one can explain why there were no follow-ups.

  In the opinion of the Commission, several public agencies should get involved in, and take advantage of their expertise in, the efforts to detect terrorism. Interaction and information-sharing is essential in order to act effectively against threats, including solo terrorists.

  “Our review indicates that legislative imbalances can present an obstacle to such collaboration.” The confidentiality provisions in the general legislation, according to the Commission, in particular the Customs Act, prevent PST from doing its job effectively.