The Mystery of the Lone Wolf Killer

by Unni Turrettini

  In 2005, parliament adopted new statutory provisions that gave PST broad authority to use radical methods in relatively early stages of suspicion where “there is reason to investigate whether someone is preparing a [terrorist] act.” At the same time, the Commission criticized the fact that a higher level of suspicion is required for civil servants in other government agencies to submit a report to PST than there is within PST itself. As an example, the requirements for probable cause are lower for PST to use listening devices as preventive measures than for a customs agent to let the PST know if disturbing items are found in a person’s luggage. Similarly, the requirements should not be stricter for the Police Security Service to procure information from customs records than to initiate an undercover search. “The Commission finds this to be inconsistent,” the report stated.

  There is no communication between the different agencies. Thus, if customs is suspicious of a package like the ones Breivik imported, they’re not encouraged to report it unless they have solid evidence of probable cause.

  Only to a modest degree has the Police Security Service utilized information and communications technology (ICT) to increase the capacity and quality of its work processes. Tips about unknown subjects are usually only checked against the service’s own working register and police records before PST makes a decision on whether the case will be given priority. Because Breivik didn’t have a criminal record, the fact that he was ordering suspicious chemicals didn’t make him suspicious enough to investigate.

  “Systems and work processes for knowledge management and advanced intelligence using open sources and public records appear to be rather crude,” the Commission concluded. Despite the fact that it has been known for years that terrorists operate on electronic platforms, Norway has not yet established any regulations for when the Police Security Service is allowed to monitor potential terrorists’ computers and closed forums on the Internet. The Commission also found that prior to July 22, PST did not take advantage of the information and capacity inherent in the postal and customs systems.

  The Commission asserted that July 22 should not have happened; Breivik should have been checked out long before.

  FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY

  Norway should have been prepared for several aspects of July 22. A car bomb at the government complex and other coordinated attacks have been recurring scenarios in threat assessments and drills for many years. Why then was it possible to park an unregistered and unknown car outside the H-block or anywhere in the government complex? What were the underlying reasons that Grubbegata was not blocked off? Why weren’t more security measures put into place? These were some of the questions the July 22nd Commission tried to answer in the year following that tragic day.

  “Norway has established security and emergency preparedness legislation in recent years that is generally up-to-date, and it has a government administration with a reasonably clear distribution of responsibility for the prevention, aversion, and management of terrorist attacks,” the Commission asserted. So what went wrong?

  As Breivik was driving his van with the bomb toward Oslo’s city center and the government buildings, he committed a traffic violation by driving up a street reserved for buses, taxis, and trams. He was not stopped. Arriving at Grubbegata near building H, he came to a halt and waited for two whole minutes with the emergency blinker lit on his car. Stopping there was also illegal, but no security guard paid any attention. Then he drove farther and parked the van directly in front of building H at 15:17. No physical blocks were set up to avoid cars entering the perimeter of the government complex, not even around the H building hosting the Justice Department and prime minister. A chain with a no-entry sign partially blocked the road, but there was enough space for a truck to drive past it. Although Breivik would have preferred to park his van in a different spot—so that his bomb would destroy the structure of the building and cause it to collapse—he still managed to park directly in front of the entrance. After approximately twenty seconds, the time it took to light the fuse of his bomb, he got out of the car and started moving away. Dressed in a police uniform and helmet, he carried a handgun. During the seven minutes between the time Breivik left the van and the explosion, seventy people passed the illegally parked van. None of them was a police officer or security guard.

  That afternoon, two security guards were present in the government complex. At 15:20, a receptionist noticed the van and called one of the security guards, who located the car on his surveillance screen but didn’t react fast enough.

  The security cameras recorded Breivik walking and sometimes running to get away from what was about to happen next. Once he stopped, turned around, and took a last look at the white Volkswagen Crafter. Then he continued. As the security guard picked up his phone to deal with the illegally parked van, it exploded. The clock showed 15:25. Eight minutes had passed, from when Breivik parked his truck until the explosion. In addition to the people who were killed or injured, buildings within a radius of 350 feet were damaged beyond repair.

  Breivik got to his flight car, a silver-gray Fiat Doblò, and drove away. However, one witness found it suspicious that this man, dressed as a police officer, with a helmet, and carrying a handgun, was getting in a civilian car and driving away from the scene. Furthermore, the suspect took a one-way street in the wrong direction. The witness called the police emergency line and reported a description of Breivik and the license plate number of Breivik’s getaway car. This message was delivered directly to the chief of emergency operations. The security guard who observed Breivik’s Volkswagen Crafter briefly before the explosion also called the police and told them it was a car bomb. He described the man getting out of the van and moving away from the area before the explosion. The police then had two corroborating tips on what the perpetrator looked like and the license plate number of his flight car.

  Because of a traffic accident, Breivik’s trip to Utøya took sixty-five minutes. No roadblocks were set up, and Breivik had no problem getting away. It would take twenty minutes from the time the tip with the license plate number was called in until someone at the police decided to check it out. Breivik had by then left Oslo and was well on his way to Utøya. When the tip was followed up, smaller police stations near Oslo were contacted, but none of these acted on the information or did anything to set up roadblocks. The police there declared the tip too vague to take action. The focus was on the bombing of the government complex.

  Forty minutes after the police received the call with Breivik’s license plate number, the police sent out a national alarm. None of the local police stations in the country took notice of the alarm. By this time, Breivik was nearly at his next target.

  “There are no indications that the police in the first hours after the terrorist attack in Oslo in any way attempted to make use of the press or media to notify the population or its own staff about the presumed perpetrator’s description and license plate number,” the Commission reported. “Only at 18:26 [that is, three hours after the explosion] did Oslo police station send out an alarm to its staff that any police officer in uniform, unable to identify himself, should be stopped, by force if necessary.”

  Though all of these systematic failures took place in 2011, the government had actually adopted procedures, in case terrorist attacks should occur, several years earlier. According to the Commission’s report, the security council had decided in 2004 to implement measures to secure the H-block and the entire government complex against attacks. “The work was to have high priority,” the Commission wrote. “Nonetheless, seven years later, it was possible to detonate a car bomb close to the entrance of the H-block. No professional routines had been established to ensure that the project was implemented with the intended speed and quality. Adequate and relevant provisional measures were not implemented.”

  In the summer of 2010, the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security were informed by the National Police Directorate that the work to secure the
government complex gave cause for concern because several measures of great importance for security had not yet been put into practice. This concern, however, never reached the leadership of the ministry in charge of national security.

  Utøya, which is owned by the Labor Party’s Youth Unit (AUF), has been the venue for the organization’s summer camp for more than sixty years. It should have been conceivable that if someone wished to harm the political power in Norway, he might also attack this island during the summer camp. All Labor Party leaders have taken part in the summer camp, and the current prime minister, Jens Stoltenberg, has been at Utøya every single summer since 1974. Yet only one security guard—unarmed at that—was present. Former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland—whom Breivik wished to kill and behead—had visited the island in the morning and left around 3 P.M. No security reinforcements in connection with her visit were put in place. After the bombing of the government buildings in Oslo, no one thought of sending forces to the island of Utøya to protect the political future of the country.

  According to the Commission report, “Hardly anyone could have imagined that a secondary attack would have been made on the youth camp on Utøya Island. Sadly, however, after repeated school massacres in other countries, an armed desperado who shoots adolescents is indeed conceivable—even in Norway. This is the type of mission that every Police District drills today, and is expected to be able to deal with.”

  At the same time, the Commission asserts that through public reports and legislative work, Norway’s parliament and government have had security and emergency preparedness high on their agendas for the past fifteen years. New directorates and oversight bodies were in fact in place, and higher expectations could reasonably have been asked of the authorities. In 2002, PST accorded the fight against international terrorism highest priority. PST stated that “. . . the terrorist acts in the United States on September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of an era in international politics with increased uncertainty and a higher threat level. It appears that the United States is the primary target, but it cannot be excluded that other countries, also Norway, may be hit in the future.”

  LACK OF POLICE PREPAREDNESS

  The Security Act, adopted in 1998, sets standards based on “vital national security interests.” According to the Commission, “Many had views on questions related to the Act, and one took the liberty of using 13 years to develop regulations that were to provide clarifications. During this period, there was no oversight that could have identified significant shortcomings with a view to security.”

  After the NOKAS cash-depot robbery in 2004, where an officer was killed, the National Police Directorate decided to set up a system for swift, secure, and efficient notification between police districts in connection with major events. Although the police in the NOKAS case had been notified of an imminent robbery at the cash depot, the perpetrators got away with $10 million, making it the biggest theft in Norway. The local police station in Stavanger was understaffed and unprepared due to Easter holidays. Only six years later, in 2010, did the system become operational.

  “The National Police Directorate was warned about weaknesses in the chosen solution,” the Commission reported. “The system was never tested systematically, and although experience indicated a number of problems, no improvements were made.” On July 22, the system failed miserably.

  Likewise, the police developed a special set of plans for use in the event of terrorism and sabotage. The measures in these plans included roadblocks to prevent terrorists from getting away and initiatives for the immediate mobilization of police personnel to reduce the response time for any further attacks, and would be of the utmost relevance in the case of a large bomb detonating in the government complex. These plans, developed to facilitate procedures in a chaotic situation, were ignored on July 22.

  “Different understandings—or more accurately, different acknowledgement of risk and vulnerability—stand out as one important explanation,” the Commission states in its report, and also illustrated its point with some examples including the fact that it was underestimated that solo terrorism could cause such devastation. The police’s emergency preparedness has not improved since the NOKAS robbery, the Commission further concluded. “Despite the fact that experience and repeated exercises have pointed out that this translates into vulnerability, the situation has not changed. The notification and mobilization of personnel are based more on coincidence than on emergency preparedness schemes.”

  Even though there were indications of further attacks after the explosion, law enforcement took too long to put security measures in place. “Helicopters and the Armed Forces’ other resources were requested so late that they did not provide much help for the police operation. Many hours passed before military troops were called out to secure civilian objects. . . . Instead, people gradually accepted that the probability of new attacks was small.”

  The Delta police forces that arrived from Oslo had no boat at their disposal when they got to the dock near Utøya, and they were unsuccessful at finding a tourist boat. The local police finally arrived with a tiny red Zodiac, but it was too small for the men and their equipment. First Lieutenant Terje Klevengen explained that because of the gravity of the situation, Delta wished to bring as many arms and as much equipment as possible. As a result, the small boat was too heavily loaded and stopped in the water. Delta had no choice but to wait until a tourist boat picked them up.

  Another boat that could have been useful to the police that day, according to the July 22nd Commission report, was AUF’s own ferry boat, MS Thorbjørn. The ferry had taken off from the island right after Breivik started shooting and the captain contacted the police, who told him to get away from the island and to safety. The ferry therefore continued north and was inaccessible to take part in the rescue operation until after Breivik was apprehended.

  Because it was July and vacation time, the Oslo police’s only helicopter was unavailable to assess the situation in Oslo and to go to Utøya. As was the case in the NOKAS robbery, authorities acted as if there existed a tacit agreement that terrorists don’t strike during holidays.

  The 720th Army platoon in the south of Norway had, however, started preparing three helicopters ready to be deployed in the operation, but the Oslo police did not reach out to ask for any assistance. Only forty-five minutes after the first report about the shooting on the island did the police contact the Army for help. A helicopter belonging to the national news channel NRK was already circling the island, but the police did not attempt to obtain it.

  The Commission puts it this way: “When the Armed Forces’ emergency helicopter services were reassigned to Afghanistan in 2009, the police’s access to helicopter support was reduced. The police’s own helicopter service experienced reduced availability during the same period of time. While the consequences of this aggregate shortfall of capacity, not least to transport the Delta forces, were acknowledged, they did not trigger any measures to compensate for the shortfall.”

  LAW ENFORCEMENT’S FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE VICTIMS AND EACH OTHER

  When the news of the Oslo bombing spread to Utøya, a meeting was held at 16:00 to inform the participants about the bombing and to reassure everyone that “we’re safe. We’re on an island. There is no place safer on earth from terrorism than Utøya.”

  The parents of Håvard Vederhus, leader of AUF Oslo, Kirsten and Alf Vederhus, were in contact with their son while he was hiding near the pumping station on the island. He kept asking his parents to call the police and have them send helicopters to save them. The last time Alf Vederhus spoke with the police, he was told a helicopter was on the way.

  “According to our son,” Håvard’s father said, “that doesn’t sound as if it’s true.” The operator then finally admitted that there was only one police helicopter in the whole of Norway, that they should assemble the family and keep calm. That was their last conversation with the police that day.

  “We were in touch with him fo
r forty minutes,” Alf said, “and it was as if we watched our son slide through our fingers and away from us. We were helpless. We couldn’t do anything.” Håvard’s parents kept waiting for their son to send them a message saying he was okay, but that message never came. Breivik murdered fourteen teenagers, including Håvard, at the pumping station.

  The Commission keeps repeating in its report that the police operation on Utøya was poorly coordinated, and as a result it took much longer than necessary to get there. The understaffed emergency operations center, which was designated in the plan to lead and coordinate, was overwhelmed by telephone calls. Communication problems caused different police units to miss each other. “Informal language usage and non-compliance with basic requirements for accurate communication in a crisis helped make a poor communication situation even more challenging,” the Commission reported.

  Seventeen minutes after Breivik started killing, the first police car left Hønefoss police station for Utøya. By this time—at 17:43—Breivik had already killed thirty-eight people. The main police station in Oslo dispatched more cars toward Utøya. Twenty-six policemen in total were at this point on their way.

  “The police had to rely on telephone calls to notify and mobilize personnel,” the Commission stated. Valuable time that could have been spent analyzing, planning, and managing the operation was lost. The police driving from Oslo didn’t know exactly where Utøya was, and with the police radio not working, there was no communication between the cars and the police station closest to the island. Police cars drove toward the island from different directions without knowing each other’s plans.

  “Weak local communications and a lack of coverage by the Norwegian Public Safety Radio played a part in how there was a misunderstanding about where the mustering place was to be,” according to the report. “The police did not have access to even the simplest technology for transmitting written mustering information to personnel and official vehicles. Most of Delta force’s cars did not have electronic map systems.”