Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  SOCRATES: Well then, do you think that people in general disagree about what wood or stone is? If you ask them, don’t they give the same answers? Don’t they reach for the same things when they want to get some wood [c] or some stone? And similarly for all other such cases; I suppose this is pretty much what you mean by understanding Greek, isn’t it?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: So they agree with each other in these cases, as we said, and with themselves when acting privately. But don’t they also agree in public? Cities don’t disagree with each other and use different words for the same thing, do they?

  ALCIBIADES: No.

  SOCRATES: So it’s likely that they would make good teachers of these things.

  ALCIBIADES: Yes. [d]

  SOCRATES: So if we wanted somebody to know these things, we’d be right to send him to lessons given by these people in general.

  ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: Now if we wanted to know not just what men or horses are like, but which of them could and couldn’t run, would people in general be able to teach this as well?

  ALCIBIADES: Of course not.

  SOCRATES: Isn’t the fact that they disagree with each other about these things enough to show you that they don’t understand them, and are not [e] ‘four-square teachers’ of them?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes, it is.

  SOCRATES: Now if we wanted to know not just what men are like, but what sick and healthy men are like, would people in general be able to teach us?

  ALCIBIADES: Of course not.

  SOCRATES: And if you saw them disagreeing about it, that would show you that they were bad teachers of it.

  ALCIBIADES: Yes, it would.

  SOCRATES: Very well, then—does it seem to you that people in general actually agree among themselves or with each other about just and unjust people and actions?

  ALCIBIADES: Not in the slightest, Socrates. [112]

  SOCRATES: Really? Do they disagree a huge amount about these things?

  ALCIBIADES: Very much so.

  SOCRATES: I don’t suppose you’ve ever seen or heard people disagreeing so strongly about what is healthy and unhealthy that they fight and kill each other over it, have you?

  ALCIBIADES: Of course not.

  SOCRATES: But I know you’ve seen this sort of dispute over questions of justice and injustice; or even if you haven’t seen it, at least you’ve heard [b] about it from many other people—especially Homer, since you’ve heard the Iliad and the Odyssey, haven’t you?

  ALCIBIADES: I certainly have, of course, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Aren’t these poems all about disagreements over justice and injustice?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: It was over this sort of disagreement that the Achaeans and the Trojans fought battles and lost their lives, as did Odysseus and the suitors of Penelope.

  [c] ALCIBIADES: You’re right.

  SOCRATES: I suppose the same is true of those Athenians and Spartans and Boeotians who died at Tanagra, and later at Coronea, including your own father. The disagreement that caused those battles and those deaths was none other than a disagreement over justice and injustice, wasn’t it?

  ALCIBIADES: You’re right.

  SOCRATES: Are we to say that people understand something if they disagree [d] so much about it that in their disputes with each other they resort to such extreme measures?

  ALCIBIADES: Obviously not.

  SOCRATES: But aren’t you giving credit to teachers of this sort who, as you yourself admit, have no knowledge?

  ALCIBIADES: I guess I am.

  SOCRATES: Well then, given that your opinion wavers so much, and given that you obviously neither found it out yourself nor learned it from anyone else, how likely is it that you know about justice and injustice?

  ALCIBIADES: From what you say anyway, it’s not very likely.

  [e] SOCRATES: See, there you go again, Alcibiades, that’s not well said!

  ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?

  SOCRATES: You say that I say these things.

  ALCIBIADES: What? Aren’t you saying that I don’t understand justice and injustice?

  SOCRATES: No, not at all.

  ALCIBIADES: Well, am I?

  SOCRATES: Yes.

  ALCIBIADES: How?

  SOCRATES: Here’s how. If I asked you which is more, one or two, would you say two?

  ALCIBIADES: I would.

  SOCRATES: By how much?

  ALCIBIADES: By one.

  SOCRATES: Then which of us is saying that two is one more than one?

  ALCIBIADES: I am.

  SOCRATES: Wasn’t I asking and weren’t you answering?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  [113] SOCRATES: Who do you think is saying these things—me, the questioner, or you, the answerer?

  ALCIBIADES: I am.

  SOCRATES: And what if I asked you how to spell ‘Socrates’, and you told me? Which of us would be saying it?

  ALCIBIADES: I would.

  SOCRATES: Come then, give me the general principle. When there’s a question and an answer, who is the one saying things—the questioner or the answerer?

  ALCIBIADES: The answerer, I think, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Wasn’t I the questioner in everything just now? [b]

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And weren’t you the answerer?

  ALCIBIADES: I certainly was.

  SOCRATES: Well then, which of us said what was said?

  ALCIBIADES: From what we’ve agreed, Socrates, it seems that I did.

  SOCRATES: And what was said was that Alcibiades, the handsome son of Clinias, doesn’t understand justice and injustice—though he thinks he does—and that he is about to go to the Assembly to advise the Athenians on what he doesn’t know anything about. Wasn’t that it?

  ALCIBIADES: Apparently. [c]

  SOCRATES: Then it’s just like in Euripides, Alcibiades; ‘you heard it from yourself, not from me.’9 I’m not the one who says these things—you are—don’t try to blame me. And furthermore, you’re quite right to say so. This scheme you have in mind—teaching what you don’t know and haven’t bothered to learn—your scheme, my good fellow, is crazy.

  ALCIBIADES: Actually, Socrates, I think the Athenians and the other Greeks [d] rarely discuss which course is more just or unjust. They think that sort of thing is obvious, so they skip over it and ask which one would be advantageous to do. In fact, though, what’s just is not the same, I think, as what’s advantageous; many people have profited by committing great injustices, and others, I think, got no advantage from doing the right thing.

  SOCRATES: So? Even if just and advantageous things happen to be completely different, surely you don’t think you know what’s advantageous [e] for people, and why, do you?

  ALCIBIADES: What’s to stop me, Socrates?—unless you’re going to ask me all over again who I learned it from or how I found it out myself.

  SOCRATES: What a way of carrying on! If you say something wrong, and if there’s a previous argument that can prove that it was wrong, you think you ought to be given some new and different proof, as if the previous one were a worn-out scrap of clothing that you refuse to wear again. No, you want an immaculate, brand-new proof.

  I’ll pass over your anticipation of my argument and ask you, all the [114] same, ‘How did you come to understand what is advantageous? Who was your teacher?’, and in my one question ask everything I asked you before. Clearly this will put you in the same position again—you won’t be able to prove that you know what is advantageous, either by finding it out or by learning it.

  But since you’ve got a delicate stomach and wouldn’t enjoy another taste of the same argument, I’ll pass over this question of whether or not [b] you know what is advantageous for the Athenians. But why don’t you prove whether the just and the advantageous are the same or different? You can question me, if you like, as I questioned you—or else work it out yourself, in your own argument.

  ALCIBIADES: N
o, Socrates, I don’t think I’d be able to work it out in front of you.

  SOCRATES: Well then, my good sir, imagine that I’m the Assembly and the people gathered there; even there, you know, you’ll have to persuade them one by one. Isn’t that right?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: If somebody knows something, don’t you think he can persuade [c] people about it one by one, as well as all together? Take the schoolteacher—don’t you think he persuades people about letters individually, as well as collectively?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And won’t the same person be able to persuade people about numbers individually, as well as in groups?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: He would be a mathematician, someone who knows about numbers.

  ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: So won’t you also be able to persuade an individual person about the things you can persuade a group of people about?

  ALCIBIADES: Probably.

  SOCRATES: Obviously these are things you know about.

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Is there any difference between an orator speaking to the [d] people and an orator speaking in this sort of conversation, except insofar as the former persuades them all together while the latter persuades them one by one?

  ALCIBIADES: I guess not.

  SOCRATES: Well then, since it’s plain that the same person can persuade individuals as well as groups, practice on me, and try to prove that what is just is sometimes not advantageous.

  ALCIBIADES: Stop pushing me around, Socrates!

  SOCRATES: No, in fact I’m going to push you around and persuade you of the opposite of what you’re not willing to show me.

  ALCIBIADES: Just try it!

  SOCRATES: Just answer my questions.

  [e] ALCIBIADES: No, you do the talking yourself.

  SOCRATES: What?! Don’t you want to be completely convinced?

  ALCIBIADES: Absolutely, I’m sure.

  SOCRATES: Wouldn’t you be completely convinced if you yourself said, ‘Yes, that’s how it is’?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes, I think so.

  SOCRATES: Then answer my questions. And if you don’t hear yourself say that just things are also advantageous, then don’t believe anything else I say.

  ALCIBIADES: No, I’m sure I won’t. But I’d better answer—I don’t think I’ll come to any harm.

  SOCRATES: You’re quite a prophet. Now tell me—are you saying that [115] some just things are advantageous while others are not?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Really? Are some of them admirable and others not admirable?

  ALCIBIADES: What do you mean by that question?

  SOCRATES: Have you ever thought that someone was doing something that was both just and contemptible?

  ALCIBIADES: No, I haven’t.

  SOCRATES: So all just things are admirable.

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Now what about admirable things? Are they all good, or are some good and others not good?

  ALCIBIADES: What I think, Socrates, is that some admirable things are bad.

  SOCRATES: And some contemptible things are good?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Are you thinking of this sort of case? Many people get [b] wounded and killed trying to rescue their friends and relatives in battle, while those who don’t go to rescue them, as they should, escape safe and sound. Is this what you’re referring to?

  ALCIBIADES: Exactly.

  SOCRATES: Now you call a rescue of this sort admirable, in that it’s an attempt to help the people whom you should help, and this is what courage is; isn’t that what you’re saying?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: But you call it bad, in that it involves wounds and death, don’t you?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Now courage is one thing, and death is something else, right? [c]

  ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: So it’s not on the same basis that rescuing your friends is admirable and bad, is it?

  ALCIBIADES: Apparently not.

  SOCRATES: Now let’s see whether, insofar as it’s admirable, it’s also good, as indeed it is. You agreed that the rescue is admirable, in that it’s courageous. Now consider this very thing—courage. Is it good or bad? Look at it like this: which would you rather have, good things or bad things?

  ALCIBIADES: Good things.

  SOCRATES: Namely the greatest goods? [d]

  ALCIBIADES: Very much so.10

  SOCRATES: And wouldn’t you be least willing to be deprived of such things?

  ALCIBIADES: Of course.

  SOCRATES: What would you say about courage? How much would you have to be offered to be deprived of that?

  ALCIBIADES: I wouldn’t even want to go on living if I were a coward.

  SOCRATES: So you think that cowardice is the worst thing in the world.

  ALCIBIADES: I do.

  SOCRATES: On a par with death, it would seem.

  ALCIBIADES: That’s what I say.

  SOCRATES: Aren’t life and courage the extreme opposites of death and cowardice?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  [e] SOCRATES: And wouldn’t you want the former most and the latter least?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Is that because you think that the former are best and the latter are worst?

  ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: Would you say that courage ranks among the best things and death among the worst?

  ALCIBIADES: I would say so.

  SOCRATES: So you called rescuing your friends in battle admirable, insofar as it is admirable, in that it does something good, being courageous.

  ALCIBIADES: I think so, anyway.

  SOCRATES: But you called it bad, in that it does something bad, being fatal.11

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Now since you call this act bad insofar as it produces something [116] bad, wouldn’t you also, in all fairness, have to call it good insofar as it produces something good?

  ALCIBIADES: I think so.

  SOCRATES: Isn’t it also admirable insofar as it’s good, and contemptible insofar as it’s bad?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Then when you say that rescuing one’s friends in battle is admirable but bad, you mean exactly the same as if you’d called it good but bad.

  ALCIBIADES: I suppose you’re right, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: So nothing admirable, to the extent that it’s admirable, is bad, and nothing contemptible, to the extent that it’s contemptible, is good.

  ALCIBIADES: Apparently not.

  SOCRATES: Now then, let’s take a new approach. People who do what’s [b] admirable do things well, don’t they?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And don’t people who do things well live successful lives?

  ALCIBIADES: Of course.

  SOCRATES: Aren’t they successful because they’ve got good things?

  ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

  SOCRATES: And they get good things by acting properly and admirably.

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: So it is good to act properly.

  ALCIBIADES: Of course.

  SOCRATES: And good conduct is admirable.

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: So we’ve seen once again that the very thing that is admirable [c] is also good.

  ALCIBIADES: Apparently.

  SOCRATES: So if we find that something is admirable, we’ll also find that it’s good—according to this argument, at least.

  ALCIBIADES: We’ll have to.

  SOCRATES: Well then, are good things advantageous, or not?

  ALCIBIADES: Advantageous.

  SOCRATES: Do you remember what we agreed about doing just things?

  ALCIBIADES: I think we agreed that someone who does what’s just must also be doing what’s admirable.

  SOCRATES: And didn’t we also agree that someone who does what�
��s admirable must also be doing what’s good?

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And that what’s good is advantageous? [d]

  ALCIBIADES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: So, Alcibiades, just things are advantageous.

  ALCIBIADES: So it seems.

  SOCRATES: Well then, am I not the questioner and are you not the answerer?

  ALCIBIADES: It appears I am.

  SOCRATES: So if someone who believed that he knew what is just and unjust were to stand up to advise the Athenians, or even the Peparethians,12 and said that sometimes just things are bad,13 what could you do but laugh at him? After all, as you yourself say, the same things are just and also [e] advantageous.

  ALCIBIADES: I swear by the gods, Socrates, I have no idea what I mean—I must be in some absolutely bizarre condition! When you ask me questions, first I think one thing, and then I think something else.

  SOCRATES: And are you unaware, my dear fellow, of what this feeling is?

  ALCIBIADES: Completely.

  SOCRATES: Well, if someone asked you whether you had two eyes or three eyes, or two hands or four hands, or something else like that, do you think you’d give different answers at different times, or would you always give the same answer?

  [117] ALCIBIADES: I’m quite unsure of myself at this point, but I think I’d give the same answer.

  SOCRATES: Because you know it—isn’t that the reason?

  ALCIBIADES: I think so.

  SOCRATES: So if you gave conflicting answers about something, without meaning to, then it would be obvious that you didn’t know it.

  ALCIBIADES: Probably.

  SOCRATES: Well then, you tell me that you’re wavering about what is just and unjust, admirable and contemptible, good and bad, and advantageous and disadvantageous. Isn’t it obvious that the reason you waver about them is that you don’t know about them?

  [b] ALCIBIADES: Yes, it is.

  SOCRATES: Would you also say that whenever someone doesn’t know something, his soul will necessarily waver about it?

  ALCIBIADES: Of course.

  SOCRATES: Really? Do you know any way of ascending to the stars?

  ALCIBIADES: I certainly don’t.

  SOCRATES: Does your opinion waver on this question, too?

  ALCIBIADES: Of course not.

  SOCRATES: Do you know the reason, or shall I tell you?

  ALCIBIADES: Tell me.

  SOCRATES: It’s because, my friend, you don’t understand it and you don’t think you understand it.