The Israel-Arab Reader

by Walter Laqueur

  For 23 years, we have been talking to our people, motivating them, talking about martyrdom, the honor of martyrdom, and the place of the martyrs. Do the Zionists, or those who encourage them, believe that I, or anyone in the Hizballah leadership, fears martyrdom? We love martyrdom. We take precautions in order to prevent Israel from making any gains. But on the personal level, and as a personal aspiration, each and every one of us hopes to be destined to martyrdom at the hands of those people, the killers of the prophets and the messengers, and most hostile to the believers, as it says in the Koran.

  Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah: Televised Speech (July 26, 2006)45

  After the U.S. secretary of state talked about a new Middle East—in other words, a new American-Israeli Middle East—does anybody believe that such a tremendous plan was born within a day or two, following the Islamic resistance’s capture of two Israeli soldiers?

  Under no circumstances. All the data indicate that there was preparation for the launching of this “new Middle East.” For the past year, at the very least, there was intensive preparation. The Americans and the Zionists believe there are obstacles facing the new Middle East.

  A new Middle East means a region under the control of the American administration, which would exclusively manage its affairs and resources, with Israel as its primary partner. In the new Middle East, the Palestinian issue must be eliminated. In the new Middle East, the Palestinians should accept the crumbs offered to them by Sharon and Olmert. In the new Middle East, there is no room for any resistance movement.

  The main obstacles in the path of the new Middle East are the resistance movements in Palestine and Lebanon, and, on the level of the regimes, mainly Syria and Iran. What is required, then, is to eliminate these obstacles, and to remove them from the path of the historic American plan which is planned for this region. . . .

  For a whole year, direct and indirect American efforts were being made. The Americans followed the internal developments in Lebanon in a clear, detailed, and intensive manner. They had hopes, but, on the internal Lebanese level, their hopes were dashed. It became clear to them that no political force in Lebanon would agree—if we want to use a positive term—or would be able—if we want to use a negative term—to eliminate the phenomenon of the resistance, or the presence of the resistance in Lebanon. . . .

  In the beginning, they hoped that the incorporation of Hizballah into the government, and its engagement in management, jobs, projects, and so on, might make it withdraw from its jihad responsibilities, in which it believes and for which it has sacrificed many martyrs, and follow another path. Even that did not happen. Thus, all internal indications showed that there is no way to eliminate the resistance. In addition, they waited for the outcome of the Lebanese national dialogue, and followed its details, and they reached the conclusion that this goal could not be achieved. . . .

  They reached the conclusion that, in their view, is inevitable: only one element can be relied upon to deal a knock-out blow to the resistance in Palestine, and that subsequently they would act to isolate Syria and Iran, to threaten them, and so on.

  On the basis of this whole analysis . . . they chose an Israeli war and Israeli aggression against Lebanon. The information that we have so far indicates that all the maneuvers of the enemy forces in recent months, especially in the north of occupied Palestine and in its south, seem to have been preparations for the aggression against Lebanon. The planned timing was late September or early October.

  When the operation of capturing the two Israeli soldiers was carried out, the resistance inadvertently—I’m not claiming this was done knowingly— thwarted the more dangerous plan and the worse scenario of a war against Lebanon, against the resistance in Lebanon, and against the Lebanese people. . . . Following the capture operation, the Zionist enemy found itself in a difficult and humiliating situation. It could not bear this blow, and therefore it hastened the war it had planned for September or October. The importance of this lies, first and foremost, in the fact that the enemy lost the element of surprise. . . .

  Indeed, once again it is our destiny, along with all the honorable patriots, to confront this accursed plan, to thwart the goals of this war, to fight the battle to liberate what remains of this land and prisoners, to fight the battle for true sovereignty and true independence, as I have said these last few days. . . .

  I state categorically that under no circumstances will we accept any term that is humiliating to our country, our people, or our resistance. We will not accept any formula at the expense of the national interests, national sovereignty, and national independence, especially after all these sacrifices—no matter how long the confrontation lasts and no matter how numerous the sacrifices may be. Our main and true slogan is “Honor First.” The houses have been destroyed, but, Allah willing, they will be rebuilt. The infrastructure has been destroyed, but, Allah willing, it will be rebuilt. Under no circumstances, however, will we allow anybody to harm our honor. We will never accept any humiliating terms. We are open to political handling and debate of the issue, and we exercise responsibility and flexibility in this matter. But our national interests, our national sovereignty, and our national independence is where we draw the line. . . .

  As I said a few days ago, we are not a classic army, and we do not put up a classic line of defense. We are waging guerrilla warfare. . . . Therefore, what is important in the ground war is the number of losses we inflict upon the Israeli enemy. I say to you: No matter how deep the ground incursion that the Israeli enemy might accomplish—and this enemy has great capabilities in this area—it will not accomplish the goal of this incursion: preventing the shelling of the settlements in the north of occupied Palestine. This shelling will continue, no matter how deep the ground incursion and the reoccupation that the Zionist enemy is trying to accomplish. The occupation of any inch of our Lebanese land will further motivate us to continue and escalate the resistance. The arrival of the army of the Zionists in our country will enable us to inflict more harm on it, its soldiers, its officers, and its tanks. This will allow us a greater opportunity to conduct direct confrontations, and to conduct a war of attrition against this enemy, instead of it continuing to hide behind its fortifications on the international border. . . .

  Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert: Speech to Mayors (August 28, 2006)

  . . . During the last campaign, the Israeli civilian home front was the enemy’s main target. And this is not by chance. Hizballah’s goal was to . . . kill, terrorize with the intention of causing alarm, panic, a public outcry which would paralyze IDF [Israel Defense Forces] activities. . . . They hoped our civilian home front would not withstand it, and they were surprised. The home front withstood it.

  It withstood it, because of the conduct of the citizens in the shelters and workplaces. It withstood it, because of the volunteer spirit and solidarity displayed by Israeli society, which mobilized in its entirety, to help, volunteer, contribute, host, and do whatever was needed. It withstood it, because of your leadership, in your hometowns, among your residents, and because of your wisdom and courage. It is also because of the actions of the government, from the first few days, at the height of a difficult military campaign which was forced on us. The home front stood firm, and because of this, largely, the Hizballah failed in deterring us.

  You remember Nasrallah’s first speech on television, his smugness, his scorn for us, his confidence in his victory.

  I know there are disagreements regarding the level of success, which is perhaps dependent on the level of early expectations. . . . One thing is clear: in Beirut and other capitals in the Middle East, they understood that we are not going to tolerate attacks on our sovereignty, our citizens, and our soldiers. This lesson, which is so important, is one we have learned for ourselves, and the world has also learned it. We saw Nasrallah yesterday say simply in his speech of regret: “If I had known that these would be the consequences—or even 1 percent of them—I would not have ordered the kidnapping
and begun the war.” Very simple.

  If, two months ago, someone would have predicted results like these, we would have said that he was exaggerating.

  What is the situation today? • Hizballah has been pushed back from the . . . border. There are no more Hizballah posts over Manara, Dovev, Avivim, or Margaliot. There are no positions which control the border.

  • Most of the forces on the front line of Hizballah have been destroyed. Hundreds of dead, hundreds of wounded. This force, which trained for years to attack us, was hit hard from the air and on the ground.

  • Most of the long-range missiles, which were the enemy’s strategic threat over Israel, were destroyed in the first hours of the campaign, in a grand campaign by our air force, within 34 hours—a campaign which reminds one of the destruction of the Arab air forces during the Six-Day War and the destruction of the Syrian missiles in the Peace for Galilee war.

  • Hizballah strongholds in Beirut and all its command centers and facilities were destroyed. The heads of the Hizballah are homeless, rootless, hunted and seeking shelter.

  • The Lebanese Army has deployed in the south, on our northern border, in order to prevent the Hizballah from renewing its threat to us, for the first time since the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war 35 years ago.

  • A strong international force, comprised of armies from European countries is organizing to enter Lebanon and assist in stopping the Hizballah.

  • Resolution 1701 is one of Israel’s most important accomplishments in the international arena. If it is fully implemented, our situation along the northern border will be infinitely better than it was on July 12.

  This was not just a war against Hizballah. Hizballah was equipped with the best weapons, missiles, night vision equipment, anti-tank missiles, Katyushas, and every destructive tool possible. Iran and Syria operated all the mechanisms, provided total backup, and were, in fact, the infrastructure and basis which the State of Israel faced during the last month. . . .

  So, is everything good? No. Not everything is good. We suffered heavy losses. It is true that they suffered heavier losses, but this does not console us over the loss of one soldier, one person who was killed, one citizen who died.

  We were not successful in stopping the Katyushas. It must be admitted— we did not, nor did anyone, have a suitable solution to stopping the curved trajectory weapons. Even complete control over the territory did not afford us total immunity. However, it must be remembered that even the Katyushas from Lebanon—like the Kassams [rockets] from Gaza—cannot stop us.

  Most importantly, we have not brought the boys home. The government of Israel, and I as its head, will spare no effort to find them and bring them home. . . .

  It is true, not everything worked as we would have liked. We were not as ready as we needed to be in every place. We did not always achieve the results we hoped for. Not everything worked. There were incidents. There were deficiencies. There were also failures. Even if the overall balance is positive, we cannot ignore the failures, we must not cover them up, we must not overlook anything. We do not have time. We must act quickly. It is my duty, as prime minister, to examine everything, draw conclusions, learn lessons, and fix everything that must be fixed. . . .

  From the first day, we all knew that this war would cost us dearly, on the front lines and on the home front. We knew that we would be exposed to rocket and missile fire directed at population centers. We seriously considered the risks and decided, if not now, when?

  If we had not reacted thus, if we had again restrained ourselves from reacting to this serious provocation to our sovereignty and our citizens’ way of life—it is possible that in a short time, we would awaken to a new reality, immeasurably more difficult, dangerous, and threatening than [what] we dealt [with previously].

  The war in the north did not create new dangers of which we were not previously aware. It obligated us to deal with these dangers without compromise, and before it was too late.

  It was clear ahead of time to everyone that this war would eventually end in the diplomatic step of a cease-fire, because we never intended to stay in Lebanon, and did not want to wallow there for many years as we did in the past. On Wednesday, August 9, the U.S. government informed us that a process was ripening which would bring about a cease-fire under conditions which were acceptable to Israel. . . .

  UN Security Council: Ceasefire Resolution (August 11, 2006)

  Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006), 1680 (2006), and 1697 (2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 (S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35),

  Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in Lebanon and in Israel since Hizballah’s attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons,

  Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,

  Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel,

  Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a United Nations force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces from southern Lebanon,

  Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest,

  Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the Shebaa Farms area,

  Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on August 7, 2006 to deploy a Lebanese armed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of additional forces from UNIFIL as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties,

  Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the conflict,

  Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 1. Calls for a full cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate cessation by Hizballah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations;

  2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in parallel;

  3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon;

  4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line;

  5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant resolutions, for the territorial i
ntegrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949;

  6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, under the authority of the Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon;

  7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for humanitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the Security Council;

  8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the following principles and elements: -full respect for the Blue Line by both parties;

  -security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area;

  -full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State;