Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  The attrition of professional officers and noncommissioned officers continued to demoralize the troops as their faith in Habsburg Supreme Command dissipated.170 Most corps troop numbers now equaled that of a division while their front lines extended twenty-eight to thirty kilometers (XIX Corps’ 29th Infantry Division front alone encompassed sixteen kilometers).171

  Artillery pieces increasingly required repair while enemy action destroyed many others. An hour of strenuous troop effort might gain 1,000 paces, while night brought renewed snowstorms and biting icy winds.172 Too often, disoriented troops marched in circles until exhausted for no gain, and many stragglers collapsed in the snow and froze to death.173 Many wounded did not survive the jarring cart rides down the mountain pathways, while others were abandoned to die on the battlefield. The 42nd Honvéd Infantry Division’s Landwehr Infantry Regiment 28 lost 26 officers and 1,800 enlisted men within two days, many of whom froze to death.174

  Fourth Army finally launched its long-overdue attack on 10 February, but its belated efforts proved too late to save Mezölaborcz.175 After fifteen days of combat, X and VII Corps surrendered the crucial territory and retreated, the corps missions far exceeding the troops’ capabilities.176 Plans to launch a counterattack to recapture Mezölaborcz never materialized because of continued Russian military success.177 Battle-weary troops hurriedly marched from adjacent nonthreatened areas to endangered positions, but they often arrived too late to affect the outcome of battle. Meanwhile, Group Szurmay failed to seize the enemy stronghold of Borynia at the doorstep of Uzsok Pass, while its troop strengths dwindled by half in less than a week, the majority a result of frostbite and exhaustion. Many soldiers collapsed while shoveling snow along the roadways. Some of the few available reinforcements had to assist in maintaining supply-route traffic.178

  Third Army’s desperate situation and the disagreements between Conrad and Boroević prompted Conrad to transfer his more pliable Second Army commander, General Böhm-Ermolli, from the German northern front back to the Carpathian theater. It would deploy between the Third and South armies. Conrad claimed that Third Army (eighteen infantry and three and a half cavalry divisions) had become too large and unmanageable, so he must divide the army’s front into two segments. He planned to transfer six additional divisions to Second Army, while General Böhm-Ermolli would assume command on 15 February and, soon thereafter, launch a new offensive to relieve Fortress Przemyśl.179

  South Army must continue its efforts, but its meager successes cost almost 10,000 men.180 Efforts to envelop opposing positions resulted in the enemy merely extending its flanks, which absorbed the few remaining South Army reserves.181 Three to four rows of barbed wire protected numerous czarist rear echelon positions as well. The opposing front lines were often in such close proximity that it prevented artillery support for the attacking infantry. A newly created XVII Corps had its divisions transferred from Fourth Army to Third Army to assist efforts to recapture Mezölaborcz and halt enemy progress against Third Army. The intervening rugged mountain terrain continued to prevent South Army and Third Army from assisting each other’s efforts. The frozen ground made it impossible to dig trenches, while troops that waded through mountain streams had their wet uniforms freeze on them.182

  Third Army launched its ill-fated offensive on 23 January 1915 with a 135,000-man complement. Two weeks later, on 5 February, official Habsburg sources reported a loss of 89,000 men, a significant number of which suffered from severe frostbite and exposure. Some 30,000 replacement troops reinforced the army during the operation. Individual corps losses proved disturbing. An example of smaller unit casualties, Schutzen Regiment 20 sank from 60 officers and 3,400 men to 9 officers and 250 men after many froze to death. A Landwehr infantry regiment reported a mere 130 troops available for duty. The 2nd Infantry Division incurred 90 percent casualties, sinking to 1,000 men after multiday battle against superior enemy numbers.183 In two weeks, Third Army had sacrificed most its strength (at least half to sickness and frostbite), overextended its front lines, and fatigued its soldiers. Table 3 provides corps troop numbers on 23 January, the number of replacement troops, losses sustained between 23 January and 6 February, and the troop stands on 6 February 1915.184

  V Corps lost most of its men to sickness and frostbite. The 37th Honvéd Infantry Division now numbered 2,000 troops, while X Corps’ 24th Infantry Division sustained 40 percent casualties. The majority of Infantry Regiment 81 casualties were listed as missing in action or captured. The deployment of inexperienced and inadequately trained March Brigade recruits momentarily returned many units to near full strength, but this most recent allotment of cannon fodder, as with their predecessors, proved unprepared for the arduous physical tasks that confronted them. The condition of Infantry Regiment 101 was depicted as “deathlike.” By midnight one night, blowing snow reduced visibility to such an extent that Russian troops approached the regiment lines undetected and launched a bayonet attack against the unsuspecting defenders. Entire companies simply vanished, forcing the meager available reserves to rush forward, but fortunately the Russians again failed to press their advantage. Conrad ordered his battered troops to maintain their positions until the 7 February Fourth Army offensive, which after multiple postponements did not occur until 10 February.185

  As conditions continued deteriorating, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s officers openly complained of war weariness, a clear indication of the seriousness of the situation.186 The Army Group troops could not find shelter in the deep snow and frostbite cases became rampant. No longer able to defend themselves, many soldiers surrendered to the enemy. As much as 90 percent of the Army Group troops had resided in mild climate regions before the war and thus were not acclimated to the harsh winter weather. Worse, most had not been issued suitable winter uniforms or equipment.

  An interesting letter from General Krautwald (X Corps commander) to Conrad emphasized that corps troop numbers had sunk to a dangerous level during the brutal Mezölaborcz battle. The troops had no shelter to protect themselves from the elements, while officer casualties increased troop apathy and reduced unit battle effectiveness. Krautwald warned Conrad that his troops could no longer resist enemy attacks, and he further cautioned that the situation could only worsen if they did not retreat and rehabilitate. However, if the corps continued its present retreat, neighboring units would be threatened with encirclement. He also reported that many of his troops surrendered to the enemy.187

  Between 6 and 16 February, inclement weather conditions continued to negatively affect military operations, and thus no major success occurred at Uzsok Pass. During this time the 106th Landsturm Brigade and VIII Corps’ 21st Infantry Division arrived at the front after several railroad delays. Third Army intended to utilize these troops to launch a counterattack against the enemy. VII Corps had sustained grave losses, while on one front sector, two Honvéd regiments opposed nine enemy units.188 The worsening situation raised the pressing question of where to deploy in-transit VIII Corps troops to produce the most advantage.189

  Anticipating that enemy efforts would continue, Conrad remained adamant that Habsburg attacks continue, regardless of the enemy’s seemingly endless supply of reinforcements. XVII Corps received orders to attack supported by III and VII Corps. For the effort to succeed, XVIII Corps must maintain its positions, even though it had previously been unable to do so. Meanwhile, VIII Corps endured a forty-eight-hour railroad transport with multiple delays to reach the front.190

  Third Army reported further alarming losses and the danger of its front collapsing as XIX and VII Corps continued their bloody retreats. The meager available reserves could not be brought into action quickly.191 On 8 February VIII Corps’ 21st Infantry Division at last launched a counterattack against the enemy troops mauling the VII Corps.192 The Corps’ twenty-five-kilometer front made it difficult for units to maintain liaison in the inhospitable, forested, and snowbound region. Any Russian attack could garner easy success.193 Rising temperatures and melting snow p
roduced flooding in lower elevations. Third Army eastern flank units received orders to assume a defensive posture until the reinforced Second Army deployed and launched a renewed offensive in the near future. Additional divisions should arrive in midmonth, but railroad troop transport continued to experience major delays and stoppages.194

  Artillery shell shortages combined with the lack of regular logistical movement resulted in an order to spare shells. Many batteries simply ran out of them, particularly badly needed high explosive shells, as deliveries faltered on the icy routes.195 This required artillery to fire the far less effective shrapnel shells against the entrenched enemy positions. Numerous inoperable guns continued to be shipped to the rear echelon for repair and returned still malfunctioning, while the extensive use of available weapons led to normal wear and tear to many of them. V Corps command reported fourteen of forty-five pieces defective, while renewed snowfall halted all traffic to the front.196

  On Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front temperatures dipped to −29°C in the Bukovina while deep snow continued to retard all attempts at movement. Telephone connections to its various units were almost nonexistent, and the Army Group’s few available, but obsolete, artillery pieces could not be placed into position. Lacking reserves or reinforcements, the Group’s Landsturm battalions melted away. The worsening situation also produced treasonous behavior among war-weary troops. For example, a Bosnian-Herzegovinian regiment, Infantry Regiment 1, had to be withdrawn from the front lines to be disciplined while the brigade commander refused to accept responsibility for the regiment. Although combat fatigue partially explained the incident of surrendering to the enemy after seven days of constant battle, the regiment nevertheless was transferred out of Pflanzer-Baltin’s ranks.197

  A report relative to the earlier Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry Regiment 2’s serious losses in battle cited professional officer losses, replaced by unqualified reserve officers, to explain the serious casualty rates. Numerous self-inflicted wounds and the unit’s debilitated state prompted a request for ten to twelve competent officers to restore its combat effectiveness.198 On 9 February, warmer temperatures caused mud to replace ice as the main obstacle on supply routes. Two additional Fourth Army divisions were transferred to the Carpathian front as XVII Corps prepared to launch an attack on 10 February. Also, South Army German troops at long last captured the Zvinin heights objective on 9 February, then repulsed a strong Russian counterattack, both sides sustaining considerable losses. One Habsburg regiment counted just 175 survivors.199

  The threat of an Entente naval campaign against the Turks at the Dardanelles also affected the situation. German diplomatic and military pressure on the Habsburgs increased to maintain the neutrality of Romania, Bulgaria, and Italy, even at the cost of surrendering territory to ensure Italy’s neutrality. Conrad, however, maintained his position that no territory should be surrendered to Italy pending the successful conclusion of the Carpathian campaign.

  On 10 February XVII Corps’ belated attack encountered strong Russian resistance after achieving initial slow, painful progress. The failure of adjoining units to provide adequate support for the attack caused the corps to incur heavy casualties as it engaged the enemy in isolated skirmishes between 10 and 14 February. Simultaneously, fierce czarist counterattacks wracked the V, XVIII, and XIX Corps, which resulted in the acceleration of IV Corps’ 31st and 32nd Infantry Divisions’ timetable for the Second Army offensive rail transport.200

  When the X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division flank again suddenly retreated, it exposed the VII Corps flank and rear areas. Many of these exhausted soldiers remained in their positions to await capture by the enemy.201 The Russians pursued the reeling Habsburg troops, an unusual occurrence, capturing many who became cut off or surrounded. These famished troops received no food, and many suffered from severe frostbite.202

  Continued czarist battlefield successes negated any Habsburg Third Army efforts to rectify its situation before Second Army’s offensive operation scheduled for late February. South Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, however, continued their efforts to wear down Russian resistance power.203 The enemy’s supply of manpower appeared inexhaustible as czarist troops launched incessant mass assaults against the hapless defenders.204

  Three thousand exhausted XVIII Corps troops were nearly surrounded while defending a critical fourteen-kilometer front, forcing them to join the retreat. XVIII Corps lacked any reserve formations necessary to counterattack, but Conrad ordered the rattled III and IX Corps troops (Third and Fourth Army inner flanks) to launch an attack on 15 February to support a renewed XVII Corps offensive effort.205 A questionable assumption remained whether Third Army’s reeling eastern flank troops could maintain their positions much longer.

  After XVIII Corps right flank position units had retreated, V Corps surrendered its main supply center, seriously compounding its logistical woes and relinquished some of its San River positions. Renewed enemy pressure at its flank and rear echelon positions threatened to envelop them, and after an overnight retreat, the corps’ supply trains withdrew further rearward. It was essential for the overall military situation that V Corps maintain its positions, but when enemy troops successfully encircled its flank, it also caused the center to buckle. The troops’ resistance capabilities had been so weakened that any enemy attack forced the defenders to recoil before it.

  As Russian artillery fire continued to batter Habsburg defensive positions, they requested the immediate dispatch of any available March Battalion replacement troops. Renewed heavy battle at the Uzsok Pass area underscored the necessity for reinforcements. On 10 February General Kusmanek reported that, if they slaughtered an additional 3,500 horses, the fortress garrison could hold out until 13 March. Approval was granted, but with the proviso that the fortress maintain its offensive capabilities. By 11 February, however, just 600 of the remaining horses could be harnessed to pull artillery, sufficient for just four batteries. The fortress requisition commission seized any hidden provisions it could discover, while foraging outside the fortress perimeter yielded another 10,000 grams of sugar beets, 2,000 grams of root vegetables, and 100 grams of cabbage and other edibles.206

  With Fortress Przemyśl’s situation deteriorating, Second Army’s mission became to liberate the fortress with 52,000 of its soldiers attacking an estimated 37,000 Russians. Seven divisions, four from Fourth Army, bolstered the Third and South armies’ inner flanks while Fourth Army’s mission remained to bind opposing enemy forces. Conrad expected Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin to launch a major offensive, but without receiving sufficient reinforcements. Despite the importance of the army group’s mission, it received just one machine gun and one artillery battery for support. Commanders would have to make do; improvisation ruled!207

  On 12 February, General Böhm-Ermolli arrived at his new headquarters. A day later, Russian forces hurled the hapless V, XVIII, and XIX Corps even further back.208 Lacking any reinforcements, the troops suffered from frostbite, exposure, and other cold-related illnesses resulting in additional significant losses.209 Also, Conrad informed the emperor’s military chancellery that liberating Fortress Przemyśl would be almost impossible, although every effort would be made to accomplish it. Three days later, Franz Joseph urged Conrad to do whatever necessary to prevent the garrison’s surrender. The emperor’s directive reaffirmed Conrad’s decision to launch the second Carpathian offensive.210

  After three weeks of continuous battle, enormous gaps existed in the front lines. Meanwhile, any earlier South Army lust for battle and expectations of victory had dissipated.211 X Corps’ 2nd and 24th Infantry Divisions now numbered less than a full-strength regiment. The continued setbacks necessitated the immediate deployment of VIII Corps’ 9th Infantry Division into the endangered V Corps sector, while its 21st Infantry Division transferred into the X Corps’ front to stabilize the enemy threat in the Laborcz Valley, which weakened the planned Second Army offensive force by an entire corps.

  A sudden onset of wa
rming temperatures again transformed the ground to mud and further delayed all supply movement. By 14 February only the most necessary supplies could be transported. The perpetual shortage of labor detachments aggravated the situation and prompted pleas for assistance. VII Corps Commander Archduke Joseph complained: “Caused by the sudden very mild weather, a huge amount of snow began to thaw. The Ondava River has flooded the entire valley. In the trenches water is one meter deep.”212

  Between 31 January and 20 February Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s polyglot group advanced through its snow-shrouded mountain battle zone, surprisingly emerging victorious onto the Galician plains. On 20 February, after the capture of Stanislau, a two infantry and one cavalry division group advanced to relieve enemy pressure against the South Army’s rear echelon areas and assist its escape from its mountain entrapment. However, intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was transferring substantial reinforcements, indicating preparations to launch a strong counterattack against the Army Group.213

  On 14 February, as poor terrain conditions persisted, XIX Corps rebuffed another fierce enemy attack. The Russians now hurled six to seven infantry divisions, supported by a number of rifle regiments, against the weak corps positions. Battle-weary V and XVIII Corps troops defending the San River line were outnumbered four to one, while further Russian reinforcements worsened the situation.214

  In retrospect, General Conrad’s first Carpathian offensive was doomed to fail. Many warnings about the problems of such an operation had reached Conrad; however, he refused to heed advice from other generals. This included General Falkenhayn, to whom he would be forced to turn when disaster struck. Aside from the unfavorable general conditions, Conrad failed to mass adequate troop strength necessary to succeed. The 175,000-man Third and South Army force proved inadequate to accomplish its mission. Furthermore the Russians, in addition to advantageous defensive positions, possessed more favorable road and railroad connections, thus enabling the rapid deployment of reinforcements. Czarist troops maintained a significant numerical advantage throughout much of the Carpathian Winter War.