Blood on the Snow
Page 15
The Russian army also maintained a tactical advantage and utilized inclement weather to its advantage. Czarist commanders waited for a weak moment in a Habsburg assault to launch a counterattack. Moreover, Habsburg operations suffered from a serious lack of coordination between its attacking forces, partially as a result of the terrain features. Many sources claimed that the adverse weather conditions explain the primary reason for the first Habsburg offensive’s failure. These assertions provided a convenient explanation for many command blunders.
Surrendering the critical railroad Mezölaborcz–Lupkov junction represented a severe setback to the Habsburg objective to rescue Fortress Przemyśl. Any attempts to liberate the fortress were contingent on controlling the major Mezölaborcz two-track transport connections. Thus Conrad must launch an immediate counterattack to regain it, partially as a result of increasing pressure to protect Hungary from invasion and liberate Fortress Przemyśl.
Another reason for the failure resulted from Habsburg Supreme Command’s negligence and inadequate planning. Its armies had not been provided the necessary equipment or preparation time for such a daunting mission. For example, when Group Puhallo advanced into the forty-kilometer gap in enemy lines, defended only by weak cavalry units, it advanced twenty-five kilometers. However, as its lines extended, the group became far too weak to accomplish its mission. Nonetheless, Conrad ordered Puhallo to relinquish a brigade to Group Szurmay to assist its effort to seize Uzsok Pass. An envelopment maneuver might have succeeded, but the Fortress Przemyśl crisis necessitated the attack assume a more direct, frontal approach, and Puhallo lacked the troop strength for such an ambitious mission.
The shortage of reserve forces placed a tremendous strain on surviving troops. Inadequate artillery support and multiple batteries left behind the mountains in the rear echelons helped increase casualty lists. The shortage of artillery shells and lack of mountain artillery pieces, because they had been deployed on the Serbian front, further hampered operations. The enemy’s numerical advantage and more effective artillery arm exacerbated the problem. Apathy, rising frostbite casualties, and the White Death eroded the men’s confidence in their higher commanders.
While attacks were launched in haste, logistical challenges remained insurmountable. The intense physical demands on Habsburg soldiers are incomprehensible. Before reaching the front, the men had to first perform long and exhausting marches under the constant threat of frostbite and the White Death. Lacking food and sleep, and in near-constant battle with both the elements and a forceful enemy, Habsburg troops suffered severe psychological and physical stress.
With the devastation wrought by the first Carpathian offensive fresh in our memory, we now turn to Conrad’s second undertaking in late February 1915.
Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf (left) with his adjutant, Rudolf Kundmann. Imgano/Hulton Archive/Getty Images
Austro-Hungarian troops positioned in the Waldkarpathen. Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS
Habsburg troops advancing on the Carpathian front. Courtesy of Photos of the Great War. http://www.gwpda.org/photos/
Habsburg infantry resting at a Carpathian Mountain pass. Courtesy of Photos of the Great War. http://www.gwpda.org/photos/
Habsburg troops on the firing line in the Bukovina. Courtesy of Photos of the Great War. http://www.gwpda.org/photos/
Russian artillery on the Eastern front. Hulton Archive/Getty Images
Austro-Hungarian ski patrol positioned along a Carpathian Mountain pass. Courtesy of Photos of the Great War. http://www.gwpda.org/photos/
Russian infantry lying in wait on the Carpathian front. Hulton Archive/Getty Images
Troops transporting a machine gun by sled on the Habsburg Carpathian front. Courtesy of Photos of the Great War. http://www.gwpda.org/photos/
Habsburg troops on the snowy Carpathian mountainside. Courtesy of Photos of the Great War. http://www.gwpda.org/photos/
Austro-Hungarian troops take aim on the Carpathian front. Courtesy of Photos of the Great War. http://www.gwpda.org/photos/
Russian General Nikolai Ivanov. Ridpath’s History of the World, vol. 10, Cincinnati, 1921. Reproduced by permission.
3
The Second Carpathian Offensive
Late February–Mid-March 1915
Every mile is two in winter. Emily Dickinson
THE RECENT FAILURE OF THIRD ARMY offensive efforts should have cautioned Habsburg Supreme Command against renewing its Carpathian Mountain winter campaign.1 By all indications, continuing the operation would further debilitate its already weakened army.2 Persistent adverse weather conditions assured that maneuvering in the mountains would be dangerous and reduce troop morale. Despite the dreadful outcome of Habsburg military operations in December 1914 through mid-February 1915, General Conrad insisted on pursuing another Carpathian offensive. What justification did the Habsburg chief of the General Staff offer for his lofty plan? Was it the threat of a Russian invasion into Hungary, the liberation of Fortress Przemyśl, or mounting political pressure to prevent Italian and Romanian intervention? In actuality, all three factors led to Conrad’s fateful decision to launch a second offensive on some of the same terrain, though on a much more limited front. The ill-fated effort would bring the k.u.k. army closer to the brink of annihilation.
In early February 1915, severe winter weather continued to wreak havoc on Habsburg military operations. In a cruel twist of fate, blizzard conditions alternated with periods of sudden thaw, leading one exasperated Habsburg field commander to remark, “It’s as if the heavens are against us!”3 Habsburg army orders and daily corps log entries describe the deplorable travel conditions that prevailed throughout the month of February 1915. Heavy snowfall in the higher elevations blocked key mountain passes. From 20 to 25 February, snow mixed with rain, creating hazardous travel conditions. Numerous major roadways were completely washed away or transformed into pits of mud. Circumstances did not bode well for the movement of troops, supplies, and ammunition—basic requirements for any military operation’s success.
As the launch date for the second offensive approached, the severe weather and terrain conditions became greater causes for concern. Trenches filled with stagnant rainwater and melted snow became the perfect breeding ground for disease. Infantry columns struggled to make their way forward through the mire. Horse-drawn supply trains sank to their axles, and horse cadavers and broken-down wagons blocked the travel routes. Oftentimes, conditions forced entire supply columns to a complete standstill. The entire Habsburg supply system had collapsed before the Second Army received its orders to attack.
In the valleys, unseasonably warm daytime temperatures often fell to below freezing overnight. The extreme temperature fluctuations took their toll on the single-lane roads and trails. The four mountain railroad lines and inadequate Galician roads further slowed the movement of supplies to the troops. In one area of the front, a solitary transport artery was to supply four corps. This shortcoming would have a decisive impact on the outcome of the Habsburg second offensive. Supply routes required constant maintenance. Enormous snowbanks lined both sides of the mountain roads, which prevented the use of side columns for movement. Roads turned to sheets of ice overnight, making travel risky for pack animals and infantry units. The dire conditions forced Habsburg Supreme Command to postpone launching the Second Army offensive for a few days. The delay cost the Habsburg army the crucial element of surprise and granted sufficient time for an effective Russian counterstroke.
The Second Army commander, General Eduard Böhm-Ermolli, disagreed with Conrad’s decision to launch the offensive without delay. Like his predecessor, General Boroević, he favored postponing the attack until weather conditions improved. General Boroević had also advised against taking further offensive action until the critical need for reinforcements had been met and the required troop numbers systematically assembled. This, Boroević explained to Conrad, would prevent unnecessary casualties, something the Habsbu
rg cause could ill afford. It would also provide additional time to improve logistical preparations. Despite these valid arguments, General Conrad insisted the offensive continue as planned. He simply could not risk denuding other war theaters in order to provide additional troops for his offensive endeavor.
General Boroević’s doubts about Conrad’s operational plan were evident from the outset. Experience had taught the wily army commander that if neighboring armies did not advance simultaneously with the main attack force, the outcome would be limited to transitory territorial gains. With the Second Army offensive looming, daily South and Third Army situation reports warned that under the present adverse conditions, military action would be severely impeded.
Artillery support for the infantry attacks, the Achilles’ heel of all three Habsburg Carpathian offensives, remained inadequate and was further hampered by gross transportation and terrain limitations. Improper transport means and poor positioning further reduced the effectiveness of artillery support during the January offensive, while the lack of sufficient artillery batteries had a decisive and negative impact on the outcome of battle. At the very least, greater artillery presence would have had a positive psychological effect on attacking Habsburg troops. However, transporting artillery and ammunition into the mountains became a near-futile effort, leading some field commanders to question whether it was worthwhile. Soon numerous unit commanders would opt to leave some artillery batteries behind the mountain ridges in favor of transporting shells for the available guns. The shortage of suitable wagons and harnesses further limited artillery use. Increased heavy traffic left roadbeds a bottomless pit of mud. Artillery batteries that reached the front lines often remained idle for a long time because poor visibility rendered them useless. To make matters worse, shell supplies often ran out.
On one particular day, a wounded Russian soldier fluent in German was taken prisoner. During interrogation, he was asked his opinion of Habsburg artillery. The Russian POW replied, “Pretty awful! Our artillerists are always joking about how the famous Austrian artillery is only being used as a shield because that’s all it’s good for!”4
The Habsburg army’s inability to rapidly maneuver artillery once it was placed into firing position further stymied efforts to support the infantry, and increased the danger of batteries being overrun if retreat suddenly became necessary. Moreover, Habsburg artillery often proved unreliable and in need of constant repair. Many guns that presumably had been repaired were returned to service still unworkable. Habsburg Supreme Command continued to receive disconcerting reports regarding the poor combat performance of replacement March Brigade units. In critical battle moments, the fighting and resistance power of these ill-prepared troops too often melted away. Meanwhile, once critical reinforcements arrived, Second Army would assume command of present Third Army right flank units for the second offensive campaign.5
The tenuous military situation led to growing concern over the reliability of certain nationalities in the Habsburg ranks. As a consequence of the growing demand for replacement troops, soldiers were now being transferred out of their normal regimental territorial districts to other front-line units. Entities that once shared a common ethnicity became mixed with troops of diverse nationalities. This had a progressively harmful effect on Habsburg army morale and cohesiveness. The myriad of languages spoken at and below the regimental level reduced communication among the officers and their men. This became particularly evident with the arrival of reserve officers, who lacked the language skills of the professional officers they replaced. This often created a volatile atmosphere of mutual mistrust and disrespect. Habsburg Supreme Command received reports of the increasing unreliable performance of once-trustworthy Landsturm units on the battlefield. In growing numbers, battalions and regiments began deserting en masse to the enemy.6 Czech soldiers were particularly suspect, especially to General Conrad. Czech deserters now serving in Russian intelligence units encouraged fellow nationals to desert.7
Adverse weather conditions did not bode well for Conrad’s second offensive effort. Torrential rains on 18 February produced rapid melting of snow and ice. Deteriorating roads and bridges prompted an urgent call for repairs. Field cannon regiments, unable to be positioned behind their respective units, were transferred to rear areas. Valiant efforts to provide field armies with a continuous flow of supplies failed.
Extended periods of heavy rainfall caused rivers to overflow their banks. At some river crossings, high water levels forced troops to cross at bridge overpasses under the threat of enemy fire. Major terrain obstructions caused infantry formations to maneuver at greater distances. At the lifeline of the arriving IV Corps, artillery units and supply trains became stuck in the mud. A twelve-kilometer section of the key supply route was rendered impassable. Similar conditions were soon reported along other connecting routes. Supply trains could no longer advance on a regular basis. On many valley road surfaces, already damaged from previous heavy usage, traffic was reduced to a trickle. On the eve of the second offensive, the danger of all movement coming to a complete halt threatened the launching of the operation.
On 19 February, sections of the bridge connecting the key supply depots and roads leading to the span became impassable. All available cavalry horses and troops formed an improvised supply line that provided frontlines troops with half of the required daily rations. Supplies for XVIII Corps had to be transported by horseback over more challenging terrain, while V Corps supply efforts remained problematic, having to now replace the route lost earlier to the enemy with the loss of Mezölaborcz. Transporting the sick and wounded to rear echelon areas came to a near standstill. Many critically wounded did not survive the jarring ride down the mountains. Many froze to death, if they did not succumb to blood loss first.
Unit reports to Habsburg Supreme Command through 20 February described the enormous time and effort given to rectifying the supply crisis. More than 7,000 civilian workers and prisoners of war assisted in repairing major roads to keep traffic moving. Field commanders cautioned that the offensive should be postponed until the weather conditions improved. Their warnings fell on deaf ears—the liberation of Fortress Przemyśl demanded immediate action!
On 23 February an artillery officer observed, “There is no apparent railroad organization and no preparation. . . . Troops are starving and continue to be mistreated. Trains are not where they are supposed to be, indicative of the constant senseless shifting of rail cars.”8 Simultaneously, surprising Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin victories prompted General Conrad to consider transferring substantial reinforcements to this extreme right flank area to expand the successful advance. However, a single low-capacity railroad line led to this portion of the front with a daily limit of twelve trains. Assembling sufficient troop numbers there would be time-consuming and would require long, exhausting marches through deep snow. Throughout the night into the morning of 21 February, heavy rains fell again, prompting new orders to restore the roads to operating condition.9 The main road to the Cisna area was in particularly poor condition and endangered provisioning for the 27 February offensive undertaking.
Returning to Second Army planning, General Böhm-Ermolli determined to launch his offensive with Third Army units placed under his command. The Second and Third Army’s offensive objective was to recapture Lupkov, thereby regaining access to its narrow-gauge railroad to expedite supply movements and to recapture the transport and communication junction of Mezölaborcz. The main offensive thrust would be launched northward toward Baligrod by an attack group under the command of a Hungarian general, Tersztyánsky. The Second Army offensive direction must coincide with Third Army attempts to recapture Mezölaborcz.10 Until the offensive launch date, newly designated Second Army units (the former Third Army right flank troops) remained in their positions, while six and a half additional divisions received orders to move behind the present front lines. Once combined, these forces would launch a frontal attack against the well-fortified and well-positioned czarist def
ensive positions, preventing egress to the most direct route to Fortress Przemyśl.11
Increasing reports that the Fortress Przemyśl garrison resistance was on the verge of collapse helped spur the decision to launch the second offensive along the shortest route to the fortress. Once the offensive commenced, not a day could be sacrificed. Despite the unfavorable conditions, the besieged garrison must be freed.
What little progress Third Army’s VII and X Corps achieved toward regaining Mezölaborcz between 15 to 18 February came to an end when XVII Corps’ offensive efforts failed and the corps was forced to assume a defensive posture. Meanwhile, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s inadequately armed and trained second-and third-line military units surprised the weak opposing Russian forces in the Bukovina and in southeastern Galicia. In the process, Kolomea fell on 16 February; Czernovitz, the capital city of Bukovina, followed on 17 February; Stanislau on 20 February.12
After capturing Stanislau, Pflanzer-Baltin’s left flank group shifted to relieve enemy pressure against the South Army’s rear area and to assist its escape from the mountains. Indications abounded, however, of the enemy assembling strong forces nearby, signaling the preparation of a czarist counterattack. The enemy quickly reacted to the military threat posed by Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s successes by assembling a new Ninth Army to retaliate. The superior czarist railroad lines enabled the rapid transfer of significant troop numbers to reinforce threatened Russian positions. The Habsburg’s limited railroad situation and extreme time pressure relative to Fortress Przemyśl forced General Conrad to transfer troops to the Third Army right flank area, rather than Pflanzer-Baltin. One of their offensive missions involved drawing additional Russian forces into the mountains to enable Pflanzer-Baltin’s successful efforts to continue.